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The year 2017 will be the one that Australia assumes the duty of 
being  Chair of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KP). 
The  KP  is an international organisation that regulates the world’s 
diamond trade. Diamonds are a symbol of love, purchased to celebrate 
marriage in many parts of the world, but this trade has been linked 
with warfare and human rights violations committed in African 
producer countries such as Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Angola. 
Graphic accounts of murder and mayhem, fuelled by the diamond 
black market, continue to emerge from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Zimbabwe, and the Central African Republic, posing an 
existential threat to the multibillion dollar industry. These human 
rights violations fall under the legal categories of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide, the most serious crimes under 
international law. In response to the grim reality of the blood diamonds 
trade, De Beers and other major corporate players joined with non-
governmental organisations and national governments to create the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in 2002. The objective of the 
Kimberley Process is to distinguish the legitimate rough diamond trade 
from the trade in diamonds linked to serious human rights abuses, 
known as conflict diamonds or blood diamonds. The Kimberley 
Process involves a system of export and import certificates attesting 
to the clean character of rough diamonds, and is backed up by a peer 
review system to monitor compliance. The Kimberley Process has been 
supported through the regulatory action of national governments at 
the domestic level, as well as the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) internationally.
The first research question considered by this book is: to what extent 
has the conflict diamonds governance system achieved its objectives? 
In response, it can be said that the conflict diamonds governance system 
has made significant progress in its core mandate. The quantity and 
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value of the international legitimate diamond industry, once the very 
paradigm of secrecy, has become more transparent through publicly 
available Kimberley Process statistics. Based on these statistics, 
the Kimberley Process estimates that the blood diamond trade now 
constitutes less than 1 per cent of the world’s rough diamond trade. 
However, it has not always been smooth sailing for the Kimberley 
Process, which has recently arrived in particularly stormy waters. 
The  integrity of the system has been endangered by the seeming 
inability of the Kimberley Process to take appropriate action in the face 
of serious non-compliance by three important national government 
stakeholders: Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Commentators are 
asking whether the Kimberley Process lion has forgotten how to roar.
The second research question is: does an application of the networked 
pyramid regulatory model to the system provide descriptive or 
normative insights into its effectiveness? In considering the relative 
success, and the current challenges facing the conflict diamonds 
governance system, important insights may be gained by looking 
at the system with reference to the networked pyramid regulatory 
model. Before applying the model, the book suggests a modification, 
dubbed the dual networked pyramid model (DNPM), whereby the 
micro-regulatory system at the national level is seen as a networked 
pyramid within the greater networked pyramid of the international 
system. The relative success of the Kimberley Process to date, when 
analysed against this theoretical hybrid of network and pyramid 
models, is largely linked to its self-conscious incorporation of insights 
from networks theory. At the international level, the Kimberley 
Process can be seen as the central node, or command centre, in 
which information is gathered, and regulatory action coordinated, 
from networks of corporations, national governments, and non-
governmental organisations. Its relative success to date can largely be 
attributed to a process of socialisation whereby big business and most 
national governments have become key supporters.
It is, however, in the theoretical domain of the regulatory pyramid that 
the Kimberley Process might find a way out of its current deadlock. 
Pyramid theory recognises the primacy of soft power, such as dialogue 
and socialisation, but demands escalation to more coercive measures 
where regulated parties are unresponsive or recalcitrant. It is suggested 
that improved procedures for managing serious non-compliance, 
combined with an agreed pathway to expulsion from the Kimberley 
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Process in such cases, would bring the Kimberley Process into better 
alignment with the pyramid model and help it to move out of the 
log jam in which it currently finds itself. A more defined pathway 
of escalation to the UNSC and the ICC would bolster the ongoing 
efficacy of the conflict diamonds governance system. A recommended 
mechanism for doing this would be to amend the Statute of the ICC 
to include a crime of trafficking in conflict diamonds, to be defined in 
terms of contravening a UNSC diamond embargo.
Beyond breaking the current deadlock, the Kimberley Process has an 
opportunity to reinvent itself by embracing the concept of development 
diamonds. First suggested by non-governmental organisations, this 
label might be applied to diamonds from the informal sector that are 
not merely free from the taint of international crime, but also comply 
with other human rights standards, most notably freedom from child 
labour. A further modification to the DNPM, assisted by insights from 
the pyramid of rewards theoretical model, reveals that the Kimberley 
Process has the chance to systematically ratchet up human rights, and 
health, safety and environmental standards in the artisanal sector, 
thereby buttressing the industry against the return of blood diamonds.
This book is a revised version of a thesis submitted towards the degree 
of Doctor of Juridical Science at The Australian National University. 
I was awarded the degree in July 2012, but the material in the 
manuscript has been updated to reflect developments as at the end 
of December 2015.
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Figure 1: The Dual Networked Pyramid Model as Applied to the Conflict 
Diamonds Governance System
Source: Author’s research .
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It is my hope that this book will contribute to the global debate about 
the blood diamonds problem, and help to stimulate renewed interest 
in safeguarding and improving the lives of the many people affected. 
To do so, I believe we must look beyond economic value to the intrinsic 
value of human life and dignity, which is synonymous with a spiritual 
perspective: 
It is said that in South Africa, a diamond mine is discovered. Although 
this mine is most valuable, yet after all it is stone. Perchance, 
God  willing, the mine of humanity may be discovered and the 





ADFL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo (militia that became the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo)
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(Sierra Leone, rebel militia)
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission
CAR Central African Republic
CDF Civilian Defence Forces (Sierra Leone, 
pro-government militia)
CFCs Chlorofluorocarbons
DDII Diamond Development Initiative International
DNPM Dual networked pyramid model
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DRI Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (India)
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States 
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FNI Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (Front 
for National Integration) (Congo, rebel militia)
FNLA National Liberation Front of Angola (rebel militia)
FRPI Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (Patriotic 
Force of Resistance in Ituri) (Congo, rebel militia)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
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ICC International Criminal Court
IFAC-3 Industry Functional Advisory Committee on 
Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy 
Matters (US)
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KP Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, also 
known as the Kimberley Process
MLC Congolese Liberation Movement
MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(militia which became the Government of Angola)
MRC Mouvement Révolutionnaire du Congo
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
RCB Republic of Congo-Brazzaville
RCD Congolese Rally for Democracy (Congo, rebel 
militia, which later split into three groups: 
RCD-Goma, RCD-National, and RCD-ML)
RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone, 
rebel militia)
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund




UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission Sierra Leone
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPC Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese 
Patriots) (Congo, rebel militia)
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development
WDC World Diamond Council





Alluvial The name of a type of diamond and the type 
of shallow mine it is extracted from, with 
diamonds found in river beds and shallow 
deposits. A form of mine that can be exploited 
by artisanal techniques.
Artisanal miner A small-scale miner of alluvial deposits, whose 
tools are typically simple, such as shovels and 
hand sieves.
The four Cs Colour, clarity, cut, and carat. These four factors 
are considered when valuing a stone.
Carat Unit of measurement of a diamond. There are 
five carats to one gram. Diamonds vary from 
a fraction of one carat up to a very rare couple 
of thousand. In trade, a stone of 60 carats would 
be considered large.
Colour Diamonds come in a wide range of hues, tints, 
and colours. They can be described as whitish, 
yellowish, greenish, brownish, pinkish, bluish, 




Small-scale diamond buyers who act 
as middlemen.
1  Based on Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the 
Angolan Conflict’ (Report, Global Witness Ltd, 1998) 15.




Illegal miners, usually artisanal.
Gem quality The highest quality of diamond, which is 
normally in high demand and commands 
top prices.
Inclusions The particles and matter sometimes found within 
a diamond.
Kimberlite The name of a type of diamond and the type 
of mine it is extracted from, which has deep 
subterranean volcanic pipes.
Mixed parcel A parcel of rough diamonds from more than one 
country.
Parcel A quantity of diamonds, which can vary from 
10 carats up to thousands of carats.
Polished The term used to describe stones when they have 
been worked. Up to 50 per cent of the diamond 
can be lost when polished, depending on the 
shape of the stone.






The shallow tunnel where my colleagues were working collapsed and 
trapped them inside. There was nothing I could do to save them; I had 
to run for my own life. On that night, three people were shot by police 
and died on the field. The following morning, police ordered us to 
bury the three bodies in one of the pits on the field. When I asked 
to dig out my four colleagues, a police officer told me, ‘Consider them 
already buried’.
Artisanal miner in Marange, Zimbabwe1
On 23 June 2011, at Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), civil society delegates staged a dramatic walkout from a meeting 
of the Kimberley Process (KP). At the meeting, the KP chairperson had 
acted to endorse the sale of controversial Zimbabwean blood diamonds 
despite a lack of consensus by KP participants. In a statement issued 
after the walkout, the civil society coalition, representing a range 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), stated:
1  Human Rights Watch interview with Marange artisanal miner R M, Harare, 26 February 
2009, referring to an attack in August 2008, cited in Human Rights Watch, ‘Diamonds in the 
Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe’ (Report, June 2009).
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The agreement between the Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe being 
discussed this week falls far short of what is acceptable to maintain the 
credibility of the Kimberley Process, protect civilians and civil society 
members living and working in Marange or prevent substantive 
quantities of illicit diamonds from infecting the global diamond 
supply chain.2
To better understand why the NGOs walked out of the meeting on 
that day, it is necessary to understand the nature of the Kimberley 
Process, an organisation that was established to tackle the issue of 
conflict diamonds, also known as blood diamonds. Blood diamonds 
constitute a segment of the rough diamond trade that is linked to 
egregious human rights violations in a number of African diamond 
mining countries.3 These diamonds are known as blood diamonds 
because of their connection with groups that have used enforced 
labour, recruited and deployed children as soldiers, murdered and 
raped civilians, amputated the limbs of their victims, and terrorised 
civilian populations, often as part of waging civil war. Although 
diamond-fuelled violence has diminished with the emergence of peace 
in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, there are ongoing concerns 
relating to the war-torn DRC and the Central African Republic.
What has garnered recent international attention more than any 
other blood diamond issue, however, is the violence associated with 
the discovery of diamonds in the Marange region of Zimbabwe. With 
civilian casualties in the hundreds, the brutality of the management 
of the Marange diamond fields by Zimbabwe’s police and armed forces 
has become well known to the international community. What would 
appear to be a clear violation of the KP’s mandate, which is to prevent 
such blood diamonds being traded on the international market, instead 
attracted a different response from the KP. Rather than excluding these 
diamonds from the international market and expelling Zimbabwe from 
the KP, the KP chair controversially acted to mandate the sale of several 
shipments of these diamonds, despite a lack of consensus within the 
2  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘NGOs Walkout of Kinshasa KP Meeting, Consider Options’, 
Other Facets: News and Views on the International Effort to End Conflict Diamonds (No. 35, August 
2011), 1. Available at: www.pacweb.org/images/PUBLICATIONS/Other_Facets/OF35-eng.pdf; 
Gooch, C, ‘Global Witness Founding Director’s Statement on NGO Coalition Walk-Out from 
Kimberley Process Meeting’, 27 June 2011. Available at: www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/
global-witness-founding-directors-statement-ngo-coalition-walk-out-kimberley-process/.
3  It should be noted that the definition of a ‘conflict diamond’ or ‘blood diamond’ was itself 
part of the dispute in the Zimbabwe Marange diamonds dispute. This is discussed in Chapter 2.
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organisation. Concerned that the core mandate of the KP was being 
contravened, the NGOs stormed out of the Kinshasa meeting, although 
they have said that they will remain within the organisation, at least 
for the moment.4 To put it metaphorically, NGOs were wondering 
whether the KP lion had lost its roar. 
The so-called showdown at Kinshasa provides a useful point of 
reference in seeking to analyse and assess the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the Kimberley Process at this moment of institutional 
crisis. The challenges facing the Kimberley Process are particularly 
relevant to an Australian audience, as Australia will take its turn as 
Chair of the KP in 2017. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KP) was established in 2002 as the international community’s primary 
response to the blood diamond problem. It has mobilised the energies 
of civil society, the major corporate players in the rough diamond 
trade, and national governments. The Kimberley Process is a chain 
of custody arrangement, which aims to provide a warranty as to the 
origin of each diamond from the point of mining, through to export and 
polishing, to incorporation in jewellery and final sale to a consumer 
in a retail context. The primary mechanism for this guarantee about 
the origin of the diamonds is the export certificate, which guarantees 
that a package of rough diamonds is conflict-free when it leaves the 
original producer country. Compliance with Kimberley requirements 
is monitored through review visits by delegations, involving 
representatives of civil society, industry, and government. In cases 
of serious non-compliance, the Kimberley Process has the ability 
to suspend or expel a government member, meaning that they are 
excluded from the legitimate rough diamond trade.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the international 
criminal tribunals are the other major players in the conflict diamonds 
governance system. The UNSC has played an important monitoring 
role through its expert committee reports, and has imposed legally 
binding sanctions on diamonds from problem countries in a number of 
instances. It is arguable that the UNSC was the midwife of the Kimberley 
4  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘NGOs Walkout of Kinshasa KP Meeting, Consider Options’, 
Other Facets: News and Views on the International Effort to End Conflict Diamonds (No. 35, August 
2011), 1. Available at: www.pacweb.org/images/PUBLICATIONS/Other_Facets/OF35-eng.pdf; 
Gooch, C, ‘Global Witness Founding Director’s Statement on NGO Coalition Walk-Out from 
Kimberley Process Meeting’, 27 June 2011. Available at: www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/
global-witness-founding-directors-statement-ngo-coalition-walk-out-kimberley-process/.
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Process, facilitating its birth. The international criminal tribunals, 
namely the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), provide a further level of conflict diamonds 
governance. A growing number of international prosecutions by these 
bodies, most notably the Charles Taylor case, have shone a spotlight 
on the role played by conflict diamonds in the perpetration of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.
Research Questions and Main Argument
The walkout at Kinshasa highlights the recent state of crisis that the 
KP finds itself in, almost 13 years after its creation in November 2002. 
Since the creation of the KP, a significant body of articles and reports 
has been written by academics and NGO activists. This has largely 
focused on the blood diamonds problem, the wider context of the 
resources and conflict linkage, and practical evaluations of the KP. 
Only two monographs have been published about the KP to date, the 
insider/practitioner perspective of Ian Smillie in his work Blood on 
the Stone, and the doctoral dissertation in book format of Franziska 
Bieri, entitled From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How 
NGOs Cleaned up the Global Diamond Industry. Bieri’s work involved 
the collation of interview material, and focuses on the role of NGOs in 
identifying the issue of blood diamonds, campaigning on the issue and 
ultimately providing a guiding role in the creation of the tripartite KP.
My book represents an original contribution to the field, as distinct 
from the works of Smillie and Bieri. Smillie presented a practitioner/
insider perspective on the Kimberley Process, while Bieri’s academic 
work focused on the role of NGOs in relation to the Kimberley 
Process. By contrast, my work analyses the KP in the context of other 
international regulatory mechanisms, using an original theoretical 
model (the dual networked pyramid model (DNPM)), which assists 
in understanding its successes thus far, as well as suggesting ways 
in which the system might be improved upon. Other works discuss 
the blood diamonds problem in general, without throwing specialist 
light on the Kimberley Process. In this category is Greg Campbell’s 
work Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most 
5
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Precious Stones.5 By contrast with Smillie and Bieri’s specialist work on 
the Kimberley Process, and the generalist blood diamonds literature, 
my book gives a rigorous overview of both the conflict diamonds 
and regulatory theory literature, provides systematic analysis of that 
literature, and provides theoretical modelling.
The first research question that this book posits is: to what extent 
has the conflict diamonds governance system achieved its objectives? 
In considering this question, the work discusses not only the Kimberley 
Process but also other international institutions that have played a 
central role in conflict diamonds governance — in particular the UNSC 
and the ICC (including its sister tribunals). It seeks to be, arguably, the 
first large-scale work to not only describe the role that each of these 
bodies has played in relation to conflict diamonds governance, but the 
way in which they have interacted, and how these interactions could 
be improved.
In considering the interactions between the major institutional players 
in the conflict diamonds governance system, the book seeks to be the 
first work to apply a theoretical, regulatory model to that system, 
with a view to understanding it better. As such, the book involves 
consideration of a further research question: does an application of 
the networked pyramid regulatory model to the conflict diamonds 
governance system provide descriptive or normative insights into 
its effectiveness? The networked pyramid model suggests that the 
most successful regulatory approaches extend beyond governmental 
action alone, to embrace non-governmental actors such as civil society 
organisations and business entities. It argues that the most significant 
regulatory gains are made through the horizontal techniques of 
dialogue, persuasion, and socialisation. Nevertheless, the model 
recognises that the deployment of vertical coercive interventions may 
be necessary in appropriate circumstances. 
Despite the intuitive applicability of the networked pyramid model, 
it is arguable that modifications to the model may be desirable before 
it can usefully be applied to the conflict diamonds governance system. 
The book suggests two significant modifications to the model that 
result in a so-called dual networked pyramid model. It is dual in two 
senses: firstly, it incorporates regulatory systems at both the national 
5  Campbell, G, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious Stones 
(Basic Books, 2013).
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and international levels, creating a pyramid inside the pyramid that 
models national governments as both regulators and the subjects of 
regulation. Secondly, by incorporating insights from the pyramid 
of rewards, it models both rewards and sanctions in a single model. 
For these reasons, it can be argued that the dual model is well placed 
to generate theoretical insights into a range of complex international 
systems, such as the global intellectual property standards system, 
beyond the application that is the subject of this book.
In relating this model to the conflict diamonds system, the second 
research question considers whether the DNPM provides descriptive 
or normative insights into the operation of the conflict diamonds 
governance system. In particular, it explores whether the reasons for 
the successes or failures of the system can be linked to the way in 
which it incorporates and implements features of the DNPM.
Returning to the first research question, the book, which considers 
developments up to the end of December 2015, argues that a 
significant degree of achievement can be attributed to the conflict 
diamonds governance system. It is argued that the governance system 
has contributed to the diminution of the conflict diamonds trade from 
estimates as high as 15 per cent in the 1990s, when the Sierra Leone 
and Angolan conflicts were active, to less than 1 per cent of the world’s 
rough diamond trade in recent years. When considering the role of the 
Kimberley Process, this relative achievement is due in large measure to 
its ability to enlist the support of the major diamond mining players, 
the vast majority of national governments involved in rough diamond 
production, trading and polishing, as well as committed international 
NGOs. KP has not been an unqualified success, however. The fact that 
Angolan and Zimbabwean conflict diamonds have not been effectively 
filtered out of the legitimate trading system, as well as the opening of 
a smuggling gateway created by Venezuela’s active opposition, show 
that serious challenges remain for the conflict diamonds governance 
system. These problems have arisen through the inability of the KP to 
expel member governments in situations of serious non-compliance. 
It is arguable that they can only be effectively addressed through 
appropriate application of vertical coercive interventions, as suggested 
by the pyramid features of the networked pyramid regulatory model. 
As such, the book recommends that Kimberley Process procedures be 
reformed so as to enable timely and definitive expulsion of recalcitrant 
governments. The work recommends that a new, specific crime of 
trafficking in conflict diamonds be created in the provisions of the 
7
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Rome Statute of the ICC. Such a crime should be defined in terms of 
contravening a UNSC ban on diamond trading and would, it is argued, 
strengthen the conflict diamonds governance system at all levels.
Beyond resolving the initial crisis that the KP finds itself in, it would 
arguably benefit from a renewed mandate, focusing on the concept of 
development diamonds. The book explores these possibilities, with 
reference to not only regulatory pyramid insights, but also insights 
from the incentive-based pyramid of rewards.
Methodology
The methodology deployed by this research projects involves a number 
of stages. The first stage was rigorous review of the existing literature 
concerning the conflict diamonds problem and international legal 
responses to it, as well as applicable literature on regulatory theory. 
The second stage of the methodology was to draw on the existing 
regulatory theory literature in order to develop a new theoretical 
model that might explain how the conflict diamonds governance 
system might, in a descriptive sense, be analysed and understood, as 
well as offering insights, in a normative sense, as to how the system 
might be improved upon.
As part of the first stage of the methodology — collecting information 
about the conflict diamonds problem and international legal responses 
to it — a limited exercise in collecting interview data was undertaken. 
In order to obtain information on the operation of the Kimberley 
Process, a number of standardised questions were presented to 
government, NGO, and industry participants in the Kimberley Process. 
The government participant, the Australian Federal Government, 
provided a written response while the NGO participant, Global 
Witness, and the industry participant, Rio Tinto, responded to the 
questions by means of a verbal interview process. The interviews 
were recorded and a written transcript produced. In relation to all 
three participants, the ethical requirements set out by The Australian 
National University concerning such research were complied with and 
approved by the ANU Research Ethics Committee.
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8
Road Map
This introduction has set out the two research questions to be explored 
by the book, namely: 
1. To what extent has the conflict diamonds governance system 
achieved its objectives?
2. Does an application of the networked pyramid regulatory model 
to the system provide descriptive or normative insights into its 
effectiveness?
This chapter advances the argument that the conflict diamonds 
governance system has made modest gains, but has failed in its 
efforts to address situations of serious non-compliance by member 
governments. In accordance with insights from the networked 
pyramid model, the book argues that procedures for expulsion in such 
cases must be clearly defined and implemented, and that pathways 
of escalation to the UNSC and the international criminal tribunals 
should be strengthened through the creation of a new international 
crime of trafficking in conflict diamonds. It also sets out a road map 
by summarising in brief the contribution of each chapter towards 
responding to the research questions, and advancing the main 
argument of the work. It also provides a more detailed introduction 
into the substantive chapters of the book.
The second chapter briefly outlines the history and features of the 
legitimate diamond trade, before turning to the problem of conflict 
diamonds. It discusses the definition of conflict diamonds, also known 
as blood diamonds, before detailing the connection of this trade to 
human rights violations and armed conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, 
the DRC, and Côte d’Ivoire.
The third chapter, which discusses the Kimberley Process, is the 
first of three chapters dealing with the conflict diamonds governance 
system. It discusses the operation of the Kimberley Process at the 
international level, including its procedures for accepting new 
members, monitoring through peer review, and dealing with situations 
of serious non-compliance. It also considers the particular roles played 
by NGOs and industry. The fourth chapter is concerned with the 




The UNSC and international criminal tribunals, the other components 
of the conflict diamonds governance system, are discussed in the 
fifth chapter. The monitoring role of the UNSC expert committees 
is discussed, as is its ability to take enforcement action through the 
imposition of diamond trading sanctions. The track record of the Sierra 
Leone Special Court and the ICC in prosecuting conflict diamonds 
cases is then discussed. The book notes that conflict diamonds were 
discussed in three ways in the emerging jurisprudence: as context for 
the commission of crimes, as being connected to crimes in the process 
of mining, and as providing a mechanism of indirect liability between 
high leadership and direct perpetrators on the ground.
The networked pyramid regulatory model is the subject of the sixth 
chapter, which discusses the utility of using a regulatory approach, 
before discussing the features of network models and pyramid models. 
The networked pyramid hybrid model is then discussed, combining as 
it does the dialogic and socialisation elements of network models with 
the ability to ratchet up to more coercive interventions in appropriate 
circumstances.
Before applying the networked pyramid model, the seventh chapter 
suggests two major modifications so as to optimise its utility in relation 
to the conflict diamonds governance system. The first modification, 
depicting regulation at the national level as a pyramid within the greater 
international pyramid, attempts to capture the complexity of a regulatory 
system that operates simultaneously at national and international levels, 
and in which national governments are both regulators as well as the 
subjects of regulation. A further modification, showing incentives and 
sanctions as part of a single model, allows interactions between the two 
regulatory ratchets to be more clearly observed.
The DNPM is applied to the conflict diamonds governance system 
in Chapter 8. In this chapter, the two central research questions are 
discussed in depth and responded to. It  is  argued that the conflict 
diamonds governance system has made progress towards its goals, 
noting  that the conflict diamonds trade has reduced to less than 
1  per  cent of the international diamond trade, and that peace has 
emerged in Angola  and Sierra Leone, both countries that were 
previously affected by the problem. The contribution of the UNSC and 
the international criminal tribunals is also noted. The chapter notes, 
however, the failure of the Kimberley Process to respond to serious 
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non-compliance by  three of its government members — Zimbabwe, 
Angola, and Venezuela — and pyramid theory is recommended as 
a way forward in these cases. If  the KP can extricate itself from its 
current crises, a further horizon beckons, in which a potential extended 
mandate might focus on the concept of development diamonds, 
which are free not only of the taint of conflict and international 
crime, but a further range of human rights ills. Diamonds mined and 
polished without the use of child labour, for example, might qualify 
for voluntary certification, thereby opening a door to fair trade 
markets in the developed world. Chapter 9, the final chapter, gives 
a recapitulation of the book, lays out a  range of recommendations 
for possible adoption by parties involved in the conflict diamonds 
governance system, and suggests areas for further research.
The Conflict Diamonds Problem
In the period following the end of the Cold War, it has become 
commonplace to observe that the nature of warfare has changed from 
being predominantly international in character to intranational. 
The two world wars, paradigms of clashes between nation states, have 
given way to conflicts between component populations of nations, 
such as occurred in the early 1990s with the collapse of the former 
Yugoslavia and the resurgence of ethnically based conflict in Rwanda.6 
Concomitant with these conflicts has been the perpetration of human 
rights violations of sufficient scale and severity to merit the use of 
the terminology of international criminal law — namely war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide. Another feature of modern 
conflict has more recently come to the attention of academics and the 
international community more broadly. This feature is the connection 
between natural resources and conflict, which has been dubbed the 
‘resource curse’.7 
6  Dallaire, R, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Random House 
Canada, 2003) 40–41, 516–517; Kofele-Kale, N, ‘The Global Community’s Role in Promoting the 
Right to Democratic Governance and Free Choice in the Third World’ (2005) 11 Law and Business 
Review of the Americas 205, 215.
7  Le Billon, P, ‘The Geopolitical Economy of “Resource Wars”’ in P Le Billon (ed.), The Geopolitics 
of Resource Wars: Resource Dependence, Governance and Violence (Frank Cass, 2005) 1–28.
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Whether one considers the connection between the oil trade and 
conflict in Sudan and Iraq, or the association between illegal drugs 
and warfare in Colombia and Afghanistan, the resource curse has 
been blamed for the instigation and perpetuation of conflict and 
gross human rights abuses. Of primary concern has been the fact that 
belligerent parties, often insurgent groups, have had their armaments 
funded through proceeds from these commodities.8 In the context of 
the African continent, the resource curse has manifested itself through 
the trade in rough diamonds. Diamonds used to fund the perpetration 
of warfare and human rights violations by insurgents are now known 
as conflict diamonds or blood diamonds.9
African conflict diamonds were brought to the attention of the 
international community as a result of the war in Angola, which 
commenced with independence from Portugal in 1975 and continued 
until 2002.10 During the course of the conflict, the rebel group National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) took control over 
all of the major diamond-producing areas of the country. The ceasefire 
of 1991–92 provided UNITA with the opportunity to sell much of 
its large harvest of rough diamonds on international markets, using 
the proceeds to purchase armaments in anticipation of a resumption 
of the conflict.11 The non-governmental organisation (NGO) Global 
Witness at this time was monitoring the situation and, in particular, 
the annual reports of the South Africa–based diamond mining giant 
De Beers Corporation. It was well known that De Beers had a standing 
policy of buying out as much of the global diamond production as it 
could manage, and the period 1991–92 was no exception. The logical 
8  Ross, M, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?: Evidence from Thirteen Cases’ 
(2004) 58 Winter International Organization 35, 35–67; Banat, A B, ‘Solving the Problem of Conflict 
Diamonds in Sierra Leone: Proposed Theories and International Legal Requirements for Certification 
of Origin’ (2002) 19 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 939, 939–973.
9  Dunn, K C, ‘Identity, Space and the Political Economy of Conflict in Central Africa’ in 
P Le Billon (ed.), The Geopolitics of Resource Wars: Resource Dependence, Governance and Violence 
(Frank Cass, 2005) 151–153, 242–279; Tailby, R, ‘The Illicit Market in Diamonds’ (2002) 218 
Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1, 1–6; 
Saunders, L, ‘Note: Rich and Rare are the Gems they War: Holding De Beers Accountable for 
Trading Conflict Diamonds’ (2001) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 1402.
10  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 8-11; Kaplan, M, ‘Junior 
Fellows’ Note: Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace through the Diamond Trade’ (2003) 35 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 559, 573–578.
11  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 8–11.
THe LIoN THAT DIDN'T RoAR
12
conclusion, which was not denied by De Beers, was that diamond sales 
during the period were going directly or indirectly into the coffers of 
UNITA, providing funds for the purchase of armaments. By the close 
of the war in 2002, the conflict had resulted in the loss of up to one 
million lives.12
In 1992, when, for much of the time, the majority of the diamond areas 
were controlled by UNITA, De Beers stated:
That we should have been able to buy some two thirds of the increased 
supply from Angola is testimony not only to our financial strength but 
to the infrastructure and experienced personnel we have in place.13
Significantly, De Beers confirmed the nature of its Angolan business 
practices in written testimony to a hearing on conflict diamonds held 
before the United States Congress in May 2000:
De Beers believes that to regard as ‘conflict diamonds’ all diamonds 
emanating from areas of Angola which were from time to [time] under 
UNITA control during this period [the Angolan civil war] muddles 
history to make a dubious point. De Beers makes no secret of the fact 
that during this period it purchased Angolan diamonds on the outside 
market, although it never at any stage bought diamonds from UNITA 
itself these purchases were made in good faith and under normal and 
customary market terms.14
Diamonds became associated not only with conflict but also the 
perpetration of egregious human rights violations in the context 
of the Sierra Leonean civil war of 1991–2002.15 The Revolutionary 
12  Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan 
Conflict’ (Report, Global Witness Ltd, 1998) 6–8; Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: 
Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal 
of Global Trade 1, 8.
13  De Beers Diamond Jewellers Ltd, ‘Annual Report’ (1992) cited in Global Witness, ‘A Rough 
Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict’ (Report, Global Witness 
Ltd, 1998) 8.
14  De Beers Diamond Jewellers Ltd, ‘Written Testimony before the United States Congress, House 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa’, Hearing into the Issue of ‘Conflict 
Diamonds’ (25 May 2000). Available at: www.diamonds.net/fairtrade/Article.aspx?ArticleID=4046. 
The oral testimony of witnesses appearing before the committee is available at: www.fas.org/asmp/
resources/govern/hrgdiamonds.htm. De Beers was not represented in person due to an ongoing 
legal dispute with the US Government over alleged monopolistic corporate practices. Bieri, F, From 
Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2010) 46.
15  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 13–16.
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United Front (RUF), based away from the coast in the Kono district, 
was notorious for the practice of amputating the hands and feet of 
civilians as a technique of intimidating the local population. The RUF 
was allegedly supported by the government of neighbouring Liberia, 
and had its activities funded through the exploitation of Sierra Leone’s 
alluvial diamond fields.16 Large-scale media campaigns organised by 
groups such as Global Witness highlighted the connection between 
diamonds sold to consumers in New York and London and the arming 
of militia in Sierra Leone, leading to consumer boycotts and ultimately 
to legal action at national and international levels.17 Particularly 
noteworthy have been the passage of a series of UNSC resolutions 
imposing diamond trading prohibitions on Angola, Sierra Leone, and 
Liberia. A related development was the creation of the Kimberley 
Process, an effort by government, business, and NGOs to provide a 
system of import/export licences so as to distinguish the legitimate 
trade in diamonds from the illegal trade.18
The conflict diamonds problem is not only of historical interest, but 
presents an ongoing and pressing contemporary challenge. As well as 
the Zimbabwe Marange diamonds issue, ongoing fighting in the DRC, 
and the recent civil war in Côte d’Ivoire have both been exacerbated 
by the trade in conflict diamonds. These challenges have proven 
to be something of a litmus test as to the effectiveness of the new 
legal mechanisms for the control of conflict diamonds. Côte d’Ivoire 
has been the site of a conflict bearing a striking resemblance to the 
Sierra Leone/Angolan precedents, in that insurgent groups largely 
captured the northern diamond-rich sector of the country. Diamonds 
in the DRC have proven to be one of a number of resources that 
have extended conflict by rebels and national governments in that 
country, particularly in its north-eastern provinces. Unfortunately, 
human rights abuses have characterised both conflicts to date. 
16  Ibid 13; Kaplan, M, ‘Junior Fellows’ Note: Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace 
through the Diamond Trade’ (2003) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 559, 568–570.
17  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 30–36.
18  SC Res 1173, UN SCOR, 3891st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998) (Angola); SC Res 
1306, UN SCOR, 4168th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000) (Sierra Leone); SC Res 1343, 
UN SCOR, 4287th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1343 (7 March, 2001) (Liberia); Kimberley Process, 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002).
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Nevertheless, it has been possible to see that the international system 
in both cases has assisted in denying access to international markets 
for diamonds originating from these rebel-held regions.19
The Conflict Diamonds Governance System
An understanding of the nature of governance responses to the conflict 
diamonds problem also requires an understanding of the nature of 
the international diamond trade itself. At the exploration stage, 
diamond deposits themselves are normally described as being either 
alluvial or kimberlite in nature. Alluvial diamond deposits are those 
that, by virtue of an existing or historical river system, have become 
scattered through the topsoil over a given area and are accessible 
without the need for expensive or sophisticated diamond mining 
equipment. By contrast, kimberlite deposits are buried deep below 
the surface of the earth, are concentrated deposits, and require the use 
of expensive, sophisticated mining equipment, making it a capital-
intensive industry that is less intrinsically vulnerable to the efforts of 
technologically unsophisticated insurgents. There are four main types 
of countries that are component parts of the international diamond 
trade: producer countries involved in mining rough diamonds; rough 
diamond wholesale trading centres such as the UK and Belgium; 
polishing/cutting countries that prepare rough diamonds for sale; 
and market countries where diamond products, such as jewellery, 
are sold to consumers. It is clear that the diamond industry is 
highly internationalised and reliant on numerous international trade 
connections to be effective.20
The principal response to the problem of conflict diamonds has 
been the Kimberley Process. This system emerged through tripartite 
cooperation between business, government, and NGOs with a view 
to  distinguishing the legitimate diamonds trade from the conflict 
19  Final Report Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146 (16 October 
2002); Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Security Council 
Resolution 1584 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2005/699 (7 November 2005).
20  Global Witness, ‘Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and 
Control of Diamonds’ (Report, June 2000), Section 1 ‘The Structure of the Diamond Industry’; 
Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 30–36.
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diamonds trade. Naturally, when divorced from conflict situations, 
the  diamond industry has the potential to be a powerful driver 
of economic and social development on the African continent. 
The Kimberley Process focuses on a system of export certificates, 
through which participant governments certify the legitimacy of 
the diamonds at the point of export. Importing governments are 
mandated to seize unlawful imports and take other action, including 
domestic prosecution, against non-compliant traders. Certification 
also allows for statistics to be kept regarding the quantity of rough 
diamonds traded between countries, allowing estimates of the annual 
diamond trade.21
The Kimberley Process also establishes a system for ensuring that 
governments take their obligations under the process seriously. 
In  particular, the Kimberley Process includes a Participation 
Committee and a Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring Committee 
is mandated to consider annual reports by member nations, as well 
as organising review visits to nations to assess their compliance with 
the international system. The Participation Committee is charged with 
considering applications by countries wishing to join the Kimberley 
Process, as well as taking punitive action against states in the event 
of serious non-compliance, where this is evident pursuant to the 
investigations made by the Monitoring Committee.22
Beyond the sphere of the Kimberley Process, and predating its 
formation, the UNSC has played a pivotal role in combating the trade 
in conflict diamonds. In response to the role of conflict diamonds 
in the Angolan conflict, the UNSC passed Resolution 1173 of 1998, 
which was the first international trade ban on the diamond trade, in 
response to the link of that trade with conflict. The UNSC further 
intervened to impose trade bans on both Sierra Leone and Liberia, the 
latter when it came to light that it was being used as a conduit country 
for smuggling diamonds of Sierra Leonean provenance. The UNSC has 
also passed resolutions concerning conflict diamonds in response to 
the situation in the DRC, and, significantly, demonstrated its capacity 
21  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002).
22  Ibid.
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to respond in a collaborative fashion by imposing sanctions in 2005 
after the Kimberley Process had imposed a trade ban on Côte d’Ivoire 
diamonds.23
A final response to the problem of conflict diamonds has come 
from the emergent institutions of international criminal justice. 
The earliest precedents of financial contribution to the perpetration 
of international crimes goes back to the Nazi war crimes cases of Flick, 
Farben and Krupp at Nuremberg in the aftermath of World War Two.24 
The jurisprudence of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ developed by the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals since the mid-1990s now provides a 
coherent legal framework for bringing such individuals to account.25 
While the ICC, established under the 1998 Rome Statute, has alluded 
to the possibility of persons complicit in the conflict diamonds trade 
being brought to account, the most important breakthrough has been 
made by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has put on trial the 
former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, for his role in the conflict 
diamonds trade as it related to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).26
The Networked Pyramid Regulatory Model
Concurrent with the recognition of the challenge posed by the 
conflict diamonds trade, there have been trends within academia to 
develop models for evaluating the effectiveness of legal systems for 
23  SC Res 1173, UN SCOR, 3891st mtg, S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998) (Angola); SC Res 1306, UN 
SCOR, 4168th mtg, S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000) (Sierra Leone); SC Res 1343, UN SCOR, 4287th mtg, 
S/RES/1343 (7 March, 2001) (Liberia); SC Res 1457, UN SCOR, 4691st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1457 
(24 January 2003) (Democratic Republic of Congo); SC Res 1643, UN SCOR, 5327th mtg, UN Doc 
S/RES/1643 (15 December 2005) (Côte d’Ivoire).
24  Trials of Nazi War Criminals before the Neurnberg Tribunals under Control Council Law 
No  10: Neurnberg October 1946–April 1949, Volumes V, VI, VII, VIII, IX (United States 
Government Printing Office, 1952). Reproduced at: www.phdn.org/archives/www.mazal.org/
NMT-HOME.htm.
25  The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) 227–228; The Prosecutor 
v Brdjanin (Appeal Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-99-36-A, 3 April 2007) 110–141.
26  International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor on the Co-operation 
with Congo and other States Regarding the Situation in Ituri, DRC (26 September 2003); 
‘Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 29 May 2007); Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence 
of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 7 January 2008).
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responding to such challenges. Such approaches often go beyond 
a purely legal analysis into the area of regulatory theory. Regulatory 
theory is distinguished from legal analysis by assessing whether legal 
systems actually achieve desired social outcomes, and involves the 
development of models that, when applied, can increase the ability of 
systems to achieve their desired outcomes.27
Two models from the field of regulatory theory, the network model 
and the pyramid model, stand out for their potential application in 
relation to the conflict diamonds governance system. Network models, 
such as the regulatory web or the horizontal government network, 
emphasise regulatory techniques based on persuasion, dialogue, and 
socialisation. These models provide for dynamic interaction with 
non-governmental participants such as business organisations and 
civil society organisations, and encompass organisations such as the 
International Labour Organization, which has formalised but largely 
private processes of naming and shaming, which create a socialisation 
pressure tending towards normative compliance.28 
Another model, the regulatory pyramid, was first developed by Ayres 
and Braithwaite to explain the ways in which regulatory standards 
for a particular industry may best be enforced when considered 
within a particular national jurisdiction. The model is useful in that 
it does not take an either/or approach to the two conflicting schools 
of regulatory thought: industry self-regulation, and command-and-
control regulation. The industry self-regulation school seeks to use 
soft compliance options involving the engagement of industry to 
promote best practice outcomes. Rather than imposing a regime 
from an external source on a particular industry, such approaches 
seek to empower the industry itself to recognise its own interest in 
complying with particular regulatory goals. By contrast, so-called 
command-and-control systems are imposed from government entities 
beyond the industry itself, using instruments such as criminal 
prosecution to forcefully bring industry players to account against 
government legal standards. The regulatory pyramid model seeks 
to marry these two seemingly disparate systems by suggesting that 
27  Black, J, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, vol. 27, 
2002, 20.
28  Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) 11, 14, 19, 21, 24, 
56, 147, 156, 261, 262. 
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industry self-regulation approaches should be implemented as far 
as practicable in the absence of command-and-control. As long 
as this approach based on soft regulation is successful, there is no 
imperative to change the regulatory dynamic. However, the sensible 
external regulator will be engaged in careful monitoring of the system 
for signs of disrepair, at which point sanctions can be ratcheted up 
and command-and-control can take over as the central regulatory 
approach. Assuming heavier sanctions such as civil sanctions or fines 
are successful, and new signs of responsiveness are observed within 
the industry, sanctions might be ratcheted back down to the status of 
self-regulation. In the event that compliance is still not forthcoming, 
more severe strategies might be resorted to, such as criminal sanctions 
or the dissolution of the corporation. The keystone of the pyramid 
is that its strategy is to be contingently punitive or forgiving.29
More recent thinking in regulatory theory has sought to bring 
together the salient features of both network and pyramid models to 
create so-called networked pyramid hybrid models. The networked 
pyramid hybrid combines network features, such as expanding 
beyond government players and the focus on techniques of dialogue, 
persuasion, and socialisation, with pyramid features, which allow 
for escalation to more coercive interventions where dialogue has 
proven ineffective. Such modelling has been applied to international 
regulatory systems, such as the regulatory export of intellectual 
property standards from the US to other national governments, the field 
of traditional knowledge as well as the development of the threat of 
collective debt default by developing countries as a regulatory weapon 
of the weak.
Adaptation and Application 
of the Networked Pyramid 
Before applying the networked pyramid model to the conflict diamonds 
governance system, the book suggests that it might be modified in 
a number of ways for optimal effect. Firstly, a complex system such as 
this would benefit from a model that could describe regulatory action 
29  Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 20–51.
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at international and national levels, where national governments are 
regulators as well as being regulated. As such, a diagram involving 
a smaller series of national pyramids at the base of a larger international 
pyramid is suggested. Furthermore, it is suggested that a regulatory 
model could benefit from the combination of incentives and sanctions 
in a single diagram, particularly with reference to the interaction 
between both sets of interventions. In summary, the revised model is 
a dual networked pyramid, with the duality being found both in the 
fact that there is a pyramid within the pyramid, and the combination 
of sanctions and incentives.
Applying the networked pyramid model to the conflict diamonds 
governance system provides insights into the analytical power of the 
model and the areas of potential improvement that might be made 
to the conflict diamonds system. It is useful, in the first instance, 
to consider whether the conflict diamonds governance system 
corresponds descriptively with either or both of the two component 
models — that is, the degree to which it already embodies the features 
of a regulatory pyramid or a network. In the event that the legal 
system is not a perfect fit on the descriptive level, the question to 
be considered is what changes would need to be made to the system 
to make a better correspondence with the theoretical model. In the 
event that these changes would appear to make the conflict diamonds 
system a more effective system, the models might be considered to be 
normatively powerful.
The models may be of particular utility in refining the relationship 
between regulatory actors in the conflict diamonds system, where 
there is little or no formal institutional linkage, for example between 
the KP, the UNSC, and the ICC. However, one of the particular 
challenges in considering the conflict diamonds legal system is that 
it operates both at the national or domestic level, where the apex of 
the system is the national government, and at the international level, 
where the principal regulators are other national governments and 
international agencies. As such, it may be that a particular model 
being considered may be a good fit at the domestic level but not at the 
international level.
While being based primarily on an analysis of existing literature 
in the fields of conflict diamonds and regulatory theory, the book 
has also involved a limited exercise in the gathering of primary 
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data. A representative from the business community, a government 
representative and an NGO representative were all interviewed 
in relation to their own views on the effectiveness of the conflict 
diamonds legal system at tackling the illicit diamonds trade. The 
interviews were carried out according to standard university ethical 
procedures, and the qualitative results from the interviews have been 
incorporated into the body of the book.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has sought to introduce the book and provide an 
overview. After some preliminary remarks, the two research questions 
were set out:
1. To what extent has the conflict diamonds governance system 
achieved its objectives?
2. Does an application of the networked pyramid regulatory model 
to the system provide descriptive or normative insights into its 
effectiveness?
The chapter also set out the central argument of the book, that the 
conflict diamonds governance system has been largely successful, 
but has failed in its efforts to address situations of serious non-
compliance by member governments. In accordance with insights 
from the networked pyramid model, the book argues that procedures 
for expulsion in such cases must be clearly defined and implemented, 
and that pathways of escalation to the UNSC and the international 
criminal tribunals should be strengthened through the creation of 
a new international crime of trafficking in conflict diamonds. The 
chapter also delineated a road map for the book, summarising in brief 
the contribution of each chapter towards responding to the research 
questions, and advancing the main argument of the book. It also 




Are Conflict Diamonds Forever?: 
Background to the Problem
There were more than thirty boys there, two of whom, Sheku and 
Josiah, were seven and eleven years old … ‘It seems that all of you 
have two things in common’, the soldier said after he had finished 
testing all of us. ‘You are afraid of looking a man in the eye and afraid 
of holding a gun.’
Ishmael Beah, former child soldier with the RUF1
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the nature and parameters of the international 
legitimate diamond trade, before distinguishing it from the conflict 
diamonds trade. The definition of conflict diamonds, also known as 
blood diamonds, is discussed. The chapter discusses the role of conflict 
diamonds in exacerbating armed conflict and human rights violations 
in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
and Côte d’Ivoire, before giving brief concluding remarks. A strong 
understanding of the nature of the conflict diamonds problem is 
essential to any meaningful attempt to respond to the two research 
questions, which seek to evaluate the effectiveness of the global 
response to the problem, and how this response might be improved, 
with reference to the networked pyramid regulatory model.
1  Beah, I, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (Sarah Chrichton Books, 2007).
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The Mainstream Diamond Trade
The mainstream trade in rough or unprocessed diamonds is a 
multinational, multibillion dollar industry that, until very recently, 
has resisted modern trends towards transparency in its dealings. 
Diamond production in the legal industry during 2006 was valued 
at US$11.5 billion, representing 176.7 million carats, where each 
carat is 0.2 grams in weight. Global diamond imports were valued at 
US$37.7 billion, representing 500.5 million carats, and exports were 
valued at US$38.4 billion, representing 514.2 million carats.2
The diamond industry has been dominated by the De Beers 
corporation for more than 100 years. De Beers produces about half 
the world’s rough diamonds, calculated by value, and regulates world 
prices for unprocessed stones by purchasing and stockpiling up to 80 
per cent of the world’s rough diamond output.3 Diamonds are sorted 
in London into approximately 5,000 categories by size and quality. 
Most diamonds are then distributed to dealers in Antwerp, where the 
majority of rough diamond trading occurs. Other major centres are 
London, Lucerne, New York, Tel Aviv, Johannesburg, Bombay, and 
Dubai. The cutting and polishing of diamonds occurs in approximately 
30 countries, including India, South Africa, Botswana, Russia, China, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, and Mauritius. A diamond would have 
been traded several times before arriving at one of the major jewellery-
making centres located in Israel, Belgium, India, and New York.4 
Connected to the virtual monopoly exercised by De Beers, diamond 
transactions have neither been subject to the rigour of tough 
competition, nor strictly regulated by governments. Reliable statistics 
regarding the quantity and value of the rough diamond trade in recent 
decades are hard to come by. In 1998, for example, the Government 
of Sierra Leone recorded that 8,500 carats of diamonds were exported 
to Belgium, whereas records in Belgium indicated that 770,000 carats 
2  Kimberley Process Secretariat, Annual Global Summary: 2009 Production, Imports, Exports 
and KPC Counts (Annual Report Summary, 7 August 2010).
3  Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan 
Conflict’ (Report, Global Witness Ltd, 1998) 5–6.
4  Global Witness, ‘Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and 
Control of Diamonds’ (Report, June 2000), Section 1 ‘The Structure of the Diamond Industry’; 
Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 30–36; Transcript of 
Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 7 January 2008) 522.
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were imported that year from Sierra Leone. The discrepancy may be 
attributed to a combination of diamonds being exported without 
the knowledge of Sierra Leone, and also a tendency in Belgium not 
to rigorously investigate information provided to it regarding the 
country of export. To take another example, a United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) investigation found that the addresses of Liberian 
companies appearing on Liberian export invoices in Antwerp, when 
investigated in Liberia, did not house actual company offices. In the 
case that postal mail was directed to the company, courier companies 
had been instructed to redirect the mail to the Liberian International 
Shipping and Corporate Registry.5
Identifying a country of origin for particular diamonds was made 
harder by the fact that the Antwerp record-keeping system, as well as 
other systems, identified only the country of last export, rather than 
the country of origin of the diamonds, thereby obscuring attempts 
to discriminate between the legitimate and black-market trades.6 
The initial reluctance to confront the conflict diamonds problem by 
industry players can largely be attributed to this lack of transparency, 
and consequent reluctance to share information freely. It might be 
noted that the illegal trade in diamonds includes not only the conflict 
diamonds trade, but also other forms of smuggling aimed at tax 
avoidance or money laundering.7 
The success of the diamond industry has largely ridden on its 
advertising approaches. Diamonds have become the most legitimate 
and acceptable symbol of marital engagement. In the 1930s, De Beers 
promulgated this image to recover dwindling sales in the Great 
Depression. Eighty per cent of engagements in the United States 
were consecrated with diamond rings by 1950, after the Diamonds 
Are Forever campaign. The United States and Europe are the largest 
consumer markets for diamond jewellery, representing about 
65 per cent of the global market, while the demand from the Chinese 
market is rapidly expanding.8
5  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008) 543–544.
6  Smillie, I, L Gberie and R Hazleton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and 
Human Security’ (Report, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000) 6.
7  Saunders, L, ‘Note: Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable 
for Trading Conflict Diamonds’ (2001) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 1402, 1414.
8  Koyame, M, ‘United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade in Conflict 
Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2005) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 80, 94–95.
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A product built on positive publicity can, however, fall by negative 
publicity focused on the association of diamonds with conflict 
and human rights violations. In 1998, Global Witness thrust the 
conflict diamonds problem into the public arena by highlighting its 
connection with the Angolan conflict. Protests in New York outside 
Tiffany & Co. jewellers led to publicity in the New York Times. Aware 
of the effect of negative publicity in debilitating the fur coat trade, 
media coverage of the conflict diamonds issue has been an important 
force in galvanising the diamond industry to take the issue seriously. 
It has also been argued that the existing diamond industry, which is 
still largely dominated by De Beers, has a strong interest in enforcing 
the Kimberley Process (KP), as it is a further means of shoring up 
a virtual monopoly over the international diamond trade.9 
In 2002, business, NGOs, and governments combined to create the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KP), aimed at tackling the 
problem of conflict diamonds. The thrust of the Kimberley Process, 
discussed further in Chapter 4, is to create a paper trail between 
diamond miners at the beginning of the diamond pipeline, and end 
consumers of diamond products, so as to distinguish between the legal 
diamond trade and the illegal trade, thereby preventing the sale of 
conflict diamonds. Such a system is necessary to identify the country 
of origin of diamonds, as there is currently no available technology 
that can accurately identify the country of origin of a diamond simply 
through analysis of the stone. At most, generalisations based on the 
value of the stone might be made, noting, for example, that Sierra 
Leone typically produces stones valued at  about US$200 per  carat, 
as compared to Canadian diamonds valued at about US$100 per carat, 
or Congolese diamonds valued at about US$25 per carat. Diamond 
value is assessed based on the qualities of clarity, colour, carats, and 
cut.10
9  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 30–36; Black, B, ‘Panel: 
Combating International Corruption through Law and Institutions’ (2007) 5 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 445, 461; Holmes, J, ‘The Kimberley Process: Evidence of Change in 
International Law’ (2007) 3 Brigham Young University International Law and Management Review 
213, 218–219.
10  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008) 518, 534.
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Naturally, the legitimate diamond trade holds great potential for the 
economic and social development of African producer nations, as is 
implied in the term development diamonds.11 If diamond revenues 
were to benefit the country’s population, and where an appropriate 
amount is paid as taxation revenue, the industry could become 
a constructive force. Unlike other trades, such as the trade in heroin, 
cocaine, and other debilitating drugs, it is hard to argue that there is 
anything intrinsically unethical about trading in diamonds. It is their 
connection with human rights abuses and conflict that makes black 
market trading a pariah. An interesting parallel can be made between 
the trade in certified diamonds and the trade in antique ivory products 
under the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species. 
In certain circumstances, the ivory trade is undesirable, namely where 
the trade in fresh ivory, or products made from it, is allowed. Naturally, 
this trade encourages the killing of elephants, an endangered species 
under the convention. The sale of antique items made using existing 
stocks of ivory, however, is arguably a distinct market, which does not 
require the continued killing of elephants.12 
Conflict Diamonds
The definition of conflict diamonds used in the context of international 
law is that found in the Kimberley Process core document, which is 
based on Resolution 55/56 of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA), and relevant UNSC resolutions: 
Conflict diamonds [are] rough diamonds used by rebel movements 
or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate 
governments.
While it is important to find a workable definition for conflict 
diamonds, the definition that was arrived at in these early resolutions, 
and that found its way into the Kimberley Process core document, 
is open to some criticism. The definition aims to capture part of the 
concept of conflict diamonds, namely the role that the black market in 
11  ‘Development diamonds’ are discussed at length in Chapter 3.
12  For a useful discussion of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species, 
see United Kingdom Wildlife Licensing and Registration Service, ‘Guidance for Antique Dealers 
on the Control of Trade in Endangered Species’ (2005). Available at: www.culturecommunication.
gouv.fr/content/download/97744/875972/version/1/file/2005_Guidance+for+Antique+dealers
+on+the+control+of+trade+in+endangered+species.pdf.
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diamonds plays in fuelling warfare. However, in focusing solely on the 
element of warfare, the definition fails to identify the important link to 
the separate concept that the black market in these circumstances also 
fuels serious human rights violations. It is a premise of international 
humanitarian law, the human rights conventions that apply during 
times of conflict, that warfare is not intrinsically illegal. Warfare only 
becomes illegal when fundamental principles are violated, such as 
the principle of distinction, which distinguishes between military 
personnel, who may be legitimately attacked, and others, including 
civilians and wounded soldiers, who may not be attacked.13 Perhaps 
the key element in harnessing world opinion against the trade in 
conflict diamonds has been its connection with serious violations 
of human rights, including the principle of distinction. The wars in 
Sierra Leone and Angola, for example, have both been characterised 
by the targeting and killing of civilians.
A further difficulty with the international definition of conflict 
diamonds is its differentiation between rebel movements and 
legitimate governments. One of the defining features of the 
development of international law during the past few decades has 
been a formal recognition that parties in a non-international conflict 
(i.e. rebel movements) are bound by the same laws of warfare as 
parties to the more established category of conflict between national 
armies.14 The  terminology used in this context also suggests that 
recourse to warfare by rebel movements is always in contravention of 
international law. International law, however, recognises that recourse 
to warfare may be justified in certain circumstances, including a war 
of self-defence, and wars against a colonising power.
The distinction made between rebel movements and legitimate 
governments also suggests that governments may legally fund their 
wars through the diamond trade, and, more problematically, the 
implication that government forces by their very nature do not 
commit human rights abuses. Although it may be difficult to outlaw 
the manner in which the diamond trade finances wars fought by 
13  For a useful discussion on the principle of distinction, see International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants. Available at: 
www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_ru_rule1.
14  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978).
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national governments, it is particularly problematic to suggest that 
government armies do not commit human rights violations. In all of 
the conflicts discussed in this section — Angola, Sierra Leone, the 
DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe — reports of serious human rights 
violations have been made not only in relation to rebel movements but 
also government armies. Furthermore, during the conflict in the DRC, 
according to a key report by the UNSC Expert Committee, the armies 
of Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe were all mining Congolese natural 
resources, including diamonds, to further their war efforts. The issue 
has also been a thorn of contention in relation to Zimbabwean rough 
diamonds originating from the Marange diamond fields. It entails 
alleged human rights abuses committed by Zimbabwean authorities 
against alluvial miners at Marange. As such, it does not involve either 
a civil war or an international conflict, and would not, on its face, fall 
within the conflict diamonds definition as it appears in the Kimberley 
core document.
The connection between the trade in black market diamonds and 
human rights violations is perhaps better expressed by the term 
blood diamonds than conflict diamonds. Although the terms are 
used interchangeably, the connection with blood arguably connotes 
the violence directed against civilians better than the more prevalent 
term conflict diamonds. Perhaps the most infamous example of the 
connection between this trade and gross human rights violations is 
the recent civil war in Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) militia have been documented as committing crimes of terror to 
subdue civilian populations, including the amputation of hands and 
limbs. Weapons and other resources that supported these activities 
were largely funded through the occupation of diamond mining areas 
by the RUF, allegedly assisted by the Liberian Government.15
Considering the challenges with the definition of conflict diamonds, 
the non-legal status of the Kimberley Process may again prove to be 
a benefit. Such an issue is more problematic in legal status documents 
that are subject to established norms of interpretation. In the absence 
of a legally binding approach, the Kimberley Process has been able 
to take a broader interpretation of the definition to encompass rough 
15  Saunders, L, ‘Note: Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable 
for Trading Conflict Diamonds’ (2001) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 1402, 1402–1428; 
Tailby, R, ‘The Illicit Market in Diamonds’ (2002) 218 Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends 
and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1, 1–6.
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diamonds originating from Zimbabwe’s Marange Field. Influential 
commentators, such as Ian Smillie, have argued for a ‘purposive’ 
interpretation of the Kimberley conflict diamonds definition.16 
In particular, Smillie points to the human rights reference in the 
perambulatory passages of the Kimberley core document:
Recognising the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade 
in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people 
in affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights 
violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts.17
With reference to this statement, he argues that the Kimberley Process 
has always been concerned ‘about the appalling human rights abuses 
committed in the course’ of conflicts. A purposive interpretation 
is even available with reference to ‘black letter’ international law. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31, states:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose. 18
If customary international law is to be invoked, evidence of ‘state 
practice’ must refer to the fact that the UNGA accepted Marange 
diamonds as conflict diamonds in a number of their resolutions.
Recognising the political importance, if not the legal necessity, of 
reinforcing the broader definition of conflict diamonds, Smillie 
recommends an amendment to the Kimberley core document. 
He suggests that the following wording be added:
The Kimberley Process promotes respect for human rights as described 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it requires their 
effective recognition and observance, as part of KPCS minimum 
standards, in the diamond industries of participating countries, 
and among the peoples, institutions and territories under their 
jurisdiction.19
16  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 15–16.
17  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) 1.
18  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 
331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 31.
19  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 16. 
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It might be argued, however, that a more explicit amendment to the 
definition of conflict diamonds would be better in the interests of 
promoting certainty. Rather than adding a general reference above to 
the recognition of human rights, it might be advisable to clarify the 
definition of conflict diamonds, perhaps in terms such as these:
Conflict diamonds are rough diamonds, the production of which is 
associated with, or the sale of which finances, the commission of 
international crimes, including war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.
The cause of the Kimberley Process would be politically and legally 
reinforced if the clarified definition was endorsed by resolutions of the 
UNGA and the UNSC. 
It would appear, however, that clarifications to the KP mandate have 
already met with political opposition within the KP Plenary. At the 
2010 KP Plenary, the KP Civil Society Coalition introduced, for the 
fourth straight meeting, language seeking to clarify the relationship 
between the KP and human rights. The language stated that KP 
participants should respect international human rights law when 
providing security in their diamond sectors. Civil Society, supported 
by the World Diamond Council and a majority of governments, argued 
that the credibility of the KP would be seriously undermined if it 
was not seen to be actively engaged in preventing and responding to 
human rights violations by state agents in the diamond sector. Despite 
this support, consensus was blocked by India, China, Russia and the 
DRC. Botswana and Namibia reserved judgement, saying they needed 
more time to study the initiative.20
While the Sierra Leone and Angolan wars fuelled by diamonds have 
now ended, diamonds still fuel conflict in the north-eastern Ituri 
region of the DRC, as well as Côte d’Ivoire. The world’s three largest 
UN peacekeeping forces are in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC, 
consisting of 35,000 troops, with combined budgets of $1.8 billion.21 
There is also a documented link between conflict diamonds and 
20  Partnership Africa Canada, Other Facets: News and Views on the International Effort to End 
Conflict Diamonds, No. 34 (February 2011) 4.
21  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 3.
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international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Grave human rights 
violations that, on their face, constitute international crimes, continue 
to be committed on the artisanal diamond fields of Zimbabwe and 
Angola by government forces.22
Diamonds possess qualities that lend themselves to the exacerbation 
of conflict. They are easy to mine without complex equipment, 
particularly where there is an abundance of manual labour, which 
makes the miners an easy target for militia groups. Alluvial diamonds 
are the most vulnerable, being diamonds distributed close to the 
surface of the earth as a result of being moved by existing or historical 
river systems. Miners of alluvial diamonds are often called artisanal 
miners, because they are able to do the mining using only a shovel 
and a sieve. Artisanal miners also take advantage of tailings, such as 
those found in Sierra Leone, which are deposits of diamondiferous 
gravel that have been abandoned in the wake of large-scale industrial 
mining. Alluvial  diamonds can be contrasted with kimberlite 
diamond deposits, which are concentrated deposits embedded deeply 
beneath the earth’s surface, normally accessible only with the use 
of sophisticated mining equipment.23
Gem-quality diamonds have historically held their value well, which 
makes them a good investment and useful as a form of hard currency 
to launder money, purchase weapons, or stockpile for later use. They 
are the world’s most concentrated form of wealth, being very small 
and of high value, which makes them easy to transport or smuggle. 
They do not show up on a standard metal detector, although they 
would be detectable by an x-ray machine. The unregulated nature of 
the diamond industry has, until recently, contributed to the problem, 
as there have been few trading restrictions and the legal industry has 
traditionally not been transparent in its dealings. Multiple transactions, 
22  Global Witness, ‘For a Few Dollars More: How Al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade’ 
(Report, April 2003) 8–9.
23  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008) 517–520, 524–525, 530–531; Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, 
‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change 
in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 3.
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international transfers, and the practice of mixing diamonds from 
different sources obscure the origin of diamonds, thereby facilitating 
smuggling and illegal behaviour.24
Beyond the connection between rough diamonds and international 
human rights crimes lies a further range of issues that problematise 
the diamond industry. International crimes are those human rights 
violations that are considered the most serious under international law, 
with the technical description of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide, which fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of 
international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Human rights violations such as murder, rape, the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, or forced labour, where carried 
out on a widespread or systematic basis against civilians, are examples 
of such crimes. Other human rights violations, while still considered 
serious, are not classified as international crimes under international 
law. This second category includes child labour, such as parents 
including their children in artisanal mining activities, and violations of 
International Labour Organization conventions such as those relating 
to health and safety, and minimum levels of remuneration for labour.
Lower level human rights violations do not fall within the current 
mandate of the Kimberley Process, however, there is a clear connection 
between these problems and the risk of escalation to the commission 
of international crimes. Put differently, well regulated, healthy, and 
safe artisanal mining communities are less likely to be attracted or 
co-opted to sell their proceeds on the black market to the benefit of 
rebel militias. As a result, these lower level issues are discussed in 
the country-by-country section. Chapter 6 suggests a framework for 
extending the Kimberley Process mandate to encompass these lower 
level violations. One of the countries discussed, India, does not have 
an international crime level issue, but has other human rights issues 
associated with its diamond cutting and polishing centres, particularly 
the use of child labour. This information is included with the view in 
mind that the Kimberley Process mandate might at some stage take 
into account this broader range of human rights issues.
24  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008) 522–523; Global Witness, ‘For a Few Dollars More: How Al Qaeda Moved 
into the Diamond Trade’ (Report, April 2003) 1–3.
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Estimating the Size of the Conflict 
Diamonds Trade
Although the period prior to the establishment of the Kimberley 
Process was characterised by secrecy and a lack of transparency, 
particularly in the area of statistics, nevertheless, attempts were made 
by several organisations to assess the overall size of the rough diamond 
trade, and the percentage of that trade represented by the trade in 
conflict diamonds. On the conservative side, De Beers estimated that, 
in 1999, conflict diamonds represented 3.7 per cent of the world 
rough diamond trade. The source countries for conflict diamonds in 
that year, according to De Beers, were Angola, Sierra Leone, and the 
DRC. It might be noted, however, that De Beers was adhering to the 
so-called narrow definition of conflict diamonds, namely, that they 
had to be fuelling rebel militias against legitimate governments. It was 
presumably on this basis that the entirety of Angola’s rough diamond 
production was not included in the statistic, so as to exclude Angolan 
government rough diamonds from the conflict diamonds equation. 
According to the broad reading of the conflict diamonds definition, 
all Angolan diamonds that year should have been classified as conflict 
diamonds, given the fact that both parties to the civil war committed 
international human rights crimes.25
In its three-year review, the Kimberley Process estimated that the 
percentage of conflict diamonds trade was thought to have been in the 
range of 4 to 15 per cent between the mid-1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s.26
Turning to the estimates of what the conflict diamonds trade may 
amount to right now, it is a particularly contested issue in light of the 
fact that participants within the Kimberley Process have split over the 
definition of conflict diamonds. As some national governments have 
preferred the narrow definition, which confines conflict diamonds to 
a connection with civil war rather than international human rights 
25  De Beers Diamond Jewellers Ltd, ‘Written Testimony before the United States Congress, 
House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa’, Hearing into the Issue 
of ‘Conflict Diamonds’ (25 May 2000). Available at: www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx? 
ArticleID=4046.
26  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review, Kimberley 
Process (November 2006) 17. Available at: www.state.gov/documents/organization/77156.pdf.
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crimes, rough diamonds originating from the Marange artisanal fields 
of Zimbabwe and the artisanal fields of northern Angola have not been 
classified as conflict diamonds. By contrast, others consider that the 
definition of conflict diamonds incorporates a connection between 
the mining and trade of rough diamonds with the commission of 
international human rights crimes. Under this broad definition, 
the association of Zimbabwean and Angolan rough diamonds with 
international human rights crimes means that these diamonds must be 
classified as conflict diamonds.
The three-year review of the Kimberley Process estimated that conflict 
diamonds represented about 0.2 per cent of the world’s rough diamond 
trade in 2004. The estimate was based around conflict diamonds 
production from Côte d’Ivoire and UNSC embargoed diamonds from 
Liberia, although the figure did not take into account the ongoing 
fighting centred on diamond mines in the DRC. While the official 
Kimberley Process organs continue to refer to this figure, those who 
take the broader definition of conflict diamonds recognise that this 
figure was calculated without reference to Angolan or Zimbabwean 
conflict diamonds and is likely to contain further inaccuracies.27
A Country by Country Approach
Angola
The Angola conflict was the first to bring international attention to 
the problem of conflict diamonds. The conflict had its genesis when 
Angola was granted independence from its former colonial master, 
Portugal, in 1975. While the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) was recognised as the first independent Angolan 
government, it was resisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s by the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and 
its ally, the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). 28 There were 
reports of gross human rights violations on both sides, including the 
27  Ibid.
28  Maggi, M, ‘The Currency of Terrorism: An Alternative Way to Combat Terrorism and End 
the Trade of Conflict Diamonds’ (2003) 15 Pace International Law Review 513, 522.
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indiscriminate shelling of civilians.29 The war resulted in the loss 
of up to 1 million lives, with 1.4 million in need of food aid, 500,000 
in critical danger of starvation, and the country burdened with 
4–5 million land mines, killing or injuring 700 Angolans per year.30 
In 1992 there was a resurgence of the conflict following UN monitored 
elections that confirmed the legitimacy of the MPLA Government. 
UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, refused to accept the result and returned 
to civil war, focusing on control of the diamond-producing areas of 
Angola.31 Diamonds were needed to fund the conflict, given that the 
end of the Cold War had resulted in the loss of financial backing from 
the United States and South Africa.32 UNITA either directly exploited 
diamond mining areas, or used systems of taxation and licensing to 
extract commission from the labour of others. Proceeds from diamond 
sales were then used to purchase weapons.33 Diamonds were also an 
important component of UNITA’s strategy for acquiring friends and 
maintaining external support. UNITA gained particular support from 
the Mobutu Government in what was then Zaire.34 Rough diamond 
caches, rather than cash or bank deposits, also constituted the 
primary and the preferred means of stockpiling wealth for UNITA. 
This provided a mechanism for avoiding the effects of international 
financial sanctions, such as confiscation of bank accounts, and 
provided a way of sustaining income expenditure over a long period.35
In response to the renewed violence, the UNSC imposed a mandatory 
embargo on the sale or supply of weapons or petroleum products to 
UNITA forces in September 1993, and established a sanctions committee 
to monitor and report on the implementation of the mandatory 
29  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and 
the Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 8–11; Global Witness, 
‘A  Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict’ (Report, 
Global Witness Ltd, 1998) 7.
30  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 11.
31  Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, 
UN Doc S/2000/203 (10 March 2000) 25.
32  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 9–10.
33  Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, 
UN Doc S/2000/203 (10 March 2000) 25–26.
34  Juma, L, ‘The War in Congo: Transitional Conflict Networks and the Failure 
of Internationalism’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 97, 135–136.
35  Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, 
UN Doc S/2000/203 (10 March 2000) 25, 32.
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measures.36 Despite the agreement of both parties to the Lusaka Peace 
Accord in November 1994, three years later it was clear that UNITA 
had used the period of peace to make extensive military preparations 
funded by its diamond mining activities.37 In 1997 there was a global 
diamond recession, which affected the nature of the Angolan conflict. 
At this time, UNITA withdrew from Cuango Valley mines, cutting 
back supplies in an overstocked industry. UNITA attempted to close 
down Angola’s official diamond industry by attacking government 
mining projects. As a result, it was difficult for the government to gain 
any profit from diamond resources.38 The Security Council responded 
with increased pressure on senior UNITA leaders and their immediate 
families, prohibiting their access to transportation or transit through 
the territory of other countries.39
UNITA have been key players in Angolan diamond production and 
in the international diamond business since the late 1980s. They have 
retained a predominant but shifting control over many of the major 
diamond areas, such as the Cuango River valley and the Lundas, 
both important areas of production. Between 1992 and 1994, UNITA 
controlled 90 per cent of Angolan diamond exports. In 1995, UNITA 
lost control of many areas and its percentage of exports changed. 
During 1996 and 1997, UNITA was producing about two-thirds of 
all diamonds mined in Angola. During 1998, the return of former 
UNITA areas to state administration took place, a condition of the 
1994 Lusaka Protocol. UNITA’s withdrawal from key areas, such as the 
36  SC Res 864, UN SCOR, 3277th mtg, S/RES/864 (5 June 1998) (Angola) [19]–[23]; Price, T M, 
‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality 
Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 10.
37  Lusaka Protocol, UN SCOR, 17th sess, UN Doc S/1994/1441 (22 December 1994); Progress 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), 
UN Doc S/1997/640 (13 August 1997); Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict 
Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global 
Trade 1, 10.
38  Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan 
Conflict’ (Report, Global Witness Ltd, 1998) 1, 7, 12; Maggi, M, ‘The Currency of Terrorism: 
An Alternative Way to Combat Terrorism and End the Trade of Conflict Diamonds’ (2003) 15 Pace 
International Law Review 513, 525.
39  SC Res 1127, 3814th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997) (Angola); Price, T M, 
‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality 
Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 8–11; Kaplan, M, ‘Junior Fellows’ Note: 
Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace through the Diamond Trade’ (2003) 35 New York 
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lower Cuango Valley, had a major impact on its level of production, 
with revenue estimated to be US$200 million for 1998; a major decline 
from previous years.40
Between 1992 and 1998, UNITA obtained an estimated minimum 
revenue of US$3.72 billion in diamond sales — not including revenue 
from other sources, or interest generated in overseas bank accounts.41 
By this time, the international community had begun to recognise the 
critical link between the international diamond trade and UNITA’s 
financial viability. In particular, De Beers was embarrassed by a Global 
Witness report, which focused on De Beers’ annual reporting in 
relation to their Angolan trading policies. De Beers’ annual reports 
indicated that its policy of buying out most of the rough diamonds 
on the market had continued, even when it was clear that Angolan 
diamonds in the 1990s were mined almost entirely by UNITA. It should 
be noted that in the wake of media criticism, De Beers announced an 
embargo on the purchase of all diamonds originating from Angola in 
October 1999 and went on to be a key supporter of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme.42
Further pressure was applied by the UNSC, which adopted resolutions 
1173 and 1176 in 1998, prohibiting the direct or indirect export of 
unofficial Angolan diamonds — those diamonds not accompanied by 
a government-issued certificate of origin.43 However, United Nations 
reports allege that a number of  countries acted as intermediaries 
between UNITA and Antwerp-based diamond traders, including 
Burkina Faso, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia, and that Antwerp 
largely turned a blind eye to the conflict diamonds traffic passing 
through its diamond market.44 For example, the government of Belgium 
reported that Zambian diamond exports to Belgium between February 
and May 2001 totalled 35,614.14  carats, with an estimated value 
40  Global Witness, ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan 
Conflict’ (Report, Global Witness Ltd, 1998) 4. Its estimates were made using statistics from 
World Diamond Industry, Directory and Yearbook 1996/97, Diamond International 1997 and 
EIU, Country Profile 1997–1998.
41  Ibid 4. 
42  Ibid 6–8; Koyame, M, ‘United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade 
in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2005) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 80, 85.
43  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 8–11.
44  Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, 
UN Doc S/2000/203 (10 March 2000) 27–29.
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of $13.3 million, which is 20  times the officially recorded Zambian 
diamond exports between 1995 to 1998 at $564,272. In addition, 
diamonds exported by Zambia between 1998 and 2001 had an average 
carat value of $373.45, indicating that they were more likely to be 
high-quality gems of Angolan origin than Zambian diamonds.45
In 1999, the government captured the crucial UNITA strongholds of 
Andulo and Bailundo, and forced Savimbi into exile. The offensive 
cost UNITA its diamond-mining areas, although UNITA profited for 
some time from stockpiles it had already created. UNITA remained 
connected to the international diamond markets by air shipping 
through third countries such as Zambia. In 2002, Savimbi was killed, 
the Angolan Government and UNITA called a ceasefire, and UNITA 
became a political party under new leader Samakuva.46
Since the establishment of the Kimberley Process in 2002, Angola 
has played an active part, particularly in the Working Group on 
Artisanal Mining. It is ironic, in the light of its KP participation, that, 
unfortunately, the human rights situation in Angola’s artisanal fields, 
which border the DRC, deteriorated dramatically in 2003. In  2003, 
Angola began a policy of expelling Congolese artisanal miners from 
Angolan diamond fields. In 2003 and 2004, tens of thousands of 
Congolese miners were expelled by the Angolan military, creating 
a refugee crisis in the neighbouring DRC. The first major waves of 
some 25,000 illegal Congolese miners were expelled in 2003, followed 
by another 10,000 in February 2004. In April, the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported the arrival 
of 68,000 exhausted Congolese in the DRC border provinces of 
Bandundu, Kasai Occidentale, Kasai Orientale, and Katanga. Estimates 
suggest that approximately 100,000 illicit miners had been expelled 
from Angola by mid-2004, about a third of the estimated number 
of miners in Angola.47 
45  Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA, UN Doc 
2001/966 (12 October 2001) 141; Koyame, M, ‘United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to 
Curb the Illicit Trade in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2005) 1 African Journal 
of Legal Studies 80, 85–86.
46  Kaplan, M, ‘Junior Fellows’ Note: Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace through the 
Diamond Trade’ (2003) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 559, 
573–578.
47  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Diamond Industry Annual Review: Republic of Angola 2004’ 
(Annual Report, July 2004) 8–9.
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While the expulsions were occurring, UN agencies, Human Rights 
Watch, and Médecins sans Frontières publicised concerns about abuses 
reported by returning miners, including rape, body cavity searches of 
both sexes for hidden diamonds, and general brutality. A human rights 
group, Voix des Sans Voix, reported that Angolan troops and civilians 
had subjected many of the Congolese to beatings and death threats.48 
Protests from the government of the DRC led to an agreement between 
the two countries that expulsions would be handled in a more 
co-ordinated and less repressive manner. Although the government 
of Angola made it plain that the expulsions would continue, Angola 
acknowledged the military brutality. ‘These excesses provoked 
harmful repercussions, which we regret, and for which we offer a 
public apology’, said Angola’s Interior Minister Osvaldo Serra Van-
Dúnem. One of the repercussions was a desperate food shortage among 
returning Angolan refugees in Malanje Province, unable to access 
markets just across the border in the DRC. In June 2004, the World 
Food Programme said the Angolan Government’s forced repatriation 
of Congolese nationals had caused hostility towards Angolans who 
depended on neighbouring Congolese markets to purchase food and 
other necessary items. An estimated 17,000 Angolans were affected.49
Unfortunately, in subsequent years, cross-border expulsions by 
Angola and attendant human rights abuses continued. As recently 
as November 2010, UNICEF reported that more than 650 women and 
girls had been raped during mass expulsions. Approximately 6,621 
Congolese returnees arrived in the Western Kasai province in the DRC 
in two waves in September and October 2010. The reports of sexual 
violence are based on evidence collected by NGO welcome committees 
in the region. Many of the victims reported being locked up in derelict 
buildings, gang-raped and tortured by Angolan security forces, and 
then forced to walk several days back across the border into the DRC.50
The scale of the mass deportations, involving systematic rape and 
abuse, suggest that they meet the indicia of crimes against humanity 
attracting the jurisdiction of the ICC. Unfortunately, the issue has 
not apparently attracted significant attention by either the ICC or the 
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid.
50  Davies, C, Reciprocal Violence: Mass Expulsions Between Angola and DRC (17 February 2011) 
The Human Rights Brief. Available at: hrbrief.org/2011/02/reciprocal-violence-mass-expulsions-
between-angola-and-the-drc/.
39
2 . ARe CoNFLICT DIAMoNDS FoReveR?
Kimberley Process itself. Unlike the situation in Zimbabwe, there 
has been relatively less media discussion of the Angola deportations. 
It would appear, on its face, that the connection between artisanal 
mining in Angola and the commission of these international crimes 
would qualify Angolan diamonds as being conflict diamonds. 
A case study, based on an interview with 28-year-old Dallas Kabungo, 
is illustrative of the experience of many thousands of DRC citizens 
expelled from Angola:
The road north from the Congolese border town of Kamoko barely 
merits the name; a narrow rutted track, impassable save by toughest 
4x4, clogged in early June this year by a tired stream of people flooding 
north from Angola. It was here that the Annual Review encountered 
28-year-old Dallas Kabungo.
He had no money, few clothes, and nothing but flip-flops on his feet. 
He had no idea where to find his wife and child. He’d been walking 
that road, and others like it on the Angolan side of the border, for over 
five days, since the night the Angolan police and army surrounded 
his encampment at Tchiamba, near the town of Lucapa in Lunda 
Norte. They began by firing shots in the air. Everyone was rounded 
up, and those without Angolan papers were searched down to their 
underwear. Anything of value was confiscated. Kabungo lost his spare 
clothes, a radio, and US$600. ‘You came to this country with nothing,’ 
the soldiers told him, ‘you will leave with nothing.’ Those who resisted 
the search were beaten, or whipped with belts …
Meanwhile, after waiting a week in the Congolese border town of 
Kamoko, Dallas Kabungo was finally re-united with his wife, Chantal, 
and their three-year-old daughter. Soldiers had arrived at the house in 
Lucapa that Kabungo had bought for her with his diamond earnings. 
They looted the furniture, took her radio and money, and set her on 
the road north. It had taken her days of walking in the heat and dust 
to reach the border.
Their reunion was a bittersweet affair. Kabungo learned that his 
wife, coming over the border crossing at Myanda, had been raped 
repeatedly by Angolan border guards. Among his Baluba tribe, he 
said, it’s believed that if a woman engages in adultery, her children 
soon fall sick and die. He’s not sure if the curse works when the 
woman has been raped.51
51  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Diamonds and Human Security: Annual Review 2008’ (Annual 
Report, October 2008) 14.
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Grave human rights violations by the Angolan security forces, namely 
the Angolan military and national police, have also targeted Angolan 
citizens engaged in artisanal mining. One documented case, the killing 
of Belito Mendes, occurred on Saturday 12 May 2007. The victim, 
28-year-old Belito Mendes, a veteran of the Angolan army, was beaten 
to death by members of the Angolan National Police after refusing 
to hand over the small amount of money he had on his person.52 It is 
unfortunate that the situation in Angola received no attention by the 
Kimberly Process at the time that these human rights violations were 
occurring.
While the Angolan expulsions have attracted little attention, there 
have recently been precedent-setting national prosecutions in French 
courts, in relation to arms trafficking and bribery related to the Angolan 
civil war of the 1990s. On 28 October 2009, a Paris court convicted 36 
people in connection to illegal arms sales to Angola during its civil 
war, including arms dealers, middlemen, and French politicians. Arms 
trading went hand in hand with diamond and oil trading during the 
war, as sales of natural resources were used to purchase armaments, 
which were then turned on the civilian population. Arms dealers 
Pierre Falcone and Arkadi Gaydamak were sentenced to six years 
in prison for arms trafficking and other offences. Former French 
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua was sentenced to a year in jail for 
taking bribes from the two men. Amongst others convicted, a son of 
former president François Mitterrand and a banker from BNP Paribas, 
a top French bank, were given suspended sentences. At the time 
of reporting, appeals were expected to follow.53
While the problem of international human rights crimes is front and 
centre when considering the rough diamond industry in Angola, lower 
level human rights issues present further challenges. In particular, the 
Angolan artisanal industry has a significant child labour problem. 
According to UNICEF, 70 per cent of Angola’s population is under 
24, and 30 per cent of children between the ages of five and 14 years 
work. A 2004 case study undertaken by Partnership Africa Canada 
and Global Witness in the Lunda Norte province showed that family 
52  Ibid 13–14.
53  Global Witness, Global Witness Welcomes French ‘Angolagate’ Verdict as Victory for Justice 
(28 October 2009). Available at: www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/global-witness-welcomes-
french-angolagate-verdict-victory-justice/.
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mining groups consist of women and children as well as adult men. 
Forty-six per cent of those interviewed and working were children in 
the age group 5–16. Many women worked as well, and differences in 
gender representation were large in only one age group — young men 
dominated the 17–25 age group. The report noted: 
In  today’s mining areas, fear, insecurity and sexual abuse are 
constant. Today’s child miners are … a direct result of war, poverty 
and the absence of education; there are few schools in the diamond 
regions and even the existing ones were destroyed during the many 
decades of war.
Yet these families, who worked in unsafe and abusive conditions, 
derived less than 5 per cent of their income from mining diamonds, 
with the largest part derived from agriculture and the rest from 
business and trading. This was not because diamonds represented less 
work than agriculture; it was because the diggers were so badly paid 
for the diamonds they found.54
Sierra Leone
The conflict in Sierra Leone saw the problem of conflict diamonds 
reach a greater level of notoriety, through the activities of the RUF. 
It was through the activities of the RUF that the illegal diamonds trade 
became connected in the eyes of the international community not only 
with the prolongation of conflict, but also with the perpetration of 
graphic human rights violations. The terror tactics employed by the 
RUF to subdue the local civilian population included the amputation 
of hands, limbs, and body parts. The militia also perpetrated unlawful 
killings, physical and sexual violence against civilians, abductions, 
looting and destruction of civilian property, forced labour including 
sexual slavery, and the conscription of boys and girls into the armed 
forces and their deployment in active fighting. The names of their 
military operations, ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ and ‘Operation No 
Living Thing’, were illustrative of their intentions and encouraged 
54  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Diamond Industry Annual Review: Republic of Angola 2005’ 
(Annual Report, July 2005) 9; Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor 
Man, Development Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal 
Alluvial Diamond Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 17–23.
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the commission of these crimes.55 The conflict resulted in the loss of 
75,000 lives, created half a million refugees and internally displaced 
2.25 million, while an estimated 12,000 children were abducted 
to fight as soldiers. Through the infamous practice of amputation, 
some 20,000 of the civilian population were left mutilated. In the 
quintessential paradox of the resource curse, Sierra Leone was listed 
at the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Human Development Index in 2001, despite its abundance of natural 
resources.56 
In 1991, former army corporal Foday Sankoh emerged as the leader 
of the RUF, which attacked Sierra Leonean border towns from Liberia. 
The attacks were marked by brutality against civilians, and children 
were kidnapped and inducted into the RUF.57 In 1994, the RUF overran 
diamond-rich areas, bauxite and titanium mines, thereby bankrupting 
the economy, but providing themselves with access to an abundance of 
natural resources. A peace accord was signed in 1996 by newly elected 
President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh, but soldiers seized power the 
following year under the banner of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC). Major Johnny Paul Koroma became the chairman and 
invited the RUF to join the government, resulting in systematic human 
rights abuses and the destruction of the formal economy.58 
The UNSC responded by imposing an arms embargo on Sierra Leone in 
1997. The United Nations launched a limited peacekeeping operation, 
United Nations Observer Mission Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), consisting 
of 70 observers. However, it was the regional peacekeeping force 
Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) that made the decisive intervention. In February 
1998, 10,000 to 12,000 ECOMOG troops forced the RUF/AFRC out of 
55  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa 
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004) 26; Crane, D M, ‘Terrorists, Warlords and 
Thugs’ (2006) 21 American University International Law Review 505, 515–516.
56  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 13; Koyame, M, ‘United 
Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-
Saharan Africa’ (2005) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 80, 86.
57  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa 
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004) 20.
58  Smillie, I, L Gberie and R Hazleton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and 
Human Security’ (Report, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000) 3.
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the capital city, Freetown, and engaged their forces in the countryside, 
enabling the Kabbah Government to be re-established. During the 
same year, an embargo was imposed that allowed the government to 
rearm itself, but the embargo on RUF weapons was maintained.59
The RUF, however, outmanoeuvred the embargo, and their offensive in 
January 1999 resulted in the capture of Freetown. In a period of only 
two weeks, Freetown witnessed the torture and murder of cabinet 
ministers, journalists, and civil servants, the deaths of some 6,000 
civilians, and the disappearance of 2,000 children. The RUF were 
ultimately pushed out of Freetown by ECOMOG forces. In an effort to 
protect Freetown, maintain security, and train Sierra Leone’s army, UN 
peacekeepers were increased to approximately 13,000, augmented by 
another 750 from the United Kingdom. A serious challenge arose with 
the capture of 500 UN soldiers by the RUF, who were only released 
when the UN was assisted by British troops.60 
Peace finally became a possibility following the capture of Sankoh in 
2000 and the subsequent disarmament of the RUF. In May 2001, the 
RUF released children who had been abducted and conscripted — aged 
10 to 15 — and in January 2002, the UN announced the completion of 
the disarmament of over 45,000 rebel soldiers. Kabbah was re-elected 
president in 2002 by 70 per cent of the vote in the first peaceful 
election since the civil war.61 Following certificate of origin initiatives 
such as the Kimberley Process, the legitimate diamond industry in 
Sierra Leone has begun to re-emerge. In 2003, Sierra Leone legally 
exported $76 million of diamonds from alluvial fields, while the 2004 
total was estimated as being $120 million.62 
59  Ibid 2–3; Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, 
and the Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 14.
60  Smillie, I, L Gberie and R Hazleton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and 
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Journal of Global Trade 1, 14–16.
61  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 14–16.
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During the civil war, the RUF armed itself through the sale of illegal 
diamonds, earning about $120 million per year from 1991 to 1999.63 The 
alluvial diamond fields in the Kono region and the Tongo Field region 
were the prize, giving the RUF little reason to engage with the peace 
process or even to try to win the war. The RUF’s mining regime was 
largely based on forced labour, whereby civilians, including children, 
were tied up, forbidden to speak, and forced to work 12-hour shifts 
at gunpoint. They were not paid or fed, and sustained themselves 
by eating nearby fruit. New labour was brought in when existing 
workers became too sick to work or were shot. Shootings were carried 
out by the RUF small boys’ units, staffed by children as young as 11 
years old, who were armed with AK-47s.64 Expert evidence suggests 
that the reason that the RUF engaged in amputations and fear tactics 
was to maintain complete control over the diamond mining fields 
without interference by the thousands of freelance diggers who would 
otherwise also mine the area.65 Prior to the RUF invasion, the diamond 
fields had been mined by thousands of licensed and unlicensed 
artisanal diggers, policed by a government force numbering 500 
persons with access to helicopters.66
From the very inception of the civil war, the RUF allegedly received 
the support of Liberian President Charles Taylor. He encouraged 
Foday Sankoh to mine diamonds and gold from the Kono district to 
finance the war, and trade these goods with Burkina Faso and Libya 
63  Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 
(2000), paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/1195 (20 December 2000) 578–
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Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004) 27; Mitchell III, A F, ‘Sierra Leone: The Road 
to Childhood Ruination Through Forced Recruitment of Child Soldiers and the World’s Failure to 
Act’ (2003) 2 Regent Journal of International Law 81, 86–87; Woody, K E, ‘Diamonds on the Soul 
of Her Shoes: The Kimberley Process and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions’ (2007) 22 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 335, 335.
65  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008) 581–582.
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for supplies, ammunition, and weapons.67 In return for diamonds, 
Taylor allegedly supplied the RUF with consignments of AK-47s, 
RPGs, Uzis, and ammunition, and provided military training to the 
militia.68 A UN expert panel collected evidence of cargoes of weapons 
in the period 1998 to 1999 being airlifted from the Ukraine and 
Eastern Europe to Liberia via transit stops in Burkina Faso and Niger. 
The weapons were then diverted to the RUF, who made use of them in 
their offensive against Freetown in January 1999 and other operations. 
It is interesting to note that one of the individuals cited as a key arms 
trader, Russian national Viktor Bout, has been tried and convicted 
in the United States on charges related to illegal arms dealing.69
Even prior to the imposition of diamond trading sanctions on Sierra 
Leone, it became apparent that Sierra Leonean diamonds were 
reaching the international market after first being diverted through 
other countries including, most notably, Liberia. Liberian annual 
diamond production capacity is estimated as being 100,000 to 150,000 
carats, however, rough diamond exports to Antwerp from Liberia 
were recorded at 31 million carats from 1994 to 1998, an average of six 
million carats per year. Similarly, Côte d’Ivoire, which had not been 
mining diamonds since the mid-1980s, registered exports of more 
than 1.5 million between 1995 and 1997. Guinea also appeared to be 
67  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa 
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004) 21.
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in the International Criminal Court’ (2007) 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 335, 338; 
Woodward, L, ‘Taylor’s Liberia and the UN’s Involvement’ (2003) 19 New York Law School 
Journal of Human Rights 923, 932–933.
69  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008) 550–562; Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security 
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a diversion point for Sierra Leonean diamonds.70 In 2000, following the 
passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1306, banning 
the sale of diamonds from Sierra Leone, Liberian production increased 
161 per cent from 1999 levels. In response to a UN panel of experts 
report, Security Council Resolution 1343 was passed, prohibiting the 
export or import of Liberian diamonds, so as to close the Liberian 
way-station for Sierra Leonean diamonds.71
According to Global Witness, the RUF trade in conflict diamonds also 
had connections to Al Qaeda and the world of international terrorism. 
For example, in 1998 an RUF official met with operatives from Al Qaeda 
to sell diamonds, with the first transaction involving $100,000 in 
cash for a parcel of diamonds. As further evidence of the connection, 
in 2004 Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a high-level Al Qaeda operative from 
70  Kaplan, M, ‘Junior Fellows’ Note: Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace through the 
Diamond Trade’ (2003) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 559, 
568–570; Smillie, I, L Gberie and R Hazleton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds 
and Human Security’ (Report, Partnership Africa Canada, 2000) 6; Koyame, M, ‘United Nations 
Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ (2005) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 80, 87; Cuellar, M, ‘Panel: Combating Diamonds 
in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2007) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 80, 447–448. The literature also 
notes that identifying accurately even the ‘country of export’ was complicated by problems of 
fraud and corruption within the Antwerp diamond market at the time. Smillie, I, L Gberie and 
R Hazleton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security’ (Report, 
Partnership Africa Canada, 2000) 6. It was also noted that Liberia was used as a way-station for 
other illicit diamonds — Russian diamonds, for example. Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence 
of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 7 January 2008) 565–567.
71  Kaplan, M, ‘Junior Fellows’ Note: Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace through the 
Diamond Trade’ (2003) 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 559, 570. 
Resolutions renewed the sanctions on a regular basis, even following the election of the reformist 
government of President Sirleaf on 23 November 2005, and the arrest of former President 
Charles Taylor on war crimes charges on 29 March 2006. However, trade in diamonds possessing 
a certificate of origin was permitted. Controversially, the sanctions were entirely removed in 
2007 under SC Res 1753 of 27 April 2007, with commentators arguing that Liberia was still 
not in a position to ensure the conflict-free status of its diamonds. Global Witness, ‘Cautiously 
Optimistic: The Case for Maintaining Sanctions in Liberia’ (Report, 2006) 17.
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Tanzania was arrested on suspicion of being involved in the trading 
of conflict diamonds and running a $20 million financing operation, 
trading illegal conflict diamonds in the Liberian capital of Monrovia.72
Crimes fuelled by conflict diamonds have now been prosecuted in 
a number of cases before the international criminal justice system, 
namely the Special Court for Sierra Leone. After Sankoh was captured 
in 2000, the Special Court was established to try him and other persons 
for violations of international law during the conflict. Although Sankoh 
died before the commencement of his trial in 2004, other members 
of the RUF leadership, namely Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and 
Augustine Gbao, were convicted of international crimes on 2 March 
2009, with their convictions upheld on appeal on 26 October 2009.73 
In June 2003, the Sierra Leone Special Court unsealed an indictment 
against Liberian President Charles Taylor in relation to his alleged 
involvement in violations of international criminal law during the 
Sierra Leone conflict. President Taylor subsequently resigned his 
office and went into hiding in Nigeria in August 2003, until being 
taken into custody by the court on 29 March 2006.74 His trial, which 
was moved to The Hague, commenced on 7 January 2008, with closing 
arguments concluding on 11 March 2011. Charles Taylor was found 
72  Martinez, I, ‘Africa at the Crossroads: Current Themes in African Law: VI. Conflict 
Resolution in Africa: Sierra Leone’s “Conflict Diamonds”: The Legacy of Imperial Mining Laws 
and Policy’ (2001/2002) 10 University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
217, 236; Global Witness, ‘For a Few Dollars More: How Al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond 
Trade’ (Report, April 2003) 45–50; Tanna, Ketan, ‘Pakistan Arrests Conflict Diamonds Al Qaeda 
Operative’, The Rapaport Diamond Report (2 August 2004), cited in Koyame, M, ‘United Nations 
Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(2005) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 80, 95. For discussion of the role of ECOMOG in such 
interventions, see Brockman, J, ‘Liberia: The Case for Changing UN Processes for Humanitarian 
Interventions’ (2004) 22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 711, 713–720.
73  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa 
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004); The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber 
I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009); The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon 
and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 
29 October 2009). For a comprehensive analysis of the early work of the Tribunal, see Jalloh, 
C C, ‘The Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the Development of International 
Law’ (2007) 15 RADIC 165, 165–207. See also Schocken, C, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: 
Overview and Recommendations’ (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law 436.
74  Brockman, J, ‘Liberia: The Case for Changing UN Processes for Humanitarian Interventions’ 
(2004) 22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 711, 738–739; Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Chief Prosecutor Announces the Arrival of Charles Taylor at the Special 
Court’ (Press Release, 29 March 2006). Available at: www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/
prosecutor-032906.pdf.
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guilty on 26 April 2012 on all 11 counts, when the Trial Chamber 
delivered its judgement. On 30 May 2012, the Trial Chamber delivered 
its sentencing judgement, sentencing Taylor to 50 years imprisonment. 
On 26 September 2013, Taylor’s conviction and sentence were upheld 
by the judgement of the Appeals Chamber.75 Pro-government forces, 
most notably the so-called Civil Defence Forces (CDF) militia, have also 
been brought to account for human rights abuses allegedly committed 
during the war. For example, the CDF was known to practice torture, 
while the Sierra Leone Government was also documented as enlisting 
child soldiers during the military regime of Valentine Strasser from 
1992 to 1996.76 Members of the CDF leadership were convicted of 
international crimes by the Special Court on 2 August 2007, with the 
convictions upheld on appeal on 28 May 2008.77
Since the conclusion of the Sierra Leone civil war, there has thankfully 
been a decade of peace and development. It should be noted, however, 
that issues remain, particularly in relation to Sierra Leone’s alluvial 
diamond mining sector. Of particular concern is the ongoing problem 
of child labour in the 120,000 person strong artisanal industry.78
The Democratic Republic of Congo
The problem of conflict diamonds was central to the outbreak and 
prolongation of the 1996–2002 war in the DRC, which has now 
transformed into the recent civil war in the north-east of that country. 
The DRC has suffered from a resource curse relating not only to 
diamonds, but a range of minerals including copper, cobalt, uranium, 
tin, zinc, and coltan, the latter being a key material in the manufacture 
75  Special Court for Sierra Leone, Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor vs. 
Charles Gankay Taylor. Available at: www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html.
76  Pham, J P, ‘A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’ (2006) 19 New York International Law Review 37, 70–72; Mitchell III, A F, ‘Sierra Leone: 
The Road to Childhood Ruination Through Forced Recruitment of Child Soldiers and the World’s 
Failure to Act’ (2003) 2 Regent Journal of International Law 81, 85–86.
77  The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 2 August 2007); The Prosecutor v Moinina 
Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 
Case No SCSL-04-14-A, 28 May 2008).
78  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 9–16. 
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of mobile telephones and other electronic equipment.79 The resource 
curse is seen as working in two different ways in the DRC conflict. 
Access to resources acted both as a reason to enter the war for militias 
and national governments, and a factor for prolonging involvement 
in the war. The war resulted in the deaths of some 3 million people, 
because of fighting, disease, and malnutrition, as well as approximately 
500,000 refugees and 2 million internally displaced people, and saw six 
national armies from neighbouring countries intervene in the conflict. 
The war also accentuated the poverty of the population, with the 
DRC ranked at 155th place out of 173 countries on the UNDP Human 
Development Index, despite its abundance of natural resources.80 
The war has its genesis in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where militias 
known as Interahamwe, backed by the government armed forces, killed 
some 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In the wake of their 
defeat by the Tutsi-led rebels, the Interahamwe and other genocidaires 
fled across the border into the DRC, from which they launched attacks 
on Rwanda and the longstanding Tutsi population resident in eastern 
Congo. In response to these attacks, and in an attempt to protect the 
Tutsi population, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo (ADFL), led by Laurent Kabila, was formed. The ADFL was 
backed by the incoming Tutsi-led Rwandan government, which, 
commentators allege, not only supported the ADFL’s wider agenda to 
topple Congolese President Mobuto Sese Seko, but also had designs 
on the mineral wealth of  the eastern Congolese provinces. In 1997, 
Kabila’s forces entered the capital Kinshasa and toppled Mobutu’s 
government. The 1996 to 1997 phase of the conflict is often termed the 
First Congolese War.81
79  Juma, L, ‘The War in Congo: Transitional Conflict Networks and the Failure 
of  Internationalism’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 97, 122–124; British 
Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Q&A: Plunder in the Congo’, BBC News: World Edition (21 October 
2002). Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2346817.stm.
80  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Q&A: Plunder in the Congo’, BBC News: World Edition 
(21 October 2002). Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2346817.stm; Fonseca, A, Four 
Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 49. Available at: www.
oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm. For statistics on casualties, refugees and displacements 
relating to the 1998–2002 period, see Koyame, M, ‘United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle 
to Curb the Illicit Trade in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2005) 1 African Journal 
of Legal Studies 80, 89.
81  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Q&A: Plunder in the Congo’, BBC News: World Edition 
(21 October 2002). Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2346817.stm; Juma, L, ‘The War 
in Congo: Transitional Conflict Networks and the Failure of Internationalism’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga 
Journal of International Law 97, 132–139.
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The support of Rwanda and allied Uganda for the new Kabila 
Government proved to be short-lived. Speculation regarding the change 
in Rwandan policy ranges from Kabila no longer being interested in 
protecting Congolese Tutsi, to wider rumours about Kabila reneging 
on important promises made to large mining corporations.82 In August 
1998 the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) emerged, supported by 
Rwanda and intent on enforcing a second regime change in Kinshasa.83 
The forward offensive was blocked, however, by troops from Angola, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, and a four-year stand-off ensued in what 
is sometimes called the Second Congolese War.84 
Although Kabila’s government survived the invasion, Kabila himself 
was not so fortunate, and died to an assassin’s bullet in 2001. It was 
left to his son and successor, Joseph Kabila, to become a party to 
the September 2002 Luanda Agreement. The agreement saw the 
commencement of a gradual withdrawal of foreign armies, although 
conflict has continued through rebel groups operating particularly in 
the north-eastern Ituri and Kivu regions.85 
A UNSC expert panel has argued that the involvement of foreign 
governments and militias in the conflict was influenced by a desire to 
reap the benefits of the extensive mineral wealth, including diamonds, 
of the DRC. The  panel argued that the main beneficiaries from the 
conflict have been individuals in the military and political leadership 
of the intervening nations, rather than those nations themselves.86 
As evidence of how Rwandan diamond enterprises supported 
Kabila’s ADFL in the First Congolese War, the report detailed 
a  financial transaction where a US$3.5 million payment was made 
from a  diamond company named MIBA to COMIEX, a company 
82  Juma, L, ‘The War in Congo: Transitional Conflict Networks and the Failure 
of Internationalism’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 97, 144–148.
83  Ibid 145–147.
84  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Q&A: Plunder in the Congo’, BBC News: World Edition 
(21 October 2002). Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2346817.stm.
85  Price, T M, ‘Article: The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the 
Universality Debate’ (2003) 12 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, 16–22; British Broadcasting 
Corporation, ‘Q&A: Plunder in the Congo’, BBC News: World Edition (21 October 2002). 
Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2346817.stm.
86  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) [135]–
[138]; Clark, J F and M Koyame, ‘The Economic Impact of the Congo War’ in J F Clark (ed.), 
The Africa Stakes of the Congo War (Palgrave MacMillan, 2002) 55–56.
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owned by Kabila. The payment was from an account held with the 
Rwandan Government’s financial institution Banque de Commerce, du 
Développement et d’Industrie. The report also stated that cargo flights 
carrying military equipment to airstrips in eastern DRC would return 
with loads of gold and coffee, as well as businessmen with stolen 
diamonds for sale.87 
During the Second Congolese War, a major diamond and gold dealer 
named Ali Hussein was reported to have met many times with 
Rwandan Government officials.88 Rwanda was estimated to have 
earned some US$4 million from 1998 to 2000 as a result of diamond 
licensing revenues, although it later shared the income with the RCD-
Goma regional administration.89 Statistics from the Antwerp Diamond 
High Council show that Rwanda, which has no diamond resources of 
its own, exported US$720,000 worth of diamonds in 1997, US$17,000 
in 1998, US$439,000 in 1999 and US$1.8 million in 2000.90 These 
statistics were largely corroborated by World Trade Organization 
(WTO) records.91 
The Ugandan Government funded its presence in the DRC through 
the re-exportation economy, repackaging and exporting natural 
resources from the DRC as Ugandan natural resources. According 
to the Antwerp Diamond High Council, Uganda, which was never 
previously a diamond exporter, exported $1.5 million dollars worth 
of diamonds in 1998, $1.8 million in 1999, and $1.3 million in 2000.92 
87  Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 49–50. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm; Report of the Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) [25]–[29].
88  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 
[93]; Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 52. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
89  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 29.
90  Ibid 25.
91  Ibid [21]–[30]; Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 
(18 April 2004) 54. Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
92  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 21.
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Statistics from the WTO corroborated the fact that Uganda, without 
diamond resources of its own, exported diamonds between 1998 
and 2001.93
Zimbabwe was also benefiting from Congolese diamonds, particularly 
in the diamond-rich Mbuji-Mayi area. There were notably 2,500 to 3,000 
Zimbabwean troops in the area, even after most other foreign armies 
had withdrawn from the DRC in 2002.94 The region had previously 
been the site of a major battle between Rwandan-backed forces and 
DRC forces in 2001.95 Burundi also caused Kabila consternation when 
its military venture into South Kivu province appeared to threaten 
the Congolese diamond reserves in nearby Katanga.96 WTO statistics 
showed that Burundi, without any diamond extraction industries of 
its own, exported sizeable quantities of diamonds in the period 1997–
2000.97 In an interesting twist, commentators suggest that Angola’s 
involvement was largely concerned with the disruption of the conflict 
diamonds trade rather than its perpetuation, considering that Kabila 
was opposed to UNITA forces trading their diamonds on Congolese 
territory.98 
Mineral resources were also a goal for a variety of militia groups, some 
of which were allegedly proxies for foreign governments. As a result, 
diamond-rich areas became the focus of fighting during the conflict. 
In August 1999, the diamond-rich town of Kisangani was the site 
of a major battle following the split of the main rebel group, which 
was fuelled by the desire to control local natural resources. The RCD, 
split into two parts: the RCD-ML, supported by Uganda, and the 
RCD-Goma, supported by Rwanda. The battle, which also involved 
direct fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops, killed some 
93  Ibid [21]–[30]; Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 
(18 April 2004) 54. Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
94  Juma, L, ‘Africa, its Conflicts and its Traditions: Debating a Suitable Role for Tradition in 
African Peace Initiatives’ (2005) 13 Michigan State University College of Law 417, 454; Juma, 
‘The War in Congo’, above n 69, 148–149; BBC, ‘Plunder in the Congo’, above n 115.
95  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 36.
96  Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 31. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
97  Ibid 54; Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 
[21]–[30].
98  Juma, L, ‘The War in Congo: Transitional Conflict Networks and the Failure 
of Internationalism’ (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 97, 149.
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400 soldiers and 200 civilians.99 On  18  November 2000, RCD-Goma 
and its Rwandan allied troops stationed in Kisangani attacked and 
took control of positions belonging to Ugandan-supported forces in 
Bengamisa, 50 kilometres north-west of Kisangani, an area with an 
abundance of diamonds.100 Late in December 2000, the RCD-Goma 
launched attacks against two other diamond-rich areas in Kandole and 
Lakutu.101 Control over diamond resources caused a further schism 
when the RCD-National formed with the objective of controlling 
north-eastern diamond resources in the Ituri region.102 
The RCD-ML benefited from its control over resources in the Ituri 
region during the Second Congolese War. For example, RCD-ML 
received benefits in exchange for granting the Ugandan-Thai company 
DARA-Forest a licence to harvest diamonds, coltan, and timber after 
the company had failed to acquire a concession from Kinshasa in March 
1998.103 The expert panel identified the retired Ugandan Major General 
Salim Saleh as benefiting from Congolese diamonds, particularly from 
the Kisangani region, as well as gold. He allegedly played a major 
role in Uganda’s operations in north-eastern Congo, cultivating 
a reciprocal relationship with RCD-ML elites. In essence, he ensured 
their individual safety in return for their looking after his resource 
extraction schemes. The general also fostered a close relationship with 
the senior leadership of RCD-National, through which dealings in 
diamonds and other natural resources were facilitated.104
In the wake of the phased withdrawal of foreign troops following the 
2002 Luanda Agreement, the UNSC expert panel commented that 
governments, including DRC government members, have continued 
99  Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 32, 
25. Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm; Juma, L, ‘Africa, its Conflicts and its 
Traditions: Debating a Suitable Role for Tradition in African Peace Initiatives’ (2005) 13 Michigan 
State Journal of International Law 417, 454.
100  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 37.
101  Ibid.
102  Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 42. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
103  Ibid 51; Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) 
[48]–[49].
104  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) [88]–
[89]; Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 52–53. 
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to benefit illicitly from mineral resources. The panel was critical of 
the connection between the DRC Government and the Zimbabwean 
Government, including the major mining project in the diamond 
centre of Mbuji Mayi. Other diamond projects are run as joint ventures 
involving both DRC and Zimbabwean officials, particularly under the 
umbrella of the COSLEG stock company. However, the panel argued 
that projects are run with the support of individuals from the DRC and 
Zimbabwean military and political elites, which give little or no revenue 
to the DRC national treasury, while supporting the individual interests 
of members of those elites. The panel also argued that, because of such 
arrangements, individuals in the Zimbabwean political and military 
circles will continue to benefit, even though the formal Zimbabwean 
military presence from the DRC is in a process of withdrawal. The 
panel argued that as a result of these transactions, Harare in Zimbabwe 
became ‘a significant illicit diamond-trading centre’.105
In the case of Rwanda, it is alleged in the expert panel’s report that 
the regional administration in the Kivu region of the DRC has largely 
been infiltrated by persons loyal to Rwanda, who will continue 
to support the efforts of that country to exploit the DRC’s mineral 
wealth, including diamond resources. Profits from resource extraction 
largely transferred back to the Rwandan Army through its Congo 
Desk, with only a small amount returning to the coffers of the regional 
administration.106
Similar to the case of Rwanda, the panel argued that the formal 
withdrawal of the Ugandan military apparatus will not prevent 
continuing economic gain to individuals who are involved in private 
businesses in the DRC. In particular, the panel argued that there are a 
number of rebel groups in Uganda who operate as de facto arms of the 
Ugandan military, able to represent the interests of the Ugandan elite 
on an ongoing basis.107
In response to the conflict diamonds problem faced by the DRC, the 
Security Council recommended a number of measures, including the 
imposition of a diamond embargo on the DRC and Rwanda, Uganda 
105  Final Report Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146 (16 October 
2002) 6–8.
106  Ibid 14–15.
107  Ibid 19–21.
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and Burundi, as well as encouraging the imposition of criminal 
sanctions against corporations and individuals breaking the embargo. 
The Security Council also called for an end to trade with certain banks, 
the seizure of assets of particular individuals, and an arms embargo 
and suspension of military cooperation with national and rebel 
military forces operating in the DRC. In contrast to the cases of Sierra 
Leone, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, however, sanctions were 
not immediately imposed on the DRC and its forces of occupation.108 
A 12-month arms embargo on the eastern half of the country was 
eventually mandated in July 2003, which was extended to the whole 
of the country in May 2005, along with assets of particular individuals 
being frozen. Sanctions on commodities such as diamonds were not 
favoured even as recently as 2007 by a UN expert panel.109 
In its subsequent 2002 report, the expert panel named not only 
individuals but a comprehensive list of small enterprises and very 
large multinational enterprises that were allegedly fuelling the 
DRC war. The persons and entities named were separated into two 
categories. The first category, listed in annexes I and II of that report, 
were targeted for restrictive measures because ‘[b]y contributing to the 
revenues of the elite networks, directly or indirectly, those companies 
and individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict and to human 
rights abuses’. While noting that those listed would be in violation 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the individuals and 
enterprises ‘involved in criminal and illicit exploitation’ were targeted 
for particular measures: travel bans on selected individuals identified 
by the panel; freezing of the personal assets of persons involved in 
illegal exploitation; barring selected companies and individuals from 
accessing banking facilities and other financial institutions, and from 
receiving funding or establishing a partnership or other commercial 
relations with international financial institutions. The panel 
108  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) [221]–
[225]; Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 68. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
109  Global Policy Forum, The Democratic Republic of Congo (2006). Available at: www.
globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kongidx.htm; Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), UN Doc 
S/2007/40 (31 January 2007) [44]–[45].
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recommended, however, that a grace period of four to five months 
be provided for those corporations identified to prove that they had 
ceased their financial activities in the DRC.110 
The panel identified a further list of corporations, many large 
multinationals registered in Europe or the United States, as being 
presumably less criminally liable in their behaviour, but nevertheless 
in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The 
expert panel reminded national governments of their responsibility to 
ensure that enterprises in their jurisdiction do not abuse principles of 
conduct they had adopted as a matter of law, with criminal prosecutions 
under national legislation being one option for consideration by 
governments. The panel also recommended that the Security Council 
establish a monitoring body to oversee action taken by governments in 
relation to multinational corporations registered in their countries.111 
Diamond trading corporations featured prominently in both categories 
identified by the expert panel. In relation to the corporations singled 
out for direct punitive action, five corporations were exclusively 
identified with the mining or trading in diamonds. The second list, 
however, was perhaps more startling for its inclusion of diamond 
mining giant De Beers and other high-profile corporates such as the 
mining company Anglo-American, and Barclays Bank. Altogether, 
12  exclusively diamond mining/trading enterprises were placed on 
the category two list.112
The UN panel report also called for the universal implementation of the 
Kimberley Process. Interestingly, they called for the establishment of 
a permanently staffed secretariat at the international level, and identified 
the necessity of creating a specialised enforcement organisation within 
each member country with the authority, knowledge and specialised 
training necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Kimberley 
Process.113
110  Final Report Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002) 
[176].
111  Ibid [170], [177]–[178].
112  Ibid 5–7, 35–44; Fishman, J L, ‘Is Diamond Smuggling Forever?: The Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade 
Problem’ (2005) 13 University of Miami Business Law Review 217, 217, 222.
113  Final Report Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms 
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002) 182.
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The withdrawal of Ugandan troops in 2002 sparked further problems, 
particularly in the Ituri area. Despite the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC), the power vacuum created by the 
withdrawal of troops has now effectively been replaced by elements 
who defected from the regular forces of the Congolese Army, who 
now operate under the name of Mouvement  Révolutionnaire du Congo 
(MRC). Reports from observers of the situation in 2006 noted that MRC 
military activities were supported by the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources in the region.114 Militia groups operating in the area had 
a strong incentive to acquire as much gold and diamonds as possible, 
so as to pre-empt the operation of the Ituri Pacification Committee, 
whose purpose under the Luanda Agreement is the management of 
natural resources. As a result, a showdown occurred between Ugandan-
backed RCD-ML, Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI), and 
Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) on the one hand, and 
the Rwandan-backed Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), supported 
by the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) and the RCD-National. 
The  Ituri conflict was further complicated by an ethnic dimension, 
notably that the Ugandan-backed militias were composed primarily 
of people of Lendu ethnic background, while the UPC was primarily 
composed of persons of Hema ethnicity. The ethnic dimension sparked 
fears of a possible genocide, which fortunately didn’t eventuate.115
Human rights violations in the Ituri region, however, attracted the 
attention of the international criminal justice system, leading to 
indictments and the first arrests by the newly established ICC.116 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, leader of the UPC, was arrested on the same 
day as the issuance of the indictment against him on 17 March 2006, 
with the assistance of Congolese authorities, French armed forces, and 
MONUC forces.117 The indictment against Lubanga alleges that the UPC, 
under the leadership of Lubanga, seized control of Bunia and parts of 
114  Africa Initiative Programme and Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER-
Africa), ‘Elections and Security in Ituri: Stumbling Blocks and Opportunities for Peace in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Report, 13 June 2006) 4–27.
115  Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998–2004 (18 April 2004) 81–82. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
116  Ibid 82.
117  International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest 
against Thomas Lubanga’ (Press Release, ICC-OTP-20060302-126-En, 2 March 2006); International 
Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, ‘First Arrest for the International Criminal Court’ (Press 
Release, ICC-CPI-20060302-125-En, 17 March 2006).
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Ituri in Orientale Province in 2002, resulting in the death of more than 
8,000 civilians and the displacement of 600,000 others. The indictment 
also alleges that the UPC took young children from their families and 
forced them to join the UPC military forces, which constitutes a crime 
under Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) Rome Statute.118 The ICC 
followed up its first arrest with a second on 18  October 2007, also 
in relation to alleged crimes in the Ituri area. The prosecutor alleged 
that Germain Katanga was a senior commander of the FRPI and was 
responsible for the massacre of hundreds of civilians in the village of 
Bogoro on 24 February 2004, as well as crimes of sexual violence and 
enlisting child soldiers.119 The third arrest, also relating to the Ituri 
situation, occurred on 7 February 2008. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui had 
allegedly been the leader of the FNI at the time that the militia, along 
with the FRPI, attacked the Bogoro village and therefore faced largely 
parallel charges to Katanga.120
The invasion of the DRC by its neighbours has also resulted in a number 
of cases before the International Court of Justice, which adjudicates 
international legal disputes between nations. In Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo, the DRC claimed that the invasion of 
Congolese territory by Burundian, Ugandan, and Rwandan troops 
on 2 August 1998 constituted a violation of its sovereignty and its 
territorial integrity, as well as a threat to peace and security in Central 
Africa. The issue of illegal seizure of assets was also raised by the DRC. 
The International Court of Justice found that it had jurisdiction to 
consider issuing preliminary measures against Uganda.121 A further 
case before the International Court followed from the issuance of an 
118  International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest 
against Thomas Lubanga’ (Press Release, ICC-OTP-20060302-126-En, 17 March 2006).
119  International Criminal Court, ‘Case Information Sheet for The Prosecutor v Germain 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07’. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20
cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200107/Pages/
democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx.
120  International Criminal Court, ‘Case Information Sheet for The Prosecutor v Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12‘, www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/ICC-01-04-02-12/Pages/default.aspx. 
Human rights violations and ongoing conflict have also occurred in the Rwandan-influenced 
regions of North and South Kivu, although a recent peace deal with General Nkunda, leader 
of a RCD-Goma splinter group, may herald the way to greater stability. See British Broadcasting 
Corporation, ‘Eastern Congo Peace Deal Signed’ (23 January 2008). Available at: www.
globalpolicy.org/security/issues/congo/2008/0123gomadeal1.htm.
121  Gray, C, ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases Concerning the Use 
of Force After Nicaragua’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 867, 878–880.
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arrest warrant by Belgium on 11 April 2000 against the incumbent 
DRC Foreign Minister, Mr Abdulaye Yerodia Ndambasi, alleging his 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, pursuant 
to a Belgian criminal statute. The International Court ruled that the 
customary international rule providing immunity to incumbent 
foreign ministers against civil and criminal proceedings rendered the 
Belgian arrest warrant unlawful under international law. The court 
noted that this rule would not extend to proceedings initiated against 
former foreign ministers or proceedings before international criminal 
courts.122
Recent statistics indicate that the legitimate diamonds trade in the 
DRC is recovering, indicating some degree of success of the Kimberley 
Process. In 2005, official exports were valued at $642 million, 
constituting a 62.5 per cent increase on the previous year. New and 
independent valuation was partly responsible for the increase, as well 
as effective implementation of the Kimberley Process and the expulsion 
of Congo-Brazzaville from the process in 2004. The expulsion of 
Congo-Brazzaville, a neighbour of the DRC, resulted in an increase in 
the legal trade because it was recognised that Congo-Brazzaville was 
being used as a back door to avoid the Kimberley Process Certification 
System. As a result of its expulsion from the system, Kimberley Process 
members were prohibited from purchasing that country’s diamonds, 
meaning that much of the diamond trade reverted to legitimate 
channels in the DRC. It should be noted, however, that there was still 
an estimated US$350 million leaving the country illicitly, indicating 
the scale of work still to be done with the industry.123 Given the 
example of conflicts in other nations, such periods of relative peace 
carry with them the threat of re-armament through the exploitation 
of conflict diamonds and other natural resources.124
122  Golden Gate University School of Law, ‘Annex: Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium): International Court of Justice 14 February 2002’ (2002) 
8 Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 151, 159–161.
123  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 25–32. The Republic of Congo was re-admitted in 2007 
to the Kimberley Process. Hennessy, S, Congo’s Diamond Industry Let Back into Kimberley Process 
(9 November 2007) Global Policy Forum. Available at: www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/
congo/2007/1109drckp.htm.
124  Malamut, S A, ‘A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley Process and 
Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 29 Suffolk Transnational 
Law Review 25, 43.
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In the period since 2005, although much of the DRC has enjoyed relative 
peace, conflict fuelled by natural resources is an ongoing feature of the 
disturbed north-eastern provinces. Even though minerals other than 
diamonds are the focus of reports by UNSC expert panels in 2007 and 
2008, it is known that diamond deposits also exist in these conflict 
areas, so it may be premature to argue that conflict diamonds are no 
longer a feature of the DRC conflicts. A further development occurred 
with the release in August 2010 of the DRC ‘Mapping Exercise’ by 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The exercise sought 
to provide preliminary evidence of international crimes committed 
from 1993 to 2003 in the context of the Congolese war, and the report 
features a section exploring the connection between resources and 
conflict, and the role it played during the war. It is possible that a 
UN international tribunal may be established to prosecute persons 
most responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide during this period.125
Côte d’Ivoire
The conflict diamonds problem arose dramatically with the outbreak 
of civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, also known as the Ivory Coast, in 
September  2002.126 According to a UNSC investigation, the Forces 
Nouvelle militia in the north of that country, who went to war 
following discontent with a controversial election process, have been 
largely funded through the illegal diamond trade. The resurgence of 
the problem, in the era where the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme is active, has proven a significant test of the resolve of the 
international community in its efforts to combat the problem.127
125  Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), UN Doc S/2007/40 (31 January 2007); Final 
Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2008/773 
(21  November 2008); United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (August 2010) 349–367.
126  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Q&A: Ivory Coast’s Crisis’, BBC News: World Edition 
(17 January 2006). Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3567349.stm.
127  Kofele-Kale, N, ‘The Global Community’s Role in Promoting the Right to Democratic 
Governance and Free Choice in the Third World’ (2005) 11 Law and Business Review of the 
Americas 205, 235; Wexler, Pamela, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on the Occasion 
of its Third Anniversary: An Independent Commissioned Review (Review Report submitted to the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process, February 2006) 7.
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Côte d’Ivoire had experienced widespread stability and prosperity for 
more than three decades after independence under the leadership of 
its first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. It was considered to have 
the fourth-largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. However, military 
rule from 1999 to 2000 under Robert Guéï, general political unrest 
under President Laurent Gbagbo, and the outbreak of civil conflict 
in 2002 led to widespread atrocities, allegedly conducted by both 
government and rebel forces, including political killings, massacres, 
disappearances, and numerous incidents of torture. While a peace 
agreement was brokered between the two sides in 2003, widespread 
impunity and a political and social climate fuelled by intolerance 
and xenophobia have caused fears that the hostilities will resume. 
UN peacekeepers have patrolled a buffer zone separating the rebel-
held north and the government-controlled south, but political efforts 
to reunite the nation have not been successful to date. In September 
2003, Côte d’Ivoire requested that the ICC accept jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on its territory since 19 September 2002.128
Like the situation that affected Sierra Leone previously, the 
establishment by rebel militia of a war economy based on diamonds 
served to entrench the power of the militia and to delay the satisfactory 
resolution of the conflict, which centres around ethnic grievances and 
issues of political representation.129 A UNSC expert panel reported 
that high levels of funds were reaching the northern-based militia 
through diamond sales, and that strict measures were required for this 
to be controlled. The report of the expert group resulted in a Security 
Council ban on imports of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire, 
pursuant to Resolution 1643 (2005).130 The expert group had conducted 
its activities through the support of the current peacekeeping mission 
128  Punyasena, W, ‘Conflict Prevention and the International Criminal Court: Deterrence in 
a Changing World’ (2006) 14 Michigan State Journal of International Law 39, 64–65; Petrova, 
P, ‘The Implementation and Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the 
United States’ (2006) 40 International Lawyer 945, 945. 
129  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Q&A: Ivory Coast’s Crisis’, BBC News: World Edition 
(17 January 2006). Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3567349.stm.
130  SC Res 1643, UN SCOR, 5327th mtg, S/RES/1643 (15 December 2005) (Côte d’Ivoire).
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in Côte d’Ivoire, United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).131 
The responses of the UNSC and the Kimberley Process to this issue is 
discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5.
Côte d’Ivoire is a minor producer of rough diamonds and has been 
a participant in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme since its 
inception. In a letter dated 13 October 2004, the Minister of Mines and 
Energy of Côte d’Ivoire informed the Chair of the Kimberley Process 
that all exports of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire were prohibited 
on the basis of a ministerial order issued on 19 November  2002. 
As there are no significant diamond deposits in the government-
controlled south, this measure seeks to cut off the northern rebels 
from international diamond markets.132
The group of experts investigated the production and export of rough 
diamonds from Seguela, Bobi, and Diarabla localities in northern 
Côte d’Ivoire in July 2005 and obtained credible information about 
diamond production in the region. The group visited the area and 
received information that significant artisanal production of rough 
diamonds was occurring along a number of small streams between 
the villages, but that semi-industrial or industrial mining techniques 
were not used.133 Based on the number of active pits and workers, 
the expert group estimated that production was at a level of 300,000 
carats per year, equal to production prior to the conflict. The revenue 
accrued by the groups controlling the production is many millions 
of US dollars per year.134 Rather than mining diamonds themselves, 
Forces Nouvelles were raising their revenue through systems of 
taxation. The militia appropriated the local diamond bureaucracy, 
and so were directly receiving taxes on diamond production that had 
previously gone to the national government. The militia also employed 
131  Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Security Council 
Resolution 1584 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2005/699 (7 November 2005); 
Update Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 1632 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2006/204 (31 March 2006).
132  Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Security Council 
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an indirect approach, through imposing a tax on those who purchased 
automobiles and motorcycles with revenue from diamond mining, or 
alternatively on persons seeking to access diamond mining areas.135 
Like the situation in other affected countries, conflict diamonds have 
been smuggled out of Côte d’Ivoire through neighbouring states. 
In this  case, the countries in question are apparently Guinea — 
a Kimberley Process participant — and Mali — a Kimberley Process 
applicant at the relevant time — after which the diamonds have been 
distributed to international markets, such as Antwerp, Dubai, or Tel 
Aviv. It is interesting to note that, unlike the situation of Republic 
of Congo, neither Mali nor Guinea was expelled from the Kimberley 
Process in response to their alleged role.136
According to a UN expert’s report in 2010, diamonds from the Seguela 
and Tortiya regions of northern Côte d’Ivoire continue to be smuggled 
through neighbouring Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, and Mali, which 
are unable or unwilling to enforce the diamond embargo. It is unclear, 
however, if the trade is connected to the most recent wave of violence 
in the country, in which outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo chose 
violent struggle over peaceful transition to the administration of 
newly elected President Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo was ultimately 
arrested for international crimes related to the brief armed struggle 
occurring from latter part of 2010 to early 2011.137 His arrest marked 
the end of the brief civil war.138 His case at the ICC was joined to 
that of Ble Goude on 11 March 2015, and the trial commenced on 
28 January 2016.139
135  Ibid; Update Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 1632 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2006/204 (31 March 2006) 10.
136  Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Security Council 
Resolution 1584 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2005/699 (7 November 2005) 17–20.
137  Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security 
Council Resolution 1946 (2010), UN Doc S/2011/272 (17 March 2011) 55–61; ‘Diamonds: Côte 
d’Ivore’ (February 2011) 41(12) Africa Research Bulletin, ‘Diamonds: Zimbabwe’ (2011) 41(12) 
February Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 18960; Dawn News, 
‘Blood Diamond Fears in Ivory Coast Political Duel’ (28 December 2010). Available at: www.
dawn.com/2010/12/28/blood-diamond-fears-in-ivory-coast-political-duel.html; McClanahan, 
P, As Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Holds Firm, ‘Blood Diamonds’ Flow for Export (23 January 2011) 
ReliefWeb. Available at: reliefweb.int/node/381665.
138  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Gbagbo Held After Assault on Residence’ (11 April 2011). 
Available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13039825.
139  The International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor vs. Laurent Gbagbo and Ble Goude, ICC-
02/11-01/15. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude/Pages/default.aspx.
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Zimbabwe
Alluvial diamonds were discovered in the Chiadzwa district of 
Marange, eastern Zimbabwe, in June 2006. The diamond fields stretch 
over 66,000 hectares and, although estimates of the reserves contained 
in this area vary wildly, some have gone so far as to suggest that it 
could be home to one of the world’s richest diamond deposits. Illicit 
production from the region, up to the end of 2008, was valued at 
approximately US$150 million. Over the past four years, Marange 
has been plagued by horrific human rights abuses by state security 
agencies against diamond diggers and local communities, resulting 
in hundreds of deaths, and many more cases of assault, rape, arbitrary 
detention, and forced labour. 140
From early 2007, police officers stationed in the fields began forcing 
miners to work in syndicates under their control, demanding bribes, 
and beating or killing anyone else they found mining in the area. The 
violence reached a peak in October 2008 with the arrival of the army, 
and the launch of Operation Hakudzokwi or ‘You will not return’. 
This operation appeared to have two goals: to ensure control of the 
diamond deposits for the Zanu Patriotic Front elite, and to reward 
the army for its loyalty to this clique. More than 800 soldiers were 
deployed alongside helicopter gunships, killing over 200 people.141
Following this operation, soldiers took over mining syndicates 
previously run by the police, and forced local people, including 
children, to mine for them. The military was also central in facilitating 
smuggling diamonds out of Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries, 
140  Human Rights Watch, ‘Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange 
Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe’ (Report, June 2009) 3–4; Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Zimbabwe, 
Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History’ (Report, March 2009) 3, 5; Partnership Africa Canada, 
‘Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarised Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe’ (Report, 
June 2010) 18; Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control 
Zimbabwe’s New-found Diamond Wealth’ (Report, 14 June 2010) 6–8. 
141  Human Rights Watch, ‘Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange 
Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe’ (Report, June 2009) 3–4; Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Zimbabwe, 
Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History’ (Report, March 2009) 7–8; Partnership Africa Canada, 
‘Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarised Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe’ (Report, June 
2010) 18; Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe’s 
New-found Diamond Wealth’ (Report, 14 June 2010) 6–8. There was an initial KP review visit in 
May to June 2007, prior to the worst violence. The review focused on the country’s regulatory 
framework and noted that the contentious fields were under government control. The KP review 
was criticised for failing to highlight ongoing human rights abuses. Partnership Africa Canada, 
‘Diamonds and Human Security: Annual Review 2008’ (Annual Report, October 2008) 23–24.
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including Mozambique and South Africa. Once again, civilians found 
digging for diamonds independently of the syndicates were severely 
beaten or killed as a warning to others.142
A Kimberley Process Review Mission was eventually sent to the 
country in June 2009 to investigate the violence and assess compliance 
with KP standards. The mission found evidence of grave human 
rights abuses, armed soldiers managing syndicates of miners, and 
a ‘smuggling operation that enables rough diamonds to flow from 
Zimbabwe outside the KPCS … largely operated and maintained by 
official entities’. This finding alone — that state agents were running 
diamond smuggling operations to Mozambique, a non-KP participant 
— should be grounds for expulsion from the scheme.143
The review team, made up of government, NGO, and industry 
representatives, ‘identified several areas in which Zimbabwe [is] 
non-compliant with the minimum requirements of the KPCS’, and 
recommended that the country be suspended from the scheme for at 
least six months.144
In a press conference held at the end of the visit, the mission’s 
leader, Liberian Deputy Minister of Mines Kpandel Fayia, made an 
impassioned plea to the Zimbabwean authorities:
Minister, on the issue of violence against civilians, I need to be clear 
about this. Our team was able to interview and document the stories of 
tens of victims, observe their wounds, scars from dog bites and batons, 
tears, and on-going psychological trauma. I am from Liberia, Sir; I was 
in Liberia throughout the 15 years of civil war; and I have experienced 
too much senseless violence in my lifetime, especially connected to 
diamonds. In speaking with some of these people, Minister, I had 
to leave the room. This has to be acknowledged and it has to stop.145
142  Human Rights Watch, ‘Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange 
Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe’ (Report, June 2009) 3–4; Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Zimbabwe, 
Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History’ (Report, March 2009) 7–8; Partnership Africa Canada, 
‘Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarised Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe’ (Report, 
June 2010) 15–16; Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control 
Zimbabwe’s New-found Diamond Wealth’ (Report, 14 June 2010) 6–8.
143  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Diamonds and Human Security: Annual Review 2009’ (Annual 
Report, 2009) 19; Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control 
Zimbabwe’s New-found Diamond Wealth’ (Report, 14 June 2010) 6–8.
144  Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe’s 
New-found Diamond Wealth’ (Report, 14 June 2010) 6–8.
145  Ibid.
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The situation in the Marange diamond fields remains critical. 
The Zimbabwean authorities claim that the joint venture companies 
they have recently established and given permits to mine in Marange 
will help regulate the diamond sector and improve standards. 
However, these companies are only operating in around 3 per cent of 
the diamond fields, with the remaining 97 per cent under the control 
of the army.146
The widespread smuggling of Marange diamonds out of Zimbabwe 
persists, and the army continues to operate syndicates of miners 
as a means of capturing the proceeds of this illegal trade.147
There have been some cases of enforcement action by national 
governments in relation to smuggled Zimbabwean diamonds. 
On  20  September 2008, India’s Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 
(DRI) apprehended two Lebanese nationals, named as Yusuf Oselli and 
Robar Hussain, from a hotel in Surat, the centre of India’s diamond 
industry. They found rough diamonds weighing 3,600 carats and 
valued at almost $800,000. The pair said they had brought the 
diamonds from Zimbabwe, and that they had made several earlier 
runs. The men, who did not have a Kimberley Process certificate or 
any other documentation for the diamonds, told the DRI that they had 
carried the diamonds through Dubai, landing undetected at Mumbai 
on 15 September.148
In October 2008, Dubai Customs discovered bags of diamonds 
wrapped around the body of a Zimbabwean woman transiting in 
Dubai. The  diamonds weighed 53,500 carats and were valued at 
US$1.2 million. The information was carried in local and international 
media, including a photograph that shows that the diamonds resemble 
146  Ibid.
147  Simpson, John, ‘Profiting from Zimbabwe’s “blood diamonds”’, BBC News (online), 20 April 
2009. Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8007406.stm; Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Zimbabwe, 
Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History’ (Report, March 2009) 7–8; Global Witness, ‘Return of 
the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe’s New-found Diamond Wealth’ (Report, 
14 June 2010) 6–8. Mugabe’s wife has personally benefited from the mining according to some 
reports. Herskovitz, Jon, ‘Zimbabwe Govt, c.bank in Blood Diamond Trade: WikiLeaks’, Reuters: 
Africa (9 December 2010). Available at: af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE6B80F820101209.
148  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History’ (Report, 
March 2009) 12.
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those originating from Marange. There is no information on whether 
the woman was charged, her travel origin or destination, or  the 
disposition of the diamonds.149
Although access to the Marange diamond fields has been severely 
restricted, testimony gathered from victims by local civil society 
representatives shows that serious human rights abuses, including 
assault and rape, are still being committed by the army and the police.150 
In March 2010, the Centre for Research and Development, an NGO 
based in Mutare, the provincial capital, identified 26 victims of abuse 
in the diamond fields and the surrounding area, including two cases 
of rape, and one of a woman being beaten so severely she was left 
partially blind. In April, the same NGO recorded 24 cases of assault by 
the security forces against civilians.151
Some local experts believe that the actual number of assaults is much 
higher, but that people are too afraid to report abuses for fear of further 
harassment. The researchers also note that the violence often precedes 
visits to the area by important government delegations — an apparent 
attempt to clear the area of miners before the visitors arrive.152
Despite the continued violence, Zimbabwe remains a member of the 
Kimberley Process, the international certification body set up to 
prevent diamond-fuelled violence and abuses. The failure of KP 
member states to agree to suspend Zimbabwe has prompted deep 
concern among some KP participants and observers, who have begun 
to question the future of the scheme.153
In 2009, a compromise approach to the Zimbabwe issue was agreed to 
by the KP, whereby the KP sent an official monitor to the Chiadzwa 
region. Zimbabwe was given six months to fall in line with international 
trade standards, pursuant to a ‘Joint Work Plan’ that included the 
demilitarisation of the diamond fields. However, this has not happened, 
and there have been ongoing reports of smuggling and harassment by 
military officers. Despite this, the KP allowed two auctions of stockpiled 
149  Ibid 12–13.
150  Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe’s 
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diamonds in 2010. The sales were meant to pave the way for full exports 
to resume, but KP members have not reached the necessary consensus 
on whether to allow full exports to resume. The KP has contradicted 
claims by the Zimbabwean Mines Minister in January 2011 that it has 
been given permission to make further official sales.154
Central African Republic
The Central African Republic (CAR) conflict is an ongoing civil war 
in the CAR between the Séléka rebel coalition and government forces, 
which began on 10 December 2012. The conflict arose after rebels 
accused the government of President François Bozizé of failing to 
abide by peace agreements signed in 2007 and 2011. Many of the rebel 
groups had been involved in the CAR Bush War. 
Rebel forces known as Séléka (meaning ‘union’ in the Sango language) 
captured many major towns in the central and eastern regions of 
the country at the end of 2012. Séléka comprises two major groups 
based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity 
(UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), 
but also includes the lesser known Patriotic Convention for Saving 
the Country (CPSK). Two other groups based in northern CAR — 
the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) and the 
Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR) — also announced 
their allegiance to the Séléka coalition. 
Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, South Africa, the DRC and the 
Republic of Congo sent troops as part of the Economic Community of 
Central African States’ FOMAC force to help the Bozizé government 
hold back a potential rebel advance on the capital, Bangui. However, 
the capital was seized by the rebels on 24 March 2013 at which time 
President Bozizé fled the country, and the rebel leader Michel Djotodia 
154  Africa Research Bulletin, ‘Diamonds: Zimbabwe’ (2011) 41(12) February Africa Research 
Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 18960, 18960–18961; Global Witness, Industry 
Must Refuse Zimbabwe Diamonds Certified by Rogue Monitor (16 November 2010). Available at: 
www.globalwitness.org/library/industry-must-refuse-zimbabwe-diamonds-certified-rogue-
monitor; Global Witness, Conflict Diamond Scheme Must Resolve Zimbabwe Impasse (5 November 
2010). Available at: www.globalwitness.org/library/conflict-diamond-scheme-must-resolve-
zimbabwe-impasse.
69
2 . ARe CoNFLICT DIAMoNDS FoReveR?
declared himself president. Due to the presence of diamonds in the 
country, the UNSC imposed a diamond embargo, which was backed 
by action from the Kimberley Process.
India
Beyond the current mandate of the Kimberley Process, which focuses 
on the connection of the diamond trade to human rights violations 
reaching the level of international crimes, lies the potential for 
addressing a range of human rights issues that, although serious, 
do not constitute international crimes. One of these issues is the use 
of child labour, which is a major problem not only in the artisanal 
mining sector, but also in the cutting and polishing industry, which 
is dominated by India.
The skills required for cutting and polishing diamonds are passed 
down by workers from generation to generation, or are picked up in the 
traditional master–apprentice relationship. Of the four Cs — colour, 
clarity, carat, and cut — nature dictates the first three aspects; the cut, 
often considered the benchmark against which a diamond’s beauty 
is judged, is the only factor determined by the human hand. It  is a 
practice requiring great expertise. However, behind the glittering 
world of India’s diamond-cutting industry lie practices of exploitation 
and child labour. India enjoys a near monopoly in the diamond-cutting 
industry, but low wages and the easy availability of labour is what 
keeps the industry profitable. India gets a lot of small diamonds to cut 
and polish. The detailed nature of the work and the repetitive strain 
of cutting and polishing these tiny specks of stones make it  labour-
intensive and often unhealthy. There is a lot of dust from the ground 
diamonds that doesn’t always get filtered out of the crowded factory 
rooms, and proves harmful for workers’ health. These small stones 
often need sharp eyes and deft hands, and children are often highly 
prized in the trade, able to cut even ‘half-pointer’ diamonds, noting 
that 100 points make a carat, which is one-fifth of a gram.155
155  Hussain, S S, ‘A Diamond’s Journey: Grime Behind the Glitter?’, World News (26 June 2009). 
Available at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15842528; Brilliant Earth, Conflict Diamond Issues (2007). 
Available at: www.brilliantearth.com/conflict-diamond-child-labor/.
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Child labour is illegal in India, but remains widespread. By conservative 
estimates, 13 million children work in India, many in hazardous 
industries. According to one estimate, up to 100,000 children, in the 
age group 6–14 years, work in the diamond industry in Surat, cutting 
and polishing diamond chips.156
Children are engaged as apprentices, with learning the trade taking 
from five to seven years. During the first two years of an apprenticeship 
children receive little or no remuneration, working for 10 hours a day. 
After two years, a child worker is paid about $1.70 per month. Studies 
by noted academic Neeta Burra revealed that more than 30 per cent 
of these children get tuberculosis due to unhygienic conditions, 
overcrowding, and malnutrition. Major health issues include body 
aches, and finger tips grazed by the polishing disc. Child labour 
continues to be a major problem, despite efforts to stop the practice 
and generally improve working conditions amongst some in the 
cutting industry.157
Concluding Remarks
This book considers two main research questions: 
1. Has the conflict diamonds governance system achieved 
its objectives? 
2. Does consideration of the system from the perspective of the 
networked pyramid model provide descriptive or normative 
insights? 
Before a fitting response to these questions can be formulated, 
however, it is necessary to examine carefully the nature of the conflict 
diamonds problem. The conflict diamonds trade stands in contrast 
to the legitimate diamond trade, with rough diamond production 
in the legal industry during 2006 valued at US$11.5 billion, and 
exports valued at $US37.7 billion. Over the past century, large-scale 
156  Hussain, S S, ‘A Diamond’s Journey: Grime Behind the Glitter?’, World News (26 June 2009). 
Available at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15842528; Brilliant Earth, Conflict Diamond Issues (2007). 
Available at: www.brilliantearth.com/conflict-diamond-child-labor/.
157  Hussain, S S, ‘A Diamond’s Journey: Grime Behind the Glitter?’, World News (26 June 2009). 
Available at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15842528; Brilliant Earth, Conflict Diamond Issues (2007). 
Available at: www.brilliantearth.com/conflict-diamond-child-labor/.
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diamond production in the legitimate trade has been characterised 
by the monopolistic behaviour of the giant De Beers multinational 
corporation, and a high level of secrecy. At the same time, the low-tech 
mining of alluvial rough diamond deposits has provided insurgent 
groups with a commodity that is easy to smuggle, given the small 
size and very high value of such diamonds, which are considered the 
most concentrated form of wealth in the world. These characteristics 
have facilitated the emergence of conflict diamonds used to finance 
grave human rights violations and armed conflict against established 
governments. The issue was first highlighted by NGOs in the context 
of the civil war in Angola, where rebel group UNITA was able to fund 
its military campaign from diamond sales between 1992 and 1998. The 
diamond trade prolonged the civil war, which resulted in the loss of 
around 1 million lives, and reportedly involved such war crimes as 
the indiscriminate shelling of civilians. Around the same time, civil 
war fuelled by conflict diamonds also emerged in Sierra Leone. The 
infamous terror tactics of the RUF, which included the amputation 
of limbs and the conscription of child soldiers, resulted in a renewed 
focus on the connection between conflict diamonds and egregious 
human rights violations. More recently, conflict diamonds have fuelled 
ongoing civil war situations and human rights violations in the DRC 
and Côte d’Ivoire. The heavy-handed response of the Zimbabwean 
Government to the management of artisanal diamond mines in the 





The Kimberley Process: 
Did the Lion Roar?
In a world of failures, this is a story about NGO campaigning, corporate 
social responsibility and diplomacy that still has a chance of working, 
not just to end and prevent conflict, but to turn diamonds with secrets 
and blood in their pedigree into an engine of development and hope 
in places where these virtues are in tragically short supply.
Ian Smillie, conflict diamonds expert, referring to the KP1
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KP), which is the centrepiece of the conflict diamonds governance 
system. The chapter gives an overview of the Kimberley Process, and 
discusses its operation, including the way it accepts new members, 
its annual reporting, and its distinctive peer-review mechanism. 
In discussing peer review, there is a particular focus on the KP’s 
management of cases of serious non-compliance. The role of industry 
in the KP is discussed, including self-regulation, as is the role of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), with a  particular focus on 
1  Smillie, I, Blood on the Stone: Greed, Corruption and War in the Global Diamond Trade 
(Anthem Press, 2010) 207.
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the continuing role of NGOs beyond the KP, including the Diamond 
Development Initiative International (DDII). The implementation of KP 
obligations at the national level is the final focus of analysis, including 
consideration of regulatory options under national legislation in 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra 
Leone, Australia, and the Netherlands.
Figure 3.1: Kimberley Process: Networked Regulators Operating 
in Parallel
Source: Author’s research .
Overview of the Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is the primary response 
by the international community to overcome the conflict diamonds 
problem. As discussed in Chapter 2, conflict diamonds are rough 
diamonds that are associated with conflict and gross human rights 
violations. The Kimberley Process aims to distinguish the legitimate 
rough diamond trade from the illegal trade through the use of 
a system of certification at the point of export. The central obligation 
of governmental participants in the KP is to ensure that all conflict-
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free rough diamond goods are certified at the point of export, and to 
ensure that only legally certified rough diamonds are imported into 
the country.2
The Kimberley Process was launched in May 2000 in the city 
of  Kimberley, South Africa. It began as a consultative process 
involving  governments, business, and NGOs,  later becoming 
a negotiating process that culminated in the adoption of the Kimberley 
Process core document at a ministerial meeting in Interlaken, 
Switzerland, in November 2002.3 Participating nations agreed to 
implement the provisions of that agreement by 1  January  2003. 
The  agreement took just 30 months to negotiate, which has been 
described as blazing speed by UN standards.4 The Kimberley Process 
received the formal endorsement of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
2  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) 
ss II, III. See also Wright, C, ‘Tackling Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme’ (2004) 11(4) International Peacekeeping 697, 699–700; Fishman, J L, ‘Is Diamond 
Smuggling Forever?: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long 
Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem’ (2005) 13 University of Miami Business Law 
Review 217, 218–219. Although the central objective of the KP is to exclude trading in rough 
diamonds from non-members, the 2008 plenary discussed the possibility of a mechanism to 
provide for trade between participants and certain authorised non-participants (in particular, 
Turkey). Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Report on the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Groups 
of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’ (New Delhi, India, 19 June 2008).
3  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002); 
Kimberley Process, Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (5 November 2002). Preliminary meetings were held 
prior to finalising the core document, in Namibia: Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process 
Meeting and Technical Workshop’ (Report on Preliminary Meeting, Windhoek, Namibia, 13–16 
February 2001); Belgium: Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process Meeting: Final Communique’ 
(Report on Preliminary Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 25–27 April 2001); the Russian Federation: 
Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process: Final Communique’ (Report on Preliminary Meeting, 
Moscow, Russia, 3–4 July 2001); England: Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process: Meeting in 
Twickenham’ (Report on Preliminary Meeting, Twickenham, England, 11–13 September 2001); 
and Canada: Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process Meeting Final Communique’ (Report on 
Preliminary Meeting, Ottawa, Canada, 18–20 March 2002). See also Wallis, A, ‘Data Mining: 
Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United Nations’ Development of Human Rights 
Norms for Transnational Corporations’ (2005) 4(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human 
Rights 388, 389. Wallis contrasts the development of the Kimberley Process, a more grass-roots 
model, to the approach by which the United Nations have sought to develop other human rights 
instruments to regulate international corporations.
4  Wexler, P, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on the Occasion of its Third Anniversary: 
An Independent Commissioned Review (Review Report submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Review of the Kimberley Process, February 2006) 6.
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in 2001.5 The Kimberley Process has 54 participants, representing 
81  countries, with the European Union and its 28 member states 
counting as a single participant.6
Noting its growing membership, it can be argued that the Kimberley 
Process has already made significant progress in reducing the trade 
in conflict diamonds. Statistics concerning the now monitored legal 
diamond trade are also encouraging. One indicator of success is the 
greater number of legitimate diamond exports, demonstrating how the 
controls have helped reduce illicit trading and bringing more revenues 
from the trade into the legitimate market. According to a three-year 
review of the Kimberley Process, the trade in conflict diamonds was 
less than 0.2 per cent of the overall diamond trade.7 Sierra Leone 
is cited as an example of a country where controls have helped 
maintain the fragile peace, and where the legitimate trade has risen 
exponentially.8 In 2008, for example, Sierra Leone exported US$99 
million of diamonds, up from $26 million in 2001. Similarly, legitimate 
rough diamond exports from the DRC were valued at US$552 million in 
2008.9 It should be noted, however, that the black market in diamonds 
still remains very significant, especially when individual countries are 
5  The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction 
of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts, 
GA Res 55/56, UN GAOR, 55th sess, 79th plen mtg, Un Doc A/RES/55/56 (1 December 2001).
6  Latest figures on participants were taken from the Kimberley Process website, www.
kimberleyprocess.com, accessed on 13 August 2015, although the website states that the figures 
are from 2 August 2013.
7  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review (Review Report, Kimberley Process, 
November 2006) 17; Letter from Karel Kovanda, Kimberley Process Chair, to Kimberley Process 
Members, 31 January 2007.
8  Global Witness, ‘Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Questionnaire for the Review 
of the Scheme’ (Review Submission, 5 April 2006).
9  Kimberley Process Secretariat, ‘Annual Global Summary: 2008 Production, Imports, Exports 
and KPC Counts’ (Annual Report Summary, 7 August 2010); Wexler, P, The Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme on the Occasion of its Third Anniversary: An Independent Commissioned 
Review (Review Report submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley 
Process, February 2006).
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considered. Despite the progress made in Sierra Leone, for example, 
it has been estimated that between 10 and 20 per cent of diamonds in 
that country are still being illegally smuggled, so challenges remain.10
The Kimberley Process is distinctive in that it is not a legally binding 
treaty. While the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is set out 
in the form of an international treaty, the instrument is not a legally 
binding treaty under international law, and is not signed and ratified 
under standard treaty procedures. However, this less formal structure 
lends itself to greater flexibility, and wider involvement of non-state 
actors, which is arguably the strength of the Kimberley Process. 
Following the informal establishment of the Kimberley Process, 
commentators such as Global Witness have advocated its being made 
legally binding through the operation of a UNSC resolution, made 
with reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.11
The second distinctive feature of the Kimberley Process is the high 
level of involvement of businesses and non-governmental organisations 
in the system.12 Although not possessing formal voting rights as 
members, business and NGO groups may be granted observer status 
and play significant roles in the working groups and committees that 
comprise the de facto secretariat of the Kimberley Process. For example, 
in June 2010, the World Diamond Council (WDC), the umbrella 
10  Interview with Global Witness Representative (telephone interview with author, 30 April 
2007). The exact date of the review visit was not specified. In order to obtain information on 
the operation of the Kimberley Process, a number of standardised questions were presented 
to government, NGO, and industry participants in the Kimberley Process. The government 
participant, the Australian Federal Government, provided a written response, while the NGO 
participant, Global Witness, and the industry participant, Rio Tinto, responded to the questions 
by means of a verbal interview process. The interviews were recorded and a written transcript 
produced. In relation to all three participants, the ethical requirements set out by The Australian 
National University concerning such research were complied with and approved by the ANU 
Research Ethics Committee.
11  Indications that the KP is not a legally binding treaty are in the Preamble to Kimberley 
Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002), where participants 
‘recommend’ particular measures, the absence of standard signature and ratification clauses that 
are present in treaty status documents, and the definition of ‘Observer’ in s I, which includes 
industry and non-governmental organisation representatives. Curtis has suggested that the 
Kimberley Process, while not legally binding under international law, is authoritative and is, 
in fact, a scheme which imposes obligations on its participants. Curtis, K, ‘But is it Law?: An 
Analysis on the Legal Nature of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on Conflict Diamonds 
and its Treatment of Non-State Actors’ (2007) Spring The American University International Law 
Review, 26–27.
12  Wright, C, ‘Tackling Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’ 
(2004) 11(4) International Peacekeeping 697, 702.
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representative group for the diamond industry, was a member of the 
monitoring, participation, and statistics committees and was the chair 
of the diamond experts committee. Global Witness, an NGO with 
longstanding interest in conflict diamonds issues, was a member of 
the participation, artisanal and alluvial, statistics, and monitoring 
committees, while the NGO Partnership Africa Canada was a member 
of the monitoring, statistics, artisanal and alluvial, and participation 
committees.13
The observer status of industry groups within the Kimberley 
Process creates direct connections with industry, thereby promoting 
compliance with the system by the diamond industry, which sees 
itself as having a stake in the process. The system thus becomes 
a   hybrid of industry self-regulation and government regulation. 
The  institutionalised involvement of NGOs provides further 
checks and balances to the system. NGOs, possessing independent 
information and analysis networks, and with links to the international 
media, provide a scrutineering role that is built in to the Kimberley 
framework.
Since the emergence of the Kimberley Process, a number of similarly 
structured organisations have been created, under the general title 
of multi-stakeholder initiatives. Of particular relevance was the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which emerged 
as a result of the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 
Johannesburg in 2002. Like the Kimberley Process, the EITI brings 
together large corporations, governments, and NGOs to achieve its 
core objectives. The EITI aims to bring financial transparency to the 
work of extractive industries such as oil, gas, and mining, by requiring 
corporations to disclose all payments by corporations to governments, 
and all revenues made by governments from their involvement with 
these extractive industries. There are 49 corporations that are involved, 
including large multinationals such as De Beers, ExxonMobil, Shell, 
and British Petroleum. Also involved with the EITI are nine NGOs, 
13  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) ss II, 
VI(8)–(10); Grant, A J and I Taylor, ‘Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley 
Process and the Quest for Clean Gems’ (2004) 93(375) The Round Table 385, 386–687.
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including Global Witness, Oxfam, Transparency International, 
and Publish-What-You-Pay. On the governmental level, the EITI has 
the provisional or full membership of 51 governments.14
A preliminary assessment of the EITI suggests that it has made 
a  good start, noting the mild language employed by NGOs, multi-
national corporations, and governments indicates a significant level 
of cooperation. One of the insights noted in relation to the EITI was 
the relative ease by which it was established, with the EITI relying 
on a consensus building technique to fully engage with the range 
of stakeholders. However, the noted drawback of this approach has 
been the relative difficulty of ensuring effective implementation of 
the system once it has been created. As implementation mechanisms 
are often difficult to reach agreement upon, as opposed to general 
objectives, multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the EITI have begun 
to experience difficulties when they attempt to bring stakeholders to 
account in relation to the standards they have agreed to. Behaviour 
modification is more difficult to address where such processes were 
not clearly envisaged and set out during the initial negotiations.15
Operation of the Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process functions at two levels, the first being the 
national level, or the within-country level, where the primary 
regulator is the national government. At this level, the national 
14  Statistics about the EITI are located at EITI, EITI Countries (2009). Available at: eiti.org/
countries. For an analysis of the establishment of the EITI, Koechlin, L and R Calland, ‘Standard-
setting at the Cutting Edge: An Evidence-based Typology for Multi-stakeholder Initiatives’ in 
A Peters et al. (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
For further background on multi-stakeholder initiatives in general, see Calton, J M and S L 
Payne, ‘Coping With Paradox Multistakeholder Learning Dialogue as a Pluralist Sensemaking 
Process for Addressing Messy Problems’ (2003) 42(1) Business and Society 7; Witte, J M, T Benner 
and C Streck ‘Partnerships and networks in global environmental governance’, in U Petschow, 
J Rosenau and E U von Weizsacker (eds), Governance and Sustainability: New Challenges for States, 
Companies and Civil Society (Greenleaf, 2005); O’Rourke, D, ‘Multi-stakeholder Regulation: 
Privatizing or Socializing Global Labour Standards?’ (2006) 34(5) World Development; Mena, 
S and G. Palazzo, ‘Input and Output Legitimacy of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives’ (2012) 22(3) 
Business Ethics Quarterly 527.
15  Koechlin, L and R Calland, ‘Standard-setting at the Cutting Edge: An Evidence-based 
Typology for Multi-stakeholder Initiatives’ in A Peters et al. (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard 
Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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government regulates the national diamond industry by ensuring 
that all legitimate  diamond exports are certified by the means 
of a Kimberley Process certificate. 
The Kimberley Process also operates on the international plane, where 
the primary regulator is the Kimberley Process Plenary, and the 
parties that are regulated are the national governments themselves. 
Important policy decisions are made at the annual plenary meeting 
of the Kimberley Process, with a consensus mode of decision making: 
‘Participants are to reach decisions by consensus. In the event 
that consensus proves to be impossible, the Chair is to conduct 
consultations.’16
The exact meaning of the term ‘consensus’ has, however, been 
the subject of divergent opinions. In particular, commentator Ian 
Smillie points out that some, but not all, government members of the 
Kimberley Process have considered the word to mean ‘unanimity’. 
Smillie turned to the Oxford Dictionary as the basis for a different 
meaning for consensus: ‘general agreement … majority view, collective 
opinion’. Although conceding that other international organisations, 
such as NATO, equate unanimity with consensus, Smillie presented 
a different, more sophisticated understanding of the term in his recent 
paper. He highlighted some failures of the consensus approach as 
currently practised by the Kimberley Process. In particular, failure to 
reach consensus occurred as a result of minorities blocking forward 
movement, disruption, time-wasting, appeasement, lowest common 
denominator decisions, ineffectual facilitation of critical issues, 
and lack of confidence and trust. A further challenge occurs where 
persons are not fully empowered by their representative government 
or organisation to reach particular negotiated settlements.17
Given the challenges faced by a purely consensus approach, Smillie 
recommends a change to the decision-making procedure to allow 
voting in the absence of consensus:
16  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI(5).
17  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 6.
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Participants are to reach decisions by consensus. In the absence 
of consensus, decisions will be made by simple majority of all 
voting Participants present, except for decisions on those matters 
specified in Annex A which require a 75% majority of those voting 
Participants present.18
The type of suggestion made by Smillie merits consideration. Even 
if a consensus decision is viewed as incorporating instances where 
there are one or two dissenting voices, in contrast to a unanimity 
approach, it appears necessary and desirable to have an alternative 
available so that issues can be progressed, following consultation, 
even where a  minority is opposed (i.e. by a majority vote). Smillie 
suggests that the annex, requiring a 75 per cent majority, be reserved 
for issues such as additions or deletions from the participants list 
(i.e. government membership of the Kimberley Process), suspension of 
participants, and the application of other interim measures relating to 
non-compliance.19
Consensus as a decision-making technique has obvious advantages in 
terms of optimising the participation of governments and industries 
in the Kimberley Process. However, in common with other multi-
stakeholder initiatives, such as the EITI, this technique held traps for 
the future evolution of the organisation, where behaviour modification 
became more important to the future of the organisation than 
standard-setting. Situations where coercive approaches to behaviour 
modification are required, by definition, involve departure from 
unanimity, and put strains on any definition of consensus. In such 
situations, some type of voting method is preferable.20
Between plenaries, the chair plays the central executive role. A vice-
chair is elected at each plenary, with the understanding that this 
representative will assist the chair in this capacity before becoming 
the new chair in the following year. The chair is also assisted in its 
executive tasks by a number of committees performing significant 
regulatory functions. The primary regulatory functions include 
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid.
20  Koechlin, L and R Calland, ‘Standard-setting at the Cutting Edge: An Evidence-based 
Typology for Multi-stakeholder Initiatives’ in A Peters et al. (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard 
Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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annual reporting, peer review, and managing serious non-compliance. 
Ad hoc working groups have also been formed concerning artisanal 
mining, diamond technical topics, and the collation of statistics.21
Figure 3.2: Kimberley Process Governance Structures
Source: Author’s research .
Accepting New Members
Section VI, paragraph 8 of the Kimberley Process core document 
states  that ‘participation in the Certification Scheme is open on 
a global non-discriminatory basis to all Applicants willing and able 
to fulfil the requirements of that Scheme’. Apart from the need for a 
new applicant to provide the chair with ‘its relevant laws, regulations, 
rules,  procedures and practices, and update that information 
21  In its resolution on October 2003, the Kimberley Process Plenary decided to provide 
a system whereby the vice-chair of the process, elected annually, would automatically become 
the rotating chair the subsequent year. Kimberley Process, ‘Final Communique: Kimberley 
Process Plenary Meeting’ (Sun City, South Africa, 29–31 October 2003). Namibia was the 
Rotating Chair for 2009. Final Message from Rahul Khullar, Kimberley Process Chair to Kimberley 
Process Members, 31 December 2008. Israel took the Rotating Chair for 2010. Kimberley Process, 
‘Kimberley Process Plenary Session Communique’ (Swakopmund, Namibia, 5 November 2009) 6.
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as required’, there were no other stipulations. Despite the simplicity 
of this requirement, there were initially a number of countries who did 
not comply. Several had not done so within the first few months of KP 
operations, and matters had become critical by the end of April 2003 
when a special KP plenary meeting was held in Johannesburg. It was 
agreed at that meeting that a Participation Committee would be struck 
to examine the credentials of all existing and prospective KP members, 
to determine whether or not they could meet the minimum standards. 
It was agreed that there would be a ‘tolerance period’ until 31 May 
2003, during which all participants and prospective participants 
would submit information relevant to their membership. The tolerance 
period was extended to June, then to the end of July, and finally, with 
a chair’s notice at the end of July, to August 31.22 
The Participation Committee included seven governments (Angola, 
Canada, the European Community as it was then called, Israel, Russian 
Federation, South Africa, and the United States), NGOs (Global 
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada) and the WDC. During this 
period, the committee examined the legislation, regulations, and 
relevant documentation of every participant.23
At this time a euphemism for removing a country from the KP was 
developed, which would be ‘dropped from the list’. Following the 
examination of credentials, several countries were dropped from the 
list: Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, Gabon, Malta, Mexico, Norway, 
Philippines, and Poland. Three of these countries — Brazil, Mexico 
and Norway — subsequently rejoined the KP.24
The Participation Committee play a central role in the Kimberley 
Process international enforcement system. The Kimberley Process 
core document states that participation in the certification scheme is 
open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all applicants willing 
and able to fulfil the requirements of the scheme. It is significant that 
only those applicants willing and able to fulfil the requirements of the 
22  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 6–7.
23  Ibid.
24  Ibid.
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scheme will be able to join. The work of the Participation Committee is 
largely concerned with whether prospective members are able to fulfil 
these requirements, such that they may be admitted to the scheme.25 
The Participation Committee Terms of Reference elaborates on 
the functioning of that committee.26 Like other committees, the 
Participation Committee must include representatives from NGOs 
and industry, as well as governmental representatives. The chair must 
also ensure an appropriate geographical balance, and that there is 
appropriate expertise on the committee to perform its functions.
The Participation Committee is tasked with assisting the chair in its 
role of handling the admission of new applicants to the Kimberley 
Process, and may enter into a dialogue with the applicant on issues 
to be addressed.27 
Annual Reporting
The Kimberley Process operates internationally to ensure compliance 
by national governments. Participating governments are required to 
provide information on an annual basis on the way in which they are 
implementing the requirements of the Kimberley Process.28 Annual 
reports must include information on the national laws and regulations 
for the export and import of rough diamonds; internal controls prior 
to the export of diamonds and after import; penalties for individuals 
and companies contravening diamond regulations; the collection 
of import and export data; whether there is a procedure for issuing 
Kimberley Process certificates; whether the certificate fulfils security 
requirements; evidence to be provided by exporter as proof diamonds 
as not conflict tainted; and the number of Kimberley Process certificates 
issued and to which participating governments they were sent.29
25  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI 
(8).
26  Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Participation Committee Terms of Reference 
(Plenary Meeting Decision, Gatineau, Quebec, 29 October 2004).
27  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) ss II, 
V(a), VI(8), (9).
28  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI 
(11); Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Implementation of Peer Review in the Kimberley 
Process (Plenary Meeting Decision, Sun City, South Africa, 30 October 2003).
29  Administrative Decision on Annual Reporting, Annex I.
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Also to be included in annual reports is information on the system 
of internal controls and industry self-regulation that is implemented 
in the participant state, information about statistical collection, and 
observations on experiences, problems and solutions that have been 
noted during the implementation process. 
The collection of statistics in an area of economic regulation such as the 
international diamond trade is naturally a central aspect of effective 
management. Such data is particularly important for identifying any 
irregularities or anomalies that could indicate that conflict diamonds 
are entering the legitimate trade. Kimberley member governments 
are required to keep quarterly aggregate statistics on rough diamond 
exports and imports in a standardised format, as well as numbers of 
certificates validated for export, and imported shipments accompanied 
by certificates. Annual statistics in the rough diamond trade, listed 
according to country, are now publicly available through a dedicated 
website maintained by a Kimberley Process Working Group on 
Statistics. Statistics on exports and imports must record diamond 
origin and provenance, carat weight, and value.30
The Working Group on Statistics is mandated to deal with statistical 
matters pertaining to rough diamonds, particularly in respect to the 
production and trade in rough diamonds, to ensure the effective 
implementation of the Kimberley Process.31 Like the Monitoring 
Committee, the Statistics Committee’s role includes general policy 
development in the area of statistics, including the use of common 
classification systems. Its second role is concerned with statistical 
collation and analysis, and administrative support to the Kimberley 
Process. Should a member government fail to provide statistics within 
three months of the close of a quarter, then issue of the continued 
membership of that government will be forwarded to the Participation 
Committee for consideration and possible compliance action.32 
In early KP negotiations, statistical data was regarded by some 
governments as information that could not be shared, either internally 
among KP participants, or externally. Some countries cited commercial 
30  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) 
Annex III. The document refers to Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) 
classifications 7102.10, 7102.21, and 7102.31. 
31  Kimberley Process, Working Group on Statistics Terms of Reference (29 April 2003).
32  Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision on Statistical Reporting (undated).
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sensitivity as a reason Russia treated diamond production data as 
a state secret, and said that it would not go along with a certification 
system that would reveal this secret to others.33
By 2003, however, much of the sensitivity on statistics had diminished, 
and in 2004 even Russia had agreed to submit quarterly trade data and 
semi-annual production data. The KP statistics website is today the 
best source of data on rough diamond production and trade, and is an 
essential tool in tracking anomalies in the system.34
For several of its early years, however, the KP statistics website was 
accessible to participants only. There was very strong resistance to 
making any of the data public, with governments citing ‘commercial 
sensitivity’. Nevertheless, in the past two years greater, although 
not complete, statistical openness has been achieved, without any 
apparent ill effect. The major advantage appears to be an end to charges 
that the Kimberley Process was hiding something by refusing to make 
its statistics public.35
The Working Group on Monitoring is tasked with reviewing annual 
reports by member governments and reporting to the plenary. 
In doing so, the Working Group on Monitoring must draw on available 
statistical data, and work cooperatively with the Statistics Working 
Group and the Participation Committee. Other Kimberley members 
may also present reports for consideration by the Working Group 
on Monitoring.36 
33  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 13.
34  Ibid.
35  Ibid.
36  The selection of office-holders to chair working groups, ad hoc bodies, etc. is to be decided 
by participants in plenary following consultation by the chairperson. The terms of reference 
for the Monitoring Committee were approved at the 28–30 April 2003 plenary, but were revised 
at the Gaborone Plenary meeting in November 2006 as a result of the three-year review of the 
KP. Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision about the KPCS Peer Review System (Plenary 
Meeting Decision, Gaborone, Botswana, November 2006).
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The Participation Committee must also be informed by the Working 
Group on Monitoring, via the chair, of government members that have 
failed to submit an annual report from the previous year and countries 
that have failed to provide the required statistical data.37
Peer Review: General Operation
Figure 3.3: Kimberley Process Peer Review
Source: Author’s research .
Monitoring is essential in any system dealing with standards and 
supply chains. A number of global commodity governance systems 
have evolved over time to include rigorous and credible third-party 
verification systems, such as the Forest Stewardship Council, the Fair 
Labour Association, and the Responsible Jewellery Council. From the 
beginning, monitoring was a highly contentious subject in Kimberley 
Process negotiations. Diamonds were regarded as a strategic mineral 
in Russia, for example, and data regarding production and trade was 
classified. In many countries there were commercial sensitivities and 
37  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s V. 
A challenge that has been addressed by the rotating chair relates to the appearance of fraudulent 
KP certificates in Sierra Leone and Ghana. Following the appearance of such certificates, 
particular certificates were removed from certification and brought to the attention of other KP 
participants. Kovanda, K, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘The Appearance of Fraudulent Certificates’ 
(Letter to Kimberley Process Members, 23 March 2007).
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security issues. In the initial KP agreement, there was provision only 
for monitoring in cases of ‘significant non-compliance’, a term that 
was never defined.38
It is also arguable that the flexibility of the Kimberley Process, with 
its focus on diplomacy, consensus, and information sharing, has 
emphasised the autonomy and sovereign equality of state actors, thus 
constituting a horizontal approach to regulation, rather than focusing 
solely on the vertical dimension, involving the cession of authority 
to a supranational body. The horizontal approach is particularly 
evident in relation to the system of monitoring through the peer 
review system. In contrast with other international systems that focus 
on adversarial dispute resolution before an international tribunal, 
the focus on peer review is a novel approach. It arguably engages 
more effectively with government members by promoting a sense of 
ownership for the certification system. States must take responsibility 
for the effective functioning of the system, rather than ceding this role 
to a supranational entity.39
The Monitoring Committee is responsible for the implementation 
of the peer-review process within the Kimberley Process. Peer review 
involves two central tasks: monitoring the implementation of the 
Kimberley Process by participant countries through review visits,40 
and monitoring situations of serious non-compliance through review 
missions.41 
Although review missions and visits are conducted with the consent 
of the government member, a review team must be given the full 
cooperation of the authorities of the country under review, who 
should facilitate access to governmental institutions and organisations 
38  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 9.
39  Other international organisations have monitoring mechanisms that function in similar ways 
to review missions, such as investigative missions for the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. However, these missions are typically carried out at the supranational level, 
rather than being staffed by representatives of member nations themselves, as occurs within the 
Kimberley Process.
40  Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Implementation of Peer Review in the Kimberley 
Process (Plenary Meeting Decision, Sun City, South Africa, 30 October 2003); Kimberley Process, 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI.
41  Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Implementation of Peer Review in the Kimberley 
Process (Plenary Meeting Decision, Sun City, South Africa, 30 October 2003).
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relevant to the implementation of the Kimberley Process, and solicit 
the cooperation of industry, consistent with national law and 
organisational rules and regulations.42 
Review missions and visits should generally number five members in 
total, consisting of three government members, an observer from civil 
society, and an observer from the private sector. The Administrative 
Decision on Peer Review further provides that, in nominating 
government member representatives, the chair would seek to ensure 
geographical balance and adequate balance between countries that are 
primarily engaged in production, trading, and processing of rough 
diamonds.43 They should last between two and five working days, with 
dates determined with the consent of the government member being 
reviewed. The fact that individual members of the review mission 
must provide their own expenses presents a challenge for civil society 
representatives, particularly those representing artisanal miners from 
diamond-producing nations. To date there has been some limited 
sponsorship made available from government members to support the 
important role of civil society experts in these teams.44
The leader of the review mission or visit must draw up a written 
draft report giving an account of the activities of the mission and its 
findings, in particular reflecting the implementation of the Kimberley 
Process in the reviewed country. The draft report must be submitted 
simultaneously to the chair and the reviewed country.
The government under review has a right of reply in relation to the 
review report, and may send observations to the chair and members 
of the review mission or visit within a month of the submission of the 
draft report. The chair may then invite the government’s authorities to 
discuss the observations with the review team members to clarify any 
misunderstandings. In the event that disagreement persists, the report 
42  Ibid.
43  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review (Review Report, Kimberley Process, 
November 2006) 41.
44  Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Implementation of Peer Review in the Kimberley 
Process (Plenary Meeting Decision, Sun City, South Africa, 30 October 2003).
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will be circulated along with the observations of the government 
member to other countries and observers. The chair may add its own 
observations as well.45 
Review visit and review mission reports are considered confidential, 
as between government and non-government members within the 
Kimberley Process system. The administrative decision also provides 
for follow-up action in relation to a review mission or review visit. 
Where the review mission deems it necessary and appropriate, the 
chair may recommend to the plenary the sending of a follow-up 
mission or review visit.46
The Sun City Plenary in 2002 provided for a roster of experts to be drawn 
up by the chair on a recommendation from the Monitoring Committee. 
Since then, a substantial number of government and non-government 
Kimberley members have nominated experts for inclusion in the roster 
that, as of July 2006, comprised 97 experts representing government, 
industry, and civil society. On the basis of this very positive response, 
it was possible in all cases for teams to be appointed corresponding to 
the required criteria. To date, experts from 17 different government 
members, and from all major geographical regions represented in the 
Kimberley Process, have participated in review visits.47
It was possible for a number of experts from developing, artisanal-
alluvial producing countries to participate in review visits and review 
missions. Participation by such experts is of great importance because 
of the crucial role of the visits in disseminating best practices among 
government members and teaching participating experts. The KP 
three-year review recommended that the participation of experts 
from artisanal-alluvial–producing nations in as many review visits 
as possible should be continued and, if possible, further developed, 
above all in review visits to artisanal-alluvial–producing countries.48
45  Ibid.
46  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI 
(16); Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Implementation of Peer Review in the Kimberley 
Process (Plenary Meeting Decision, Sun City, South Africa, 30 October 2003).
47  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
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The Participation Committee also has a role in relation to compliance. 
It considers information submitted to it by the Working Group on 
Monitoring regarding compliance by a government member, and can 
determine whether the government is able and willing to meet the 
minimum common standards of the certification scheme.49 
Peer Review: Cases of Serious Non-Compliance
Through the action of the peer-review system, in tandem with the 
working groups on monitoring and participation, the Kimberley 
Process has responsive yet effective mechanisms for holding member 
governments to account regarding their obligations under the system. 
The Kimberley Process commands the threat of a significant sanction, 
which is the expulsion of members for non-compliance, through which 
the diamond trade with that member is prohibited to other Kimberley 
Process participant countries. Through sharing of information and 
experience, with heavy reliance on consensus and diplomatic pressure, 
the Kimberley Process offers a novel approach for addressing urgent 
global issues.50 The informality of its mode of operation has, arguably, 
enhanced its ability to respond quickly to crises that have occurred 
in the system, notably in the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville (RCB) and 
Côte d’Ivoire.51
Two straightforward cases of apparently serious non-compliance 
occurred early in the life of the Kimberley Process. In May 2003, 
the Central African Republic (CAR) was suspended from the KP 
following a coup in which François Bozizé overthrew the government 
of President Ange-Félix Patassé and suspended the constitution. 
The CAR was reinstated as a participant after authorities provided 
49  Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Participation Committee Terms of Reference 
(Plenary Meeting Decision, Gatineau, Quebec, 29 October 2004) s 4.1; Kimberley Process, 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI (8).
50  Wexler, P, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on the Occasion of its Third Anniversary: 
An Independent Commissioned Review (Review Report submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Review of the Kimberley Process, February 2006) 6.
51  Subsequent to the action taken by the Kimberley Process Chair in relation to the Côte d’Ivoire 
situation, the Kimberley Process Plenary issued resolution and follow-up action, including 
cooperation with the United Nations. Kimberley Process, ‘Final Communique: Kimberley Process 
Plenary Meeting’ (Moscow, Russia, 15–17 November 2005). Other participants have also been 
suspended from the Kimberley Process for differing periods of time. Ghana was suspended 
following an Administrative Decision of the Gaborone Plenary on 9 November 2006, but was 
reinstated by the KP chair on 1 March 2007. Letter from Karel Kovanda, Kimberley Process Chair, 
to Kimberley Process Members, 1 March 2007.
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assurances they could implement the KP and agreed to let a review 
mission evaluate the country’s diamond control system. The review 
found that CAR was managing its internal diamond controls and KP 
standards responsibly.52
Lebanon expressed its eagerness to join the Kimberley Process in 
early 2003. It submitted all of the required documentation, including 
legislation that at the end of the tolerance period was awaiting 
presidential signature. Lebanon was included in the list comprising 39 
countries plus the European Community that was approved with effect 
from 31 August 2003. However, nine months later, the presidential 
approval for the country’s KP legislation had not been given and 
Lebanon was dropped from the list on 1 April 2004. In 2005, Lebanon 
was readmitted to the Kimberley Process following enactment of the 
legislation and two KP review missions.53
The first major test of the ability of the Kimberley Process to manage 
serious non-compliance was in relation to the RCB, which neighbours 
the DRC. Following consideration of relevant statistics and reports, 
it was brought to the attention of the Kimberley Process that the 
RCB appeared to be funnelling diamonds mined in the DRC through 
its borders, thereby bypassing the certification requirements that 
would otherwise have been implemented in the DRC. The chair of the 
Kimberley Process took rapid action, firstly securing the agreement of 
the RCB President that a KP review was required, and authorising the 
deployment of a review mission that verified the problem. The review 
took place in May 2004, and included an aerial survey of the country’s 
diamond mining areas. The review concluded that the RCB’s exports 
could not be explained by local production or official imports.54 
In July, through a chair’s notice, RCB was expelled from the 
Kimberley Process, meaning that other countries no longer traded in 
diamonds with that country. Conditions for readmission included an 
independent third-party survey of the country’s geological diamond 
potential. The result of the expulsion was that the legitimate, certified 
52  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 6–7.
53  Ibid.
54  Ibid 7; Global Witness, ‘Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Questionnaire for the 
Review of the Scheme’ (Review Submission, 5 April 2006); Interview with Global Witness 
Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007).
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trade through the DRC picked up significantly. Three years later, 
in November 2007, RCB hosted another KP review, which concluded 
that it had met all of the Kimberley Process stipulations. The RCB was 
then readmitted into the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.55
In some respects, the Côte d’Ivoire situation is a good example of the 
Kimberley Process acting quickly to respond to a serious threat to its 
integrity. The Kimberley Process was able to rapidly make a decision 
to prohibit the trade in diamonds originating from Côte d’Ivoire, 
thereby providing at least a formal barrier to conflict diamonds. 
The Kimberley Process, through its Working Group on Monitoring, 
was apprised of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2004, 
following the emergence of indications that diamond production was 
continuing in rebel-controlled northern Côte d’Ivoire. The Working 
Group on Monitoring adopted a recommendation to the chair on 
the matter on 24 September 2004, after which the chair entered into 
communications with the Côte d’Ivoire authorities, who clarified 
that an export ban had been imposed on rough diamond throughout 
Côte d’Ivoire.56 The Chair of the Kimberley Process issued a request 
on 23 November 2004 to all participants not to accept any shipments 
with Côte d’Ivoire certificates until further notice, and reported on 
the status of Côte d’Ivoire at the Ottawa Plenary in October 2004.57 It 
should be noted, however, that UNSC expert panels noted ongoing 
diamond mining in Côte d’Ivoire during the civil war, even after the 
country was excluded from the Kimberley Process.58
55  Global Witness, ‘Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Questionnaire for the Review of 
the Scheme’ (Review Submission, 5 April 2006); Interview between Author and Global Witness 
Representative; Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership 
Africa Canada, June 2010) 7–8. However, some commentators have questioned whether 
expulsion of the Republic of Congo would be sufficient to stop the conflict diamonds trade in 
the neighbouring DRC. Malamut, S A, ‘A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the 
Kimberley Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 
29 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 25, 26, 44–45.
56  Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring, ‘Submission for the 2006 Review of the 
KPCS’ (Kimberley Process Secretariat, February 2006) 19.
57  Ibid 19–20.
58  Update Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 1632 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2006/204 (31 March 2006).
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Other countries in which serious compliance issues have arisen 
include Zimbabwe, Ghana, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Venezuela.59 
In mid-2005, Venezuela, a KP participant since 2003, ceased issuing 
Kimberley Process certificates, and communications with the KP 
ceased. Nevertheless, diamonds were being mined and openly, if 
not legally, exported. The problems were documented in a 2006 
Partnership Africa Canada report. The KP procrastinated, and it 
was not until October 2008, following bitter internal debate and 
widespread calls for Venezuela’s expulsion from the KP, that a KP team 
visited Venezuela, corroborating many of Partnership Africa Canada’s 
findings. In November 2008, Venezuela announced that it would self-
suspend from the KP, saying it would halt all diamond production 
and trade for at least two years while reorganising its diamond sector. 
The KP concurred with this approach.60
However, in Venezuela little changed. Early in 2009, the mineral leases 
of five diamond mining cooperatives held by the state-owned mining 
concern Corporación Venezolana de Guayana were renewed. Diamond 
mining and exporting, whether legal or illegal, continued as before.61
In a March 2009 letter, the KP Chair, Namibia, hailed the arrangement 
with Venezuela, saying that the KP would ‘assist and support the 
country in developing appropriate internal controls over its alluvial 
diamond mining’. The chair said that this was ‘yet another example of 
mutual inclusiveness inherent in the Scheme and is testimony to the 
willingness of the KP family to stand together, learn from global best 
practices and proactively provide assistance when required’.62
However, there has been little substantive communication with 
Venezuela since 2008, and the KP has provided no assistance or 
support, but rather turned a blind eye to the fact that Venezuela’s 
diamonds are entering world markets illegally.63
59  Letter Prior to Plenary Meeting in Brussels from Karel Kovanda, Kimberley Process Chair 
to Kimberley Process Members, 2007.
60  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
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In 2008, a number of events occurred suggesting that Zimbabwe was 
losing its ability to meet KP minimum standards. Large volumes of 
easily identified smuggled Zimbabwean diamonds were the subject of 
arrests in Dubai and India. A diamond rush by illicit diamond diggers 
in the Marange area was suppressed by well-documented extrajudicial 
killings and widespread human rights abuse by the buying offices 
in Manica, just across the Zimbabwe border in Mozambique, where 
a flourishing trade in smuggled goods continues today.64
Zimbabwe became the subject of bitter debate within the KP. It took 
months before a review mission could be undertaken, and the mission 
itself became the subject of debate and political manipulation. Its 
findings were clear but its recommendations were vague, and in the 
end a bitter debate resulted in little more than the appointment of 
a KP monitor whose terms of reference omitted almost all the topics 
of controversy. Zimbabwe’s continued presence without censure in 
the KP has been ensured by strong support from South Africa and 
other neighbouring countries, although its behaviour continues to be 
both erratic and controversial, and its ability to meet minimum KP 
standards cannot be demonstrated.65
The Zimbabwean situation has arguably been the most concerning, 
with reports of violence and smuggling in the Marange mining 
area following the occurrence of a diamond rush there. As a result, 
the Kimberley Process agreed to send a review visit to the country. 
Although irregularities were discovered, the Kimberley Process 
decided against suspending Zimbabwe’s membership in the scheme. 
However, a Joint Work Plan was agreed between the Kimberley 
Process and Zimbabwe, involving the appointment of a special 
Kimberley monitor to address compliance issues. A ‘supervised export 
mechanism’ was established for exports of rough diamonds from 
Marange, under which the Kimberley Monitor must examine potential 
exports and sign the Kimberley Process certificate before they can be 
64  Ibid 8–9.
65  Ibid.
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considered as legitimate.66 One of the consequences of the Marange 
diamonds dispute within the Kimberley Process, when it became clear 
that Zimbabwe would be permitted to export diamonds from Marange, 
was that NGO members from the KP, including Global Witness, chose 
to leave the KP completely, taking the view that it had failed in its 
core mandate.67 Other NGOs, such as Partnership Africa Canada, 
have chosen to remain within the KP despite their objections to the 
handling of the issue.68 With the Marange diamonds issue settled in its 
favour, Zimbabwe has gone on to export a large quantity of diamonds 
legitimated by the Kimberley Process: it exported US$480  million 
of rough diamonds in 2014.69
Review missions have an important role where there are more serious 
allegations of non-compliance. The case of Brazil is a good example. In 
2005, Partnership Africa Canada published a report detailing instances 
of fraud relating to illicit diamond production and exports within 
Brazil’s diamond industry. This led Brazil’s Federal Police to launch 
an investigation into the country’s diamond industry, and Brazilian 
authorities to suspend diamond exports. A previously commissioned 
Kimberley review visit found a range of shortcomings in the way in 
which the scheme was implemented in Brazil, ranging from a lack of 
training and experience among staff and customs officers, to flaws 
66  Esau, Bernhard, MP, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Public Statement on the Situation in the 
Marange Diamond Fields, Zimbabwe’ (Kimberley Process Secretariat, Windhoek, Namibia, 
26 March 2009); Esau, Bernhard, MP, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Statement: High Level Envoy 
Visit to Zimbabwe: Situation in Marange Diamond Fields’ (Kimberley Process Secretariat, 
Windhoek, Namibia, 16 April 2009); Esau, Bernhard, MP, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Risk of 
Fake KP Certificates’ (Kimberley Process Secretariat, Windhoek, Namibia, June 2009); Kimberley 
Process Secretariat, ‘Kimberley Process Intersessional Meeting Communique’ (Windhoek, 
Namibia, 25 June 2009); Esau, Bernhard, Hon, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Clarification About the 
Kimberley Process Chair’s Working Visit to Zimbabwe Which Took Place 19–21 August 2009’ 
(Kimberley Process Secretariat, Windhoek, Namibia, 3 September 2009); Hirsch, Boaz, Kimberley 
Process Chair, ‘Appointment of KP Monitor to Zimbabwe’ (Kimberley Process Secretariat, 
Jerusalem, Israel, 1 March 2010); Hirsch, Boaz, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Re: Trade of Marange 
Diamonds in Compliance with KPCS Requirements: Vigilance Against the Laundering of Illicit 
Shipments’ (Letter to Kimberley Process Participants, 6 May 2010).
67  Global Witness, ‘Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade to 
be Held Accountable’ (2 December 2011). Available at: www.globalwitness.org/archive/global-
witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable/.
68  Partnership Africa Canada, ‘PAC and the Kimberley Process: A History’, www.pacweb.org/
en/pac-and-the-kimberly-process; a listing of remaining members of the official KP civil society 
observers is available at the Kimberley Process website: www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/civil-
society-coalition.
69  Kimberley Process website: www.kimberleyprocess.com/node/227.
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in Brazil’s Kimberley certificate.70 Brazil handled the revelation of 
irregularities well. On its own accord, Brazil suspended all diamond 
exports for 2006 well in advance of the Kimberley review visit. 
Brazilian authorities were transparent and eager to assist the review 
team. Brazil invited a follow-up review visit.71
Peer Review: Evaluation
In the initial KP agreement, there was provision only for monitoring in 
cases of ‘significant non-compliance’, a term that was never defined. A 
year after the KP came on stream in 2003, the peer-review system was 
agreed to. The entire process was developed after the core document 
had been finalised, providing a textbook case of how the KP has 
evolved in order to achieve the goals that are expected of it.72
The peer-review mechanism was assessed as part of the November 
2006 review of the Kimberley Process, which was conducted by an 
Ad Hoc Working Group, as envisaged in the Kimberley core document. 
The group reported that there was widespread agreement among 
governments, civil society, and NGOs that the peer-review mechanism 
had been a great success. In particular, the review highlighted the fact 
that review visits were a crucial confidence-building tool, allowing 
the Kimberley Process to be sure its requirements were being met 
effectively.73 The review noted that 32 participants received review 
visits prior to the review, and that a further two non-participants, 
Liberia and Lebanon, had received special expert missions prior to 
joining the Kimberley Process. Two review missions had been carried 
out: to the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo. As at 
30 October 2006, 12 member governments had not yet received review 
70  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review (Review Report, Kimberley Process, 
November 2006) 39–40.
71  Ibid 40.
72  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 8–9.
73  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s 20; 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review (Review Report, Kimberley Process, November 
2006). See also Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the KPCS, Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme Questionnaire for the Review of the Scheme (Questions for Review Submissions, Kimberley 
Process, 2005); Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: Terms of Reference Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on the Review of the KPCS (Revised 31 July 2006).
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visits, but nine invited review visits. Overall, 42 of the 45 Kimberley 
participants (93 per cent) received or invited review visits or missions. 
All previously conflict diamond–affected countries received review 
visits, and almost all countries reporting diamond production or trade 
had had review visits.74
The review, however, also mentioned a number of areas in which the 
peer-review mechanism could be improved. Croatia, Indonesia, and 
Venezuela had not had review visits, and had not requested them. 
The three-year review recognised that these three countries should be 
encouraged as strongly as possible to invite review visits as soon as 
possible. The chair of the Monitoring Committee confirmed that these 
countries had been approached and are considering inviting a review 
visit.75
The three-year review also recommended a number of modifications 
to the Monitoring Committee mandate, specifically so that review 
visit activities could explicitly integrate a regional dimension into 
their activities — i.e. trading patterns in neighbouring countries. 
Expert missions should be able to be deployed on an ad hoc basis 
in preparation for determining whether or not to admit a particular 
applicant into the Kimberley Process.76 
The three-year review considered the effectiveness of review visits in 
two ways: by considering whether the system had detected the main 
implementation problems, and whether the peer-review system had 
contributed to bringing about tangible improvements to the identified 
problems. The Review Working Group concluded that governments 
who had been reviewed had received the visits with openness, and 
provided access to their documentation and the range of activities 
linked to certification. This made it possible for the review team 
to identify issues that would not otherwise have been apparent. 
However, the three-year review also noted that some review visits 
were more sophisticated in comparing the actual mining capacity 
of a reviewed government to its declared rough diamond exports. 
74  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
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The review recommended that each team report on whether it has 
reviewed internal controls for effective compliance in the countries 
it has visited. The three-year review also suggested that individual 
countries identify different needs for technical assistance and training 
in order to help participating governments implement effective 
internal controls. Examples of constructive interaction, resulting in 
improved implementation practices, included the adoption of proper 
import procedures by some producing governments that did not 
have import procedures in place; the training of diamond valuators 
to enable them to carry out a review visit’s recommendation that all 
imports into a government member be subjected to a regime of physical 
inspection; and the initiation of an investigation by a government into 
suspicious trading activities pursuant to the findings of a review visit. 
One suggestion to improve the capacity of review visits was to increase 
the length of the average review visit. Given that these are normally 
only three to five days long, they can take on more of a diplomatic 
than an investigative character.77
The review also recommended that the Kimberley Process should 
seek to further diversify the leadership of review visits to include 
in particular alluvial-producing countries, as only Sierra Leone in 
2006 had taken such a role. It was also suggested that the criteria 
in the Administrative Decision on Peer Review should be expanded 
to include a provision that experts are required to be impartial and 
highly professional, and should further require members to disclose 
any potential conflict of interest.78
The review suggested that the peer-review system be maintained, 
but that the Administrative Decision on Peer Review be amended, 
specifying that, in further review visits, attention should be 
focused on follow-up of issues identified in the first visit. In the 
case of repeated review visits, the visiting teams should be flexible 
in size and duration, to ensure that scarce resources are focused on 
substantial implementation issues. The Participation Committee 
77  Ibid 38–39; Interview between Author and Global Witness Representative.
78  Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: Third Year Review (Review Report, Kimberley Process, 
November 2006) 41-42.
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should  carefully  engage with countries that fail to implement the 
review visit recommendations, with expulsion from the KP available 
as a last resort.79
One of the areas in which the peer-review could be strengthened 
would be to make the receipt of a peer-review visit compulsory to all 
members. The reluctance of some members to receive a peer-review 
visit calls into question the entire monitoring and enforcement system 
of the Kimberley Process. If a country is able to deny access to a review 
team, there is no ability for the Kimberley Process to verify its level of 
compliance with the process.
In evaluating the Kimberley Process’s response to cases of serious 
non-compliance, its ability to take executive action between plenary 
meetings, mediated by the chair, has been very important. In this 
feature, a year-round operational secretariat, it resembles the success 
of the equivalent secretariat responsible for managing compliance 
with the Convention on the Illegal Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna. A system has been developed for the convention 
whereby a decision concerning a serious non-compliance issue can be 
made during the course of a year, prior to a meeting of the plenary. 
Action such as a trading ban with the problematic country can be 
implemented in this interim period.80
Although the office of the Kimberley Process Chair has been 
highlighted  as a strength of the peer-review system, it has also 
been criticised for being overly dependent on the willingness of 
the incumbent to take decisive action. For example, observers 
have argued that it was fortunate that the Canadians were chairing 
the Kimberley Process at the time that the Republic of Congo was 
expelled, as they were proactive and took the decision to ensure 
the integrity of the system.81 This  example can be contrasted with 
the situation of  Venezuela. Although seen as being in blatant non-
compliance with Kimberley requirements, Venezuela was not targeted 
for expulsion under the mandate of the European Community (2007) 
79  Ibid 46; Interview between Author and Global Witness Representative.
80  Hewitt, T, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora in the South Pacific Region: Management and 
Scientific Authorities’ (2002) 2(1) Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 98, 98–130.
81  Interview between Author and Global Witness Representative.
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or Angola  (2008).82 This highlights the need for a formal procedure 
for dealing with countries that are seriously non-compliant, and, 
arguably, in determining the suitability of particular governments 
to carry out this important function.83
When it works well, the peer-review system is adequate, although 
three-day reviews in some cases are not long enough to develop 
a comprehensive understanding of a country’s diamond industry. 
In many cases, however, it is far from adequate. Worst case examples 
include a review of Ghana where the report, a year in production, was 
superseded by a much tougher UN report revealing the transit through 
Ghana of conflict diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire (missed entirely by the 
KP team). An enormous nine-member Guinea review team spent less 
than two hours outside the capital city and did not complete its report 
for more than a year. A review of Venezuela was orchestrated entirely 
by the non-compliant host government. Civil society was prevented 
from participating in the exercise, and the team was never allowed 
near diamond mining or trading areas.84
The makeup of review teams is inconsistent. Burden sharing has 
been uneven, with some NGOs footing a larger share of review costs 
than most governments. This has been alleviated in recent years by 
contributions from Rio Tinto Diamonds, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
United States to a fund for NGO participation.85
82  Ibid; Interview between Author and Global Witness Representative. Subsequently, 
an  Administrative Decision (AD) on Venezuela’s participation was adopted in the plenary 
meeting of the Kimberley Process in Brussels in 2007. Further to this, the KP Chair attempted to 
organise a review visit in the first quarter of 2008 but this was never acceded to by Venezuela. 
As a result, the Working Group on Monitoring concluded on 10 June 2008 that, since it could 
not ensure the implementation of the administrative decision, that the matter should be referred 
to the Participation Committee. Just prior to the intersessional meeting, the KP Chair received a 
notification from Venezuela that it intended to ‘voluntarily separate from the KP for a period of 
two years and to cease certification for export of its diamonds’. Message regarding Compliance 
of Venezuela from Kimberley Process Chair Rahul Khullar to Kimberley Process Members, 9 July 
2008. The plenary formally encouraged continued efforts to reintegrate Venezuela into the KP 
at its meeting in 2009. Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process Plenary Session Communique’ 
(Swakopmund, Namibia, 5 November 2009).
83  Interview between Author and Global Witness Representative.
84  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 10.
85  Ibid.
THe LIoN THAT DIDN'T RoAR
102
While some reviews have been thorough and have made important 
recommendations, there has been a chronic lack of follow-up. Review 
teams have repeatedly stated that some of the countries worst affected 
by conflict diamonds, such as Angola, the DRC, and Sierra Leone, have 
extremely weak internal controls. Getting a grip on internal controls 
remains the single most important issue for the diamond industry and 
the Kimberley Process.86
Well-documented cases of serious non-compliance have been brought 
to the attention of the Kimberley Process on several occasions, mainly 
by civil society representatives and the media, but the KP has been 
either slow to act, or has not acted at all. Smuggling of diamonds from 
Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, and Zimbabwe has been debated at length, 
but have elicited weak, slow, or no response. The same has been 
true in cases where gross statistical anomalies suggest the need for 
urgent action: Guinea and Lebanon are two cases that were ‘pending’ 
throughout 2009, and which remain unresolved.87
‘Technical assistance’ has been used as a catch-all, last-minute 
answer to many of these problems. Assistance, regardless of how it 
is described, is not always the solution to problems of compliance. 
The KP approach, however, has been ad hoc and patchy. Guyana and 
Ghana, among others, are still awaiting technical assistance promised 
by the Kimberley Process. KP terminology and thinking need to 
expand beyond the idea of technical assistance as sending experts, 
to incorporate other ideas, including longer-term inputs and the 
provision of equipment.88
In sum, the Kimberley Process needs a rigorous, clear and phased 
compliance enforcement strategy that starts with assistance and 
internal pressure, moves to public naming and shaming, and then 
moves to high levels of sanctions, suspension, and expulsion.89
Smillie recommends the establishment of independent, third-
party monitoring. He suggests that the KP Chair create a panel of 
experienced experts to design and propose a range of models for 
independent, third-party monitoring, complemented by rigorous 
86  Ibid.
87  Ibid.
88  Ibid 11.
89  Ibid.
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follow-up, credible sanctions in cases of continued non-compliance, 
and a decision-making process on non-compliance that is not hostage 
to political interference.90
Smillie also recommends the establishment of a small permanent KP 
secretariat to manage monitoring and follow-up, providing service to 
the KP Chair and working groups as required. The secretariat would 
not replace or supplant the Working Group on Monitoring; it would 
handle the organisational and managerial functions that currently fall 
to a single KP participant.91
Smillie also recommended the establishment of a multi-donor trust 
fund for timely and appropriate follow-up assistance in helping 
participants to meet KP minimum standards.92
Smillie also notes that the Kimberley Process has repeatedly ignored 
calls for the inclusion of oversight on the cutting and polishing 
industry in KP minimum standards. This sector remains vulnerable 
to, and a convenient laundry for, rough diamonds that have evaded 
KP scrutiny. The volume of illicit goods is growing: 100 per cent 
of  Venezuela’s production; conflict diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire; 
a large volume of Zimbabwe’s diamonds moving through Mozambique; 
and an unknown volume of smuggled and stolen goods from other 
countries. Major seizures of illicit diamonds in India, Dubai, and 
elsewhere in recent months may be the tip of an iceberg.93
Smillie recommends that companies that cut and polish diamonds 
document their sources, and that their records be made subject to 
independent audit as an integral part of KP minimum standards. 
He suggests that the World Diamond Council should commission an 
independent evaluation of its system of warranties, to determine how 
it could improve the performance of industry actors in meeting KP 
challenges.94
Public transparency was originally a key focus of the Kimberley 
Process. The preamble to an early draft of the core document stated: 




93  Ibid 12.
94  Ibid 11.
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rough diamonds will only be credible if supported by appropriate 
arrangements to ensure transparency and accountability with respect 
to its implementation.’95
Under the heading ‘Cooperation and Transparency’, however, the 
final KP core document lists seven provisions, dealing only with 
the exchange of information among participants. There is no discussion 
of public transparency. The KP’s most notable failing in this area is the 
fact that reports of review visits are kept confidential.
The explanation given for this is that governments would not open 
themselves to full peer scrutiny if blemishes were to be made public. 
Most blemishes are, however, self-evident to inside observers, 
and are hardly a public secret. By hiding the reviews and their 
recommendations, and by failing to follow up on the recommendations, 
the KP effectively removes a tool that might improve matters without 
any effort on its part: publicity. Confidentiality, of course, also 
obscures the KP’s lack of follow-up on its own recommendations. 
It also prevents concerned citizens from knowing about, and calling 
for change in, their governments’ implementation of KP obligations.96
According to Smillie, greater openness in the Kimberley Process 
might be uncomfortable because it would be easier for the media, 
civil society, and others to hold it more accountable for timely follow-
up on reviews, and for action on issues of serious non-compliance. 
But all of these stories find their way into the media anyway. Greater 
transparency would help to make the KP the regulatory body it aims to 
be, and the one the industry and African producer countries so badly 
require.97
Smillie recommends that all KP annual reports and reports of KP 
reviews, as a matter of course, be placed on the open KP website, 
along with details of follow-up action. A transparency working group 
should be established to develop criteria on exceptions to the rule, 
and to deal with special requests for confidentiality.98
95  Kimberley Process, (Working Document no 3/2001, 21 August 2001) cited in Smillie, I, 
‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa Canada, June 2010) 12.
96  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 12.
97  Ibid 14.
98  Ibid.
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Smillie is also critical of what he considers self-censorship by the 
Kimberley Process of draft resolutions prepared for submission to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. He states that, in 2009, 
Venezuela insisted that all references to Venezuela be dropped; China 
insisted that all references to human rights be dropped; and Zimbabwe 
insisted that all references to Zimbabwe be dropped. An anodyne 
UNGA resolution was passed, as a result, without a single reference 
to the issues that had most consumed the Kimberley Process over 
the previous two years. Echoing the growing dissidence from civil 
society and some industry players, several governments, including 
Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, challenged the 
official KP version of events in the UNGA debate.99
According to Smillie, a major concern at the outset of KP negotiations 
was the potential cost implications of a global regulatory system. 
It was assumed that the industry would have to bear most of the cost, 
although as it turned out most of the financial burden has fallen on 
governments. In almost all countries, government has taken on most 
if not all of the cost of implementing the KP. The industry created the 
WDC to represent its interests in the Kimberley Process, and in some 
countries a low-cost chain of warranty system has been developed. 
Industry has participated in review visits and has contributed to the 
costs of special undertakings such as the 2006 review of Ghanaian 
diamond exports. All things considered, however, the cost of the 
KCPS to industry has been small.100
Civil society organisations have participated in all working groups, 
plenaries and intersessional meetings, and have participated in most 
review visits and missions. Civil society organisations have also 
undertaken a large number of independent reviews, studies and 
publications and have, arguably, borne a disproportionate cost of 
participation — and in holding the Kimberley Process accountable to 
its mandate.101
99  Ibid; Charbonneau, L, ‘Zimbabwe “Blood Diamonds” Dispute Breaks out at UN’, 
Reuters Canada (11 December 2009). Available at: ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAT 
RE5BA3OI20091211.
100  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 16–17.
101  Ibid.
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The major cost implications lie in the adoption of an independent, 
third-party monitoring system, the establishment of a small secretariat 
to manage that function, and the required follow-up as an ongoing 
service to the chair of the day. The Working Group on Monitoring 
would continue to set the agenda and the policy framework and other 
working groups would remain unchanged. Smillie estimates the costs 
of the working group as being US$2.25 million per annum.102
Role of Industry
Although the primary regulator for the Kimberley Process at the 
national level is the national government and its agencies, one of the 
distinctive features of the Kimberley Process is that it can be considered 
as operating simultaneously as a government-regulated system as well 
as an exercise in industry self-regulation. The  Kimberley Process 
has, from the outset, been driven by the needs and interests of the 
diamond industry. The De Beers corporation was a significant driving 
force in the finalisation of the Kimberley Process core document, 
and the industry as a whole has been represented through the WDC, 
an umbrella organisation for the large firm commercial diamond sector, 
at subsequent plenary meetings of the Kimberley Process.103 
The journey of the high-end corporate diamond sector from the targets 
of bad press to advocates for the continued operation of the Kimberley 
Process is one of the striking features of the history of the organisation. 
One commentator has described this transformation as being a process 
of socialisation from self-interest to ‘enlightened self-interest’.104 
The high sensitivity of the industry to its media and public image 
can be understood in the light of the end products of the industry. 
Although mining rough diamonds is undertaken for industrial 
purposes, such as their use in high-powered cutting tools, the bulk 
of the commercial value in the industry resides in the jewellery retail 
sector. Fundamentally, the value of a diamond in this context is 
aesthetic and sentimental, meaning that its value is at risk if it were 
102  Ibid 17.
103  Commentator C Kantz argues that, while it was NGOs who highlighted the problem of 
conflict diamonds, the diamond industry became socialised to take responsibility for addressing 
the issue: Kantz, C, ‘The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley 
Process’ (2007) 9(3) Business and Politics Art 2, 3.
104  Ibid.
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to become associated with negative sentiment resulting from a link 
with human rights violations. Given its awareness of the risk, the 
commercial diamond industry has positioned itself as an advocate for 
the Kimberley Process, so as to separate its product from the conflict 
diamonds trade. One of the interesting findings from interviews 
conducted with Rio Tinto and the Australian Government was that 
Rio Tinto was a very strong advocate for the continued operation of 
the Kimberley Process whereas the Australian Government expressed 
the view that its relevance was diminished given the emergence of 
peace in Angola and Sierra Leone. The expression of this view by 
government would appear to be connected to the fact that much of 
the operating costs of the Kimberley Process comes from government 
rather than industry. This view, however, appears a little short-
sighted given the emergence of new conflict diamonds threats in the 
DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe, in tandem with the importance of 
the Kimberley Process for the prevention of threats emerging again in 
Angola and Sierra Leone, or surfacing in another country.105
Although the WDC has observer status rather than voting status 
in the Kimberley Process, it can be argued that its representations 
at this level have a strong influence, whether voiced through the 
plenary or particular working groups and committees. This influence 
is particularly strong considering that decisions of the Kimberley 
Process plenary must be through consensus.106 This means that, should 
the WDC lobby only a  single government delegation to support its 
viewpoint, then it would not be possible for the Kimberley Process 
Plenary to make a decision regarding that which it does not concur.
The involvement of industry representatives and NGOs in the 
international Kimberley Process system is perhaps most pronounced 
through the committee and working group system. All committees 
have, both in principle and practice, involved industry and NGO 
representatives. Representatives are also mandated to participate in 
105  Interview with Rio Tinto Representative (telephone interview, 30 May 2007); Written 
Response from Australian Government to Author’s Interview Questions, 14 September 2007.
106  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s VI 
(5). Other international regulatory initiatives have sought to directly manage the activities of 
multinational corporations, including instruments such as the UN Norms of Responsibility 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
discussed in Tripathi, S, ‘International Regulation of Multinational Corporations’ (2005) 33(1) 
Oxford Development Studies 117, 126.
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review visits and review missions as part of the peer-review mechanism 
employed by the Kimberley Process. This level of involvement stands 
apart from standard expectations of NGOs and civil society, which 
typically are excluded from direct participation in the execution of 
treaty body decisions, and do not normally enjoy such a high level 
of influence in decision-making processes.107
One of the benefits of industry involvement is its ability to provide 
experts who enhance the system procedurally and practically. Rio 
Tinto has been asked for advice by other diamond-producing mines 
regarding Kimberley Process compliance, and has happily offered this 
advice in the knowledge that the company’s reputation is affected if 
diamond-mining operations by others are not Kimberley-compliant.108
Industry Involvement Through Self-Regulation
Given the direct involvement of major diamond-producing 
corporations, such as De Beers, in the WDC, the formal diamond sector 
has been strongly integrated into the self-management of conflict 
diamonds prevention standards. As such, De Beers management, for 
example, has sought to ensure that its component corporate entities 
are compliant with certification requirements and its other obligations 
under the Kimberley Process. 
One of the challenges, however, has been the involvement of the 
informal diamond sector in this process. It is very important to engage 
the informal sector, predominantly representing alluvial diamond 
miners, as this sector has been so directly implicated in producing 
diamonds for militia groups. As it does not appear that their interests 
are represented through the WDC, it will perhaps fall to national 
107  Grant, A J and I Taylor, ‘Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process 
and the Quest for Clean Gems’ (2004) 93(375) The Round Table 385, 385–387.
108  Interview between Author and Rio Tinto Representative.
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governments to engage with the informal sector. It is noteworthy 
that guidelines for such engagement are currently being developed 
at the international level through the Kimberley Process to assist 
governments.109 This movement culminated in the attendance of 
representatives of artisanal miners at the 2007 Kimberley Process 
Plenary in Brussels. The Kimberley Process decided to establish an 
Artisanal Mining Working Group to especially meet the needs of this 
central sector.110
The ability of the diamond industry to regulate itself in relation to 
the chain of warranties from import to retail was the subject of a 2004 
study of the retail sector. Diamond retailers in the US and the UK 
were targeted by a survey, coordinated through the efforts of Global 
Witness and Amnesty International, to determine the effectiveness 
of diamond industry self-regulation at the retail end of the trading 
chain. In particular, reference was made to commitments made by 
the industry in January 2003 to implement a code of conduct to 
prevent buying or selling conflict diamonds; to implement a system 
of warranties requiring that all invoices for the sale of diamonds and 
jewellery containing diamonds contain a written guarantees that 
diamonds are conflict-free; to keep records of the warranty invoices 
given and received, and for this to be audited and reconciled on an 
annual basis by the company’s own auditors; and to inform company 
employees about the industry’s policies and government regulations 
to combat the trade in conflict diamonds.111 Unfortunately, the study 
found that implementation of the system of warranties at the point 
of retail was inconsistent and not fully functioning. In particular, the 
study showed that retailers, where they were in fact implementing 
the voluntary self-regulatory measures, were not taking sufficient 
precautions to ensure that their suppliers were providing Kimberley-
compliant diamonds. The study made a number of recommendations 
with diamond retailers in mind. It recommended that strict criteria 
109  Kovanda, Karel, Kimberley Process Chair, ‘Valedictory Remarks of Mr Karel Kovanda, 
Kimberley Process 2007 Chairman’ (Intersessional Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 8 November 2007).
110  Ibid.
111  Global Witness and Amnesty International, ‘Déjà vu: Diamond Industry still Failing 
to Deliver on Promises: Summary of UK and US Results of UK and US Results of Global Witness 
and Amnesty International Survey’ (Report, Global Witness, October 2004).
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be applied in the selection of suppliers and that third-party auditing 
procedures be adopted to ensure that policies are working effectively; 
that retailers provide written assurances to consumers stating that 
the diamonds they purchase are conflict-free, so that the system of 
warranties covers the entire supply chain, from point of mine to point 
of sale to the consumer; and that retailers carry out education and 
training on conflict diamonds and the Kimberley Process, and require 
it as a condition of employment, so that salespeople are fully informed 
about policies and communicate this to consumers in a transparent 
manner.112 
Both the formal and informal diamond sectors have some ability to 
enforce standards in a self-regulatory context. For example, internal 
disciplinary boards can be established to hear complaints about 
breaches of Kimberley Process standards by diamond industry 
employees. 
Role of Non-Governmental Organisations
Non-governmental organisations such as Global Witness and 
Partnership Africa Canada were pivotal in bringing the problem of 
conflict diamonds to the attention of the international community, 
leading to the establishment of the Kimberley Process. They have 
subsequently had a vital role within the Kimberley Process, and have 
been described as representing the ‘conscience of the Kimberley 
Process’.113
Non-governmental organisations play a very important role in the 
monitoring of Kimberley Process obligations both within the system 
and outside the system. Within the system, as discussed earlier, 
NGOs  are able to bring potential non-compliance issues to the 
attention of the Kimberley Process, and to participate in the peer-
review mechanism. 
112  Global Witness, ‘Broken Vows: Exposing the “Loupe” Holes in the Diamond Industry’s 
Efforts to Prevent the Trade in Conflict Diamonds’ (Report, March 2004).
113  Kovanda, Karel, ‘Valedictory Remarks of Mr Karel Kovanda, Kimberley Process 2007 
Chairman’ (Intersessional Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 8 November 2007).
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NGOs have had a central role in the development of standard-setting 
within the Kimberley Process, including those standards relevant to 
regulation at the national level. They have an institutionalised role 
in relation to the functioning of the Kimberley Process, including 
providing ideas and recommendations as to further developments in 
the area of standard-setting. 
The Kimberley Rules of Procedure clarify that observers may be 
invited to attend meetings of an ad hoc working group or a subsidiary 
body, either on a temporary or a permanent basis. The plenary may 
take a decision to revoke an invitation.114 
One of the key successes and unique features of the Kimberley Process 
is its high degree of involvement with non-state entities, in particular 
representatives from the diamond industry and non-governmental 
organisations. NGOs play important roles in standard-setting and 
monitoring within the scheme. As stated in one review submission: 
‘NGOs and experts from throughout the diamond industry have 
played a vital role and their input is accepted (if not expected) as if 
they were states.’115
NGOs often initiate the incorporation of new standards in the context 
of Kimberley Process meetings. An example that stands out is the drive 
for more detailed internal controls to be set out through the Kimberley 
Process. In the area of monitoring, Global Witness and Partnership 
Africa Canada have contributed assessments as part of the three-year 
review of the Kimberley Process, they serve on the Working Groups 
on Monitoring and Participation within the Kimberley Process, 
and they have been involved in several review visits and missions. 
114  Kimberley Process, Rules of Procedure of Meetings of the Plenary, and its Ad Hoc Working 
Groups and Subsidiary Bodies (2003).
115  Wexler, P, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on the Occasion of its Third Anniversary: 
An Independent Commissioned Review (Review Report submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Review of the Kimberley Process, February 2006) 6.
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Rather  than preferring an adversarial approach to the Kimberley 
Process, these organisations engage dynamically within the process to 
effect change.116
In their landmark study of the ‘governance triangle’, assessing a range 
of tripartite (government, business, NGO) initiatives, Abbott and 
Snidal interestingly position the Kimberley Process at the centre of 
their triangle model, indicating their assessment that, as regards the 
relative influence of the three stakeholders, the KP is perhaps the most 
evenly balanced of the assessed initiatives. It is possible to challenge 
this assessment, however, by observing that only governments are 
voting members of the KP, despite the significant influence of NGOs and 
businesses. Given the walk-out at the Kinshasa interplenary meeting, 
and the subsequent non-attendance by NGOs at the November 2011 
plenary, the structural weighting towards governments has more 
clearly made itself manifest.117
116  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) ss III, 
IV. Work has been initiated within the Kimberley Process in relation to the effectiveness of such 
internal controls and industry self-regulation. Kimberley Process, ‘Final Communique: Kimberley 
Process Plenary Meeting’ (Gatineau, Canada, 29 October 2004). This culminated with Kimberley 
Process Plenary’s endorsement of a document, called the Brussels Declaration, on internal 
controls of participants with rough diamond trading and manufacturing. The declaration gives 
guidance on controls for record keeping, spot checks of trading companies, physical inspections 
of imports and exports, and maintenance of verifiable records of rough diamond inventories. 
Kimberley Process, ‘2007 Kimberley Process Communique’ (Brussels, Belgium, 8 November 
2007). A critique of the lack of internal controls in the Kimberley Process is set out in Fishman, 
J L, ‘Is Diamond Smuggling Forever?: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First 
Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem’ (2005) 13 University 
of Miami Business Law Review 217, 237–238; Interview between Author and Global Witness 
Representative. The use of strategies within and outside formal processes to influence outcomes 
by NGOs has been described as ‘multitrack diplomacy’. Grant, A J and I Taylor, ‘Global 
Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems’ (2004) 
93(375) The Round Table 385, 386–687.
117  Abbott, K and D Snidal ‘The Governance Triangle’ in W Mattli and N N Woods (eds), 
The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 50–52; Partnership Africa 
Canada, ‘Kimberley Process lets Zimbabwe off the Hook Again’, (2 November 2011). Available at: 
www.pacweb.org/Documents/Press_releases/2011/KP_lets_Zim_off_the_hook_Nov2011.pdf.
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Role of NGOs External to the Kimberley Process
Outside the system, NGOs have also been effective in undertaking their 
own independent monitoring of the effectiveness of the Kimberley 
Process in particular contexts and countries.118 It was through reports 
by organisations such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada 
that world attention was given to the conflict diamonds problem, 
and Global Witness has continued to provide this external aspect of 
scrutiny of the Kimberley Process system. NGOs have proven adept 
at attracting international media attention to the conflict diamonds 
issue. The 1998 protests organised by Global Witness in front of 
Tiffany’s jewellery store in New York was a landmark in attracting 
global attention to the problem.119 Another media event occurred in 
2006 with the release of the popular Hollywood movie Blood Diamond, 
which brought further public attention to the issue.120 Considering this 
external aspect of its scrutiny, recent reports by the organisation have 
considered the ability of the diamond industry to implement its chain 
of warranties from the point of import to the point of retail. A report 
dated June 2010 released by Partnership Africa Canada provides an 
important external and contemporary critique of the operation of the 
Kimberley Process.121
Bringing conflict diamonds trading to the attention of the global 
media, and naming and shaming unscrupulous corporate or individual 
behaviour, acts itself as a form of enforcement action, which is readily 
available to non-governmental organisations. The term ‘enforcement’ is 
used here in the regulatory sense, rather than in the normal legal sense 
that generally connotes action by a central authority.122 Enforcement 
in this sense indicates the pressure that negative media attention 
brings to bear on industry, which influences industry to change its 
behaviour to conform with international regulatory standards. It is 
118  Examples of public reports are Global Witness, ‘Broken Vows: Exposing the “Loupe Holes” 
in the Diamond Industry’s Efforts to Prevent the Trade in Conflict Diamonds’ (Report, March 
2004); and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Diamonds and Human Security: Annual Review 2008’ 
(Annual Report, October 2008).
119  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 41.
120  Ibid 148.
121  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010).
122  As discussed in Chapter 5, regulation is theorised to consist of the processes of standard-
setting, monitoring, and enforcement.
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noted that the ultimate consumers of diamond products purchase 
diamond jewellery as much for its image as its intrinsic qualities. 
Should diamonds develop a bad media image, the value of the industry 
would rapidly decrease. NGOs may also use the threat of poor media 
publicity as leverage with industry and governmental groups to seek 
higher standards under the Kimberley Process.123 
The Diamond Development Initiative International
The quality of internal control systems varies greatly from one KP 
participant to another. Implementing effective internal controls is 
most difficult for countries with alluvial diamond reserves. Alluvial 
diamonds are found in vast areas, usually along riverbeds, and these 
areas are often beyond the control of both states and the diamond 
industry. Alluvial diamonds are most frequently mined by artisanal 
miners who work with simple tools and often earn less than US$1 
per day. Kimberlite diamonds, on the other hand, are mined with 
capital-intensive machinery that extracts the diamonds directly 
from a volcanic pipe. Botswana, the exemplar for positive African 
development based on diamonds, extracts its gems from kimberlite 
mines. African countries with large alluvial diamond reserves include 
Angola, CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone.124
Artisans mine between 10 and 20 per cent of the diamonds used 
for jewellery, which makes them an important part of the industry. 
They  have no better employment opportunities and typically hope 
to make a big find in the diamond fields. But the vast majority, 
despite their back-breaking labour, will never find that large stone. 
The diamonds they dream of are referred to as poverty diamonds, but 
are closely linked to conflict diamonds: ‘The poverty, the hundreds 
of thousands of willingly exploited adults and children, and the 
123  Tamm, I J, ‘Dangerous Appetites: Human Rights Activism and Conflict Commodities’ (2004) 
26 Human Rights Quarterly 687, 691. Academic commentators have noted, however, that negative 
publicity can operate indiscriminately, thereby damaging the diamond revenues of producer 
nations that are considered to have ‘clean’ diamond industries, such as Botswana. Taylor, I and 
G Mkhawa, ‘Not Forever: Botswana, Conflict Diamonds and the Bushmen’ (2003) 102 African 
Affairs 261, 271. See also Shaw, Timothy M, ‘Regional Dimensions of Conflict and Peace-Building 
in Contemporary Africa’ (2003) 15 Journal of International Development 487, 492.
124  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 149.
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volatility of the diamond fields make for a highly flammable social 
cocktail, one that has ignited several times in recent years, with tragic 
results.’125 The alluvial sector is closely linked to civil wars in those 
countries and has led to regional and international instability. Rebels 
continue to control alluvial diamond fields and poor artisanal diamond 
workers are easily recruited for rebel armies or to sell the diamonds 
they find to regional warlords. A range of social problems is associated 
with artisanal mining: child labour, HIV infections, environmental 
destruction, crime and violence, poverty, and unhealthy and 
dangerous working conditions. Some states have declared the alluvial 
diamond mining sector illegal, while most states neglect it altogether, 
thereby exacerbating the problems. ‘There are no cases in Africa 
where artisanal diamond mining has been supported and regulated 
successfully.’126 
The conflict diamonds campaign, in particular that by Global 
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, did not pay close attention 
to development issues relating to alluvial miners until late 2004. But 
local African initiatives appeared as early as the beginning of 2002, 
as soon as relative stability emerged in the region. Various pilot 
projects attempted to address the issue. For example, the government 
of Sierra Leone created the Diamond Area Community Development 
Fund, through which part of the export tax on diamonds is directly 
returned to the artisanal diamond communities. The DRC created an 
organisation to assist in creating mining cooperatives. The Campaign 
for Just Mining was launched by the Network Movement for Justice 
and Development (a Sierra Leonean NGO and Southern partner 
organisation of Partnership Africa Canada) in January 2000, following 
the widely publicised Partnership Africa Canada report Heart of the 
Matter on Sierra Leone. The Campaign for Just Mining’s goals are 
to ‘promote sustainable development in Sierra Leone by advocating 
accountability, transparency and social responsibility within the 
125  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 6–7.
126  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 8; Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: 
How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 149–150.
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mining sector’.127 The campaign is squarely rooted in a human 
rights frame, or, as they call it, a ‘rights-based approach to mining’, 
including the right to a sustainable livelihood (i.e. formalising diggers’ 
employment status); the right to basic services; the right to security; 
protection of the environment; ensuring long-term human security, 
including food security; and avoiding illnesses such as malaria; 
and the right to participate in various decision-making processes.128
Many of these local initiatives were funded through bilateral aid, 
which was often forthcoming after peace agreements had been 
reached. The Peace Diamond Alliance was launched in December 
2002, organising diggers in cooperatives to help them obtain better 
prices for diamonds. It was funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and managed by Management 
Systems International, a Washington-based consulting firm. ‘It has 
brought together an eclectic group of local and international NGOs, 
diamond buyers, mining companies and government officials.’129 Other 
pilot projects were also initiated by state donor agencies and NGOs. 
Bilateral agencies such as USAID and some international governmental 
organisations, notably the World Bank, committed funds and 
organisational capacity to the issue of artisanal and small-scale mining. 
Many of these initiatives grew out of foreign policy efforts by states, 
especially the USA and the UK, sometimes in relation to their brokering 
of peace agreements. For instance, the involvement of the US in Sierra 
Leone in 1999 brought USAID and other bilaterally focused agencies 
into the region. The civil wars in the area, particularly in Sierra Leone, 
had become closely associated with diamonds during the course of the 
conflict diamonds campaign. The mining initiatives emerged in the 
context of bilateral agencies’ attempts to address one of the primary 
causes of the wars.130
127  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 11.
128  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 12; Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley 
Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 149–150.
129  Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Rich Man, Poor Man, Development 
Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond 
Fields of Africa’ (Report, October 2004) 11.
130  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 150–151.
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These initiatives reveal several important characteristics. First, they 
were frequently organised in a tripartite fashion. Multi-stakeholder 
models had been firmly established in the development/aid sector by 
the late 1990s, meaning that national and local civil society partners 
were usually involved. In the case of mining extraction activity, where 
state and large-scale industry are frequently co-owners, it meant that 
large-scale industry was also an important stakeholder for small-scale 
mining initiatives.131
Second, the bilateral funds that were disbursed for artisanal diamond 
mining projects showed that the issue of poverty or development 
diamonds was already on the agenda of some state donor agencies by 
2002–03. For example, the World Bank’s Community and Small Scale 
Mining initiative, launched in March 2001, had been in the works 
since September 1999. It focused largely on artisanal mining in South 
America and Asia. But government donor agencies’ agendas were also 
affected by the conflict diamonds campaign in early 2000. For example, 
the third annual general meeting of the World Bank’s Community and 
Small Scale Mining Project was held in Ghana in September 2003, 
with diamond mining prominent on the agenda. Partnership Africa 
Canada gave a presentation on the KP. The aid that followed the 
peace agreements was intended to address the circumstances causing 
conflicts. The conflict diamonds campaign had made diamonds appear 
to be especially important as a source of conflict. The Sierra Leone 
war, for instance, had come to be defined almost entirely as a conflict 
diamonds issue. The conflict diamonds campaign thus influenced aid 
and development responses in 2002 and helped put artisanal diamond 
mining on the agenda of some governmental aid agencies.132
Third, the emergence of the development diamond projects shows 
that the development frame was on the agenda of local NGOs in 
former conflict diamonds areas. For many African NGOs, in fact, these 
developmental aspects relating to artisanal miners were always at 
the forefront, and many African NGOs were eager to shift the focus 
of the conflict diamonds campaign towards underlying issues of 
development. Prior to 2004, African NGOs were unable to add the 
development framework to the global public awareness campaign, and 
the Western NGOs leading these efforts focused narrowly on conflict 
131  Ibid 151.
132  Ibid.
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diamonds. However, African NGOs became partners of bilateral aid 
agencies eager to work with civil society on local development projects 
on small-scale mining. That is how they were able to pursue a broader, 
more holistic approach to the role of diamonds in conflict regions and 
to get the Western NGOs to broaden their focus.133
The first strategic meeting leading to the establishment of the Diamond 
Development Initiative International was called by Global Witness, 
Partnership Africa Canada, and De Beers in January 2005 in London. 
This meeting was chaired by former US Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa Walter Kansteiner, and included representatives from states, 
the European Community, the United Nations, the Department for 
International Development (British Foreign Aid Agency), USAID, the 
World Bank, industry, and NGOs.134
A second meeting took place in Washington DC in June, in 
conjunction with a Communities and Small Scale Mining meeting at 
the World Bank. Both meetings were devoted to defining the goals and 
scope of the initiative. The DDII was to address the political, social, 
and economic challenges associated with artisanal diamond mining 
in Africa, attempting to bring this large informal sector into the 
formalised economy. While some industry players remained sceptical, 
De Beers and Martin Rapaport had already been involved in the 
Peace Diamond Initiative in Sierra Leone. They had been important 
in bringing the conflict diamonds issue to the industry’s attention 
in early 2000, when the campaign got underway. De Beers’ motives 
for its proactive involvement on development diamonds were viewed 
with suspicion by some NGOs and by some in the industry. However, 
other NGOs recognised that, while De Beers was operating from the 
perspective of the financial interests of their company by managing 
potential bad publicity, this could be seen as a form of ‘enlightened 
self-interest’.135
Initiators of the DDII (De Beers, Partnership Africa Canada, Global 
Witness, the Rapaport Group, and Jeffrey Davidson, representing 
the World Bank’s Communities and Small Scale Mining Secretariat) 
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Security, and the International Diamond Manufacturer’s Association, 
and ‘the DDII [was] endorsed by the governments of Sierra Leone, 
Guinea, the DRC, Namibia and others, and … received start-up 
project funding from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs’.136 
Overall, alluvial diamond mining countries expressed great interest 
in the initiative, while other diamond mining countries, such as South 
Africa, Botswana, and Namibia, were less engaged in the matter.137
Communities and Small Scale Mining’s experience in dealing with 
artisanal mining suggested that getting donors involved in such 
initiatives was difficult. It was explained that extractive industries 
were regarded by some donors as an area too complicated to get into. 
Mining was not liked generally, and artisanal mining was traditionally 
considered particularly problematic by donors.138
Despite some of these early challenges, participation in the inaugural 
DDII meeting held in Accra (Ghana) on 27–30 October was very good. 
It was limited to 80 representatives from states, industry, and civil 
society. The meeting was financed by registration fees from industry 
and northern states ($400 each), $30,000 from the World Bank, and 
$5,000 each from Rapaport, De Beers, Global Witness, and Partnership 
Africa Canada. Registration for NGOs and Southern states was free. 
At the Accra meeting, the DDII’s goals were further developed.139
The DDII seeks to integrate artisanal diamond mining initiatives 
already underway, such as the above-mentioned projects — the Peace 
Diamond Alliance, Communities and Small Scale Mining, Campaign 
for Just Mining. It shares with the Kimberley Process the vision 
136  Partnership Africa Canada, Diamond Development Initiative International. Available at: 
www.pacweb.org.
137  Gizenga, Dorothee Ngolo, interview with F Bieri, 6 July 2006 in Bieri, F, From Blood 
Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2010) 155.
138  Smillie, Ian, interview with F Bieri, 6 July 2006, in Bieri, Franziska, From Blood Diamonds 
to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2010) 155.
139  Smillie and Ngolo Gizenga, interview with F Bieri, 6 July 2006, in Bieri, Franziska, From 
Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2010) 155–156.
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of being a multi-stakeholder partnership between governments, NGOs, 
and industry, seeking to pool resources, experience, and knowledge, 
although without the formal organisational structure of the KP.140
The DDII seeks not only to put artisanal diamond mining on the 
agenda of NGOs and donors working on mining issues (such as the 
World Bank’s Communities and Small Scale Mining project) but also to 
create an encompassing approach that is not country — or initiative — 
specific. It attempts to translate these initiatives into a more cohesive 
and global frame in which diamonds are a development issue, and to 
get the big international development organisations on board.141
In essence, the goal is making the world’s 13 million artisanal diamond 
miners, most of whom live in total poverty, and face multiple health, 
peace, and security challenges, a new focus in development. Artisanal 
diamond miners tie the conflict and development frames together. 
By consolidating local initiatives, the DDII forms a bridge between the 
conflict frame and the development frame.142
Initially, Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness did not 
explicitly assign any staff, not even part-time, to the initiative.143 
The lack of resources is partially explained by the fact that the KP 
continues to exhaust NGOs’ capacities. It is more difficult to engage 
other NGOs and donors on the development diamonds than conflict 
diamonds.144
Ngolo Gizenga from Partnership Africa Canada mentions several 
hindering factors. First, it is more difficult to garner support from 
other NGOs because development diamonds do not lend themselves 
to the same ‘sexy’ consumer campaign as conflict diamonds. Second, 
there was suspicion about working on an initiative jointly with the 
industry and states. Specifically, Partnership Africa Canada was 
140  Diamond Development Initiative International, Accra Conference Background Note, (October 
2005) 2. Available at: www.artisanalmining.org/userfiles/file/DDI_Accra_Oct.5.pdf.
141  Smillie, quoted in Partnership Africa Canada, Other Facets, Ottawa (October 2006) 1.
142  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 156.
143  Smillie, Ian, interview 6 July 2006 with F Bieri, in Bieri, Franziska, From Blood Diamonds 
to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2010) 156.
144  Ibid 156; Gizenga, Dorothee Ngolo, interview with F Bieri, 6 July 2006 in Bieri, F, From 
Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2010) 157.
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accused of getting into bed with De Beers. However, building on the 
track record of cooperation from the Kimberley Process experience, 
which was also tripartite, the DDII seemingly overcame this obstacle 
and was able to continue to attract financial support for its activities. 
The personal relationships developed in the KP served in good stead 
for the creation of the DDII. The same individuals involved in the DDII 
have sat through countless hours of negotiations in the KP and have 
socialised informally at frequent meetings around the world.145
While particular industry players are involved in the DDII, most 
notably De Beers and the Rapaport group, the WDC — the industry 
NGO created to deal with the conflict diamonds issue — remained 
uninvolved. While formally welcoming the initiative, the WDC kept 
its distance, saying that it was created to  address only the conflict 
diamonds issue.146
The WDC thus was intent on keeping its focus on the KP. Its distance 
from the DDII can possibly be explained by the fact that the DDII 
was an initiative of De Beers, which is both loved and hated for its 
dominant position in the industry. Also, the DDII leaves out industry 
members that have little to do with artisanal mining (i.e. industries 
involved in kimberlite extraction, many traders and retailers) or who 
were already reluctant partners in the KP/WDC.147
Despite close connection between the DDII and the KP, there was 
never any intention of incorporating the DDII within the KP. States, 
the industry, and the NGOs agreed that this would have been 
counter-productive. No one wanted to jeopardise what had so far 
been achieved in the KP by overburdening it. In addition, the KP 
would have prevented the DDII from engaging state donor agencies 
who could help fund the initiative. As explained in the chapter on 
implementation, the KP is minimally funded, and state officials 
145  Gizenga, Dorothee Ngolo, interview with F Bieri, 6 July 2006 in Bieri, F, From Blood 
Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2010) 157; Bone, Andrew, interview with F Bieri, 7 July 2005 in Bieri, F, From 
Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2010) 160; Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs 
Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010).
146  Izhakoff, interview with F Bieri, 2005 in Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley 
Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 160.
147  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 160–161.
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in the KP are not connected to the state agencies most likely to be 
potential donors; instead, they represent trade departments or mineral 
extraction ministries. Third, most KP participants are not involved in 
the DDII. While any diamond trading state must participate in the KP 
to engage in international diamond transactions, most states take no 
interest in and are sceptical about being asked to engage on issues of 
diamonds and development.148
NGOs identified that the KP was a regulatory system but not a 
tool for development, which was the emerging role of the DDII.149 
The  DDII  reminded KP participants why the certification was 
initially  launched. Important links between the KP and the DDII 
existed and were nurtured. The KP provided the networks, reputations 
and know-how, especially for tripartite interaction, which were 
applied in the DDII.150
The KP also lent the DDII legitimacy by commending its activities, 
which is itself a sign of the global esteem the KP had achieved by 2005. 
On several occasions, the DDII was given the opportunity to make 
presentations at formal KP meetings; Ian Smillie presented the DDII 
to the Moscow plenary in November 2005. The final communiqué of 
the KP Moscow plenary concluded: ‘Liaison between the KP and the 
DDI was encouraged in order to optimize synergies.’151 The DDII thus 
kept development issues on the agenda of the KP by closely linking 
development to conflict diamonds and showing that the conflict 
diamonds problem could not be solved without also addressing 
development issues related to artisanal miners.152
Most importantly, the DDII addressed one of the KP’s key weaknesses: 
the lack of internal controls in alluvial diamond states. The KP in 
essence doesn’t capture much alluvial diamond mining. It is unable 
to assess with confidence from which mine or mining area an alluvial 
148  Ibid 161.
149  Partnership Africa Canada, Diamond Development Initiative International. Available at: 
www.pacweb.org.
150  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 161.
151  Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting Final Communique, (Moscow, 
2005). Available at: www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2005-final-communique-plenary-moscow 
compendium.
152  Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond 
Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 161.
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diamond comes. Concerned about this weakness, the KP established 
an ad hoc working group on artisanal mining, estimating that the 
concerns of an estimated 1 million artisanal miners were not being 
addressed adequately.153
Thus, for the KP, the DDII is an important means of tackling an 
issue that  threatens the effectiveness and legitimacy of the KP. In 
broader terms, the DDII is important because the KP alone cannot 
ensure peace in the region. The KP operates in a context supported 
by UN Peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and the 
Congo, with a combined troop strength of 38,000 and an annual 
budget of US$2.3 billion. The DDII contributes a further layer to the 
peacekeeping structure.154 
Current arrangements are unsustainable in the long run, and without 
the UN peace forces in the Congo the Kimberley Process cannot 
effectively ensure that diamonds will not fuel renewed conflicts. 
This may explain why the DDII received much attention and was 
positively endorsed by the KP. That the DDII’s goals were defined 
as complementary and supportive of the KP facilitated a sound 
relationship between the two. The DDII did not undermine the KP 
for its ineffectiveness with regard to development, which would have 
delegitimised the process as a whole.155 
Overall, the KP served as an important starting point for the DDII, 
but the DDII was built as a separate organisational effort. While 
relationships developed in the KP were important, not all industry 
players involved in the KP became involved in the DDII. For instance, 
the WDC remained focused on the KP, while De Beers and Rapaport 
helped initiate the DDII. States that were crucial in setting up the KP 
(South Africa, Botswana, Namibia) were not closely involved in the 
DDII, while alluvial diamond-producing nations and several donor 
countries became active in the DDII. Canada, Britain, and the United 
States were involved in both, though for Britain and the United States 
different state agencies dealt with the KP and development diamond 
issues (the US Trade Department and the European Community in 
the KP, USAID and DFID in DDII), while for Canada the Department 
153  Diamond Development Initiative International, Accra Conference Background Note, (October 
2005) 5. Available at: www.artisanalmining.org/userfiles/file/DDI_Accra_Oct.5.pdf.
154  Smillie, quoted in Partnership Africa Canada, Other Facets, Ottawa (October 2006) 1.
155  Ibid 162.
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of Foreign Affairs was the central agency for both initiatives. In 2008, 
funding for the DDII was provided by the government of Sweden, 
Tiffany & Co. Foundation, Partnership Africa Canada and the JCK 
Industry Fund, with an annual budget of $287,580.156
In the end, the NGOs did not press for the DDII agenda to become 
incorporated into the operations of the KP. Whilst some view this 
separation as desirable, it is arguable that the KP would be enhanced 
and revitalised by adopting a broader mandate, as exemplified by the 
DDII. This matter is discussed in more depth below. See in particular 
the discussion in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
DDII’s first operational year, 2008, saw important progress made. 
The  DDII produced several ‘Standards and Guidelines’ materials, 
offering various stakeholders important information on artisanal 
mining in specific countries. The DDII engaged in a pilot study on 
Guyana’s registration system of alluvial miners and its internal diamond 
production tracking mechanisms. This study now serves workshops 
and training sessions in Africa to implement similar systems there.157
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided an overview of the Kimberley Process, 
including the main ways in which it operates. It discussed procedures 
for membership, annual reporting, and the peer-review mechanism, 
including the manner in which the Kimberley Process has dealt with 
cases of serious non-compliance. The chapter has also considered the 
role of industry in the Kimberley Process, including self-regulation, 
as well as the role of NGOs, including those NGOs external to the KP, 
with a particular focus on the DDII. The chapter has also provided 
an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the KP. The KP has been 
successful in creating a unique regulatory organisation harnessing the 
unique contributions of governments (legitimacy, capacity for national 
enforcement), industry (technical knowledge and self-regulation), and 
156  Diamond Development Initiative International, 2008 Annual Report: Beyond Dreams the 
Journey Begins (2008) 9; Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs 
Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 162–163.
157  Diamond Development Initiative International, 2008 Annual Report: Beyond Dreams the 
Journey Begins (2008) 9; Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs 
Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010) 162–163.
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NGOs (widespread, objective networks for monitoring and behaviour 
modification). Its success in enlisting the support of major industry 
groups, in particular cartel leader De Beers, is particularly notable. 
On the issue, De Beers has done a 180-degree turn from opposition 
to ferocious agreement with NGO players, perhaps aware of focusing 
attention away from the potential criminal liability of its officers for 
complicity in human rights abuses that occurred in Angola and the 
DRC during the 1990s. With De Beers and peak group WDC taking 
ownership of the issue, a large piece of the solution falls into place 
simply by having these major players not engaged in the purchasing 
of conflict diamonds.
The KP has created unprecedented transparency in the diamond 
industry, particularly in the provision of statistics, which are more 
comprehensive, reliable, and accessible than before. With reference 
to these statistics, it is possible to estimate that conflict diamonds 
have fallen to less than 1 per cent of the international diamond trade. 
While the reduction in conflict diamonds is largely attributable to the 
emergence of peace in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, the 
KP has arguably contributed to the tackling of the conflict diamonds 
problem and creating these conditions of peace.
Despite the level of success it has achieved, the KP has struggled 
recently in the face of serious non-compliance by some of its government 
members. Despite acting decisively to protect the integrity of the KP 
when faced by large-scale illicit trade being funnelled through the RCB 
in 2004, the KP did not act in this way when Venezuela behaved in a 
similar fashion in 2006. Most disturbing, however, are the large-scale 
killings and rapes that have occurred in Angolan and Zimbabwean 
artisanal fields, without eliciting suspension or expulsion from the 
KP. Diamonds emerging from these environments must be classified 
as conflict diamonds, and the continuing failure to act by the KP 




Kimberley at the National Level: 
Fancy Footwork?
The people back home wouldn’t buy a ring if they knew it cost 
someone else their hand. 
From the movie Blood Diamond1
Chapter Overview
National governments, particularly those of diamond-producing 
nations, are the front-line defences against conflict diamonds. 
At the heart of the KP is the initial certification by the country of 
first export  that the diamonds are, in fact, free from association 
with international human rights crimes. For this certification to be 
meaningful, an effective system of internal controls from the diamond 
mining site to customs at the place of international export is required. 
This chapter focuses on those internal controls as well as, to some 
extent, the internal controls required by cutting and polishing nations, 
and those nations that are primarily involved in the retail of diamond 
jewellery. In doing so, the chapter makes an important contribution 
towards answering the first research question, namely, to what extent 
has the conflict diamonds governance system achieved its objectives? 
The chapter considers in detail the manner in which several African 
1  Blood Diamond, 2006, motion picture, Warner Bros, www.imdb.com/title/tt0450259/quotes.
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diamond-producing nations — Angola, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone — have incorporated 
internal controls into domestic legislation. By way of contrast with a 
developed country, the implementation of KP obligations by Australia 
is also discussed. Finally, legal developments in the Netherlands 
are considered, most notably the efforts of that government to hold 
accountable one of its nationals (Gus Kouwenhoven) before its national 
court system, in relation to resource-based crimes under international 
law. The chapter closes following concluding remarks.
Implementation at the National Level
Figure 4.1: Kimberley Process: The Domestic Regulatory Pyramid
Source: Author’s research .
The Kimberley Process is premised on the idea of a chain of warranties 
that verifies the origin of rough diamonds from the point of mining 
to the point at which the diamonds are purchased by consumers at 
retail outlets. The primary obligations under the Kimberley Process 
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relate to the regulation of the import and export of conflict diamonds. 
Each country participant, on export, is required to ensure that each 
shipment of rough diamonds is accompanied by a duly validated 
certificate. On import, each participant must require a duly validated 
certificate be presented by the importer. The participant must also send 
confirmation of receipt to the exporting authority.2 Governments must 
ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported or exported 
without such certification, thereby excluding non-participating 
countries from the rough diamond trade. Transit countries, however, 
are not required to verify or issue certificates, providing that parcels 
are not tampered with in transit. 
Even where countries have implemented these obligations into their 
domestic laws,3 such regulation will only apply to the process of 
exporting or importing diamonds. The Kimberley Process provides 
that regulation of the initial half of the trade in diamonds, from the 
point of mining to the point of export, must be guaranteed by states 
themselves, though little detail of how such internal controls are to 
be implemented is provided in the international instrument itself. 
Consequently, this matter has been left to individual states to devise, 
with varying degrees of success. Similarly, states are responsible 
for ensuring that rough diamonds that are imported are Kimberley-
compliant.4 
2  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) s III.
3  The Australian Government made the point that the Kimberley Process border control 
measures must be implemented under the domestic laws or regulations of each participating 
country. Written Response from Australian Government to Author’s Interview Questions 
(14 September 2007). 
4  It is noted that work was initiated within the Kimberley Process regarding the effectiveness 
of internal controls and industry self-regulation. Kimberley Process, ‘Final Communique: 
Kimberley Process Plenary Meeting’ (Gatineau, Canada, 29 October 2004). This culminated with 
the Kimberley Process Plenary’s endorsement of a document called the Brussels Declaration on 
internal controls of participants with rough diamond trading and manufacturing. The declaration 
gives guidance on requirements for record keeping, spot checks of trading companies, physical 
inspections of imports and exports, and maintenance of verifiable records of rough diamond 
inventories. Kimberley Process, ‘2007 Kimberley Process Communique’ (Brussels, Belgium, 
8 November 2007). A critique of the lack of internal controls in the Kimberley Process is set 
out in Fishman, J L, ‘Is Diamond Smuggling Forever?: The Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem’ 
(2005) 13 University of Miami Business Law Review 217, 237–238. See also, Global Witness and 
Partnership Africa Canada, ‘The Key to the Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls: Seven Case 
Studies’ (Report, 2004).
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Spearheaded by NGOs, there has been significant pressure for the 
Kimberley Process Plenary to finalise an administrative decision that 
sets down particular requirements for internal controls in rough 
diamond–producing nations. For example, there are currently no 
specific requirements regarding the licensing of diamond mining 
and trading activities, or requirements that customs officials have 
the power to monitor the industry through spot-checks, or even 
requirements that fines and criminal penalties attach to trafficking 
black market diamonds. There should be minimum training standards 
for diamond valuers and customs officials, and requirements regarding 
how they report back about diamond exports. In the absence of such 
specifications, it is difficult to ensure that effective internal controls are 
in place. The task of review teams sent through the peer-review system 
is made more difficult as there are no established requirements to look 
for in assessing the internal controls of countries being investigated.5
For example, government monitoring officers are not able to monitor 
effectively on the ground at mining centres. The overall governance 
of the system is hindered by lack of implementation capacity, 
and corruption. 
One dimension of the problem is that a lot of diamond miners are 
working in dangerous conditions for very little remuneration, which 
is an example of the many labour, social, and environmental issues 
underpinning the conflict diamonds problem. Many of these diggers 
are unregistered and unlicensed by the national government.6 
Similar comments, but with a different emphasis, on the issue of 
internal controls were made by the representative from Rio Tinto in 
his interview response. The representative stated that regulation by 
national governments probably varies quite a lot and can be improved. 
However, he also stated that this was not a fundamental issue from an 
industry perspective. He suggested that less than 1 per cent of traded 
diamonds are linked to human rights violations. The representative 
also stated that further improvements were possible in relation to the 
Kimberley Process.7
5  Kimberley Process, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Core Document, 2002) ss III, IV.
6  Interview with Global Witness Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007).
7  Interview with Rio Tinto Representative (telephone interview, 30 May 2007).
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In order to improve the Kimberley Process, Global Witness and other 
organisations have urged that the process make explicit the internal 
controls that are required for different categories of countries. 
In  particular, artisanal diamond producing and trading countries 
all need separate systems of controls, as do countries with cutting 
and polishing centres. The creation of the Artisanal Mining Working 
Group represents an important step in this direction.8
According to Global Witness, problems also exist at the point of retail 
in countries such as the United States. Global Witness argues that there 
is insufficient checking of shipments, because it is a low priority for 
business and government. In its interview response, Global Witness 
highlighted the issue of the ongoing sustainability of the Kimberley 
Process. With not as many diamonds fuelling conflict, the concern 
raised was that governments will give up on the Kimberley Process, 
thereby undermining its power as a preventative measure. As a result, 
there is the risk of renewed instability in artisanal diamond areas 
potentially leading to the outbreak of conflict.9
A further important mechanism of regulation is through the making and 
enforcement of contracts. Requirements regarding Kimberley Process 
obligations could be built into any potential contracts negotiated 
between government and business. For example, a government 
contract with a business enabling the mining of a concession could 
stipulate that the business guarantee that no revenue go to persons 
linked to human rights violations. Failure to ensure this stipulation 
could lead to the termination of the contract. Corporations entering 
into contracts with subsidiaries or other independent businesses 
could put guarantees of Kimberley Process compliance into their 
contracts. For example, a diamond retailer might put a guarantee 
that diamonds being purchased are conflict-free into their purchase 
contract from a diamond cutter/polisher. Failure to adhere to the 
8  Global Witness, ‘Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Questionnaire for the Review 
of the Scheme’ (Review Submission, 5 April 2006). At its 6–9 November 2006 meeting, the 
Kimberley Process Plenary agreed to the creation of a Working Group on Artisanal-Alluvial 
Production. Kimberley Process, ‘Kimberley Process Plenary: Final Communique’ (Gaborone, 
Botswana, 6–9 November 2006).
9  Interview with Global Witness Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007).
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obligation would constitute breach of the contract. It would be open 
to national governments to require that retailers or other businesses in 
the diamond supply chain include such provisions in their contracts.10
Regulatory Options Under 
National Legislation
Of importance and interest to any system of regulation is the 
ability of regulators to enforce their rules. The Kimberley Process 
core document is not silent simply on the issue of internal controls 
for governments, but also on the matter of how the import/export 
certification regime is to be enforced. National governments have an 
array of enforcement mechanisms available to them to ensure that 
national industry is compliant with the Kimberley Process. They are 
able to engage in negotiation and discussion with industry in order 
to promote compliance with the Kimberley Process. Their ability to 
engage in negotiation is backed up by the ability to impose sanctions 
for various types for non-compliance. Naturally, the first of such 
sanctions is the refusal to grant an export certificate under Kimberley 
Process procedures. Beyond this, national governments might impose 
financial penalties or even undertake criminal prosecutions for serious 
offences. 
It would seem logical, in the implementation of the Kimberley 
Process on the national level, to provide for criminal sanctions for 
individuals who trade in diamonds in the absence of appropriate 
certification. This  is the simplest method of providing a criminal 
sanction for violation of the Kimberley Process provisions, as all that 
must be proven is an absence of a valid Kimberley Process certificate. 
The sanction should have confiscation of the diamonds and some type 
of fine as a minimum penalty, with the option of terms of imprisonment 
where appropriate mens rea is present, including situations of repeat 
offenders. Where there is evidence that a person has been engaged in 
the conflict diamonds trade, as opposed to simply trading without 
a certificate, there are further options for national criminal prosecution. 
This might be considered a more serious offence, as it shows that the 
10  Collins, H, ‘Regulating Contract Law’ in Christine Parker, et al. (eds), Regulating Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2004) 13–32.
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attempt to export the diamonds was made in the knowledge that, at 
some point, the trade benefits militia groups involved in human rights 
abuses. Of arguably greater seriousness is the crime of contravening 
United Nations sanctions, where such sanctions have been imposed.11
One of the strengths of prosecutions for trafficking in conflict diamonds, 
or contravening United Nations sanctions, is the comparative simplicity 
of making out a case. Rather than requiring the judicial process to 
consider the intricacies of international crimes prosecutions, it is 
simpler for a court to consider evidence that an individual has been 
trading in conflict diamonds that are not correctly certified, and that 
the person possesses the requisite mens rea. Sanctions under national 
laws could also be applied to corporations themselves, an option not 
currently available under international criminal law. 
Moving squarely into the province of serious international crimes is 
the prospect of prosecution domestically for conduct amounting to 
the war crime of pillage, as incorporated into domestic legislation by 
parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
Essentially, this crime involves the removal of resources and property 
without the consent of the legitimate government.12 
A final option is prosecution for trading in conflict diamonds, by 
relying on indirect liability for the perpetration of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity such as murder and torture. Such an 
approach focuses on human rights violations committed by direct 
perpetrators, but attributes individual criminal responsibility to those 
whose role was financing the perpetrators through illegal diamond 
trading. Any country that is a party to the Rome Statute is obliged 
to legislate domestically for international crimes such as torture and 
11  For example, see discussion of the Kouwenhoven case below, which involved a prosecution 
under Dutch laws that criminalised the infringement of United Nations sanctions.
12  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 8(2)(b)(xvi) (prohibition of pillage in 
international conflicts), art 8(2)(e)(v) (for non-international conflicts). A further possibility is 
taking proceedings, based on state responsibility rather than individual criminal responsibility, 
before the International Court of Justice. Uganda was found to be in breach of its international 
obligation to prevent plunder by the International Court in the Case Concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) (Judgement) (1995) ICJ 
Rep 90 [213]–[214], [242]–[251]. The relevant obligation that had been breached was the rule 
concerning pillage in Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 
18 October 1907, (entered into force 26 January 1910) art 43.
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murder. This possibility is the national analogue of an international 
prosecution before the court itself, and is discussed in the context of 
the Kouwenhoven case further below. 
Beyond an in-principle consideration of domestic legislative 
approaches,  the actual legislative framework from a number of 
diamond-producing countries in managing diamond mining and 
export, including provisions specifically directed against conflict 
diamonds, are discussed below. Most of the legislation considered 
relates to African diamond-producing nations. However, the 
legislative approach of a developed diamond-producing country, 
Australia, is also considered, by way of comparison. Finally, a domestic 
prosecution initiated by Dutch authorities in an analogous field 
to conflict diamonds, the Kouwenhoven case concerning so-called 
‘conflict timber’, is discussed.
Angolan National Legislation
Angola has created a legal regime under its domestic legislation to 
manage diamond mining activities. The legislation employs two main 
approaches to the regulation of the mining industry, namely zoning 
and licensing.13 Zoning involves the designation of certain areas as 
diamond production zones.14 Public access to such areas is prohibited 
or restricted, and taking up residence in the area is regulated, as is 
the carrying on of certain economic activities there, and bringing 
particular goods into and out of the zone.15 Criminal offences for 
contravention of these requirements are created.16 
Under licensing laws, persons are authorised to carry out 
particular activities in relation to diamond mining activity, such as 
prospecting, exploration, extraction, trading, and, importantly, export 
13  However, other regulatory approaches are also provided for. For example, an income 
tax regime for diamond mining is established under the Regulamento do Regime Fiscal para 
a Indústria Mineira 1996 [Regulation of the Fiscal Regime for the Mining Industry] (Angola) 
Decree-Law No 4-B/96, 31 May 1996.
14  Da Lei dos Diamantes 1994 [The Diamond Law] (Angola) Law No 1/92, 7 October 1994 arts 
14–23; Lei sobre o Regime Especial das Zonas de Reserva Diamantífera 1994 [Law on the Special 
Regime of Zones of Diamondiferous Deposits] (Angola) Law No 17/94, 7 October 1994.
15  Da Lei dos Diamantes 1994 [The Diamond Law] (Angola) Law No 1/92, 7 October 1994 arts 
14–23; Lei sobre o Regime Especial das Zonas de Reserva Diamantífera 1994 [Law on the Special 
Regime of Zones of Diamondiferous Deposits] (Angola) Law No 17/94, 7 October 1994.
16  Da Lei dos Diamantes 1994 [The Diamond Law] (Angola) Law No 1/92, 7 October 1994 
arts 28–31.
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of diamonds.17 The government has the ability to inspect and audit all 
mining activities18 and suspend or revoke mining licences if required.19 
Criminal offences exist for persons carrying out such activities in 
the absence of a licence.20 Artisanal mining is specifically regulated 
through the use of particular zoning and licensing requirements.21 
Angolan legislation provides, in particular, that diamond exporters 
must have an export licence, and sets out relevant customs procedures 
for exporters.22 Classification and valuation of diamonds prior to 
export is regulated by the national diamond mining agency, Emprese 
Nacional de Diamontes.23 Unauthorised importation of diamonds into 
the country is criminalised, as is unauthorised trading in diamonds.24
Congolese National Legislation
The DRC employs the tools of zoning and licensing to regulate its 
mining industry under its national legislative regime.25 By the use of 
a zoning mechanism, the government may prohibit mining activity 
in particular areas.26 When properly licensed, a natural person, 
public entity or corporation, whether foreign or Congolese, may 
carry out diamond mining on a large-scale basis.27 Such activities 
include prospecting, exploration, extraction, trading and export of 
17  Lei das Actividades Geológicas e Mineiras 1992 [Law on Geological and Mining Activities] 
(Angola) Law No 1/92, 17 January 1992 arts 6–7. Articles 10–13 allow for the granting of 
exploration rights, a process of determining whether traces of a material are commercially 
exploitable. The legislation also provides for the licensing of extraction activities. 
18  Ibid art 24. 
19  Ibid arts 17, 22.
20  Da Lei dos Diamantes 1994 [The Diamond Law] (Angola) Law No 1/92, 7 October 1994 ch 6, 
especially art 24.
21  Ibid arts 31–36 creates specific licensing and zone regulations for artisanal miners.
22  Regime Aduaneiro Aplicável ao Sector Mineiro 1996 [Customs Regime Applicable to the 
Mining Sector] (Angola) Decree-Law No 12-B/96, 31 May 1996 arts 9, 10.
23  Da Lei dos Diamantes 1994 [The Diamond Law] (Angola) Law No 1/92, 7 October 1994 art 10. 
24  Ibid arts 36, 38; Regime Aduaneiro Aplicável ao Sector Mineiro 1996 [Customs Regime 
Applicable to the Mining Sector] (Angola) Decree-Law No 12-B/96, 31 May 1996 arts 9, 10.
25  Loi Portant Code Minier 2002 [Law Relating to the Mining Code] (The Democratic Republic 
of Congo) Law No 007/2002, 11 July 2002.
26  Ibid arts 6, 8.
27  Ibid art 5. Under this article, the applicant must specify the type of mineral that will be 
mined (e.g. diamonds).
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diamonds.28 Mining licence applications can be refused or revoked by 
the government.29 Fines apply to persons undertaking unauthorised 
mining activities, with minerals being subject to confiscation.30 Also 
criminalised are theft, possession of stolen minerals, unauthorised 
trading in minerals, and unauthorised transportation of minerals.31 
Fraudulent exports are also subject to criminal sanctions.32
A separate regime applies to artisanal miners. Such activities may 
be restricted to particular artisanal mining zones and may only be 
carried out by Congolese natural persons who are licensed for artisanal 
diamond mining.33 Only authorised artisanal diamond traders may 
purchase diamonds from miners and sell them on the domestic 
market.34 Only diamond trading houses, and their agents, may export 
artisanally mined diamonds.35
Côte d’Ivoire National Legislation
The Côte d’Ivoire legislative framework provides for protected zones 
where mining is not permitted, as well as zones where entry is not 
permitted without authorisation and zones for artisanal mining.36 
The legislation sets up licensing systems for mineral prospecting, 
28  Ibid arts 18–21 (prospecting), chapter 1 (exploration), arts 63–66, 69, 73, 80 (exploitation, 
which includes extraction and sale of extracted minerals), art 85 (separate authorisation is required 
to export ‘untreated ores’, although it is unclear whether this applies to rough diamonds. Article 
266 states that a licence holder can export and sell its production to international markets.). 
Articles 23 and 25 require that, apart from prospecting, foreign corporations must act through 
a mining agent in the county. The government requires 5 per cent of the shares of the registered 
capital of mining corporations who have an exploitation licence. Chapter III of the Mining Code 
provides that an exploitation licence may apply to artificial mineral deposits known as ‘tailings’.
29  Ibid arts 27, 73, 80. Government officials are not permitted to be artisanal or large-scale 
miners or traders.
30  Ibid art 299.
31  Ibid arts 300–302.
32  Ibid art 234, which refers to sanctions located in customs legislation.
33  Ibid arts 5, 26–27, 109–118. A further category called ‘small-scale mining’ also exists under 
Chapter 5 of the Mining Code, which is larger than artisanal mining, but smaller than large-scale 
mining.
34  Ibid arts 27, 118–119.
35  Ibid arts 120–123. They are required to purchase all artisanally mined substances presented 
for sale, regardless of quantity or quality, under Article 123. Partnership Africa Canada, an 
NGO involved in the Kimberley Process, reported that there was evidence of bribes being taken 
by diamond valuers in the period since 2005, which was the year that the employment of an 
independent diamond valuer was discontinued. Partnership Africa Canada, ‘Diamonds and 
Human Security: Annual Review 2008’ (Annual Report, October 2008) 4–5.
36  Code Minier 1995 [Mining Code] (Côte d’Ivoire) Law No 95-553, 17 July 1995 title VI (large-
scale mining), art 42 (artisanal mining).
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exploration and exploitation, as well as artisanal mining.37 
Furthermore, the legislation establishes criminal offences to enforce 
the licensing system, which are punishable by fines, imprisonment 
or both. Such  offences include exploitation, possession, trade and 
transportation of minerals without authorisation, as well as fraud in 
relation to these activities.38
Sierra Leone National Legislation
The Sierra Leone legislative framework also provides for zoning in 
relation to artisanal mining activities.39 Artisanal miners, traders and 
exporters must also be licensed, and artisanal diamonds are only 
allowed to be traded between such persons, unless exported under 
a valid export licence.40 Large-scale mining activities, including 
prospecting, exploration, exploitation and export are also subject to 
a licensing regime.41 Fines and terms of imprisonment may be imposed 
if a criminal offence is successfully prosecuted. Offences include 
mining, possession, sale or export of minerals without authorisation.42
Australian National Legislation
The Kimberley requirements for the export of rough diamonds 
were implemented under Australian domestic law under Regulation 
9AA of the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958. Under 
this regulation, the responsible minister may, on application, grant 
permission for the exportation of rough diamonds to a country by 
issuing a certificate. The regulation prohibits the export of rough 
diamonds unless the exporter holds a Kimberley Process certificate, 
the original is produced to customs at or before the time of exportation 
and the rough diamonds are exported in a tamper-resistant container.43
37  Ibid titles II, III (large-scale mining), arts 43–45 (artisanal mining).
38  Ibid arts 101–108.
39  Mines and Minerals Act 1994 (Sierra, Leone) s 20.
40  Ibid ss 76, 79–81, 118.
41  Ibid ss 1, 49, 54–55, 61, 67, 118.
42  Ibid ss 117–118. The legislation also provides for a number of revenue-raising mechanisms 
for the government (Part XIII). 
43  Written Response from Australian Government to Author’s Interview Questions 
(14 September 2007).
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Australia has a two-tier system of managing export certification. 
Occasional exporters are required to apply to the relevant federal 
department in writing for each shipment and provide documentary 
evidence of the origin of rough diamonds they wish to export. 
Applicants are required to complete a criminal history check through 
the Australian Federal Police. Packages of rough diamonds to be 
exported must be declared to customs on departure and the certificate 
presented.44
Businesses wishing to regularly export shipments of rough diamonds 
may apply for a frequent exporter licence. Successful applicants are 
pre-issued with sequentially numbered stocks of partially completed 
Kimberley Process certificates. Using database applications supplied 
by the relevant federal department, the companies are able to complete 
the details of the goods for shipment and the importing business and 
then finalise the validation of the Kimberley Process certificate. Details 
of each Kimberley Process certificate are transmitted to the relevant 
federal department and incorporated into the Export Authority’s 
database records. Under this decentralised system, frequent exporters 
work closely with Australian Kimberley Process authorities to manage 
certification procedures. Customs verifies the shipment satisfies the 
requirements of regulations at export.45
Under import regulation, Regulation 4MA of the Customs (Prohibited 
Imports) Regulations 1956, the import of rough diamonds is 
prohibited unless the diamonds are accompanied by a Kimberley 
Process certificate, they are imported in a tamper-resistant container 
and the diamonds are imported from a country that is a participant in 
the Kimberley Process.46
The Customs Act 1901 (C’th) provides customs with the appropriate 
powers to enforce compliance with the regulations and take appropriate 
action. Shipments not meeting the requirements of import or export 
controls may be detained or seized by customs. Customs undertakes 
checks to verify compliance in an environment that is largely self-
regulated. Customs intervenes in transactions proportionate to the 
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The intervention of customs is generally aimed at encouraging 
compliance and is appropriate to the assessed level of risk. Customs 
compliance programs focus on assisting clients who are willing and 
capable of complying with the legislation but there is scope to impose 
sanctions on entities where appropriate.48 Cooperation with industry, 
facilitated by the relatively concentrated nature of diamond mining 
industry in Australia has been one of the major strengths of Australia’s 
implementation of the Kimberley Process.49
For exports of diamonds from Australia, the relevant federal 
department may decline to grant a Kimberley Process certificate where 
the circumstances warrant such action. Import or export of prohibited 
diamonds is an offence under the Customs Act 1901. Regulation 9AA of 
the Export Regulations makes it an offence to export rough diamonds 
from Australia without a Kimberley Process certificate. Regulation 
4MA of the Customs Import Regulations makes it an offence to import 
rough diamonds into Australia without a Kimberley Process certificate.
Regulation 4N of the Import Regulations and Regulation 8A of the 
Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions – Côte d’Ivoire) make it an 
offence to import rough diamonds into Australia from Côte d’Ivoire 
(whether or not the rough diamonds originated in Côte d’Ivoire) 
or of Côte d’Ivoire origin from a third country.
In all cases, offences only apply where rough diamonds are exported 
from or imported into Australia. There is no specific offence under 
Australian law of trading in rough diamonds where the trade does not 
involve Australian territory. The penalty on conviction is not greater 
than three times the value of the goods or AUD$110,000 whichever 
is greater.
According to the Global Witness interview comments, Australia has 
not had a review visit and there has been no independent verification 
of its Kimberley Process controls. However, Australia has submitted 
annual reports every year, and appears to comply with minimum 
requirements. Global Witness noted that there is generally not much 
of an issue with conflict diamonds in the large-scale industrial mining 
sector that is present in Australia. However, the respondent stated 
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid.
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that Australia appeared to have hands-off regulation much like the US 
system, and there was a question as to what checks are going on and 
whether there is sufficient government oversight.50
Dutch National Legislation and the 
Kouwenhoven Case
As discussed above, the utilisation of national war crimes 
legislation represents a possible avenue for national governments 
to bring to account those engaged in the conflict diamonds trade. 
The Netherlands utilised its national war crimes legislation to initiate 
a prosecution about the related issue of so-called ‘conflict timber’. 
Although not a conflict diamonds prosecution as such, the war crimes 
legislation was used to prosecute timber trader and Dutch national, 
Gus Kouwenhoven. Reminiscent of the conflict diamonds problem, 
Kouwenhoven allegedly provided financial assistance through his 
logging activities to human rights violators.51 Kouwenhoven was 
charged with war crimes for his role in the conflict in Liberia, as well 
as breaching United Nations sanctions.
The indictment alleged that in at least four locations, Kouwenhoven 
committed, directly or indirectly, the war crimes of killing, inhuman 
treatment, looting, rape, severe bodily harm, and offences against 
dead, sick or wounded persons.52 Machine guns and rocket-propelled 
grenades were used in an attack that made no distinction between 
50  Interview with Global Witness Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007).
51  Global Witness, Natural Resources and Conflict under the Legal Spotlight, War Crimes Trial of 
Gus Kouwenhoven to Commence in The Hague (21 April 2006). Available at: www.globalwitness.org/
library/natural-resources-and-conflict-under-legal-spotlight-war-crimes-trial-gus-kouwenhoven. 
An interesting discussion of the illegal timber trade and its parallels with the conflict diamonds 
trade and the Kimberley Process can be found in Salo, Rudy S, ‘When the Logs Roll Over: The Need 
for an International Convention Criminalizing Involvement in the Global Illegal Timber Trade’ 
(2003) 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 127, 127–146.
52  Guus Kouwenhoven, Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], Case No AY5160, 
7 June 2006, 3. The  international criminal law provisions allegedly contravened were the 
international customary law prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, as well as contraventions 
of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III), 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 130 
and common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The latter two provisions prohibit torture, 
inhuman treatment, rape, looting and acts of violence against inactive soldiers and civilians. The 
modes of individual criminal responsibility with which Kouwenhoven was charged were direct 
commission, aiding and abetting and superior responsibility. 
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active combatants and civilians.53 In addition, a house was set on 
fire, resulting in the deaths of civilians and inactive soldiers.54 Such 
persons were also killed in buildings through the use of grenades.55 
Civilians and inactive soldiers had their hands amputated, and babies 
were injured.56 Women and children were raped, and the possessions 
of civilians and inactive soldiers were plundered.57 
Kouwenhoven’s alleged role in these crimes was through selling or 
supplying weapons, vehicles and equipment, such as machine guns, 
rocket-propelled grenades, helicopters and trucks to Charles Taylor 
and his armed forces, and placing staff members with timber companies 
under threat of dismissal from employment at the disposal of the 
armed conflict. He was also charged with supplying or giving money, 
cigarettes, and marijuana to members of the armed forces of Charles 
Taylor, the Liberian Government, and timber company employees 
assisting the conflict. He allegedly gave instructions regarding the use 
of weapons, including heavy weapons and battle methods to the armed 
forces of Charles Taylor, the government of Liberia and staff members 
assisting the conflict, telling them that all should be killed without 
distinction and that looting was accepted.
In two further counts, Kouwenhoven was charged with contravening 
United Nations sanctions on Liberia, criminalised under domestic 
Dutch legislation. In particular, Kouwenhoven was charged with 
supplying Taylor’s forces with machine guns, grenade launchers, and 
mortars.58
The decision of the District Court of The Hague in the Kouwenhoven 
case was delivered on 7 June 2006.59 The court found that these basic 
crimes were committed. However, concerning the role of the accused, 
the court did not find that Kouwenhoven was individually criminally 
responsible. In particular, the court found there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the alleged 
criminal activities of his subordinates. In most instances the security 
53  Guus Kouwenhoven, Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], Case No AY5160, 
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employees were former fighters of Charles Taylor’s armed forces, and 
so it could not be concluded that the security employees participated 
in these acts by order of or with the consent or knowledge of the 
defendant. The court found it proven that the defendant, together 
and in conjunction with another, supplied weapons to Charles 
Taylor, but found that this was not itself sufficient evidence that he 
directly participated in committing the offences charged under the 
three counts. The court noted that weapons could have been used for 
legal acts.
The court, however, found Kouwenhoven guilty of charges four and 
five, relating to the contravention of United Nations sanctions. Based 
on evidence adduced in court, the court found that there was a close 
financial relationship between the defendant and Taylor. There were 
also personal ties between Kouwenhoven’s timber company staff and 
Liberian Government members. The court found it established that 
Kouwenhoven played an important role in supplying weapons to 
Taylor and Liberia. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in 
particular on the fact that Kouwenhoven was the owner of a ship called 
the Antarctic Mariner, which had been used to import weapons for 
the benefit of Taylor and his regime. From this, the court concluded 
that in 2000, Kouwenhoven was involved in the contravention of UN 
sanctions. The court rejected a defence to weapons importation on 
the grounds that the weapons were needed as legitimate self-defence 
by Liberia. Instead, the court found that the United Nations Security 
Council had already pronounced that Liberia was acting illegally 
through supporting the Revolutionary United Front rebels based 
in Sierra Leone.60 
The conviction of Kouwenhoven at first instance was overturned on 
appeal on 10 March 2008.61 According to the Court of Appeal, the 
written testimony of a number of witnesses was not considered 
sufficiently reliable to ground a finding connecting Kouwenhoven 
with the transport of weapons. 
60  Ibid.
61  British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Profile: Guus van Kouwenhoven’ (2008). Available at: 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5055442.stm.
143
4 . KIMBeRLeY AT THe NATIoNAL LeveL
Although there was no conviction recorded against Kouwenhoven as a 
result of insufficient evidence, the case is an important precedent for 
war crimes prosecutions where an individual has allegedly assisted the 
crime financially rather than being a direct perpetrator. The court was 
clearly quite prepared to consider the allegations that Kouwenhoven 
contributed to the commission of the crimes through such indirect 
means as providing financial assistance, weapons, training, and 
enforced enlistment of employees to fight in the conflict. If these 
modes of involvement are recognised as being sufficient in principle 
to bring about a war crimes conviction, then it would appear that 
trading in conflict diamonds, to the benefit of human rights violators, 
and with the appropriate mens rea, may also be sufficient to lead to 
a guilty verdict in a domestic war crimes case.
A further development occurred in 2010, when the Dutch Supreme 
Court overturned the acquittal by the Appeal Court. The trial 
re-opened in December 2010, and Kouwenhoven still faces charges 
of war crimes and illegal arms trading. In November 2014, the court 
in Den Bosch was to hear arguments for dismissal as there were no 
witnesses available to testify. The Prosecutor Cara Pronk-Jordan 
wishes to have the earlier anonymous interviews used as evidence.62
Concluding Remarks
The chapter discussed the implementation of the Kimberley Process 
at the national level, including regulatory options under national 
legislation in Angola, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Australia, 
and the Netherlands. A review of legislation and regulatory action 
at the national level is necessary in terms of responding to the 
first research question: to what extent has the conflict diamonds 
governance system achieved its objectives? Legislation in African 
diamond-producing states focuses on zoning and licensing systems. 
Zoning is a method of distinguishing kimberlite, industrial areas of 
mining from artisanal-alluvial mining areas, and is used to designate 
areas for diamond mining exploration. Licensing denotes systems of 
authorising persons to carry out particular diamond mining–related 
62  Global Witness, Global Witness Welcomes Dutch Court’s Decision to Hear New Prosecution 
witnesses in Kouwenhoven Case. Available at: www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/global-witness-
welcomes-dutch-courts-decision-hear-new-prosecution-witnesses-kouwenhoven/. 
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activities, such as  prospecting, exploration, kimberlite mining or 
artisanal mining. Both zoning and licensing are potentially useful 
regulatory techniques, with the caveat that implementation of the 
law is carried out within the bounds of international human rights 
law. Zoning areas for artisanal mining potentially allows for these 
miners to carry on a livelihood, while protecting the interests of 
large-scale industry that are focused more on kimberlite deposits. 
However, enforcement of zoning, namely moving artisanal miners 
from kimberlite areas, or unauthorised artisanal miners, has become 
a justification for government security forces to carry out serious 
human rights abuses such as rape and murder in countries such as 
the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Similarly, the use of licensing, 
particularly for artisanal miners, as well as diamond traders and 
exporters, if effectively monitored and enforced, would represent an 
effective internal control set to ensure that all diamonds being mined 
and exported are legitimate rather than funding rebel militias or the 
commission of international crime. The challenge with licensing thus 
relates to both excessive and inadequate enforcement. Angola and 
Zimbabwe have seen the excessive use of force, resulting in murder, 
beatings and rape, in the name of enforcement of rights to mine in 
artisanal mining areas. At the other end of the spectrum are artisanal 
areas where there are inadequate bureaucratic resources to manage 
licensing systems correctly, or in which corruption means that the 
licensing system will not work properly. 
The Australian example shows that Kimberley Process certification 
requirements, for both import and export, have been implemented 
into domestic legislation. The challenge of applying the Australian 
legislative provisions to those of the African producer states lies in 
the fact that diamond mining in these African countries is largely 
artisanal, whereas diamond mining in Australia is solely of industrial, 
kimberlite deposits. A further difference is that Australian diamonds 
are predominantly industrial grade, and are used as drill bits, rather 
than jewellery pieces. The Australian approach could therefore be used 
in relation to large-scale kimberlite mining, for example, in Angola, 
which has both kimberlite and artisanal sites, but is of little value 
to the informal artisanal sector. For example, Australia gives blanket 
approval and Kimberley Process certification in advance to the Rio 
Tinto operation, although it provides for inspections of the Rio Tinto 
operation to ensure that domestic regulatory requirements are being 
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adhered to. It is possible to argue that this approach is appropriate to 
a large-scale operation in a country not experiencing civil war, and 
where there are no known international crimes being committed in 
connection with the mine. Australia takes a different approach for 
small packets of diamonds that are being exported: the Kimberley 
Process certificate would only be available by application to the 
department. Naturally, rough diamond imports require Kimberley 
Process certificates before importation is accepted. 
The Australian experience, on reflection, may not be a good model 
even in relation to kimberlite diamond mining in African producer 
countries, because countries such as Angola are only just emerging 
from situations of civil war, and so a more careful approach to issuing 
Kimberley Process certificates is warranted. This is particularly the 
case in Angola, where military and police forces have been implicated 
in gross human rights abuses since the end of the civil war period. 
As such, allowing corporations to self-administer KP certificates, 
even in the presence of regular inspections, would not be a sensible 
way forward. The Australian experience does not throw light onto 
the administration of KP internal controls in the artisanal industry. 
As previously discussed, a system of licensing in principle would be 
effective, but would require efficient implementation by a bureaucracy 
that is free from corruption. 
The chapter has also considered the landmark Kouwenhoven case, 
prosecuted in the Netherlands court system. Although it was not 
a  conflict diamonds case, it was a case concerning the interaction 
between resources, in this case the timber industry, and international 
human rights crimes committed during the course of the Liberian 
civil war. An interesting side issue is that this case concerns the 
relationship of Kouwenhoven to the Liberian regime of Charles Taylor, 
who was a key player in conflict diamonds trafficking. However, the 
central value of the case lies in the fact that it largely parallels the type 
of prosecution that could be initiated in relation to conflict diamonds 
trading. Instead of trading in diamonds, thereby funding the purchase 
of weapons and the commission of human rights abuses, Kouwenhoven 
was accused of misusing his management of the timber industry to 
assist Charles Taylor’s army to carry out gross human rights violations. 
His timber corporation was allegedly used as a means of purchasing 
armaments that were later deployed by Taylor’s forces. Kouwenhoven 
allegedly directed his timber corporation employees to join Taylor’s 
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forces, which then carried out human rights violations, including 
the murder of civilians. The case is yet to be finally resolved by the 
Dutch court system as the acquittal was overturned in 2010, and the 
case reopened  to hear new prosecution evidence from December 
of that year.
What is perhaps most interesting about the Kouwenhoven case is that 
there was no debate, as a matter of law, as to Kouwenhoven’s criminal 
liability, with the multiple appeals turning on whether the evidence 
was credible and able to sustain the conviction. This means that, 
regardless of the final outcome of the case, the Dutch court system 
has accepted that, should it be proved that a person, for example, 
forced their employees to join an armed force that went on to commit 
international crimes, that person could be found to be legally 
responsible for the crimes committed. In this way, the case shows that 
business leaders can be convicted for their role in the commission of 
international crimes. It is furthermore possible to imagine that some 
of the ways that Kouwenhoven was involved in the commission of 
crimes, through his connection with a timber corporation, might be 
applied to a different business leader who is involved in the traffic 
of rough diamonds rather than timber.
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Growing Teeth: The UN Security 
Council and International Tribunals
What had meaning in this conflict were diamonds. Between 1998 
and 2000, diamonds mined by forced labour were first taken to the 
headquarters in Buedu and from there to the accused [Charles Taylor] 
in Liberia. In return … arms were then distributed to the AFRC/RUF 
forces …
Prosecutor’s opening statement, Taylor case1
Chapter Overview
This chapter looks beyond the Kimberley Process (KP) to the other 
international organisations that contribute to the conflict diamonds 
governance system. After considering briefly the role of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), I consider the role of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in creating the KP and enhancing it 
through its monitoring and enforcement activities. Finally, the chapter 
considers the jurisprudence emerging from the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court (ICC) about conflict 
diamonds in the context of the commission of international human 
rights crimes. The jurisprudence uses conflict diamonds in three major 
ways: as the context in which international crimes are committed, as 
1  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 59.
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a direct aspect of an international crime, and as indirectly imposing 
liability for the international crimes committed by others. The 
chapter’s concluding remarks highlight the important relationship 
between international human rights crimes, the KP, and the concept 
of conflict diamonds.
Figure 5.1: Conflict Diamonds Governance as a Networked Pyramid 
of Sanctions
Source: Author’s research .
United Nations General Assembly
The UNGA has played a significant role in the establishment of the 
Kimberley Process and in providing it with ongoing political support. 
The Kimberley Process was initially called for under United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 55/56. The legitimacy and authority of 
the Kimberley Process has subsequently been reinforced on an annual 
basis by UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. It has 
been noted, however, that, unlike a formal mandate under the coercive 
powers of the Security Council, General Assembly resolutions are 
not legally binding. The three-year review of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KP) called for the UN Secretariat to be regularly 
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invited to KP Plenary meetings and kept informed of KP decisions. 
It is interesting to note that although the KP exists as a non-legally 
binding, informal institution, it is largely a product of the UN system, 
which continues to monitor its activities, provide political support 
and, in the case of the UNSC, intervene in  particular enforcement 
scenarios.2 
United Nations Security Council
Prior to the establishment of the Kimberley Process, the Security 
Council played a key role in bringing to international attention the 
problem of conflict diamonds. In 1998, it adopted resolutions 1173 and 
2  SC Res 827, UN SCOR, 3217th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993) (‘Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’); The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling 
Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed 
Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts GA Res 55/56, UN GAOR, 
55th sess, 79th plen mtg, A/RES/55/56 (1 December 2001); The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling 
Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed 
Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts, GA Res 56/263, UN GAOR, 
56th sess, 96th plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/56/263 (13 March 2002); The Role of Diamonds in 
Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and 
Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts GA Res 57/302, UN 
GAOR, 57th sess, 83rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/57/302 (15 April 2003); The Role of Diamonds 
in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and 
Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts GA Res 58/290, UN 
GAOR, 58th sess, 85th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/58/290 (14 April 2004); The Role of Diamonds 
in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and 
Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts GA Res 60/182, 
UN GAOR, 60th sess, 67th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/60/182 (20 December 2005); The Role of 
Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough 
Diamonds and Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts GA 
Res 61/28, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 64th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/61/28 (4 December 2006); Report 
of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 
61/28, by Fernando M. Valenzuela on behalf of Kimberley Process Chair, 62nd sess, Agenda 
Item 13, UN Doc A/62/543 (13 November 2007); The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: 
Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict 
as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts, 62nd sess, Agenda Item 13, UN 
Doc A/62/L.16 (21 November 2007); The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the 
Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict as a Contribution 
to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 11, UN Doc A/63/L.52 
(5 December 2008); The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: Statement to General Assembly, 
Kimberley Process Chair Nirupam Sen, 63rd sess, 67th plen mtg, Agenda Item 11, UN Doc A/63/
PV.67 (11 December 2008). See also, Written Response from Australian Government to Author’s 
Interview Questions (14 September 2007).
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1176, prohibiting the direct or indirect export of unofficial Angolan 
diamonds.3 In 1999, the UNSC passed a resolution prohibiting trading 
in diamonds originating from conflict-ridden Sierra Leone.4
In regulatory terms, the resolutions are important examples of the 
standard-setting and enforcement roles of the Security Council. 
The legally binding nature of these resolutions means that the rulings 
must be complied with by all nations. The imposition of diamond 
trading bans represents an important mechanism for breaking the 
link between the illegal diamond trade and the commission of serious 
human rights violations. 
The Security Council has engaged with the issue of conflict diamonds 
over a number of years, and has intervened decisively with resolutions 
concerning Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), and Côte d’Ivoire. At these times, the Security Council 
has mandated trading bans with these countries concerning the rough 
diamond trade.5
The main mechanism that the Security Council has made use of in 
terms of monitoring has been its panel of experts. The panel of experts 
mechanism is important, as it provides vital on-the-ground fact-finding 
that can be used to assess the requirements for further international 
action, including the relative success of already existing mechanisms. 
3  SC Res 1173, UN SCOR, 3891st mtg, S/RES/1173 (12 June 1998) (Angola); SC Res 1176, UN 
SCOR, 3894th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1176 (24 June 1998). See also Interview with Global Witness 
Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007).
4  SC Res 1306, UN SCOR, 4168th mtg, S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000) (Sierra Leone).
5  SC Res 864, UN SCOR, 3277th mtg, S/RES/864 (5 June 1998) (Angola); SC Res 1127, 
3814th mtg, S/RES/1127 (28 August 1997) (Angola); SC Res 1171, UN SCOR, 3889th mtg, UN 
Doc S/RES/1171 (5 June 1998) (Sierra Leone); SC Res 1173, UN SCOR, 3891st mtg, S/RES/1173 
(12 June 1998) (Angola); SC Res 1295, UN SCOR, 4129th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1295 (18 April 2000) 
(Angola); SC Res 1306, UN SCOR, 4168th mtg, S/RES/1306 (5 July 2000) (Sierra Leone); SC Res 
1343, UN SCOR, 4287th mtg, S/RES/1343 (7 March, 2001) (Liberia); SC Res 1385, UN SCOR, 
4442nd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1385 (19 December 2001) (Sierra Leone); SC Res 1408, UN SCOR, 
4256th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1408 (6 May 2002) (Liberia); SC Res 1457, UN SCOR, 4691st mtg, 
S/RES/1457 (24 January 2003) (Democratic Republic of Congo); SC Res 1459, UN SCOR, 6494th 
mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1459 (28 January 2003) (Kimberley Process Certification Scheme); SC Res 
1521, UN SCOR, 4890th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) (Liberia); SC Res 1579, UN 
SCOR, 5105th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1579 (21 December 2004) (Liberia); SC Res 1643, UN SCOR, 
5327th mtg, S/RES/1643 (15 December 2005) (Côte d’Ivoire).
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In reports as early as 1997, such expert panels have assessed the 
impact of the diamond trade in conflict zones, as well as the efficacy 
of diamond trade prohibitions and other economic sanctions.6
Since the establishment of the Kimberley Process, the Security 
Council has operated more closely with this new international agency. 
A  particularly noteworthy example relates to the situation of Côte 
d’Ivoire. In 2006 it came to the attention of the Kimberley Process 
that conflict diamonds were propping up the rebel-held north of 
Côte d’Ivoire. Following an inspection by a KP monitoring team, the 
KP took action to expel Côte d’Ivoire from the KP. Shortly after, the 
matter was considered by the UNSC, which imposed a ban on trading 
in diamonds with that country.7 The report on developments in 
Côte d’Ivoire referred to under Resolution 1572 was a joint mission 
undertaken in April 2006.8
There was also close cooperation with the UN Group of Experts 
appointed to report on developments in Liberia under UNSC 
Resolution 1521. By 2007, Liberia had notably made a transition out of 
its situation of conflict, had held internationally recognised elections, 
and elected a new president, Joan Sirleaf. In March of that year, 
a Kimberley Process review mission led by the European Community 
concluded that Liberia had designed effective controls in line with 
KP requirements. Although there were reservations from the NGO 
participants that Liberia would benefit from more time to ensure its 
6  Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola 
(MONUA), S/1997/640 (13 August 1997); Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security 
Council Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2000/203 (10 March 2000); Report of the Panel of Experts 
Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in Relation to 
Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195 (20 December 2000); Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, S/2001/357 (12 April 2001); Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on 
Sanctions Against UNITA, 2001/966 (12 October 2001); Final Report Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002); Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant 
to Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1584 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/699 
(7 November 2005); Update Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 1632 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, S/2006/204 (31 March 2006); 
Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), S/2007/40 (31 January 2007).
7  See also Interview with Global Witness Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007), 
with the representative commenting favourably on this coordination, although she noted that 
the action of the Security Council should have occurred more rapidly.
8  Written Response from Australian Government to Author’s Interview Questions 
(14 September 2007).
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resilience against the return of conflict diamonds, the KP presented its 
findings to the UNSC. The UNSC decided to lift its diamond embargo 
on Liberia on 27 April 2007 and Liberia was admitted to the KP on 
4 May 2007.9
One of the important strengths of the Security Council resolutions 
is the legitimating role it plays at the apex of the United Nations 
security system. For example, the Security Council resolutions have 
enhanced the support base for the Kimberley Process, with significant 
momentum being gained for US national implementation legislation 
as a result of Security Council backing. The resolutions are, to an 
extent, self-contained mechanisms, as national governments are 
legally obliged to take action to implement them, even in the absence 
of national implementing legislation or involvement in a scheme such 
as the Kimberley Process.
Security Council expert panel reports have themselves acted as a 
type of enforcement mechanism, in the sense of naming and shaming 
particular individuals and corporations who have allegedly been 
involved in the conflict diamonds trade. Following its 2002 report on 
the DRC, the expert panel engaged in a negotiated process by which 
corporate and individual names could be removed from the black list 
following evidence of significant compliance with United Nations 
resolutions. The expert panel also reported a number of corporations 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) under the OECD multinational code of conduct for further 
action. Under this code, multinationals are required to account for 
their conduct before a committee. The OECD process, however, has 
been criticised as lacking in significant punitive powers in the event 
that breaches are found to have occurred. One approach that wasn’t 
apparently considered, but was open to the Security Council, was the 
referral of individuals, including corporate directors, for prosecution 
by the ICC. This contingency is discussed in more depth below. 
The consciousness-raising and information-sharing role of the 
Security Council has continued in more recent times. On 25 June 2007 
there was a thematic debate at the UNSC following a proposal by the 
Belgian Mission on the theme ‘Natural Resources and Armed Conflict’, 
involving amongst other themes the illicit trade in diamonds. 
9  Ibid; Interview with Global Witness Representative (telephone interview, 21 May 2007).
153
5 . GRowING TeeTH
The  council adopted a presidential statement on natural resources 
and armed conflict that underlined the importance of taking this 
dimension into account, where appropriate in the mandates of UN and 
regional peacekeeping operations, within their capabilities.10
The Security Council stated that natural resources are a crucial 
factor in contributing to long-term economic growth and sustainable 
development, while noting that in armed conflict situations the 
exploitation of natural resources has played a role in the outbreak, 
escalation, or continuation of the conflict. The council emphasised the 
contribution of monitoring schemes such as the KP.11
The response to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire also illustrates the high 
level of coordination between the Kimberley Process and the UNSC. 
The Working Group on Monitoring monitored the situation regarding 
illicit mining in Côte d’Ivoire throughout 2005, drawing on a variety of 
reliable sources, and cooperated closely with the UN Panel of Experts 
on Côte d’Ivoire, which was convened by the Security Council. 
The Kimberley Process Secretariat then made a formal submission to 
the UN panel in June 2005, while a special envoy to the chair visited 
Abidjan in April 2005 to clarify Côte d’Ivoire’s status in the Kimberley 
Process.12 A special working group to deal with conflict diamonds from 
Côte d’Ivoire was established by the Kimberley Process at the 15–17 
November plenary meeting.13 On the basis of a presentation by the 
working group of the evidence available regarding production in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Moscow Plenary meeting of November 2005 adopted a 
comprehensive package of measures to tackle the outflow of conflict 
diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. Implementation of these measures 
is proceeding under the responsibility of the chair assisted by the 
Working Group on Monitoring.14 Despite the rapid response of the 
working group to the crisis, and its cooperation as reflected in United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1643 (2005), the working group 
10  Written Response from Australian Government to Author’s Interview Questions 
(14 September 2007).
11  Ibid.
12  Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring, Submission for the 2006 Review of the 
KPCS (Kimberley Process Secretariat, February 2006) 19–20.
13  Update Report of the Group of Experts Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 1632 (2005) Concerning Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc S/2006/204 (31 March 2006) 10.
14  Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring, Submission for the 2006 Review of the 
KPCS (Kimberley Process Secretariat, February 2006) 19–20.
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recognised that the Kimberley Process’s action has not by itself put 
an end to the illicit trade in Côte d’Ivoire conflict diamonds, and that 
further action is required.15 
International Criminal Tribunals
Holding individuals criminally liable for particular conduct not only 
involves serious sanction for that person, but also sends a strong 
message to the international community. The liability for international 
crimes of those involved in industry was recognised at the Nuremberg 
trials of Farben, Flick, and Krupp following World War Two.16 Recently 
established international courts and tribunals now provide the legal 
mechanisms for prosecuting modern industrial crimes, with a number 
of current conflict diamonds cases setting important international 
precedents. 
Internationally, the UNSC has acted as a mediator between regulatory 
bodies such as the Kimberley Process and international criminal 
processes. One option that it has exercised has been the creation of ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals, such as the Sierra Leone Special 
Court, for the prosecution of international crimes that involve a conflict 
diamonds dimension. The court, which is a hybrid institution jointly 
established by the United Nations and the Sierra Leone Government, 
was established to prosecute international crimes committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone since 1996. Due to the conflict diamonds 
dimension of the Sierra Leone conflict, the special court is uniquely 
placed amongst the ad hoc international criminal tribunals to carry 
out international conflict diamonds prosecutions.17 
15  Ibid 20.
16  Trials of Nazi War Criminals before the Neurnberg Tribunals under Control Council Law 
No 10: Neurnberg October 1946–April 1949, Volumes V, VI, VII, VIII, IX (United States Government 
Printing Office, 1952). Available at: www.mazal.org/NMT-HOME.htm. Nuremberg prosecutors 
give useful commentary on the trials in these works. Taylor, T, ‘Final Report to the Secretary of 
the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10’ (William S. 
Hein & Co: Buffalo, 1997) 184–202; Sprecher, D A, Inside the Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor’s 
Comprehensive Account, Vol. 1 (University Press of America, 1999) 134–137.
17  Website of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. Available at: www.rscsl.org. 
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Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was arrested 
in 2000, and was to have been put on trial as part of the first case before 
the special court. Although Sankoh died before the commencement 
of his trial in 2004, proceedings commenced against other high-
level members of the RUF, namely Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, 
and Augustine Gbao.18 The  Trial Chamber delivered its judgement, 
convicting all three, in this combined case on 2 March 2009, and the 
Appeals Chamber confirmed the convictions on 26 October 2009. 
In June 2003, the Sierra Leone Special Court unsealed an indictment 
against Liberian President Charles Taylor in relation to his alleged 
involvement in violations of international criminal law during the 
Sierra Leone conflict. President Taylor subsequently resigned his office 
and went into hiding in Nigeria in August 2003, until being taken into 
custody by the Court on 29 March 2006.19 His trial, which was moved 
to The Hague, commenced in early 2008.20 Charles Taylor was found 
guilty on 26 April 2012 on all 11 counts, when the Trial Chamber 
delivered its judgement. On 30 May 2012, the Trial Chamber delivered 
its sentencing judgement, sentencing Taylor to 50 years imprisonment. 
On 26 September 2013, Taylor’s conviction and sentence were upheld 
by the judgment of the Appeals Chamber.21
Pro-government forces, most notably the so-called Civilian Defence 
Forces (CDF) militia, also known as the Kamajors, have also been 
brought to account for human rights abuses allegedly committed 
18  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa 
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004); Jalloh, C C, ‘The Contribution of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone to the Development of International Law’ (2007) 15 RADIC 165, 165–207. 
See also Schocken, C, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations’ 
(2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law 436. 
19  Brockman, J, ‘Liberia: The Case for Changing UN Processes for Humanitarian Interventions’ 
(2004) 22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 711, 738–739; Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Chief Prosecutor Announces the Arrival of Charles Taylor at the Special 
Court’ (Press Release, 29 March 2006). Available at: www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/
prosecutor-032906.pdf.
20  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Evidence of Expert Witness Ian Smillie’, The Prosecutor 
v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-
PT, 7 January 2008).
21  The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Residual Court for Sierra Leone at Freetown and 
The Hague, The Prosecutor vs. Charles Gankay Taylor. Available at: www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html.
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during the war. The Trial Chamber delivered its judgement in that case 
on 2 August 2007, convicting all accused, and the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the convictions in its judgement of 28 May 2008.22
Another forum for international conflict diamonds prosecutions 
is the treaty-based permanent ICC. The  ICC possesses territorial 
and nationality jurisdiction for states parties for crimes committed 
since 2002, and prosecutions in relation to such states parties may 
be initiated through referral by the particular state party, under 
Article 13(a), or by the prosecutor acting on its own initiative, under 
Article 13(c).23 Along with Sierra Leone, the DRC is perhaps the most 
important state to have ratified the ICC statute from the perspective of 
conflict diamonds prosecutions. It should be noted that the court may 
also exercise jurisdiction over situations in states that are not parties 
to the statute under limited circumstances. A non-party state may give 
the court jurisdiction in relation to a ‘crime in question’, pursuant to 
Article 12(3), and the court may similarly exercise jurisdiction over 
a non-party state in the event of a referral from the UNSC, under 
Article 13(b). The mechanism of a non-party state giving jurisdiction 
to the court was utilised by Côte d’Ivoire in September 2003, when it 
requested that the ICC accept jurisdiction over crimes committed on 
its territory since the events of 19 September 2002 ‘for an unspecified 
period of time’. The grant of jurisdiction was confirmed by the Côte 
d’Ivoire Government in documents dated 14  December 2010 and 
3 May 2011. In a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III of the ICC dated 
3 October 2011, the grant of jurisdiction was used as a foundation 
to approve investigations by the prosecutor into crimes allegedly 
22  The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 2 August 2007).
23  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002).
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committed by former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent  Gbagbo.24 
His case at the ICC was joined to that of Blé Goudé on 11 March 2015, 
and the trial commenced on 28 January 2016.25
Human rights violations in the diamond-rich Ituri region of the DRC 
have already attracted the attention of the ICC, leading to indictments 
and the first arrests by the recently established court.26 Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, the alleged leader of the military wing of the Union 
des Patriotes Congolais, was arrested on the same day as the issuance 
of the indictment against him on 17 March 2006, with the assistance of 
Congolese authorities, French armed forces, and MONUC forces. Dyilo 
was found guilty on 14 March 2012 of the war crimes of enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities. He was sentenced on 10 July 2012 
to a total of 14 years of imprisonment. His verdict and sentences were 
confirmed by the ICC Appeals Chamber on 1 December 2014.27 
The ICC followed up its first arrest with the arrest of Germain Katanga, 
the alleged military leader of the Force de Résistance Patriotique en 
Ituri (FRPI), on 18 October 2007, also in relation to alleged crimes in 
the Ituri area. Katanga was found guilty on 7 March 2014 of one count 
of crime against humanity and 4 counts of war crimes committed on 
24 February 2003 during the attack on the village of Bogoro (DRC). 
24  Ibid; International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber III, ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire’ (Pre-Trial Chamber III Decision, ICC-02/11, 3 October 2011) paras 
10–15, 34–35, 212–213. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/11-
14&ln=en; Punyasena, W, ‘Conflict Prevention and the International Criminal Court: Deterrence 
in a Changing World’ (2006) 14 Michigan State Journal of International Law 39, 64–65; Petrova, 
P, ‘The Implementation and Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the 
United States’ (2006) 40 International Lawyer 945, 945; Dawn News, ‘Blood Diamond Fears in 
Ivory Coast Political Duel’ (28 December 2010). Available at: www.dawn.com/2010/12/28/blood-
diamond-fears-in-ivory-coast-political-duel.html; McClanahan, P, As Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Holds 
Firm, ‘Blood Diamonds’ Flow for Export (23 January 2011) ReliefWeb. Available at: reliefweb.int/
node/381665.
25  The International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor vs. Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, ICC-
02/11-01/15. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude/Pages/default.aspx.
26  Fonseca, A, Four Million Dead: The Second Congolese War, 1998-2004 (18 April 2004) 49. 
Available at: www.oocities.org/afonseca/CongoWar.htm.
27  International Criminal Court, ‘Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo’, ICC-01/04-01/06. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/
LubangaENG.pdf.
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He was sentenced on 23 May 2014 to a total of 12 years imprisonment. 
The judgement is final as parties have discontinued their appeals. 
Decisions on possible reparations to victims will be rendered later.28 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, allegedly the military leader of the Front des 
Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI), was the third person arrested, 
on 7 February 2008, in relation to the conflict in this area. Chui was 
acquitted on 18 December 2012 of three counts of crimes against 
humanity and seven counts of war crimes. He was released from ICC 
custody on 21 December 2012. His acquittal was confirmed by the ICC 
Appeals Chamber on 27 February 2015. 29
Conflict Diamonds: Use as Context
Prosecutions by the international criminal justice system can take 
into account the significance of the conflict diamonds trade in several 
ways. The first is primarily contextual: control over diamond mining 
and diamond trading becomes a military objective within a conflict. 
The Sierra Leone cases have highlighted the fact that Kono, Kenema, 
and Kailahun districts were targeted for combat operations as a 
result of their being rich areas for diamond mining.30 The diamond 
mining areas changed hands several times, between Armed Forces 
28  International Criminal Court, ‘Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga’, 
ICC-01/04-01/07. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/KatangaEng.pdf.
29  International Criminal Court, ‘Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui’, ICC-01/04-02/12. Available at: www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/ChuiEng.pdf. 
Human rights violations and ongoing conflict have also occurred in the Rwandan-influenced 
regions of North and South Kivu, although a recent peace deal with General Nkunda, leader 
of a RCD-Goma splinter group, may herald the way to greater stability. See British Broadcasting 
Corporation, ‘Eastern Congo Peace Deal Signed’ (23 January 2008). Available at: www.globalpolicy.
org/security/issues/congo/2008/0123gomadeal1.htm. An arrest warrant was also issued for Bosco 
Ntaganda. ‘Warrant of Arrest’, The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (International Criminal Court, Case 
No ICC-01/04-02/06, 7 August 2006); The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Case No ICC-01/04-02/06, 10 February 2006). 
30  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 3, 8, 10, 
184, 186, 188, 239, 251, 348–349 (strategic importance of Kono diamonds fields), 355 (confiscation 
of diamonds from civilians); The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine 
Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 4, 
365–367 (regarding findings on Kailahun as a diamond mining site).
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Revolutionary Council (AFRC), RUF, and CDF.31 Context has also been 
given through setting out, in both RUF and AFRC indictments, the 
capture of diamond-rich areas as an objective AFRC/RUF, involving 
the commission of international crimes as a means to achieving this 
objective.32
When used contextually, the role of conflict diamonds is not 
articulated as criminal in itself, but rather shows the significance of 
the trade in exacerbating the conflict and increasing the likelihood that 
international crimes will be committed. Areas of economic significance 
may be considered legitimate military targets. International crimes 
only become involved when, for example, civilians are targeted as part 
31  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 59–60; 65; The Prosecutor v Alex 
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Trial Judgement) (Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007) [336]; Transcript of 
Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu 
Kondewa (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 3 June 
2003) 10, 11, 20, 28; The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 2 August 2007) [374], 
[381], [384], [389]–[405]; The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao 
(Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 
2 March 2009) 612, 614 (concerns the rift between AFRC and RUF which occurred in April 1998).
32  ‘Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesa, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-15-PT, 2 August 
2006) [36]–[39], [71] cited in The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao 
(Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 6, 28; see 
also the identical wording in ‘Further Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Alex 
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Case No SCSL-2004-16-PT, 18 February 2005) [33] cited in The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, 
Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case No SCSL-2004-16-A, 22 February 2008) 81. The Prosecution in 
the RUF Indictment sought to modify the purpose to be the ‘pillage the resources in Sierra Leone, 
particular diamonds [sic], and to control forcibly the population and territory of Sierra Leone’. 
However, this modification was rejected by the Trial Chamber in its judgment. The Prosecutor v 
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 115, 118, 127–128. Nevertheless, 
the chamber held that it did not materially prejudice the defence case. It is also apparent that the 
confirmation of the original formulation by the chamber did not have an adverse effect on the 
prosecution. The Trial Chambers’ approach was upheld on appeal. The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan 
Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 35–38. The Appeals Chamber, furthermore, confirmed 
the Trial Chamber’s finding that a common purpose can be constituted by a non-criminal 
objective (i.e. diamond mining), where the intended means to achieve that objective are criminal 
(i.e. enslavement, terror, etc.): The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine 
Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 
107, see also 120–121,127–128, 130–135.
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of the military operation, when child soldiers are employed as part 
of  the operation, or when slave labour is used to mine diamonds in 
the area. 
The Charles Taylor case also used the trade in conflict diamonds to 
provide a context for the commission of international crimes. The 
indictment focused on six fields controlled at different times by the 
RUF. In Kono, there were diamond fields in Koidu, Tombudu, and 
Yengema. In Kenema, there were the Tongo Field, including the 
so-called ‘Cyborg Pit’.33 In its opening statement against Taylor, the 
prosecution argued that Taylor conducted his diamond transactions 
through Eddie Kanneh, a Sierra Leonean and former SLA officer who 
joined the RUF in 1998.34 The statement alleged that in 2000 there 
were regular shipments of arms, in exchange for diamonds, from 
Taylor to the RUF in Sierra Leone, and Taylor’s men visited the RUF-
held territories and reported to Taylor on economic and military 
developments.35 Similarly, the CDF case describes military operations 
to wrest control of the Tongo diamond fields from the RUF and AFRC 
as the context for crimes that were committed by the CDF or Kamajors 
at those locations.36
The conflict diamonds cases before the ICC also refer to the contextual 
role of diamonds as military targets in the war in the DRC. The charging 
document for the Katanga and Ngudjolo cases refers in the background 
section on the ‘Region of Ituri’ to the significance of natural resources, 
including diamonds, in exacerbating the conflict in the region. It states 
that the desire to control Ituri’s natural resources has been integral in 
promoting conflict in the region. The charging document states that 
33  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 33. See also Transcript of 
Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No 
SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004) 48; The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine 
Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 
2 March 2009) 323–324, 439–440.
34  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 40, 42, 45, 49–51.
35  Ibid 51–53.
36  The Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 2 August 2007) [375]; The Prosecutor v 
Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals 
Chamber, Case No SCSL-04-14-A, 28 May 2008) 16, 80; The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, 
Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007) [327]–[332].
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the natural wealth in Ituri includes gold, diamonds, Colombo tantalite 
(coltan), timber and oil. Mongbwalu, located north-west of Bunia in 
Djugu territory, is known as an important gold mine.37 In the context 
of the Katanga and Ngudjolo cases, the connection between the two 
local military forces to Ugandan and DRC governments are stated to 
have been political and military in nature although it is known from 
UN reports that the relationship also involved trading in diamonds 
and other natural resources.38
The Lubanga arrest warrant does not directly refer to conflict 
diamonds other than in a contextual sense. In terms of substantive 
crimes, Lubanga is charged with the enlistment, conscription, and use 
of child soldiers in the conflict in Ituri in the north-east of the DRC. 
However, the diamond trade is referred to in the prosecutor’s opening 
statement, as part of the factual context in which the child soldiers 
were recruited and deployed.39 
Conflict Diamonds: Substantive Crimes 
One way in which conflict diamonds situations may accrue 
international criminal liability is when the mining itself involves 
criminal conduct. Key examples of this are when the RUF and the 
AFRC conducted mining operations using abducted civilians as slaves, 
37  ‘Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of the Statute’, The Prosecutor 
v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-01/04-
01/07, 21 April 2008) [1], [16], [25]–[35], [72]–[89], 31–34; International Criminal Court, ‘Case 
Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga’, ICC-01/04-01/07. Available at: www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/KatangaEng.pdf. See also ‘Warrant of Arrest’, Ntaganda 
(International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-01/04-02/06, 7 August 2006) 4, 5; (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-02/06, 10 February 2006) 12.
38  ‘Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) of the Statute’, Chui 
(International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 21 April 2008) [1], [16], [25]–[35], 
[72]-[89], 31–34; Final Report Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146 
(16 October 2002).
39  ‘Warrant of Arrest’, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (International Criminal Court, 
Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 February 2006) 1–5; International Criminal Court, ‘Case Information 
Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, ICC-01/04-01/06. Available at: www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/LubangaENG.pdf ; Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Opening Statement’, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Trial), (International Criminal 
Court, Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 26 January 2009) 15.
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with child soldiers operating as enforcers of the slave labour system.40 
Small mining communities were called zoo bushes.41 Conditions for the 
miners were harsh, with there often being little or no food available 
for their sustenance, and miners were sometimes forced to wear only 
their underwear in an effort by the RUF to exert authority over them.42 
Civilians were killed or beaten at mines such as the Cyborg Pit, some 
because they were suspected of stealing diamonds, and others because 
their deaths created a climate of terror to deter escape.43 
A significant, if controversial, finding of the RUF Trial Chamber was 
that it determined that the forced labour that occurred at the Kenema 
district mining sites, especially the Cyborg Pit, constituted the war 
crime of terror whereas, by contrast, in the Kono district it was 
determined that, although enslavement had been made out, terror 
did not occur. The Trial Chamber drew a distinction between the 
severity of the enslavement in Kenema and Kono: whereas the former 
40  ‘Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesa (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-15-PT, 2 August 2006) 8–22, especially [70]–[71]; 
The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 298, 334–338 
(describing the use of the ‘Small Boys Unit’ to kill and terrorise civilians used to forcibly mine at 
the Cyborg Pit mine and the Tongo Field mine. It also discusses forced mining in Kono district), 
340–341, 343–344 (use of forced mining labour as ‘enslavement’), 346–347 (discusses killings 
at pit as ‘terror’), 348 (killings at Cyborg Pit not considered ‘collective punishment’), 375–382, 
398–399, 423, 429–430, 443 (forced mining as ‘enslavement’ in Kailahun District), 497–498 (use of 
child soldiers in Tongo Field, Kenema, to guard diamond mining operations: they committed 
most of the documented killings there), 511–514, 584, 635; Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening 
Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-
2004-16-T, 7 March 2005) 24, 25, 30, 35, 36; Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles 
Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 
2007) 54, 65–67; ‘Further Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba 
Brima (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-16-PT, 18 February 2005) 67–68.
41  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 423.
42  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 64; The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan 
Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 334–338, 340–341, 343–344, 346–348, 
375–382, 398–399.
43  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 54, 62, 65-67; ‘Further 
Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-16-PT, 18 February 2005) [67]–[68]; The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan 
Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 334–338, 340–341, 343–344, 346–348, 
356–357, 372, 375–382, 398–399.
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was characterised by severe mistreatment and killings, the latter 
was considered less severe. These factual findings played in the Trial 
Chamber’s mind when it was called upon to make its legal finding 
as to whether the actions of the AFRC/RUF showed a specific intent 
to cause terror. Due to the difference in severity, the chamber found 
that there was no specific intent to cause terror in Kono, terror being 
a side-effect of the enslavement, although it was present in Kenema.44 
This distinction, however, appears a little artificial. It is recalled that 
what must be proved is the ‘specific intent to cause terror’. When it is 
clear that the consequence of large-scale abduction and enslavement 
is the creation of terror in a civilian population, it is difficult to argue 
that terror was not also intended when the campaign of enslavement 
was implemented.
This discussion on the nature of the specific intent to cause terror is 
similar to the legal argument that if there is a clear objective in mind 
underlying a crime such as the obtaining of a military objective, then 
it is not possible to determine that the action was carried out with the 
specific intent to cause terror. This reasoning, however, was overruled 
by the Appeals Chamber that concluded the specific intent to cause 
terror can exist side-by-side with other objectives.45
The mining of diamonds may also be considered a crime in itself if 
it is categorised as the plunder of the natural resources of the state 
concerned. Jurisprudence on the war crime of plunder and pillage 
articulates that it is not simply private property that might be open to 
being plundered, but also public or state-controlled property. Pursuant 
to domestic legislation, natural resources are typically considered to 
be owned by the state rather than being private property, subject to 
licensing out to individuals for commercial exploitation purposes.46 
Therefore, the ransacking of a diamond mine or unauthorised 
44  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 407.
45  Ibid [1348]; The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Appeal 
Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 240–242, 318–319.
46  Loi Portant Code Minier 2002 [Law Relating to the Mining Code] (The Democratic Republic 
of Congo) Law No 007/2002, 11 July 2002; Da Lei dos Diamantes 1994 [The Diamond Law] 
(Angola) Law No 1/92, 7 October 1994; Code Minier 1995 [Mining Code] (Côte d’Ivoire) Law No 
95-553, 17 July 1995; Mines and Minerals Act 1994 (Sierra).
THe LIoN THAT DIDN'T RoAR
164
exploitation of an alluvial diamond field might be considered an act 
of plunder against the state as well as or instead of the theft of private 
property.47 
An opportunity was missed to test the parameters of the war crime 
of pillage in the context of the work of the Sierra Leone Special Court. 
Unfortunately, count 14 of the indictment charged pillage of ‘civilian 
property’ in the Kono district and did not refer to the diamond resources 
of Sierra Leone. Even though the prosecution made submissions on 
this charge in its prosecution final trial brief, the chamber refused to 
consider them due to the lack of particularisation in the indictment.48 
At the trial level, the chamber found that this type of pillaging did not 
constitute an act of terrorism as it lacked, in their opinion, the specific 
intent to spread terror. The chamber found that, as the name of the 
military operation, ‘Operation Pay Yourself’, suggests, the AFRC/RUF 
rebels appropriated civilian property for their personal gain.49 This 
finding, however, is open to the criticism that, although one of the 
objectives of Operation Pay Yourself was personal gain, it appears clear 
that terror is a consequence of such behaviour. Therefore, it is possible 
to consider that a charge of terrorism should have also been made out 
in relation to this behaviour.
Interestingly, the chamber had to determine whether armed conduct 
by child soldiers against civilians at diamond mines could be 
considered to be active participation in hostilities, as is required for 
the crime of using child soldiers. Naturally, such attacks contravene 
the international law prohibition on the targeting of civilians, and so 
a question arises whether such attacks can be included in the concept 
of active hostilities. Significantly, the chamber did not say that, in 
doing so, the civilians were legitimate military targets, but simply that 
there were strategic outcomes in military terms which accrued to the 
RUF through deploying the child soldiers in this manner.50
47  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 399, 
discussion of the crime of ‘pillage’. The chamber did not consider pillage in the context of 
looting state property. In an interesting discussion, the chamber noted the widespread nature 
of the looting to support it as being a ‘serious violation’, therefore meeting the test set out in the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court (as distinct from international law).
48  Ibid 400–401.
49  Ibid 408.
50  Ibid 511–513.
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Conflict Diamonds: Indirect Liability
Another way in which conflict diamonds prosecutions can be 
employed is in establishing individual criminal responsibility for other 
international crimes. For example, Charles Taylor is alleged to have 
assisted the RUF by accepting diamonds in exchange for providing 
weapons and ammunition.51 Diamond transactions that take place in 
the knowledge that the transaction will assist the RUF to continue to 
commit international crimes connect the individual indirectly to the 
crimes ultimately committed by the RUF, such as the unlawful killing of 
civilians, causing bodily harm to civilians, the use of child soldiers, or 
sexual offences.52 A supplementary question is how far down the line it 
might be possible to prosecute an individual for indirectly assisting the 
commission of international crimes in this way.
Both the ICC statute and the statute of the Sierra Leone Special 
Court support the application of the recently developed doctrine of 
joint criminal enterprise. This doctrine has arisen from the recent 
jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal 
and is a doctrine of individual criminal responsibility that would be 
of great utility in pursuing a prosecution in relation to the conflict 
diamonds problem.53 A person may be guilty by supporting a criminal 
project, for example through the provision of the economic resources 
needed to sustain the project, even if the person does not directly 
carry out the crime.
The international criminal law requirements for joint criminal 
enterprise  liability were recently set out in a case before the 
International  Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Appeals 
Chamber. Regardless of the category at issue, or of the charge under 
consideration, a  conviction requires a finding that the accused 
51  Transcript of Proceedings, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial), (Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, Case No SCSL-03-01-PT, 4 June 2007) 30–31, 41, 74–78. See also 
The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 259–260, 264, 266, 
595–596, regarding the RUF/AFRC trade in diamonds.
52  Transcript of Proceedings, ‘Opening Statement of the Prosecution’, The Prosecutor v Issa 
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial), (Trial Chamber I, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 5 July 2004) 20–21, 25–26, 39.
53  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 25(3)(d); The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, 
Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) [257], [1977]–[1985].
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participated in a joint criminal enterprise. There are three requirements 
for such a finding. First is a plurality of persons. Second is the 
existence of a common purpose (or plan) that amounts to or involves 
the commission  of a crime provided for in the statute. Third is the 
participation of the accused in this common purpose, characterised as 
the accused making a ‘significant contribution’ to the common purpose. 
The mens rea required for a finding of guilt differs according to the 
category of joint criminal enterprise liability under consideration. 
Where convictions under the first category of joint criminal enterprise 
are concerned, the accused must both intend the commission of the crime 
and intend to participate in a common plan aimed at its commission.54
The indictments for both the RUF and AFRC cases refer to the role 
of the diamond trade as being a goal of the joint criminal enterprise 
in Sierra Leone:
The RUF … shared a common plan … which was to take any actions 
necessary to gain and exercise political power and control over the 
territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas. 
The  natural resources of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamonds, 
were to be provided to persons outside Sierra Leone in return for 
assistance in carrying out the joint criminal enterprise.55
54  The Prosecutor v Brdjanin (Appeal Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-99-36-A, 3 April 2007) [364]–[365]. See also [227]–[228].
55  ‘Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesa (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-15-PT, 2 August 2006) [36]–[39], [71] cited in 
The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 6, 28. See also the identical wording 
in ‘Further Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-16-PT, 18 February 2005) [33] cited in The Prosecutor 
v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Appeal Judgement) (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case No SCSL-2004-16-A, 22  February 2008) [81]. 
The  prosecution in the RUF indictment sought to modify the purpose to be the ‘pillage the 
resources in Sierra Leone, particular diamonds [sic], and to control forcibly the population 
and territory of Sierra Leone’. However, this modification was rejected by the Trial Chamber 
in its judgement. The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial 
Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 
2009) 115, 118, 127–128. Nevertheless, the chamber held that it did not materially prejudice the 
defence case. It is also apparent that the confirmation of the original formulation by the chamber 
did not have an adverse effect on the prosecution. The Trial Chambers’ approach was upheld on 
appeal. The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 35–38. The Appeals Chamber, 
furthermore, confirmed the Trial Chamber’s finding that a common purpose can be constituted 
by a non-criminal objective (i.e. diamond mining), where the intended means to achieve that 
objective are criminal (i.e. enslavement, terror etc.): The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 
29 October 2009) 107, see also 120–121, 127–128, 130–135.
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It is interesting to note that, in the AFRC case, the reference to conflict 
diamonds as part of the joint criminal enterprise was challenged 
on the grounds of being irrelevant to the crimes pleaded in the 
document. It  was argued that the objectives of the common plan 
must themselves be crimes. This argument was upheld by the Trial 
Chamber, but the Appeals Chamber overturned it, arguing instead 
that, while the common plan of a joint criminal enterprise must involve 
the commission of international crimes, there may be other elements 
involved in the joint criminal enterprise that are not intrinsically 
criminal.56 By contrast, the CDF indictment does not refer to diamonds, 
although it mentions the objective of gaining and exercising control 
over the territory of Sierra Leone.57
April 1998 was a central moment in the conflict as it was the time 
that the coalition between the RUF and the AFRC ended. In the light 
of the split between the two factions, the Trial Chamber considered 
that this was the time that the joint criminal enterprise between the 
two factions ceased to exist. As a result, different modes of individual 
liability needed to be pleaded in relation to crimes committed after 
this date.58
In the RUF case, the chamber made findings not only that the control 
of the diamond mining in Sierra Leone was a part of the common 
purpose of the joint criminal enterprise, but also that management of 
the diamond mining by the accused Sesay represented his significant 
contribution to that joint criminal enterprise. The chamber noted 
that Sesay planned the enslavement of civilian miners and the use 
of child soldiers to guard mining sites and force the miners to work 
at Tongo Field. It is notable that some of these indicia of ‘significant 
contribution’ relate to direct contribution to the joint criminal 
enterprise rather than this mode of liability representing solely an 
indirect mode of responsibility.
56  ‘Further Amended Consolidated Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-2004-16-PT, 18 February 2005) [32]–[33], [74]–[76]; 
The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Appeal 
Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case No SCSL-2004-16-A, 
22 February 2008) [188].
57  ‘Indictment’, The Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No SCSL-03-14-I, 5 February 2004) [19].
58  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 614–618.
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In making this finding, the chamber noted that forced mining in 
Tongo Field provided an important source of revenue for the junta 
regime and that this topic was discussed in the AFRC Supreme Council 
meetings when Sesay was present. The sheer scale of the enslavement 
in Kenema district demonstrated that the forced mining was a planned 
and a systematic policy of the regime devised at the highest level. 
The chamber inferred from Sesay’s membership of the Supreme Council 
that he was involved in the planning and organisation of the forced 
mining in Kenema. The chamber also found that he, along with Samuel 
Bockarie, received diamonds at the AFRC Secretariat originating from 
Tongo Field. In addition, Sesay was personally engaged in mining for 
his personal benefit in Tongo Field.59 
The chamber also found that Sesay was involved in mining activities in 
Kono district and made a significant contribution to the joint criminal 
enterprise activities there. He visited the mines to collect diamonds, 
signed off on the mining log books and transported diamonds to 
Bockarie and also took them to Liberia. The chamber held that Sesay, 
therefore, participated in the forced labour in diamond mines in Kono 
district between 14 February and May 1998 in order to further the 
common purpose.60
The chamber also found that Kallon made a significant contribution 
to the joint criminal enterprise through assisting the diamond 
mining operations. Firstly, it found that, as a member of the AFRC 
Supreme Council, Kallon was involved in decision-making processes 
that included the orchestration of the widespread forced labour 
in the Kenema district. The chamber also found that Kallon used 
his bodyguards to force civilians to mine diamonds at Tongo Field, 
a practice that was prevalent among senior RUF and AFRC commanders. 
The chamber also found that on two occasions, Kallon was present at 
the mining pits in Tongo Field when Small Boys Units and other rebels 
shot into the pits, killing unarmed enslaved civilian miners.61
59  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 588–589, 
604–605, 611.
60  Ibid 618–619. 
61  Ibid 590–591, 604–605, 611. See also The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon 
and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 
29 October 2009) 279, 452–453, 458–459.
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In relation to the Kono district, the chamber also found that Kallon 
made a significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise through 
his activities in engaging his bodyguards to supervise on his behalf 
the private mining by enslaved civilians. Kallon also visited mining 
sites in Kono district during February/March 1998. He also received 
regular communications about the activities of the joint forces in Kono. 
As a result, the chamber found that Kallon actively participated in the 
joint criminal enterprise in Kono.62
In relation to the period from December 1998 to January 2000, the 
chamber found that Bockarie appointed M S Kennedy as the Overall 
Mining Commander in Kono district. In 2000, it was Sesay who 
appointed Kennedy’s replacement. The overall mining commander 
reported to Sesay. Throughout 1999 and 2000, Sesay visited Kono 
district and collected diamonds. Sesay maintained a house in Koidu 
Town where he received mining commanders for this purpose. He also 
visited the mines and ordered that civilians be captured from other 
districts. He arranged for transportation of the captured civilians to 
the mines. The chamber found that the nature and magnitude of the 
forced mining in Kono district required extensive planning on an 
ongoing basis. It was provided by the detailed administrative and 
archiving records maintained to compute the size, grade, origin, and 
value of the diamonds found. The mining system in Kono district 
was designed and supervised by Sesay who operated at the highest 
levels. His conduct was a significant contributory factor to the 
perpetration of enslavement, and he intended the commission of the 
crimes.63 On appeal, these findings were challenged on the basis that 
the chamber relied on planning as the mode of individual criminal 
liability for Sesay. The Appeal Chamber found that the Trial Chamber 
did rely on planning, but that the legal test for planning was correctly 
identified as a substantial contribution rather than a significant 
contribution.64 
62  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 621. 
See also RUF Appeal (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 279, 
452–453, 458–459.
63  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Case No SCSL-04-15-T, 2 March 2009) 624. 
See also general conclusion regarding the JCE at 639. 
64  The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Appeal Judgement) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, 29 October 2009) 245, 248, 350–251.
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An alternate mode of liability is aiding and abetting, which requires 
that the acts in question must be specifically directed to assist the 
crime and must make a substantial contribution to the commission 
of the crime. This mode of liability was used in a civil action taken 
pursuant to the US Alien Torts Claims Act, in relation to the alleged 
involvement of a multinational corporation in human rights abuses by 
government forces providing security services.65 
Neither the ICC statute nor the Special Court statute provide for 
the prosecution of corporations as legal persons but allow for 
the prosecution of individuals who may be the directors of such 
corporations. This is arguably a weakness in the utilisation of criminal 
sanctions to stop the conflict diamonds trade, although the possibility 
of individual prosecution is arguably a stronger deterrent for the 
corporate leadership. A case scenario considered in the literature was 
a hypothetical prosecution of De Beers for their involvement with 
Angolan conflict diamonds under the US Alien Torts Law. The case 
study found that this would be unlikely to succeed, however, based 
on a number of issues specific to US domestic law.66 It is interesting to 
note that, in relation to the conflict situation in the Congo, the UNSC 
expert report highlighted poor behaviour not only by individuals 
but corporations as well. There remains an option for the directors of 
such corporations, if not the corporations themselves, to face criminal 
charges before the ICC.67
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has considered the organisations above and beyond the 
Kimberley Process that make a significant contribution to the conflict 
diamonds governance system. While the United Nations General 
Assembly provides important political support and lends legitimacy 
to the KP, it is perhaps the UNSC that is more central to its operation. 
The UNSC was alert to the issue of conflict diamonds before the KP 
was established and, in some respects, acted as the midwife to the KP 
65  Doe I v Unocal Corp, 248 F 3d 915, (9th Cir, 2001).
66  Saunders, L, ‘Note: Rich and Rare are the Gems they War: Holding De Beers Accountable 
for Trading Conflict Diamonds’ (2001) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 1402.
67  Final Report Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms 
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002).
171
5 . GRowING TeeTH
through its resolutions. The UNSC has lent significant resources to 
the task of monitoring through its expert committees on the various 
African conflict situations, as well as enforcement, in particular, 
through the imposition of diamond trading embargoes. The ultimate 
ratchet in the international pyramid of sanctions is a prosecution 
before an international criminal tribunal. This ratchet has been 
applied in the four cases heard by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
as well as preliminary proceedings in a number of cases before the ICC. 
Conflict diamonds have been referred to so as to provide the context in 
which crimes were committed (diamond areas as military targets), as 
an integral part of the direct commission of crimes (such as the use of 
child soldiers to enforce diamond mining) and so as to prove indirect 
liability for the commission of crimes by others (diamond sales to 
purchase weapons used to commit crimes).
The UNSC and the ICC can be viewed as part of a single conflict 
diamonds governance system that reinforces the activities of the 
Kimberley Process. A conflict diamond is conceptualised with 
reference to the connection between the mining of the stone and grave 
human rights abuses amounting to international crimes. As such, 
conflict diamonds inherently attract the jurisdiction of international 
criminal tribunals. This represents a big stick that, according to 
pyramid theory, reinforces ability of the Kimberley Process to operate 





Raging Bulls and Flyswatters: 
The Networked Pyramid Model
A fly should not be hit with a sledgehammer, nor a raging bull with 
a flyswatter.
I Ayres and J Braithwaite, regulatory theorists1
Chapter Overview
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework that is employed 
in later chapters to analyse the effectiveness of the conflict diamonds 
governance system, thereby responding to the second of two main 
research questions being considered in this book. The chapter begins 
by discussing the value of using a regulatory approach in this type 
of   context as opposed to, for example, a strictly legal analysis. 
Finally, a  number of sophisticated regulatory models are explored 
in more detail,  namely the network model, the pyramid model, 
and an approach  that combines the two, the networked pyramid 
hybrid model.
1  Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 49.
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Why Use a Regulatory Approach?
There are a number of different ways in which a governance system, 
such as the conflict diamonds governance system, can be analysed. 
Naturally, the starting point for those with legal training is to identify 
sources of law, such as treaties, legislation and jurisprudence, from 
which rights and obligations might be identified. By contrast, 
a regulatory approach provides a significantly different perspective. 
Julia Black’s definition of regulation is illuminating in this regard:
Regulation is the sustained and focussed attempt to alter the 
behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes, with 
the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, 
which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-
gathering and behaviour modification.2
Consideration of this definition is of assistance in articulating the 
value of using a regulatory lens to analyse a legal system, whether 
it be national or international in nature. Of central interest is that 
regulation has defined standards or purposes that it seeks to achieve. 
Whereas a lawyer may be content with considering the question, 
‘what is the law?’, a regulatory approach will critically analyse the 
current law in terms of whether or not it is achieving a  particular 
purpose and, if it is not achieving that purpose, suggest ways in 
which it might be improved. Regulation extends beyond law itself, to 
encompass a variety of means by which its purpose might be achieved. 
For example, a  lawyer might question whether an industry code of 
conduct is legally binding. However, if it has the effect of achieving 
a particular purpose in that industry, then it may still qualify as 
effective regulation.3
A related consideration is that legal scholars are concerned, 
to  a  significant degree, in maintaining the internal consistency 
and integrity of the rules system. This objective seems to be of 
comparatively less importance from the regulatory perspective, 
which is less concerned with whether law is correct in seeing itself 
2  Black, J, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, vol. 27, 
2002, 20.
3  Parker, C et al. (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) 1–3.
175
6 . RAGING BULLS AND FLYSwATTeRS
as characterised by unity, coherence, or particular modes of reasoning. 
Rather, it is the outcomes of the legal system or regulatory system that 
are paramount, such as social justice, or economic efficiency.4
Regulatory theory not only seeks to analyse a system in terms of its 
ability to achieve a particular purpose, but also involves a generally 
agreed set of functional criteria as to whether that system will 
be successful. In developing these criteria, regulatory theory has 
borrowed  from the study of artificial intelligence, or cybernetics. 
These  criteria can be listed as mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information gathering (or monitoring) and behaviour modification. 
These criteria, it is argued, provide for the means of control whereby 
a system, whether artificial or natural, is kept within a preferred subset 
of all possible states. In the absence of any one of these elements, 
there is not control in a cybernetic sense.5
Further to the discussion in earlier chapters of this book, the 
conflict diamonds governance system is defined to include those 
persons, corporations, and organisations involved in addressing the 
conflict diamonds issue through their regulatory behaviour. The 
main players in the system are national governments, the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KP) (including the non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), corporations and national governments therein 
represented), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). In considering the utility 
of applying a regulatory approach to a system such as the conflict 
diamonds governance system, the regulatory approach will not 
simply provide insight into the rights and obligations that comprise 
that system, but will also assess the system in terms of whether it 
is achieving a particular purpose or set of purposes. In relation to 
the conflict diamonds governance system, the central issue is whether 
the system is actually preventing the illegal diamonds trade from 
providing financial support to human rights abusers.
4  Black, J, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, vol. 27, 
2002, 22–26; Parker, C et al. (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) 3–4.
5  Black, J, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, vol. 27, 
2002, 20.
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A regulatory approach also contemplates approaches that are not 
strictly legal in character, as long as they contribute to the achievement 
of the overall objective in question.6 This approach is well suited to an 
analysis of the conflict diamonds governance system, which features 
strong elements of industry self-regulation, and reflects the important 
role of NGOs and the media in managing the conflict diamonds 
problem. This reflects the trend towards ‘new governance’ and 
‘fragmentation’, through which governments are recognised as only 
one of a number of regulatory agents.7 The organisation most central 
to the world’s response to conflict diamonds, namely the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme, does not possess formal legal status or 
impose obligations under the international laws relating to treaties.
Finally, regulatory theory provides insight into criteria that are 
essential in establishing an effective system in promoting the desired 
outcomes: the elements of standard-setting, monitoring, and behaviour 
modification. Through the articulation of particular regulatory 
approaches and models, regulatory theory provides a further level 
of sophistication to assist in designing a system that will achieve the 
desired outcomes.8 
In terms of regulatory approaches, the two approaches at the opposite 
ends of the behaviour modification spectrum are command-and-
control, and goal-orientated regulation. Command-and-control 
regulation focuses on punitive action by a central regulator, such 
as a government agency, which rigorously polices a given industry, 
and applies punitive measures against those who are non-compliant. 
By contrast, goal-orientated regulation moves the locus of regulation 
from the regulator to industry participants, relying on internalised 
motivations to promote whole-hearted and creative engagement rather 
than begrudging compliance.9
6  Parker, C et al. (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) 1–3.
7  Scott, C, ‘Regulating in Global Regimes’, Working Paper No 25/2010, University College 
Dublin (2010) 1–4.
8  Black, J, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, vol. 27, 
2002, 20.
9  Salamon, L M, ‘The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction’ in 
L M Salamon (ed.), The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 15.
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More complex regulatory models combine command-and-control 
and goal-orientated approaches. They articulate particular systems 
of standard-setting, monitoring and behaviour modification that are 
designed to maximise the ability of a given regulator to achieve the 
desired regulatory outcomes. The models presented in this chapter 
are network models, pyramid models, and hybrid models combining 
features of both networks and pyramids. These models stand out as 
being useful in their application to the conflict diamonds governance 
system, for reasons discussed in greater detail below. Of greatest 
interest is the hybrid networked pyramid model, as it combines the 
insights and approaches of both network and pyramid models. 
The Network Model
There is an increasing and diverse literature based around the 
ways in  which networks of people, businesses, organisations, and 
governments act together in a regulatory capacity.10 Networks 
contribute expertise and information that assists in carrying out 
regulatory functions. They may also contribute a range of regulatory 
interventions to a given system. They typically deploy techniques 
that are based on dialogue rather than coercion, and are horizontal 
in the sense that they operate in a non-hierarchical manner.11 Beyond 
general principles, more sophisticated models for the regulatory 
10  For example, see Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 550–562; Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University 
Press, 2004); Burris, S, P Drahos and C Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal 
of Legal Philosophy 30; Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal 
Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401; Scott, C, ‘Regulation in the 
Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-regulatory State’ in J Jordana and D Levi-Fuar (eds), 
The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reform for the Age of Governance (Edward 
Elgar, 2004); Koechlin, L and R Calland, ‘Standard-setting at the Cutting Edge: An Evidence-
based Typology for Multi-stakeholder Initiatives’ in A Peters et al. (eds), Non-State Actors 
as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Coen, D and M Thatcher, ‘Network 
Governance and Multi-level Delegation: European Networks of Regulatory Agencies’ (2008) 
28(1) Journal of Public Policy 49; Freiberg, A, The Tools of Regulation (The Federation Press, 2010); 
Mikler, J, ‘Sharing Sovereignty for Global Regulation: The Cases of Fuel Economy and Online 
Gambling’ (2008) 2(4) Regulation and Governance 383; Williams, C A, ‘Civil Society Initiatives 
and ‘Soft Law’ in the Oil and Gas Industry’ (2004) 36 Winter–Spring New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics 457.
11  Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
553–554; Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) 19–20. Issues 
of power may continue to play a role, albeit less pronounced, in such networks. For example, 
economic and military strength may be considerations in horizontal diplomacy.
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functioning of networks have been developed. Two of these models, 
discussed below, are the web of dialogue and horizontal government 
network models.
Close attention to network models and the way they contribute to 
hybrid networked pyramid models is merited in relation to the 
conflict diamonds issue, as the Kimberley Process (KP) self-consciously 
incorporates important features of network governance. Its tripartite 
structure of government, industry, and NGOs brings together three 
different networks, each with a particular interest in the resolution of 
the conflict diamonds problem. Its informal manner of functioning, 
including the monitoring technique it has labelled as peer review 
reflect the benefits of networks in creating a regulatory process 
of socialisation and peer pressure. The manner in which network 
regulatory models generate insights into the descriptive and normative 
operation of the conflict diamonds governance system is discussed in 
depth in Chapter 7 of this book.
Webs of Dialogue
The web of dialogue model was proposed by Braithwaite and Drahos 
in the context of systems of business regulation at the international 
level. Given the focus of the Kimberley Process on the regulation 
of the international trade in rough diamonds, the model has a clear 
applicability at face value. Apparent in the label, web of dialogue is 
the idea of a network of different persons and organisations that act 
on each other using techniques of dialogue to achieve a regulatory 
purpose. These webs, which often link industry, government, and civil 
society participants, are identified as the principal means by which 
regulatory systems are developed and exported across the globe. 
A web of dialogue may refer to the operations of an intergovernmental 
organisation, a multinational corporation, or an industry or professional 
association. The term dialogue refers to a range of non-coercive 
interactions between actors in a regulatory setting, ranging from 
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discussions in intergovernmental organisations, to mutual auditing 
between subsidiaries of a multinational corporation, and even naming 
and shaming of irresponsible corporate practices by NGOs.12 
In their study, Braithwaite and Drahos concluded that the regulatory 
technique of dialogue was more prevalent and significant than 
techniques of coercion and reward.13 An earlier study of over 100 
multilateral treaties to which the US was a party, encompassing both 
national security and business regulatory matters, found very little 
resort to sanctions. Indeed, few treaty texts even included a formal 
enforcement mechanism.14 Beyond their empirical observation that 
webs of dialogue are successful in achieving regulatory outcomes, 
Braithwaite and Drahos attempt to explain why this is the case. 
They  suggest the answer lies in a number of factors, which they 
describe as complex interdependency, normative commitment, 
modelling, and habits of compliance.15
The initial process of problem definition can be crucial to the success 
of a web of dialogue. During this process, actors are persuaded to take 
ownership of a global problem by identifying their own interests in 
its resolution. An interesting example of this is the manner in which 
different groups, particularly in the United States, rallied together 
to address the problem of the depletion of ozone gas in the earth’s 
atmosphere. Naturally enough, environmental groups were involved in 
raising awareness of the issue, noting the increase in harmful radiation 
as a result of the loss of significant ozone levels. The conservative US 
Government was not initially in favour of the international process 
that led to the Montreal Protocol, but was persuaded to come on side 
12  Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
553. There is some debate in the literature about whether naming and shaming is a non-coercive 
technique deserving the title of ‘dialogue’ or if it is more coercive than this. Elsewhere, it is 
suggested that naming and shaming of corporate practices may be more a technique of coercion 
than dialogue: Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) 22–24. The context of the naming and shaming may 
be important to take into account. For example, shame or praise in a largely private context of 
an organisational meeting may be considered less coercive than an aggressive media campaign 
targeting a particular corporation.
13  Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 557.
14  Chayes, A and A H Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1995) cited in Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global 
Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 556.
15  Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
553–554.
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as a result of the intervention of a major US manufacturer, Du Pont. 
Du Pont led research and development towards replacement products 
for the harmful chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) responsible for the damage 
to the ozone layer. As a result, it had a keen economic interest in the 
international prohibition on CFCs, as it was then in a position to become 
a global market leader. In this manner, the US Government intervened 
decisively in favour of the Montreal Protocol, which was finalised 
in 1989. The level of cohesion created in the ozone-implementation 
network was described clearly in the words of scientist-diplomat 
Mostafa Tolba: ‘What they would implement, and how, has been 
based on a circle of friends, an ever-growing circle of friends, that has 
worked tirelessly under conditions of personal trust.’ The subsequent 
success in replacing CFCs with innocuous hydrofluorocarbons has 
resulted in the global success story of the ozone problem. Today, levels 
of atmospheric ozone have returned to acceptable levels.16
In the example discussed above, civil society, industry, and 
government  found common cause to establish and implement an 
international regulatory regime. Braithwaite and Drahos provide 
an  explanation for the cooperative behaviour of disparate groups 
even in the absence of easily identified self-interest. The explanation, 
labelled complex interdependency, is that actors seeking to find a 
solution to a  regulatory issue are often engaged with each other in 
other forums in relation to different issues. As a result, there is an over-
arching reason to cooperate, even in the absence of clearly identified 
self-interest that relates to that specific issue or problem. For example, 
a national government may be persuaded to cooperate in a global 
environmental regime through the realisation that it wishes to make 
headway in upcoming trade negotiations with those same countries 
involved in the environmental negotiation. This approach can develop 
into a habit of compliance, whereby parties to a regulatory negotiation 
will favour compliance as their default position.17
16  Ibid 264–267. Quote is cited in Canan, P and N Reichman, Ozone Connections: Expert 
Networks in Global Environment Governance (Greenleaf Publishing Limited, 2002) 60–61, which 
deploys a network model to explain the success of that system (see generally 61–100).
17  Braithwaite, J and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
550–562. 
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Braithwaite and Drahos highlight a number of other factors as 
supporting the efficacy of dialogue as a regulatory technique. For 
example, parties may be persuaded as to the normative value of a course 
of action, and can be convinced by the modelling and compliance 
of actors they consider as their equals. When a number of national 
governments agree to a new regulatory standard, a type of peer 
pressure comes into play, influencing representatives of other national 
governments to give serious consideration to joining the regulatory 
regime. This type of peer pressure can be reinforced through reporting 
obligations, which institutionalise praise and shame for parties to 
a regime. An example of this is where labour ministries appear before 
the Freedom of Association Committee or the Committee of Experts of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) to account for their efforts 
implementing ILO agreements. According to Braithwaite and Drahos, 
a sense of professional pride and honour is created, which motivates 
representatives to complete with each other in relation to their level 
of regulatory compliance.18
Another important feature of webs of dialogue is the ability to 
share information. By meeting the informational needs of potential 
participants in such a network, the costs and benefits of compliance 
are more easily understood, thereby facilitating decision making. 
Networks are able to provide technical expertise on aspects of the 
regulatory system to those parties who may have such a need.19 
Webs of dialogue and their processes of socialisation and peer pressure 
share a similar conceptual framework with the idea of isomorphism 
— a Latin word meaning ‘same form’ — in the regulatory literature. 
Under this concept, organisations undergo particular pressures to 
conform to a common standard (for example, international accounting 
firms may undergo pressure to conform to unified financial reporting 
standards). The literature discusses three forms of isomorphism: 
coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative 
isomorphism. Under coercive isomorphism, organisations conform 
to unified standards as a competitive necessity  — for example, to 
compete for international finance. Mimetic isomorphism operates 
when an organisation adopts a standard to avoid pitfalls (such as fraud 
scandals) that appear to have been avoided by standard adopters. Peer 
18  Ibid 555–556.
19  Ibid 555, 562–563.
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pressure by professionals operate under normative isomorphism, in 
particular with a need to ensure that organisations are able to meet 
common market needs and expectations in relation to their services.20
Horizontal Government Networks
In her work A New World Order, Slaughter suggests a network 
model for  international regulation. Her model is proposed both on 
a descriptive  level, as being something that is already occurring 
in the international environment, and on the normative level, 
as a constructive approach that entails significant benefits for effective 
international regulation. Her model is informed by a redefinition of the 
meaning of sovereignty for a modern nation state. In conceptualising 
and identifying global networks that influence the decisions of 
national governments, she posits that the modern concept of national 
sovereignty is more concerned with a state’s ability to influence these 
global networks, rather than that state’s ability to exclude the network 
from having an influence in its national jurisdiction. Government 
networks are loosely defined by Slaughter to be a pattern of regular 
and purposive relations among like government units from different 
nations working together. Slaughter recognises that civil society and 
industry groups participate in discussions hosted by government 
networks, but suggests that privileging of government representatives 
is appropriate for reasons of democratic legitimacy.21 
20  Werner, J R and J Zimmermann, ‘The Evolving Post-National Regulation of Financial 
Reporting’ in H Rothgang and S Schneider (eds), State Transformations in OECD Countries: 
Dimensions, Driving Forces, and Trajectories (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 73–74.
21  Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) 11, 14, 56, 261–262; 
Chayes and Chayes cited in Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 
2004) 267. There is a small volume of literature discussing Slaughter’s model, although much 
of it is a discussion of issues of the political legitimacy of the actors involved in government 
networks, such as Howse, R, ‘Book Review: A New World Order, By Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International 
Law 231. See also Chung, C, ‘International Law and the Extraordinary Interaction Between the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan’ (2009) 19 Indiana International 
and Comparative Law Review 233; Anderson, K, ‘Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty 
and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law 
Review 1255; Antal, E, ‘Lessons from NAFTA: The Role of the North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation in Conciliating Trade and Environment’ (2006) 14 Michigan State 
Journal of International Law 167; Lang, A and J Scott, ‘The Hidden World of WTO Governance’ 
(2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 575.
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Slaughter suggests the notion of horizontal government networks 
to explain the cooperation between national agencies from different 
countries aimed at resolving international concerns. She identifies 
three broad types of networks within the range of horizontal 
networks: information networks, enforcement networks, and 
harmonisation networks. Information networks bring together 
regulators, judges, or legislators to exchange information and collect 
best practice. An example is the environmental exchange between the 
Environmental Protection Agency of the USA and Mexico’s equivalent, 
La Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente, on monetary 
penalties in enforcement cases, administrative enforcement procedure 
and the development of programs for criminal environmental 
enforcement. 22
Enforcement networks are motivated by the need of government 
officials to cooperate with other countries to enforce their own 
laws. Cooperation involves information exchange and assistance 
programmes. Perhaps the best known enforcement network is 
Interpol, which is composed of 179 police services internationally, 
but has no constituent treaty to constitute itself on a formal basis. 
Criminal intelligence, including arrest warrants, is shared between 
member nation police forces through Interpol. Other examples include 
the European Union’s criminal enforcement network, known as Trevi. 
Enforcement networks may also include the provision of capacity 
building, or technical assistance. For example, technical assistance 
from the US Securities and Equities Commission, US Environment 
Protection Agency, and Justice Department and Treasury Department 
is a significant contribution to capacity building in the areas of 
competition, environmental and other forms of regulation globally.23
Harmonisation networks generally rely on a treaty or executive 
agreement, and bring regulators together to ensure that rules 
in a particular area conform to a common regulatory standard. 
Harmonisation networks have come under particular criticism as 
undemocratic, because the technical process of harmonising laws 
generally bypasses the public, and ignores domestic winners and losers 
22  Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) 14, 56, 264.
23  Ibid 56.
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from the process. Harmonisation is often linked to trade agreements 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements or the North 
American Free Trade Area agreement, but can also be bilateral.24
Slaughter suggests a number of features possessed by horizontal 
government networks: they are a flexible and fast way to conduct 
the business of global governance; they are able to coordinate and 
harmonise national government action; they can initiate and monitor 
different solutions to global problems; they are decentralised and 
dispersed, and so cannot exercise centralised coercive authority; and 
they are government actors, and so are responsible to constituencies 
that will hold them accountable in the same manner as purely 
domestic activity, even though they may interact with NGOs of civic 
and corporate nature.25 
At the normative level, Slaughter identifies a number of advantages 
to such arrangements, which benefit in particular weak, poor, and 
transitional countries, including the exchange of information; the 
development of collective standards; the provision of training and 
technical assistance; ongoing monitoring and support; and active 
engagement in enforcement cooperation. Counterparts in more 
powerful countries are able to reach beyond their borders to try to 
address problems impacting within those borders.26
According to Slaughter, networks create a system of socialisation that 
develops and enforces standards of honesty, integrity, competence, 
and independence in performing regulatory functions. The prestige of 
membership in a network is often enough to give government officials 
who want to adhere to high professional standards ammunition against 
countervailing domestic forces.27
24  Ibid 19.
25  Ibid 11.
26  Ibid 265–266.
27  Ibid 24.
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The Pyramid Model
The regulatory pyramid approach, first articulated by Ayres and 
Braithwaite in 1992, seeks to combine a number of regulatory 
approaches into a dynamic synthesis. Its initial formulation concerned 
regulation at the national level. The pyramid model combines elements 
of both the deterrence or command-and-control approaches, which 
argue that law must be tailored towards ill-intentioned people who 
seek to unscrupulously pursue their interests, as well as elements of 
the compliance and goal-oriented models, which argue that gentle 
persuasion is the best approach to securing business compliance. Put 
another way, it combines rational choice thinking, which argues that 
business always looks to economic self-interest, along with sociological 
approaches that give credit to the law-abiding and socially responsible 
instincts of business. Ayres and Braithwaite argue that it is a false 
dichotomy to have to choose between punishing and persuading, 
and that regulators need both approaches in their regulatory 
armoury. It is a vertical approach in that the model also provides for 
coercive interventions that may be imposed by a regulator acting 
from a hierarchically privileged position. The privilege may relate to 
superior legal authority or simply greater power or influence.28
Braithwaite argues that an optimally functioning enforcement pyramid 
strategy will involve the following elements: a tit-for-tat strategy; 
access to a hierarchical range of sanctions and interventions, which 
can be set out in the form of a pyramid diagram; and the availability 
of a highly coercive sanction at the apex of the pyramid diagram.29 
The model lends itself intuitively to the study of the conflict diamonds 
governance system as it allows for the type of dialogic interaction and 
socialisation that occurs within the Kimberley Process, but also goes 
further to provide for more coercive approaches in appropriate cases. 
Exclusion from the Kimberley Process, or referral to either the UNSC 
or the ICC, represent escalations that are available within the system.
28  Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 20–21.
29  Ibid 40–44.
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The Tit-for-Tat Strategy
Figure 6.1: Regulatory Pyramid: Escalating Approaches According 
to Actor
Source: Author’s research. Based on Ayres, Ian and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (oxford University Press, 1992).
One of the key processes for the functioning of the regulatory 
pyramid is labelled tit-for-tat enforcement, which can be described 
as being contingently provocable and forgiving. The fundamental 
principle of the tit-for-tat approach, which is synonymous with 
ratchetting up and down the enforcement pyramid, is that it rewards 
like with like. It  starts off with a posture that the regulated entity 
will be compliant with the regulations. This gives it the advantage of 
preserving the trust, goodwill, and cooperation of businesses that are 
seeking to comply with the regulations. A regulator may also employ 
the technique of positive attribution that encourages long-term 
compliance — for example, labelling a regulated business as helpful 
may encourage the directorship of that business to act in a helpful 
manner. However, in the event that it finds that the business is non-
compliant and unresponsive to an approach based on dialogue and 
persuasion, the regulator gives like in return for like, and escalates 
one stage up the enforcement pyramid, thereby demonstrating that 
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negative consequences arise from unprincipled business behaviour.30 
The decision by the regulator to start from a position of trust, however, 
means that the threat of sanctions has low salience for actors who are 
intrinsically motivated, but can be made salient for those with no 
intrinsic motivation.31
It is important, however, that the minimal sufficiency principle be 
applied in the deployment of an appropriate sanction to the non-
compliant business. A fly should not be hit with a sledgehammer, nor 
a raging bull with a flyswatter, to use Braithwaite’s colourful imagery. 
By using the minimum sanction necessary to trigger compliance, long-
term damage to the relationship between regulator and the regulated 
business is avoided. When the business returns to a compliant posture 
of conscientious cooperation, a promptly forgiving posture by the 
regulator rewards this move and quickly consolidates the desire to 
return to resource-conserving dialogue and persuasion. It should be 
noted in this regard that persuasion is cheap, while punishment is 
expensive, whether in terms of financial or political capital. A strategy 
based on punishment alone also fosters organised subcultures of 
resistance, involving regulatory cat-and-mouse, loophole games, and 
rule proliferation. Punishment damages the capacity of the business to 
adopt a goal-oriented approach of internalised cooperation.32 
The core idea of a contingently punitive or forgiving approach is 
a core idea that is incorporated into the dual networked pyramid 
model (DNPM) presented in Chapter 7. Under the DNPM, the conflict 
diamonds governance system is set up in a pyramid fashion to present 
the idea of a hierarchy of regulatory actors as is required in the 
regulatory pyramid model of responsive regulation. Under the DNPM, 
the key regulatory players in the international conflict diamonds 
governance system are set up in pyramidal fashion, with national 
governments at the bottom, the Kimberley Process in the middle, the 
UNSC above that, and the ICC at the apex. The idea of ordering these 
regulatory actors in this way is to reflect the tit-for-tat, contingently 
punitive or forgiving concept underlying the regulatory pyramid. For 
example, the Kimberley Process is able to be contingently punitive or 
forgiving in relation to a national government that has been found to 
30  Ibid 21–27.
31  Ibid 49–51.
32  Ibid.
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be in contravention of its obligations under the Kimberley Process. 
While willingness to engage might be rewarded with full membership, 
and even prestige through positive publicity and recognition, minor 
or serious non-compliance may attract adverse attention through 
a critical peer review or even expulsion from the Kimberley Process 
itself. The ability of the KP to act in this way in relation to a national 
government, but not the reverse, indicates a hierarchical relationship, 
which is an understood feature of the regulatory pyramid. 
A Hierarchical Range of Sanctions
Figure 6.2: Regulatory Pyramid: Escalating Sanctions
Source: Author’s research. Based on Ayres, Ian and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (oxford University Press, 1992).
Braithwaite argues that businesses will more readily defect from 
cooperation where a regulator has only one deterrence option, even if 
that option is cataclysmic. Such a super-punishment is unlikely to be 
used for political, moral, or legal reasons if it is disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the crime.33 For example, prosecutions for criminal 
33  Ibid.
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offences involving long periods of imprisonment are unlikely to be 
initiated for relatively minor business transgressions, such as creating 
a low level of pollution. 
An example of a regulatory pyramid of sanctions is persuasion — 
warning letter — monetary penalties — criminal prosecution — 
temporary suspension of licence — permanent revocation of licence.34 
A discussion of the powers of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) by Assaf provides a real-life example.35 ASIC has 
powerful strategies at its disposal, ranging from administrative and civil 
to criminal options, relating to corporate regulation. Powers possessed 
by the regulator include freezing assets, and criminal prosecutions 
can be commenced by ASIC for illegal corporate activity. The ultimate 
sanction is, arguably, the de-registration of the corporation.
The concept of the regulatory pyramid of sanctions, which sets out 
key  regulators hierarchically, is a core idea in the newly presented 
DNPM of  this book. Each actor in the system has access to an 
escalating range of sanctions, and there is an ability to ratchet up to 
a further actor higher up the system who can bring a further range 
of sanctions to bear. For example, the Kimberley Process is located 
higher up the DNMP than national governments. The KP has at its 
disposal an escalating range of sanctions that it can deploy in cases 
of minor or serious non-compliance. At the lower level, the KP is able 
to generate critical publicity through a negative peer review. This 
might be amplified by networked actors such as NGOs who might 
undertake a negative publicity campaign on the basis of a peer-review 
report. Further up the scale is the prospect of a national government 
being expelled from the KP and a blanket export ban on diamonds 
originating  from that country being imposed for serious non-
compliance. Further escalations of sanctions may be deployed by other 
actors in the same system, positioned towards the apex of the DNPM. 
For example, the UNSC might impose an independent ban on diamond 
exports acting under its Chapter VII peace and security powers, 
if particularly concerned by the situation in a country. Beyond this, 
cases might be referred to the ICC in relation to international crimes 
committed in conjunction with a conflict diamonds issue, as a further 
escalation. 
34  Ibid.
35  Assaf, F, ‘What will Trigger ASICs Strategies?’ (2002) May Law Society Journal, 60, 60–63.
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A more general approach to the regulatory pyramid is to describe 
general tools pitched at the entire industry. An example of a pyramid 
of broad strategies might be self-regulation — enforced self-regulation 
— command regulation with discretionary punishment — command 
regulation with nondiscretionary punishment.36 A central advantage 
of this broad strategies approach is that it provides for industry self-
regulation as part of the regulatory pyramid, with industry peak 
bodies effectively acting as an intermediate regulator. In some respects, 
industry associations can be more important regulatory players than 
single firms. For example, individual firms will often follow the advice 
of the industry association to cooperate or face a more interventionist 
regulatory regime. Peer regulation may also have greater salience to an 
individual business, as its reputation in the eyes of fellow businesses 
may be considered more important than its reputation in the eyes 
of an external regulator.
The escalating systems approach is also reflected in the DNPM, 
which can be described as a pyramid within a pyramid. The national 
regulation of conflict diamonds can be considered a distinct pyramid, 
even while it operates conceptually as a subset of the international 
conflict diamonds regulatory pyramid. Thus, the idea of escalating 
regulatory systems is also reflected in the DNPM, albeit that both the 
national and the international system are stand-alone systems with a 
full range of sanctions available to them, from the persuasive and self-
regulatory to the punitive. It is simply that the peak regulator at the 
national level, the national government, becomes the regulated entity 
in the international pyramid, with institutions such as the Kimberley 
Process and the UNSC taking on regulatory functions.
One of the interesting observations from empirical work in this area 
is that businesses are intrinsically concerned with adverse publicity, 
above and beyond simple loss of profits. It has been observed that 
the personal reputation and corporate reputation of businesses are 
considered as priceless assets. It follows that a powerful punishment 
for a business, which can be used in the sanctions armoury of the 
regulatory pyramid, is adverse publicity.37
36  Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 39.
37  Ibid 22–24.
191
6 . RAGING BULLS AND FLYSwATTeRS
Figure 6.3: Regulatory Pyramid: Escalating Systems
Source: Author’s research. Based on Ayres, Ian and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (oxford University Press, 1992).
In a more recent discussion of the tit-for-tat strategy, Braithwaite 
has warned against a rigid, doctrinal use of the pyramid approach. 
He reinforced the concept that there is a presumption for use of the 
least coercive technique, but that this is a presumption only. He styles 
the regulatory interventions as tools in a tool-box, and states that it is 
important to differentiate these tools from the work of the regulator. 
That is, the work, or goals, must be in the forefront of the thinking 
of the regulator. As such, there may be situations where, despite the 
presumption of starting at the foot of the regulatory pyramid, it is 
necessary to commence a regulatory intervention part-way up the 
pyramid, or even at its apex. Braithwaite discusses the possibility that 
occasionally it is necessary to have a radical escalation or even a radical 
de-escalation. As an example of a radical de-escalation, he discusses 
the situation where police confront an armed individual in a siege 
situation. In such a stand-off, he suggests that a radical de-escalation 
may involve bringing in the spouse, mother, or other loved one of the 
armed person, who may be able to persuade that person to surrender. 
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When discussing interventions by police and other forces in East 
Timor, he noted that a Catholic nun had intervened to diffuse stand-
offs between violent youth gangs.38
Availability of Highly Punitive Punishments
Ayres and Braithwaite describe the most effective regulatory players 
as benign big guns. Such a player, they argue, speaks softly while 
carrying a very big stick. An example they give is the operation of 
the Reserve Bank of Australia, which has extensive powers to take 
over banks, seize gold, and increase reserve deposit rations. However, 
the Reserve Bank hardly ever uses its powers, but instead relies on 
persuasion,39 which becomes a highly effective tool to the extent that it 
could be dubbed regulation by raised eyebrows. Ayres and Braithwaite 
argue that the greater the heights of punitiveness to which an agency 
can escalate, the greater its capacity to push regulation down to the 
cooperative base of the pyramid. The availability of highly punitive 
responses helps regulators to cultivate an image of invincibility, so that 
it is believed that the regulator is good to the loyal, but invincible 
when it decides to impose sanctions on the disloyal.40 If the regulator 
is viewed as being invincible, there is little point in the regulated 
entity moving for a direct challenge, and cooperation is seen as the 
only viable approach. 
It might also be said that strategic punishment can underwrite 
regulatory persuasion. In the event of the failure of persuasion, 
a  punitive stance with a recalcitrant company can underwrite the 
authority of the regulator, who is seen as being fair in the eyes of 
responsible companies that do not cheat. If the regulatory agency is 
patient and fair in the escalation, giving warning of the inevitability 
of the escalation, it enhances even further its reputation for justice as 
well as strength against recalcitrance.41 As argued by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, effective regulation requires that rules must 
be implemented in a predictable and consistent manner.42 
38  Braithwaite, J, Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008) 97–104.
39  Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 40.
40  Ibid 44–47.
41  Ibid 42–43.
42  Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Penalties: Policy, Principles and Practice in 
Government Regulation’ (Conference Discussion Paper, June 2001).
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Tit-for-tat maximises the difference between the punishment payoff 
and the cooperation payoff. Cooperation is the economically rational 
response, and where punishment is perceived as a fair response, the 
intrinsic motivation of the actor continues to be supported.43 Effective 
escalation is characterised by a short stick period of discomfort, 
followed by a longer carrot period of reintegration where the punished 
party is induced to cooperate with its punishers during the stick 
period. By inducing cooperation in the stick period, agencies reduce 
the costs of punishment, and self-punishment moves more quickly 
onto the carrot phase. In plea bargaining, for example, the threat of 
stick and stick makes stick and carrot seem the preferable option.44
The regulatory pyramid must also have the ability to manage a further 
category of regulated entities, namely those who act in an irrational 
rather than self-interested manner. For example, non-compliance 
may be the result of negligent management of a business rather than 
wilful pursuit of greater profits. Although mid-level sanctions may 
assist negligent management to raise its standards (for example, by 
compulsorily seeking a business consultancy report), the ability to 
incapacitate a business (for example, by the revocation of its licence 
to do business) should also be available.45 
Pyramids with Multiple Regulators in Parallel
Since the original formulation of the regulatory pyramid model in 1992, 
there has been a significant literature dedicated to testing the theory in 
numerous empirical settings. This literature has resulted in a number 
of critiques and re-modelling of the regulatory pyramid approach.46 
One of the significant critiques of the theory is that it underestimates 
43  Ayres, I and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 49–51.
44  Ibid 43.
45  Ibid 30.
46  For example, Grabosky, P N, ‘Discussion Paper: Inside the Pyramid: Conceptual Framework 
for the Analysis of Regulatory Systems’ (1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Laws 
195; Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance 
Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401; Braithwaite, J, Regulatory Capitalism 
(Edward Elgar, 2008); Braithwaite, J, ‘Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, 
Weapons of the Strong’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 297; Rawlings, G, ‘Taxes 
and Transitional Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty’ 
(2007) 27(1) Law and Policy 51; Parker, C, ‘The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in 
Responsive Regulatory Enforcement’ (2006) 40 Law and Society Review 591.
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the ability of industry self-regulation and third-party regulation to 
impose coercive measures on recalcitrant businesses. For  example, 
in the diagram showing the pyramid of strategies (Figure 6.3), self-
regulation is considered to be at the base of the pyramid, on the basis 
that it is the most persuasive and least coercive general strategy for 
business regulation. This was criticised as not being reflective of the 
potential coercive measures available through self-regulation.47 For 
example, the ability of medical practitioner boards to revoke a medical 
practitioner’s ability to practice is the equivalent of the business 
incapacitation of that individual and is a severe penalty for medical 
malpractice.48 Similarly, the NSW legal practitioners’ board was 
recently empowered to suspend the practicing certificates of barristers 
who went bankrupt as a method for avoiding tax responsibilities.49
Figure 6.4: Regulatory Pyramid: Multiple Regulators in Parallel
Source: Author’s research. Based on Grabosky, P N, ‘Discussion Paper: Inside the Pyramid: 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Regulatory Systems’ (1997) 25 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Laws 195 .
47  Grabosky, P N, ‘Discussion Paper: Inside the Pyramid: Conceptual Framework for the Analysis 
of Regulatory Systems’ (1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Laws 195, 197–199.
48  Ibid 199.
49  Book, L, ‘Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap’ (2009) 20 Stanford Law and Policy 
Review 13–15.
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A further critique of the regulatory pyramid was that it did not 
account for the action of third-party regulators, who are neither 
governments nor industry self-regulatory mechanisms. Although the 
original model contemplated action by way of adverse publicity, it did 
not specifically identify non-governmental or third-party operators 
as the regulators using this regulatory tool. By contrast, subsequent 
literature highlighted the ability of such operators to wield powerful 
coercive tools appropriately located in the upper part of a regulatory 
pyramid.50 Examples include the ability of a bank to bankrupt 
a business in the event of consistent default,51 and the ability of NGOs 
to use the media for the purpose of naming and shaming.52 
In an effort to re-imagine the regulatory pyramid so as to address these 
limitations, Grabosky proposed a three-dimensional pyramid model 
(see Figure 6.4) that has three distinct faces. As with the original 
model, the vertical dimension represents the range of interventions 
available to a particular regulator, with the most coercive at the apex 
of the pyramid. Each of the faces of the pyramid represents the efforts 
of a different regulatory actor: government, industry self-regulation, 
or third-party regulation. The advantage of having the pyramid appear 
in three dimensions is that it gives a visual representation of the 
action of three different regulators, potentially acting simultaneously, 
in a single model. Each type of regulator is represented as having a full 
range of possible interventions available in their tool-kit, including 
highly coercive ones.53 
Figure 6.4 discusses the concept of multiple regulators in parallel. 
It demonstrates how different regulators may operate simultaneously 
on a particular regulated industry, with each deploying a range 
of  measures that range from persuasive to coercive. Operation of 
multiple regulators in parallel has particular relevance to the DNPM, 
in particular the tripartite nature of regulation under the Kimberley 
50  Grabosky, P N, ‘Discussion Paper: Inside the Pyramid: Conceptual Framework for the 
Analysis of Regulatory Systems’ (1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Laws 195, 199; 
Scott, above n 497. In Braithwaite, J, Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008) 87–88, he notes 
that his earlier work discussed ‘tripartism’, but the role of third-party regulators was not worked 
seamlessly at that time into the regulatory pyramid model.
51  Grabosky, P N, ‘Discussion Paper: Inside the Pyramid: Conceptual Framework for the 
Analysis of Regulatory Systems’ (1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Laws 195, 200.
52  Ibid 198–200.
53  Grabosky, P N, ‘Discussion Paper: Inside the Pyramid: Conceptual Framework for the 
Analysis of Regulatory Systems’ (1997) 25 International Journal of the Sociology of Laws 195, 
198–201.
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Process, which is depicted as part of the DNPM. Within and beyond the 
Kimberley Process, industry self-regulation, government regulation, 
and NGO regulation act simultaneously, with each regulator having 
at its disposal a range of sanctions starting with those of a more 
persuasive nature and moving up to progressively more coercive 
options. For example, within the private confines of the Kimberley 
Process, NGOs may raise compliance concerns of particular national 
governments with other parties. They may, however, ratchet up action 
against a non-compliant government through the means of organising a 
consumer boycott of diamonds produced by the national government, 
or indeed organising a boycott of the Kimberley Process. In parallel 
with regulation by such NGOs, industry and national governments 
have a range of available persuasive and coercive options at their 
disposal. Through the instrumentality of the Kimberley Process, 
industry and national governments cooperate to share information 
and regulatory approaches and, in cases of serious non-compliance, 
may recommend, endorse, and enforce a coercive diamond export ban 
on a particular country.
Pyramids with Multiple Regulators in Sequence
While different regulators may act simultaneously, or in parallel, on 
a particular regulated group, other systems involve a sequence of 
independently acting regulators. One such sequence was represented 
in a regulatory pyramid depicting police action to manage gang-
led unrest in East Timor in 2006. At the base of the pyramid were 
community policing and problem-solving efforts by the Australian 
Federal Police operating in Dili and other parts of East Timor under 
international arrangements. Where such efforts were unsuccessful, 
and police were confronted with organised hostility by gangs, the AFP 
would pass the baton to the Portuguese elite force called the Guarda 
Nacional Republicana, who were armed with heavy firearms and had 
a range of more coercive strategies available to them, including the 
use of rubber bullets and pushing gangs apart with shields. The apex 
of the pyramid involved a third group, the joint Australian and New 
Zealand armed forces, who were able to initiate full-scale military 
operations as a last resort.54
54  Braithwaite, J, Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008) 100–104.
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Figure 6.5: Regulatory Pyramid: Multiple Regulators in Sequence
Source: Author’s research. Based on Braithwaite, John, Regulatory Capitalism 
(edward elgar, 2008).
The concept of multiple regulators in sequence is foundational to the 
DNPM developed in this book. Such an idea relates to the key idea that 
regulation is passed from national to international regulators, while, 
at the same time, the entirety can be understood as a single system 
for the regulation of conflict diamonds internationally. For example, 
the central regulator at the national level is the national government, 
however, national governments are themselves the subject of regulation 
by international operatives such as the Kimberley Process, the UNSC, 
and the ICC, particularly in the case that national governments are 
in serious breach of their responsibilities under the Kimberley Process. 
The Strengths-Based Pyramid
A complementary partner to the regulatory pyramid, the strengths-
based pyramid, has been proposed in recent regulatory literature. 
This  model, which might also be usefully termed the pyramid of 
rewards, focuses on rewarding admirable behaviour rather than 
imposing sanctions on unsatisfactory behaviour. It is the carrot to the 
regulatory pyramid’s stick. Table 6.1 contrasts the two approaches. 
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While the regulatory pyramid deters through fear and involves 
risk assessments of regulated parties, the pyramid of rewards 
creates incentives through hope, and encourages regulators to make 
opportunities assessments in relation to regulated parties.55 
Table 6.1: Comparison of Regulatory Pyramid and 
Strengths-Based Pyramid
Regulatory Pyramid Strengths-Based Pyramid
Risk assessment opportunities assessment
Fear Hope
Prompt response before problem escalates wait patiently to support strengths 
that bubble up from below
Pushing standards above a floor Pulling standards through a ceiling
Source: Author’s research. Based on Braithwaite, John, Regulatory Capitalism 
(edward elgar, 2008).
Further elaboration of the pyramid of rewards is made easier with 
reference to Figure 6.6. Each sanctions escalation up the regulatory 
pyramid is mirrored by an escalation of rewards on the strengths-
based pyramid. For example, at the base of both pyramids is 
education and persuasion, although the focus of such discussion in 
the regulatory pyramid concerns a problem to be avoided (at pains 
of possible sanctions), whereas the education in its complementary 
pyramid is in relation to a strength that is being encouraged. The well-
known practice of naming and shaming in the regulatory pyramid is 
paralleled by naming and faming, through which positive behaviour 
is praised to encourage the regulated party, as well as bringing the 
behaviour to the attention of others as a model worthy of emulation.56 
Ratchetting up the regulatory pyramid are sanctions imposed 
for failure to meet a standard, so as to deter both the regulated 
party and others from violating that standard. At the equivalent 
place in the pyramid of rewards is a prize or grant through which 
financial reward is added to prestige and praise for achievement and 
commitment to exceeding minimum standards. Escalated sanctions 
in the regulatory pyramid lead ultimately to what Braithwaite terms 
capital punishment, which may also be read, in the business world, 
55  Ibid 115–126.
56  Ibid.
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as revoking a corporation’s right to operate. While it is unlikely that 
Braithwaite is championing the death penalty for natural persons, 
his general point is that there should be a  serious consequence to 
either natural persons or business entities that can be deployed in 
the most extreme cases of non-compliance with regulatory standards. 
In the parallel world of the pyramid of rewards, the apex might be 
a highly prestigious and/or financially rewarding prize, such as the 
academy awards given annually in the motion picture industry. While 
the apex for either punishment or reward is infrequently bestowed, 
the possibility of its imposition serves to either deter or inspire, as the 
case may be, greater action.57
Figure 6.6: Diagram of Regulatory Pyramid and Strengths-Based 
Pyramid
Source: Author’s research. Based on Braithwaite, John, Regulatory Capitalism 
(edward elgar, 2008).
The Networked Pyramid Hybrid Model
Over the last few years there have been attempts to combine the 
essential features of network models and pyramid models so as to 
benefit from the insights from both theoretical frameworks. In so 
doing, these new approaches seek to benefit from both the horizontal 
thinking of the network approaches, as well as the ability to escalate 
vertically to more coercive forms of intervention. In thinking about 
57  Ibid.
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the simultaneous applicability of two theoretical approaches to a real 
world issue, it might be recalled that in the field of physics, light, 
paradoxically, was observed to behave as both a particle and a wave 
at the same time.
Vertical Networks
Some of the first thinking about mixed models occurred with the 
development of network models involving elements of coercion. 
Braithwaite and Drahos proposed a web of reward and coercion. 
They  suggested that reward involves increasing the value of 
compliance, while coercion is concerned with reducing the value 
of non-compliance. Techniques of reward include the provision of 
foreign aid, while coercion can involve economic sanctions or the 
threat or use of military force. According to Braithwaite and Drahos, 
only a few actors on the international stage had the resources to deploy 
reward and coercion techniques, notably the US, EU, China, and the 
World Bank.58
Braithwaite and Drahos argued that webs of reward and coercion were 
in general less efficient than webs of dialogue and that this was the 
case because extrinsic pressures overwhelm intrinsic motivation and 
normative commitment to comply. By contrast, dialogic webs heighten 
the probability that norms established will be internalised by actors 
who are part of the web.59 
Slaughter’s vertical government network involved a more sophisticated 
attempt to bring together network approaches and coercive regulatory 
interventions, recognising that nation states will, for specific problems, 
form genuinely powerful supranational institutions that are able 
to overcome the collective action problems inherent in formulating 
and implementing global solutions. Hard power is exercised by the 
institution, which is not simply the combined membership of the 
network, such as the ability to make a binding decision in relation 
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to a country, including co-opting domestic government enforcement 
powers, or excluding a country from membership. This power can 
be contrasted with the soft power of information, socialisation, 
persuasion, and discussion. However, as they involve national 
governments as well as supranational entities, they are still considered 
to be networks.60
The Dispute Resolution Panel of the WTO is the supranational 
organisation exercising hard power over national governments in 
the WTO vertical government network. The panel consists of three 
experts, who make binding decisions based on their understanding of 
WTO treaty instruments. These decisions affect individual members 
and the generality of the membership of the government network 
of WTO members. Other vertical networks are spearheaded by the 
European Court and the European Commission.61
A significant point to be considered in relation to vertical networks 
is that supranational organisations are more effective in performing 
functions that states charge them to perform if they can link directly 
with national government institutions. Such linkages resolve the 
traditional problem of the inability to enforce decisions of a world 
body, such as the International Court of Justice, in the absence of 
a permanent international police force or other enforcement agency. 
A practical solution to this dilemma is where the existing national 
enforcement networks are drawn upon by the supranational body. 
For  example, the European Court of Justice interacts directly with 
national courts to ensure that its decisions are reflected in the 
decision making of their counterparts at the national level. This is 
a disaggregated state approach, in which courts interact directly with 
each other without, for example, being mediated by the respective 
minister for foreign affairs.62 
Another example of a vertical network is the complementarity system 
established by the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
1998. Under this system, primary jurisdiction is exercised by national 
courts over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
It is only where a national court is unable or unwilling to prosecute 
60  Slaughter, A-M, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) 269.
61  Ibid 13, 269.
62  Ibid 20.
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that the ICC may claim jurisdiction and take over a prosecution. 
The  possibility  of such a jurisdictional takeover occurring is, 
in  principle, a motivating factor for national prosecutors to take 
their responsibilities in this matter seriously. It should be noted, 
however, that the international system benefits from this primacy. 
The international court is unlikely to have the resources to manage all 
prosecutions that must be followed throughout the world. Therefore, 
relying on appropriately well-established national systems significantly 
relieves this case load, and enables the international court to co-opt 
the domestic courts to promote its international objectives. National 
courts, in addition, would increasingly be reliant on precedent-setting 
cases handed down by the international court, thereby promoting 
a uniform jurisprudence on international criminal law.63
It might be noted that Slaughter does not include secretariats, 
commissions, and other information agencies under the rubric of 
vertical government networks, as they are perceived as operating 
solely though the soft power of information sharing, dialogue, and 
persuasion only. In this category are placed the technical committee 
of the International Organisation of Securities Commissioners, the 
Secretariat of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species, and the Secretariat of the Commonwealth. As they do not 
possess the binding, coercive powers of bodies such as the European 
Court of Justice, they are seen rather as handmaidens to national 
government officials, providing such officials with information 
needed to coordinate and enforce national law. Nevertheless, this role 
represents a real level of power, particularly when it is recognised that 
the professional reputation of member agencies can be buttressed or 
damaged as a result of compliance information obtained and transferred 
by a secretariat body. Such modes of operation are increasingly seen 
as more flexible, responsible and effective than command-and-control 
approaches.64
63  Ibid 21, 147.
64  Ibid 156.
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Pyramids Linked with Networks and Nodes
Figure 6.7: Regulatory Pyramid: Escalating Using Networked Partners
Source: Author’s research. Based on Braithwaite, John, Regulatory Capitalism 
(edward elgar, 2008).
A number of recent developments in regulatory theory have sought 
to bring together both regulatory pyramid and network models. 
Some of the concrete examples explored have considered these models 
in an international context rather than a purely national one. One of 
the general framework diagrams set out above by Braithwaite shows 
the ability of a regulator to elicit the support of a new regulator, 
which is perhaps a network of people, businesses, or organisations. 
The new regulator adds new resources, information, expertise and 
regulatory intervention tools that may be deployed. As the resources 
of further regulators/networks are enlisted, an even greater range 
of resources, information, expertise and tools are made available to the 
primary regulator.65
65  Braithwaite, J, Regulatory Capitalism (Edward Elgar, 2008) 94–97.
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One of the important developments in networks theory over the last 
few years is the concept of the node. A node is like the command 
centre for a network, where resources and expertise are pooled, and 
key decisions are made. A grass-roots example of a node in relation to 
a network comes from the movement for peace and security in South 
African townships. A diverse range of people wanting to promote 
peace and security through dialogue and discussion at the local level 
constitutes the network, while the node, where resources are pooled 
and key decisions made, is the peace committees.66 The literature also 
states that there are meta-nodes, where a number of different networks 
are represented in a single decision-making forum. An example of such 
a meta-node is discussed below in the section about the international 
intellectual property regime.
A further model, developed by Drahos, seeks to explain some of 
the interaction between network and pyramid concepts in a hybrid 
model. Drahos’ model suggests that the reach of a regulatory pyramid 
is extended by its connection with a greater number of nodes. 
This model, like that developed by Braithwaite, notes that networks 
and their nodal command centres add resources, information, expertise, 
and tools to a primary regulator. The concept of regulatory reach in the 
context of Drahos’ model includes the ability of a regulatory regime, 
such as intellectual property protection, to operate in an increasing 
number of national jurisdictions throughout the globe.67
66  Burris, S, P Drahos and C Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal 
of  Legal Philosophy 30, 30–43; Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: 
A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401, 404–405.
67  Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance 
Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401, 418–419.
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Figure 6.8: Nodes and the Reach of an Enforcement Pyramid
Source: Author’s research. Based on Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical 
Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401.
Hybrid Models Applied to Different Systems
The Intellectual Property Regulatory Pyramid
Drahos diagrammatically sets out a significant example of the way 
in which an international pyramid is constructed, and its utilisation 
of nodes and networks. The example considers the development and 
export of legal standards for intellectual property protection from 
the United States to other countries in the international community. 
Drahos discusses how the process was initiated and has subsequently 
been sustained by a large number of multinational corporations 
based in the United States, which come from industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, software and entertainment, seeking patent and 
copyright protection for their products. In particular, the corporations 
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seek intellectual property protection in emerging markets so that they 
can financially benefit from exporting products or operating there 
in line with the situation they enjoy in the US domestic market.68
Figure 6.9: Nodally Coordinated International Enforcement Pyramid 
for Intellectual Property Rights
Source: Author’s research. Based on Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical 
Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401.
Drahos charts how the corporations enlisted the support of the US 
Government in the 1980s, which actively pursued the intellectual 
property agenda through multilateral treaties such as the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and bilateral 
negotiations. His regulatory model involves both a pyramid, the 
apex of which is the key regulator, the US Trade Representative, as 
well as showing connections to the nodes that play a central role in 
the regulatory system. The interventions available to the US Trade 
Representative begin with informal dialogue, continue on to listing on 
various types of watch lists, with the ultimate intervention being the 
68  Ibid 413–419; see also Burris, S, P Drahos and C Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 
30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30.
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imposition of formal trade sanctions on a country, thereby depriving 
that country of access to the very large US market for its export goods. 
The US Trade Representative is empowered by interaction with 
some important nodes, the most significant of which is the Industry 
Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for 
Trade Policy Matters (IFAC-3). This body is a committee that advises 
the US Congress and President on all matters that relate to intellectual 
property in prospective trade agreements. It is composed of a number 
of representatives of peak industry groups with an interest in 
international recognition of intellectual property standards, such as 
the pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment industries. IFAC-3 
contributes its expertise, information resources, and political influence 
towards promoting the goals of US-based multinationals. Besides 
offering formal advice as to whether an agreement is in the economic 
interests of the US, the committee occasionally also takes an active role 
in the finalisation of actual text of intellectual property provisions in 
agreements. For example, it was a major drafter of the US–Singapore 
free-trade agreement.69 
Other nodes identified by Drahos as interacting with the US-based 
intellectual property regulatory pyramid are peak industry bodies: 
the Biotechnology Industry Organization, with a membership of 
more  than 1,000 member organisations, the Business Standards 
Association, which is concerned with copyright issues, and the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance, with a membership 
of over 1,100 companies. These are industry peak bodies that are 
constituted with the goal of advancing the common goals of its 
membership with  respect  to intellectual property. Each is directly 
represented on IFAC-3, although, as Figure 6.9 shows, each may also 
interact directly with the US Trade Representative. Because IFAC-3 
harnesses the resources of a number of nodes, it is described by Drahos 
as a meta-node.70 
The concept of the nodally coordinated enforcement pyramid is an 
important regulatory idea that is developed by the author in the 
DNPM. In a nodally coordinated pyramid, the regulation is undertaken 
by a node of actors, in the case of intellectual property regulation, 
69  Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance 
Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401, 401–419.
70  Ibid.
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business and government. Such nodal action is also reflected in the 
Kimberley Process, which operates as a node that brings together 
NGO, corporate, and governmental players. Such players share key 
information as well as carrying out enforcement action in the case of 
Kimberley Process non-compliance. 
The Traditional Knowledge Pyramid
Figure 6.10: International Enforcement Pyramid for Traditional Knowledge
Source: Author’s research. Based on Drahos, P, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical 
Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Summer Temple Law Review 401.
Drahos gives another example of an international enforcement model, 
involving pyramids and networks, to represent a potential regulatory 
model for the regulation of traditional knowledge. Traditional 
knowledge is the broad range of customary knowledge known by 
indigenous peoples around the world, including the use of genetic 
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resources from local flora and fauna. Drahos proposes a model where 
the primary regulator is a potential global bio-collecting society. 
The global bio-collecting society, for example, is well-placed to provide 
resources to indigenous groups seeking to protect a particular patent. 
Identifying possible patent infringements by carefully examining 
patent applications and existing patents can be an exhaustive 
process, which indigenous groups may not always have the resources 
to undertake. Therefore, the resources of the global bio-collecting 
society, and any other groups they may be able to network with 
such as business, states or civil society, are vital from the regulatory 
perspective.71
The Threat of Collective Debt Default
A further example of an international regulatory pyramid, connected 
to appropriate networks, has been suggested as a means by which 
developing countries could leverage their resources internationally 
around issues of significance to them. The regulatory tool is an example 
of turning a perceived weakness — the massive scale of the debt of 
developing countries to countries and financial institutions in the 
developed world — into a strength. It is based on the somewhat ironic 
notion that a person with an enormous financial debt to a bank has a lot 
of effective control over that institution. The concept that developing 
countries might network for the purpose of making a coordinated 
default on their bank loans has real weight to it, considering that the 
collective debt has been estimated to be US$2.5 trillion. Braithwaite 
suggests that such an intervention might represent the apex of 
a regulatory pyramid, and that the threat of this intervention could 
be used by developing countries with a view to making gains in other 
areas of collective interest. These areas might include the lowering of 
agricultural tariffs that currently exist in some developed countries 
against exports from developing nations.72 
71  Ibid 419–424.
72  Braithwaite, J, ‘Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the 
Strong’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 297, 311–330.
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Regulation of International Tax Havens
The regulation of international tax havens, also known as offshore 
financial centres, has also been considered in terms of the regulatory 
pyramid model. An understanding of the way in which the regulatory 
pyramid model has been applied to specific international regulatory 
systems demonstrates the utility of the model in understanding such 
systems. Such an in-depth understanding is important because the 
regulatory pyramid model is one of the foundational theoretical 
models that underpins the author’s DNPM.
The central concern of the regulation of international tax havens is the 
behaviour of a number of nation states, such as Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
and the Bahamas, which do not impose tax on international persons or 
businesses, thereby operating as a way for foreign nationals to avoid 
their tax obligations. The article considered the regulatory efforts of 
international organisations, including the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Union. Empowered with significant 
coercive tools at their disposal, these organisations have attempted 
to achieve tax law reform in these nations. A further development, 
however, were attempts of a number of countries to foster bilateral 
tax arrangements known as double tax treaties. Under the provisions 
of these treaties, the relevant tax haven undertakes obligations to the 
effect that, where a person or business had affiliations with another 
country, it must pay tax either to that country or to the government 
of the tax haven country. However, according to Rawlings, the effect 
of negotiating these agreements was to grant recognition and political 
capital to the tax haven in question. Bolstered by the new political 
support, it became more difficult for the international organisation to 
enforce a greater level of cooperation in relation to that country.73
The study of international tax havens has utility for the development 
of a model to help understand the descriptive and normative operation 
of the international conflict diamonds governance system. The tax 
havens case study shows that the regulatory pyramid model can be 
used to hierarchically sequence a number of international regulators as 
well as the persuasive and coercive interventions they offer. The model 
73  Rawlings, G, ‘Taxes and Transitional Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion 
of Offshore Sovereignty’ (2007) 27(1) Law and Policy 51, 51–66.
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of double tax treaties is a less coercive intervention, as it provides tax 
relief in the event that tax has already been paid in the country of 
residence. Potentially more interventionist strategies are applicable 
through the auspices of the OECD, the IMF, and the European 
Union. Similarly, the DNPM deploys, in part, the regulatory pyramid 
approach in an attempt to describe the operation of international 
and national regulators in the conflict diamonds governance system. 
Like the international tax havens example, it benefits from the 
application of the regulatory pyramid, as the pyramid demonstrates 
how the deployment of an escalating range of sanctions is efficacious 
in dealing with non-compliance with the conflict diamonds regime. 
The regulatory pyramid model in the international setting is able to 
effectively describe the way in which an issue might be transferred 
to a different international regulator for more efficacious intervention, 
thereby making use of a sequence of international regulators. 
Concluding Remarks
This book considers two main research questions: 
1. To what extent has the conflict diamonds governance system 
achieved its objectives? 
2. Does an application of the networked pyramid regulatory model 
to the system provide descriptive or normative insights into its 
effectiveness? 
The role of this chapter was to provide the necessary theoretical 
underpinning for a sophisticated response to the second question, 
which comes from a regulatory point of departure, rather than a strictly 
legal one. Rather than a purely legal analysis that identifies sources 
of law, from which particular rights and obligations are derived and 
articulated, a regulatory perspective considers whether a legal system 
has been successful in achieving its core objectives. Regulation does not 
confine itself to strictly legal systems, but includes non-governmental 
and civil society organisations as protagonists in systems involving 
standard-setting, monitoring, and behaviour modification. 
A number of specific models have been developed to explain why some 
regulatory systems have proven to be effective, and how their efficacy 
might be further improved. The network model recognises that 
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regulation occurs horizontally between governments, corporations, 
and NGOs in webs that promote normative commitment to common 
goals. The main regulatory techniques involved in such networks are 
dialogue, persuasion, and socialisation. Although the pyramid model 
allows for techniques of dialogue, persuasion, and socialisation, it also 
suggests that there is an important role to be played by more coercive 
interventions in appropriate cases. If these vertical interventions 
are employed infrequently and judiciously, then there is an overall 
reinforcement of the dialogue and socialisation occurring at the base of 
the pyramid. The networked pyramid hybrid model seeks to combine 
the key features of both models into a single approach. It recognises, 
for example, that there may be a network of regulators who operate 
simultaneously, or who operate in sequence, by passing the regulatory 
baton to others in the network. Node concept provides a logical 
connection between network and pyramid models. This concept 
recognises that networked regulation has a command centre or node 
that, as well as benefiting from the information-gathering nature of 
the network, is able to deploy an escalating array of interventions, 
as envisaged by regulators in the pyramid model.
Recalling that the second research question requires the application 
of the networked pyramid model to the conflict diamonds governance 
system, a sub-issue relates to the immediate readiness of the existing 
theoretical model to accommodate such an application. As discussed in 
chapters 3 to 5, the conflict diamonds governance system is a complex 
system involving simultaneous regulatory action at both national 
and international levels, and in which national governments regulate 
and are regulated. A system of this complexity has not previously 
been adequately modelled using the networked pyramid approach. 
To accommodate these requirements, the model itself needs to be 
elaborated. It will be argued that an optimal model should include 
both incentives and sanctions in a single diagrammatic approach. 
The construction of a model fulfilling these two objectives is addressed 
in the next chapter.
213
7
The Dual Networked Pyramid 
Model: The Pyramid Inside 
the Pyramid
That which traineth the world is Justice, for it is upheld by two 
pillars, reward and punishment. These two pillars are the sources 
of life to the world.
Baha’u’llah, nineteenth-century spiritual teacher1
Chapter Overview
The second research question being considered by this book is the 
extent to which the networked pyramid model offers descriptive or 
normative insights into the conflict diamonds governance system. 
The  previous chapter discussed the state of the art in terms of the 
networked pyramid regulatory model. The networked pyramid 
combines the insights of two models, the network model and the 
regulatory pyramid or pyramid of sanctions model. Network models 
emphasise the ability of regulators to make significant progress 
in standard-setting, monitoring, and behaviour modification by 
networking broadly with diverse groups including non-governmental 
1  Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh Revealed After the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Bahá’í Publishing 
Trust 1988) 128–129.
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organisations (NGOs), corporations  and governments and using the 
soft power of dialogue and persuasion. Beyond this, the regulatory 
pyramid offers insights into how regulators might respond to 
unresponsive or antagonistic regulated parties. The pyramid suggests 
a contingently punitive or forgiving response, in which more coercive 
interventions are deployed in cases were the soft power of dialogue 
and persuasion has not provided results.
The insights and approaches of the networked pyramid model are 
intuitively applicable to the conflict diamonds regulatory system. 
Nevertheless, two particular issues emerge that arguably suggest 
a number of modifications to make the networked pyramid a more 
applicable and powerful model for complex international systems, 
such as the conflict diamonds governance system. The first issue is that 
the networked pyramid model, particularly the regulatory pyramid 
sub-model, was developed primarily in the context of regulation in 
a national rather than international setting. Particular challenges arise 
when the networked pyramid is adapted to an international context. 
For example, are national governments regulating parties, or regulated 
parties, or both? Can a pyramidal apex be identified as readily in an 
international context as it can be in a national context?
In fact, these issues arise in any international system involving 
nation states regulating and being regulated, such as the intellectual 
property system discussed in the previous chapter. While the 
intellectual property application effectively demonstrates how 
nodal coalitions of US-based businesses and US Government 
instrumentalities deploy a regulatory pyramid approach to foster and 
enforce the uptake of intellectual property norms by other nation 
states, it does not simultaneously seek to model the manner in which 
those intellectual property norms are implemented, monitored, and 
enforced within those national jurisdictions. Such shortcomings in 
theoretical modelling are particularly acute in the conflict diamonds 
governance system because the Kimberley Process explicitly relies on 
the regulatory role of national governments, while they themselves 
are regulated by the possible sanction of expulsion from the process, 
as well as other possible sanctions in the event of UN intervention.
The second issue arises in the context of building the strengths-
based pyramid or pyramid of rewards ideas into the networked 
pyramid model. Typically, this pyramid is modelled separately to 
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the regulatory pyramid or pyramid of sanctions model. A question 
arises as to whether it is beneficial to model the operation of both 
rewards and sanctions, or carrots and sticks, in a single diagrammatic 
model and in so doing whether dynamic interactions or ratchets might 
become more apparent.
The Pyramid Inside the Pyramid
The networked pyramid model, particularly the regulatory pyramid 
sub-model, has its origins in modelling regulation in a national context. 
As such, one of the key regulators is the national government, which 
will typically apply much of the regulatory apparatus, as well as the 
sanctions apex of the pyramid: criminal sanctions for individuals 
or the de-registration of a corporation. The addition of a networked 
dimension to this analysis, highlighting self-regulation by corporations 
and naming and shaming by NGOs, can still be conceptualised at 
this domestic or national level. The immediate challenge of moving 
to the international level lies in distinguishing the regulating parties 
from the regulated parties, a question that looms particularly large 
for national governments. Looking at the bigger picture, it  would 
appear that national governments are regulated parties for the 
purposes of  the conflict diamonds governance system. For example, 
the Kimberley Process (KP) acts as a regulator, attempting to make 
sure that national government participants are complying with their 
obligations, ensuring that only conflict-free diamonds are certified for 
export, and that only certified diamonds are imported. Regulatory 
techniques, such as informal naming and shaming through the peer-
review system, are deployed with the intention of regulating national 
governments, as is the highest level intervention of expulsion from the 
KP for serious non-compliance.
It might also be argued, however, that national governments are just 
as much regulators in the KP system as they are the subject of regulation. 
Governments typically rely on the passage of domestic legislation 
to give them the legal authority to carry out their international 
obligations under the KP, and are therefore essential in the process of 
implementing KP requirements. It is the customs apparatus of national 
governments that must perform the leg-work of actually examining 
potential rough diamonds exports and issuing KP certificates for 
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those found to be conflict-free. It is national governments that must 
implement internal controls, such as licensing systems, to ensure 
that rough diamonds originate from legitimate sources, rather than 
areas and persons connected with the commission of international 
human rights crimes. Enforcement options such as fines or criminal 
prosecutions must be administered at the national level.
In the awareness that national governments act as both regulators 
and  regulated parties in the conflict diamonds governance system, 
it  must be considered whether this double action can be factored 
into a modified version of the networked pyramid regulatory model. 
The  suggested modification to the networked pyramid model is to 
embrace the concept of the pyramid inside the pyramid, thereby 
creating the dual networked pyramid model (DNPM). With reference 
to Figure  7.1, it can be noted that the bottom layer of the larger 
pyramid is composed of small pyramids. These small pyramids denote 
national regulatory systems, in particular national governments. These 
national governments are seen as being a self-contained networked 
pyramid unto themselves, as is envisaged in the concept that national 
governments are regulators in relation to their own jurisdictions. 
As discussed previously, national governments are charged with 
implementing their international KP obligations by ensuring that 
only rough diamonds that have been appropriately certified as being 
conflict-free are exported.
Figure 7.1 also demonstrates that national governments are the subject 
of regulation within the context of a larger, international networked 
pyramid. In this context, the Kimberley Process acts to regulate 
national governments, applying the regulatory techniques of dialogue, 
persuasion, informal naming and shaming, and, potentially, expulsion, 
so as to promote optimal compliance by national governments. 
The international pyramid also allows for a further range of regulatory 
interventions in relation to non-compliant national governments. 
The United Nations Security Council may intervene to impose diamond-
trading sanctions on the non-compliant national government. Beyond 
that, individual members of governments implicated in conflict 
diamonds practices may be the subject of international criminal 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court.
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Figure 7.1: The Dual Networked Pyramid Model as Applied to the 
Conflict Diamonds Governance System
Source: Author’s research .
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The modified DNPM is therefore a clearly recognisable version of 
the networked pyramid model as discussed in the earlier theoretical 
literature. However, it is arguably better able to encapsulate a more 
sophisticated array of regulatory action than previous efforts to 
model international systems using the networked pyramid model. 
In particular, it is able to represent simultaneous regulatory action 
at the international and national levels using the concept of the 
pyramid within the pyramid. Such an approach to modelling, beyond 
application to the conflict diamonds governance system, is of utility 
to any international system, such as a treaty-based system, where 
international bodies focus on regulating the implementation of 
obligations at the international level into the domestic sphere.
Interactive Rewards and Sanctions
A further modification incorporated into the DNPM is the 
incorporation  into the model of the features of the strengths-based 
pyramid that is also known as the pyramid of rewards. There are, 
therefore, multiple meanings to the dual nature of the model. It is 
a duality in the sense that it is a pyramid inside a  pyramid, as 
discussed above, and also in the sense that it combines both rewards 
and sanctions. The rationale behind incorporating insights from the 
pyramid of rewards into the model is largely linked to the concept 
of extending the existing mandate of the KP. While  insights from 
the pyramid of sanctions model may well provide a way forward in 
relation to the current KP crisis of managing serious non-compliance 
from Zimbabwe and Angola, it is arguable that the KP, and the system 
more broadly, might find a new lease of life by extending its mandate 
to incorporate human rights issues that are of a less serious nature 
than international crimes. Such issues include the prevalence of child 
labour in the artisanal mining fields, which deprives the children of 
the opportunity to undertake a proper education, even where children 
are working with their parents. As  referred to in Chapter 2, child 
labour is a major problem in cutting and polishing centres in India, 
with thousands of children missing out on a proper education due 
to their induction into this industry, which provides only minimal 
remuneration. Other issues, particularly associated with the artisanal 
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rough diamond mining industry, are poor health and safety conditions, 
poor remuneration for work performed (less than US$1 a day), and 
environmental degradation.
NGOs working on conflict diamonds issues have gradually turned 
their  attention to the broader range of problems in the diamond 
industry. The term ‘development diamonds’ was coined to denote 
diamonds that are not merely free from the taint of conflict and 
international crime, but promote development because they have 
tackled a broader human rights agenda, such as child labour, health 
and safety, and remuneration for work performed. The NGO, Diamond 
Development Initiative International, formed itself around this core 
concept, and has done important work assessing and comparing the 
artisanal industries in several countries, and initiating projects to 
improve conditions on the ground. This book suggests that a further 
step would be beneficial: incorporating this important work into 
the core mandate of the Kimberley Process. There would be many 
significant benefits that would flow as a result of such a move. First of 
all, the engagement of the organised elements of the KP, namely 
national governments, corporations, and NGOs, would bring much-
needed resources and international attention to this important work. 
It would also be of benefit to the existing original mandate of the KP, 
as healthy industrial practices are less likely to degenerate into places 
that support the commission of international crimes. For example, 
if  an artisanal diamond miner is receiving a good reward for his or 
her work, that person is less likely to willingly engage with the black 
market, including conflict diamonds traders, in the hope of better 
remuneration. On the flip side, and noting that government military 
and police have been responsible for murder, rape, and beatings in 
Angola and Zimbabwe, a healthy focus on improving and legitimating 
the work of artisanal miners would work as something of an antidote 
to prevailing attitudes that artisanal miners occupy a position very 
close to the bottom rung on the social spectrum.
A final reason for pursuing the development diamonds agenda 
through the instrumentality of the Kimberley Process is that the 
concept of development diamonds lends itself naturally to incentive-
based regulation, taking its cue from Braithwaite’s strengths-based 
pyramid. The KP is a certification-based system, which opens the 
doors to a new type of certification, beyond a simple accreditation that 
a batch of diamonds is conflict-free. While conflict-free certification 
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is mandatory prior to export, under the terms of the KP certification 
as a development diamond would not be required prior to export, 
but  would be an option open to the rough diamond exporter. 
If  the rough diamond shipment meets the required criterion to be 
a development diamond, which might initially be the requirement 
that it has been produced without the use of child labour, then the 
exporter would have the option to have it certified as a development 
diamond at the point of export. The incentive for the exporter to 
make use of this option is that such certification opens to that person 
the growing fair trade or ethically produced consumer market in the 
developed world. As with other fair trade products, there is a market 
that will pay more for a product with that label, as opposed to a 
standard product. Ultimately, the intention of the certification is to 
enable the original artisanal producer to achieve a greater reward 
from production of a development diamond than a diamond that does 
not meet development diamond criteria. Thus an incentive is created 
that encourages the production of diamonds that are in conformity 
with the relevant human rights standard — for example, the absence 
of child labour in relation to the production.
One of the innovations of the DNPM is that it brings incentives and 
sanctions together into a single diagrammatic model, thereby creating 
a duality independent from the idea of the pyramid inside the 
pyramid. Although the model is based upon Braithwaite’s strengths-
based pyramid, the original theoretical discussion of the model took 
the shape of two pyramids next to each other (see Figure 6.6), thereby 
contrasting the strengths-based or rewards-based approach with the 
regulatory pyramid or pyramid of sanctions. Although a compare 
and contrast approach has its own virtue, combining carrots and 
sticks into a single model creates a  greater capacity to observe the 
interactions between incentives and sanctions. In particular, there is a 
facility to clearly model the operation of a regulatory ratchet, whereby 
aspirational standards may, over time, be recognised as mandatory 
standards. For example, in the event that the KP embraced a larger 
mandate, the first stage of operation might involve the elimination 
of child labour as an aspirational standard linked to development 
diamonds accreditation, even as freedom from connection to 
international human rights crimes is required before a shipment may 
be accredited as being conflict-free and exported. After enough time 
has passed and considerable progress has been made towards the 
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elimination of child labour, the freedom from child labour standard 
might be moved from the aspirational to the mandatory side of the 
ledger. This would mean that export of rough diamonds would not be 
permissible if they were associated with child labour practices, much 
as export is not permissible under the current mandate where rough 
diamonds are associated with international human rights crimes. 
There is, moreover, the capacity to ratchet up a further range of human 
rights standards. These standards would make their first appearance 
as aspirational goals that would qualify associated rough diamond 
exports with the label development diamonds. After significant 
progress has been made towards these goals through the incentive-
based framework, and noting the learning process undertaken by 
industry and regulators in this context, the particular standard might 
be ratcheted into the mandatory column. Mandatory standards, 
of  course, require compliance as a prerequisite to export. In this 
manner, a dynamic of progress would be created within the artisanal 
diamond industry.
As well as creating an interactive dynamic and a ratchetting effect, 
incorporating insights from the pyramid of rewards into the DNPM 
allows for easy access to insights from this regulatory model in the 
context of the conflict diamonds governance system. As provided 
for in the original strengths-based pyramid model, discussed in 
Chapter 6, the model provides for increasingly substantial rewards 
in return for outstanding behaviour that surpasses minimum 
requirements. The various incentives modelled often mirror available 
sanctioning responses from the regulatory pyramid. For example, 
while the regulatory pyramid suggests naming and shaming, the 
pyramid of rewards provides for naming and faming. This incentive-
based process already occurs, to some extent, within the KP as it 
currently operates. This is because new standards of excellence in 
implementing KP obligations, including internal controls, are shared 
with others as a by-product of the peer-review mechanism. The dual 
model, however, pairs incentives with a self-conscious programme of 
aspirational standards, thereby allowing for parties to set goals that 
exceed simple compliance with the original KP mandate. For example, 
an initiative by an NGO to educate children from the artisanal mining 
fields, rather than allowing them to be involved in child labour, might 
be famed at the KP meeting.
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A further ratchet up the rewards side of the dual networked pyramid 
is the possibility of providing grants to NGOs, national governments, 
or corporations to assist them with projects designed to address the 
aspirational goals of the suggested new KP mandate. In keeping with 
the concept of the pyramid within the pyramid is the idea that this 
segment of the model might itself contain a microcosm of the pyramid 
of rewards. That is, there might be different levels of grants that could 
be applied to efforts to improve conditions in the artisanal and cutting/
polishing sectors of the diamond industry. One dynamic that might 
arguably emerge is that an NGO or organisation is provided initially 
with a grant for a limited duration, or a specific project. In the event 
that these limited goals are met, or perhaps expectations exceeded, 
the KP would be likely to provide a larger grant for a longer period of 
time, creating an upwards dynamic of funding, and progress towards 
the human rights goals. 
Finally, at the peak of the incentives side of the pyramid is a Nobel 
Peace Prize nomination, chosen for its rough correspondence to 
international criminal prosecutions, which represents the apex of 
the sanctions side of the dual model. While any form of international 
recognition could usefully be employed on the incentives side of the 
pyramid, a Nobel Peace Prize nomination is arguably the pinnacle of 
achievement in relation to contributions to world peace, noting that 
organisations such as the KP arguably would be able to exert influence 
towards a nomination, with the actual conferral limited, of course, 
to the Nobel Committee itself. While such a nomination might appear, 
at first, to be overly ambitious in relation to the fledgling KP, it might 
be noted that two NGOs working on the issue of conflict diamonds, 
Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness, already received such 
a nomination in 2003.2
Concluding Remarks
After considering the question of whether the conflict diamonds 
governance system has achieved its objectives, this book asks about the 
extent to which the networked pyramid model might offer descriptive 
or normative insights into the effectiveness of the conflict diamonds 
2  Smillie, I, Blood on the Stone: Greed, Corruption and War in the Global Diamond Trade 
(Anthem Press, 2010) 8–9.
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system. The networked pyramid model combines the benefits of the 
dialogic/persuasive networks theory, for responsive parties, with the 
ability of the regulatory pyramid to escalate punitive interventions in 
cases of unresponsiveness or outright recalcitrance. The networked 
pyramid model, intuitively, suggests an ability to describe the 
conflict diamonds governance system and prescribe improvements 
to that system. Before applying the model, however, this chapter 
has suggested two ways in which it might be modified such that it is 
optimally placed to describe and prescribe in relation to the conflict 
diamonds governance system. 
The first modification relates to the fact that the heritage of the 
networked pyramid model is largely linked to modelling regulation 
at the national rather than international level. Recognising that 
the microcosm of national regulation is semi-independent of the 
international macrocosm, a modification to the networked pyramid 
model is suggested, which incorporates the idea of a pyramid within 
a pyramid. The modified model, which could be labelled the dual 
networked pyramid model, suggests that the base of the international 
networked pyramid is comprised of a number of smaller national 
networked pyramids. In this way, the higher institutions of the 
international system, in particular the Kimberley Process, act as 
regulators of the national governments, which are the regulated 
parties. Under the Kimberley Process, the peer-review mechanism 
operates by way of informal naming and shaming to influence national 
governments in the direction of compliance with their KP obligations. 
However, in implementing their KP obligations within their own 
national jurisdiction, national governments also act as regulators, 
involving themselves in standard-setting, monitoring, and behaviour 
modification in relation to the mining of rough diamonds, and their 
export. 
The second suggested modification creates a further duality in the 
model, through the combination of insights from the pyramid of 
rewards, as well as the pyramid of sanctions. Rather than presenting 
these models as operating in parallel, the DNPM argues that there 
are synergies to be realised through laying out the operation of 
both rewards and sanctions in a single model. This  interactivity is 
particularly valuable should the KP decide to broaden its mandate to 
include a more ambitious human rights agenda. The combination of 
rewards and sanctions has the potential to create a regulatory ratchet 
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towards higher and more ambitious human rights standards within 
the industry, particularly in relation to the artisanal mining, and 
cutting and polishing sectors. The KP as it currently operates sets 
out minimum standards that must be met before a shipment of rough 
diamonds can be exported. Sanctions attach to those who export 
rough diamonds without proper authorisation. By contrast with 
this approach, this book suggests that the concept of development 
diamonds can be utilised as a form of voluntary certification that 
is available to diamond shipments that have been mined and cut/
polished in accordance with aspirational human rights standards. 
While certification as a development diamond is not a  prerequisite 
to export, there is a  commercial incentive to do this, as the end 
product could be labelled as a development diamond at the point of 
retail, thereby attracting the fair trade or ethical consumer market, 
who would pay slightly more for a product known to be promoting 
higher standards of human rights in the industry. It is suggested 
that a regulatory ratchet might be developed, whereby today’s 
aspirational standard (compliance not required for export) might 
become tomorrow’s minimum standard (compliance required prior to 
export). For example, the current KP mandate requires that diamonds 
be free from association with civil war and serious international 
crime before they can be exported. If freedom from child labour was 
added as an aspirational goal this year, in several years it might be 
included as one of the requirements prior to legitimate export under 
the KP. The ratchet could, furthermore, be used to raise the ceiling in 
relation to other standards, such as health and safety, remuneration for 
artisanal diamonds, and environmental standards.
Application of the pyramid of rewards, which escalates in proportion 
to the achievement above expectations of the parties, might move 
from informal recognition through naming and faming to grants 
and awards, with the apex reward a potential Nobel Peace Prize 
nomination. Financial grants might stimulate progress towards 
incorporating aspirational standards, and the potential for a high-level 
prize or recognition serves to raise the height of the aims of parties.
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Applying the Dual Networked 
Pyramid Model: Naming, 
Shaming, and Faming
The Kimberley Process is failing, and it will fail outright if it does 
not come to grips with its dysfunctional decision-making and its 
unwillingness to deal quickly and decisively with non compliance.
Ian Smillie, conflict diamonds expert1
Chapter Overview
The aim of this chapter is to return to the original research questions. 
The first of these is an empirical question: to what extent has the conflict 
diamonds governance system achieved its objectives? In considering 
this question, it is important to look not only at the degree to which 
the system has been successful, but the reasons for that level of 
success, and anything that may be holding the system back from 
achieving more of its potential. The second research question seeks 
to provide a theoretical overlay to the conflict diamonds system: to 
what extent does the networked pyramid model provide descriptive 
and normative insights into the functioning of the conflict diamonds 
governance system? It is necessary to provide an appropriate response 
1  Smillie, I, Blood on the Stone: Greed, Corruption and War in the Global Diamond Trade 
(Anthem Press, 2010) 207.
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to the first question so as to be fully equipped to respond to the second 
question. When the reasons for the relative success or failure of the 
conflict diamonds system to date are identified, they may be linked to 
features of the networked pyramid model. In doing so, the networked 
pyramid theory may provide insight into why the system has been 
successful, as well as suggesting ways in which it might be improved.
Has the Conflict Diamonds Governance 
System Achieved its Objectives?
Has the Kimberley Process Achieved its Objectives?
As the centrepiece of the conflict diamonds governance system, 
the Kimberley Process (KP) has faced a difficult task in seeking to break 
the link between human rights violations and the rough diamond 
trade. The central criterion of evaluation is whether the Kimberley 
Process has prevented the rough diamond trade from benefiting 
human rights violators. Given the historical lack of transparency that 
has characterised the diamond industry, it might be commented that 
there was ample room for improvement. In contrast with this starting 
position, the Kimberley Process now publishes annual statistical data, 
setting out the quantity and value of the legitimate trade in rough 
diamonds, and has come to conclude that conflict diamonds represent 
less than 1 per cent of the world rough diamond trade. Such important 
gains are an impressive record for an organisation that is less than 
a decade old. However, recent challenges have emerged that threaten 
the ability of the Kimberley Process to achieve its core mandate.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the current challenges to the Kimberley 
Process is that they do not arise from industry, but rather from 
government. When the conflict diamonds issue first arose in the 
1990s, big business, in particular De Beers, was linked to the illegal 
trade. However, in subsequent years, De Beers has become a staunch 
backer of the Kimberley Process. Rather than big business, it has been 
governmental participants that have thumbed their noses recently 
at the Kimberley Process. In the cases of Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and 
Angola, the ongoing integrity and success of the Kimberley Process 
faces strong challenges. Although human rights violations have not 
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been linked to Venezuelan rough diamonds, its lack of cooperation 
with Kimberley Process instrumentalities has resulted in a significant 
quantity of uncertified diamonds entering the world diamond market.2
By contrast with its early success with serious non-compliance, 
the  Kimberley Process has been surprisingly spineless in response 
to these challenges. The Kimberley Process accepted Venezuela’s 
voluntary withdrawal from the process, but has effectively turned 
a  blind eye to the fact that it has recommenced diamond trading 
outside the Kimberley system. There are several negative implications 
from Venezuela’s action and the Kimberley Process’s inaction. One 
is that many rough diamonds are entering world markets with 
uncertified origin. Although there has been no concrete evidence that 
Venezuelan diamonds are linked to human rights abuse, Venezuela’s 
determination not to be involved in the system means that this cannot 
be clearly verified. It is possible that, while there are no linkages to 
human rights violations per se, there may be linkages to corruption 
and bribery, as was found to be the case in neighbouring Brazil. 
Notably, Brazil cooperated in a review visit by the Kimberley Process 
and took action to deal with the problems that were unearthed in 
relation to its diamonds industry. Venezuela also sets a bad example 
by demonstrating to other nations that it is possible to confront the 
Kimberley Process and assert your own dominance over it. Finally, 
the Venezuelan case leaves open the possibility of conflict diamonds 
entering world markets by being passed off as Venezuelan, and using 
Venezuela as a conduit place.
A more appropriate response to Venezuela’s action would have been 
to recognise that this behaviour constituted serious non-compliance 
and for the Kimberley Process to follow-up with expulsion from the 
process, meaning that other Kimberley members were not permitted 
to trade with Venezuela while the problem persisted. 
The cases of Zimbabwe and Angola are of more serious concern than 
Venezuela. Turning to the Zimbabwe situation, diamonds deriving 
from the Marange fields are connected with human rights violations, 
and are therefore understood to be conflict diamonds.3 The approach 
2  The main exception to this analysis is the linkage of De Beers to alleged illegal trading 
during the early period of the Congolese wars, circa 1998–2002.
3  It should be noted that the definition of a ‘conflict diamond’ or ‘blood diamond‘ was itself 
part of the dispute in the Zimbabwe Marange diamonds dispute.
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of the Kimberley Process to the emergence of Zimbabwean conflict 
diamonds has been less than perfect. Rather than ensuring that 
Zimbabwe was not rewarded for the violence associated with the 
diamond discoveries, there was a weak response from the Kimberley 
Process focused on a  monitor arrangement near the Marange mine. 
Beyond this, shipments of rough diamonds have been authorised for 
sale by the KP, often in controversial circumstances, such as when 
the civil society coalition walked out from the Kinshasa KP meeting 
on 23  June 2011. A stronger approach would have been to expel 
Zimbabwe from the Kimberley Process pending its willingness to 
ensure that appropriate measures were taken to ensure that conflict 
diamonds were not able to enter world markets.
In the case of Angola, as detailed in Chapter 2, hundreds of thousands of 
artisanal miners have been expelled from the Angola to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in circumstances involving widespread rape, 
murder, and other human rights violations. Perhaps as a result of 
the prevailing standoff in the KP  regarding Zimbabwean diamonds, 
the situation in Angola has received very little attention, even from 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, it would appear 
that the prevailing situation in Angola might, on its face, represent 
the commission of crimes against humanity (particularly widespread 
and systematic rape), meaning that these Angolan alluvial rough 
diamonds are in fact blood diamonds. Perhaps most ironic of all is the 
representation of Angola on the KP Artisanal Mining Working Group.
The cases of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Venezuela reveal some 
important problems in the current manner in which the Kimberley 
Process manages situations of serious non-compliance. Neither the 
Zimbabwean situation nor the Venezuelan situation have been clearly 
identified as cases of serious non-compliance, which is problematic 
given the threat to the integrity of the system that each represents. 
There has been no attempt to more clearly define the parameters 
of what constitutes serious non-compliance. There is a need for 
further standard-setting in relation to the definition. Unfortunately, 
the Angolan situation has not been given even this much attention, 
and remains largely ignored. Perhaps most important of all is the need 
for a standardised procedure to deal with situations of serious non-
compliance. In the event that such situations persist, and the relevant 
national government is resistant to attempts to bring its behaviour 
into line with Kimberley standards, it should be accepted that there 
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will be a ratchet up to expulsion from the system. Naturally, there 
needs to be an ability to reinstate governments that have restored their 
compliance with the system.
A further problem facing the Kimberley Process is the failure of the 
consensus method of decision making. As discussed in Chapter  3, 
this  method of decision making is not appropriate for dealing 
decisively with situations of serious non-compliance. A system 
of voting requiring some type of majority is required for decisions 
in such cases. The use of a third-party assessment system would 
assist the Monitoring Committee in making clear and unambiguous 
recommendations regarding situations of serious non-compliance.
The Kimberley Process seeks to establish a chain of warranties from 
the point of production to the point of sale in relation to rough 
diamonds. Although the primary mechanism established under the 
Kimberley Process is the export/import certificate, it was always 
understood that the certificate would be meaningless in the absence 
of appropriate government controls to ensure the veracity of the 
certificate. Perhaps most significant in this regard is the ability of 
producing nations, which are often developing nations with low 
levels of bureaucratic capacity, to certify that rough diamonds at the 
point of export are free from association with human rights abuse. 
An important step in this direction was the decision by the Kimberley 
Process to make the internal controls of producer countries subject to 
consideration by review teams. However, further measures need to be 
enacted. In particular, more detailed guidelines should be developed 
to identify the main criteria for assessing whether a producer country 
has adequate internal controls in relation to their rough diamond 
industry.
Further tightening of the Kimberley Process chain of warranties needs 
to occur once the rough diamonds have entered countries involved in 
cutting and polishing, such as India and Israel. This is particularly 
important given the pervasive use of child labour that characterises 
the cutting and polishing industry in India, a problem that ought to be 
addressed by the KP in the context of a new, expanded development 
diamonds mandate. Ideally, a certificate system should be associated 
with the production and export of all diamond jewellery, so as to ensure 
that the originating rough diamonds are conflict-free. Unfortunately, 
no such protocols have been created. Further down the chain, at the 
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retail end, there is a further lack of implementation. A 2004 study 
of the practices of jewellery retailers in the US, Canada, and the UK 
concluded that there was intermittent compliance at best with retail 
codes of practice. It would appear that customers purchasing diamond 
jewellery are not given a firm warranty regarding the provenance 
of the diamonds they are purchasing.
Have the UN Security Council and Tribunals Helped?
As was outlined in chapters 3 and 5, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) was the first organisation in the international system 
to gather information about and take action on the issue of conflict 
diamonds. It actively facilitated the establishment of the Kimberley 
Process, and continues to provide political support to it through its 
annual resolutions. Looking further afield, the UNSC was a major 
player in the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
which has initiated the first international criminal prosecutions 
relating to conflict diamonds. The UNSC also has institutional ties 
to the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), possessing as it 
does the ability to make formal referrals to that body. At least one 
individual is connected to the work of institutions at all three levels. 
In the late 1990s, Ian Smillie was chosen to serve on the UNSC expert 
panel, which highlighted the ongoing conflict diamonds problem in 
Sierra Leone. After this, through his role with Partnership Africa 
Canada, Ian Smillie was an important influence in the establishment 
of the Kimberley Process. And it was Ian Smillie who was called on as 
an expert witness for the prosecution in the Charles Taylor case before 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Noting the interconnectedness of the main institutions in what I have 
termed the conflict diamonds governance system, it seems natural 
to consider them as part of a network that operates to combat the 
problem of conflict diamonds. The interventions of the UNSC and 
the international tribunals have arguably contributed to the level 
of success achieved by the Kimberley Process in breaking the link 
between the rough diamond trade and the commission of human 
rights violations.
The first role played by the UNSC is its monitoring role through 
its expert committees. These committees, which have investigated 
situations in the African countries that have suffered from conflict 
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and human rights violations as a result of conflict diamonds, have 
played an important information-gathering role not only for the UNSC 
but also for other actors in the regulatory community, including the 
Kimberley Process, the international tribunals, industry, NGOs, and 
the media. It might appear redundant in the context of the monitoring 
now undertaken by the Kimberley Process itself, however, as noted 
in one critical review, the UNSC reports have sometimes picked up 
on problems in the implementation of conflict diamonds trading bans 
that were overlooked by the Kimberley Process monitors in reviews of 
the same country.4
The imposition of economic sanctions, including diamond trading 
sanctions, on countries in breach of their obligations relating to conflict 
diamonds represents an important coercive ratchet that is available 
to the conflict diamonds governance system. Such interventions 
were particularly significant in the period before the establishment 
of the Kimberley Process, but retain their importance in a multi-
regulatory environment. In the event that a member country has been 
excluded from the Kimberley Process, and therefore excluded from 
the rough diamond trade through this mechanism, UNSC sanctions 
represent a more coercive escalation. This is because resolutions 
imposing sanctions issued with reference to the Chapter VII powers 
of the UNSC are legally binding under international law. The United 
Nations resolutions typically address a range of related issues, such as 
import bans on armaments, and potential bans on diamond exports. 
The political authority of the UNSC, combined with the possibility of 
further escalation, suggests that such resolutions have greater impact 
than exclusions under the Kimberley Process. The UNSC has, in fact, 
continued its practice of imposing or maintaining diamond trading 
and other sanctions on African producer countries in particular 
circumstances, despite the contemplated or actual action by the 
Kimberley Process. Examples include sanctions on the DRC, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Central African Republic and Liberia. It is suggested that the 
ongoing use of this regulatory ratchet has been a continuing factor in 
the success of the Kimberley Process to date.
4  The smuggling of Côte d’Ivoire blood diamonds through Ghana was not picked up by the 
review visit, but was noted by the UNSC Expert Committee. Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: 
An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa Canada, June 2010) 10.
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As discussed previously, the UNSC has important institutional 
connections with the international criminal tribunal system. 
The criminal tribunal system has already played an important role in 
relation to the conflict diamonds in relation to at least two countries: 
the DRC and Sierra Leone. Following the UNSC expert report about 
the conflict diamonds problem in the DRC, the prosecutor of the ICC 
issued public notices highlighting the potential liability of those 
parties involved in the conflict diamonds trade including, potentially, 
businesses at the far end of the trade. Prosecutions initiated by the 
ICC in relation to the DRC have further highlighted the role of conflict 
diamonds in exacerbating the conflict there, and its connection to 
grave human rights abuses, including the use of child soldiers and the 
killing of civilians. More recently, the cases before the Sierra Leone 
Special Court have provided even greater attention to the problem 
of conflict diamonds. Conflict diamonds have been used to provide 
context to finalised cases, prove liability to subsequent human 
rights violations, and are connected — through mining processes 
— directly to human rights violations. There was significant media 
attention to the proceedings of the Special Court, particularly the 
high-profile prosecution of Charles Taylor, which even involved the 
testimony of celebrity supermodel Naomi Campbell. The conviction of 
members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) leadership on charges related to conflict 
diamonds, and the ongoing prosecution of Charles Taylor, have sent 
a clear message that, in the most serious cases, persons involved in 
orchestrating the conflict diamonds trade will be subject to criminal 
prosecution. There is also a moral dimension to prosecution, which 
serves to reinforce social norms against a trade such as the conflict 
diamonds trade. The trials before the ICC and the Sierra Leone Special 
Court have focused international attention on the issue of conflict 
diamonds and thereby reinforced the important work of the Kimberley 
Process in seeking to regulate the trade in rough diamonds. Even 
political leaders of national governments have been made to realise that 
involvement in the conflict diamonds trade, and commission of human 
rights abuses, may result in international criminal prosecutions. This 
has increased general willingness of member nations to cooperate 
fully with the other international agencies of the conflict diamonds 
governance system, such as the UNSC and the Kimberley Process. 
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In turn, such a contribution must be recognised as one of the factors 
resulting in the reduction of the conflict diamonds trade to less than 
1 per cent of the international rough diamonds market.
Applying the Dual Networked Pyramid 
Model to the Conflict Diamonds 
Governance System
Network Features of the Conflict Diamonds 
Governance System
The Network as a Descriptive Tool
The network models, regulatory webs, and government networks 
provide important insights into the operation of the conflict diamonds 
legal system, particularly the functioning of the Kimberley Process. 
The  value of networked regulation was seemingly built into the 
Kimberley Process, through the use of the tripartite government, 
business, and NGO structure. Each category of participant is, in 
a sense, a network. The fact that the majority of governments involved 
in the rough diamond trade are represented shows that Kimberley is, 
at least in part, a government network. The Kimberley Process was 
also the catalyst for the large-scale diamond industry to organise 
itself through the formation of the World Diamond Council (WDC). 
With the involvement of the WDC at the Kimberley Process, as well 
as member businesses such as Rio Tinto and De Beers, the Kimberley 
Process represented a network of rough diamond trading businesses. 
Given that each NGO is itself a network of like-minded persons, the 
bringing together of a number of NGOs of global reach through the 
Kimberley Process is another network feature of the organisation.
The Kimberley Process can also be understood as a node that acts 
as a command centre by bringing together representatives of the 
government, NGO, and business networks. The KP processes the 
information gathered by these expansive networks and makes concrete 
regulatory decisions in response.
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There are a number of specific features mentioned in the network 
models that correlate closely to the operation of the Kimberley 
Process. The concept of webs of information is very apt in regard to 
the Kimberley Process, which brings together expansive networks 
of information through government, business, and NGO networks. 
Such information is vital for appropriate regulatory action to occur. 
For example, in the event there is an outbreak of human rights abuses 
fuelled by conflict diamonds, it is often the NGO network, which has 
been coined ‘the conscience of the Kimberley Process’, which brings 
it to the attention of the Kimberley Process. The manner in which 
such information is brought back to the Kimberley Process could 
also be described in terms of webs of accountability. Importantly, the 
Kimberley Process incorporates a type of separation of powers, where 
each power or interest is able to bring accountability to the others. 
In the event that big business gets caught up in the conflict trade, 
national governments, which are institutionally removed, may bring 
them to account, particularly national governments from different 
countries with no particular stake in that business.5 Big business has 
an interest in holding to account parts of the industry, including the 
artisanal industry, which might bring the diamond trade as a whole 
into disrepute. Besides highlighting contraventions, big business 
has an incentive in assisting small business or parts of the trade that 
have been traditionally troubled in building capacity and becoming 
Kimberley compliant. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, is the 
role that NGOs play in promoting accountability. Entering into the 
Kimberley Process without an economic stake in the rough diamond 
industry, they are able to present an objective third-party perspective 
into the operation of the Kimberley Process. In particular, they are 
in a position to hold to account not only business interests but also 
national government interests where these diverge from the larger 
purpose of the Kimberley Process as a whole. 
A further insight into the Kimberley Process derives from Ann-
Marie Slaughter’s government networks theory, which posits that 
networks of government officials group together around particular 
subject-matter domains. One of the ways in which they operate she 
describes as horizontal government networks. Such networks avoid 
5  Braithwaite, J, ‘Realism and Principled Engagement in International Affairs and the Social 
Sciences of Regulation’ (Paper presented at RegNet@10 Conference, The Australian National 
University, March 2011) 3.
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hierarchical  structures, but operate on the basis of government 
officials coming together as equals, giving rise to the operation of peer 
pressure. Through this type of peer pressure, government officials find 
themselves in social relationships to other governments, and through 
this connection feel a  sense of accountability for obligations that 
are mutually undertaken. This model is particularly mirrored in the 
working of the Kimberley Process peer-review system. In the Kimberley 
Process peer-review system, government representatives, assisted by 
NGO and business representatives, review other governments in terms 
of their degree of compliance with Kimberley Process requirements. 
One of the main ways in which this system works is that it draws on the 
sense of mutual obligation by which Kimberley Process governments 
come together. Through highlighting an inadequacy in the operation 
of one nation’s diamond processing system, pressure is placed upon 
that nation to come into greater conformity with its obligations. 
The Network as a Normative Tool
It is arguable that the success of the Kimberley Process to date may 
largely be attributed to its ability to incorporate features from the 
networks regulatory model. However, as discussed below, this book 
contends that if its operating procedures more closely conformed to 
features of the pyramid model, further improvement of the conflict 
diamonds governance system would follow. However, there should be 
no backtracking of the networks features already incorporated into the 
Kimberley Process and its related regulators. While the sine qua non 
of the networks theory is socialisation, the central feature of pyramid 
theory is its ability to deploy coercion in an optimal manner. However, 
there is a noted risk in the literature around pyramid theory that 
coercion, particularly as embodied in classic command-and-control 
theory of regulation, tends to undermine the normative good will 
and cooperation that are gained through socialisation, dialogue and 
persuasion. Therefore, it is important in discussing the deployment 
of coercive interventions to keep in mind that they must be made 
in a  context where the potential to harm the gains made through 
persuasive functioning are minimised. This challenge is  discussed 
further below.
While the conflict diamonds governance system has significant 
lessons to learn through analysis in the light of the networked 
pyramid model, there are arguably insights that might be suggested 
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in relation to networked pyramid regulatory theory that arise out 
of a study of the conflict diamonds governance system. One such 
insight relates to networks theory and understanding of the node 
concept. Nodes are considered the command centres of networks, 
with meta-nodes involving representatives of several networks. 
Nodes are the places where information from the various networks 
is gathered, and where regulatory action is determined and carried 
out. It appears on its face that the Kimberley Process conforms to this 
definition. The KP plenary brings together three major networks: 
representatives of NGOs, industry, and national governments. 
It  is the plenary, and between meetings the chair and committees, 
which carry out regulatory functions relating to conflict diamonds, 
including information gathering (annual reports, statistics, review 
visits), standard-setting through developing terms of reference for 
working committees, procedures, or suggestions to reform the primary 
agreement, and behavioural modification activities, such as reporting 
on non-compliance issues highlighted in review visits, reporting 
issues to the UN system, or recommending that countries be expelled 
from the Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process has the further 
capacity to engage with other networked regulators in the conflict 
diamonds governance system. It can receive a ratchet from below from 
national governments, such as when Côte d’Ivoire requested that it be 
removed from the Kimberly Process due its inability to manage conflict 
diamonds. The Kimberley Process is also able to ratchet up regulatory 
interventions to more interventionist institutions such as the UNSC 
or even the ICC. In these ways, it functions as a powerful meta-node, 
much in the manner that IFAC-3 operates as the major regulatory node 
in the export of US-developed intellectual property rules throughout 
the international community. 
There are, however, significant differences between the nature of 
the intellectual property node described by Drahos and the nature 
of the node represented by the Kimberley Process. First of all, the 
intellectual property node is less formalised than the Kimberley 
Process. Although there are references to its functioning in terms of 
finalising trade treaties by the US Congress, the Kimberley Process 
Agreement is a more comprehensive constitutional document, placing 
the organisation on a more formal footing than IFAC-3. The  other 
difference, however, is more significant in terms of the nature of 
nodal theory. In the intellectual property regime, IFAC-3 and the US 
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Government fundamentally agree on the same agenda, and promote the 
same interest. This is perhaps made easy because it is concerned with 
the alteration of rights overseas to the advantage of US corporations, 
and is therefore not confronting US interests in a direct manner. 
The  nature of this node is very different to the Kimberley Process, 
which brings together divergent interests in the name of solving 
a  common problem. Prior to the identification of conflict diamonds 
as a problem, even large corporations seemingly had no problem in 
purchasing them. National governments do not necessarily identify 
regulation of this sector as being in their immediate national interest, 
as demonstrated by the recent approach of Venezuela and Zimbabwe. It 
follows that the task of forging a common purpose and common agenda 
between NGOs, industry, and national governments requires looking 
beyond immediate self-interest in a manner that is not modelled in the 
intellectual property regime. Indeed, the bringing together of the three 
disparate groups can be seen as an example of separation of powers. 
This constitutionalist concept, previously discussed, indicates that, as 
far as possible, there should be a division of powers amongst different 
power bases, and not simply in the normal manner of government 
(i.e. between judiciary, executive, and legislature). Some examples 
given in the literature include separation of traditional/tribal power 
from power in terms of the modern state in developing countries, the 
separation of church and state, and the breaking up of the US military 
industry complex.6 
Perhaps the best analogy to the manner in which the Kimberley 
Process formalises the tripartite involvement of civil society, industry, 
and national governments relates to the much more venerable 
International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO, which seeks to 
set standards regarding labour standards internationally, combines 
governments with employers and employees. It is famously one of 
the only organisations to survive the transition from being connected 
with the League of Nations to the post-war era of the United Nations 
(perhaps the only other structure to do so being the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, which was transformed into the International 
Court of Justice, although this continuity is debated in the literature). 
The three separate interests that are brought together in the ILO hold 
each other accountable as each seeks different outcomes through 
6  Ibid.
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serving the point of view of their differing constituencies. The ILO 
could certainly be conceptualised as a node according to networks 
theory, however, it appears that this has not yet been done. Perhaps 
this study of the Kimberly Process as a node will prompt scholarly 
investigation into the manner in which the ILO operates in a similar 
fashion. 
Pyramid Features of the Conflict Diamonds 
Governance System
The Pyramid as a Descriptive Tool
The regulatory pyramid tool is particularly useful in describing the 
vertical aspect of regulation, that is, the manner in which increasingly 
coercive measures may be applied to achieve a regulatory outcome. 
Typically, the regulator who applies such a higher coercive measure is 
in a more powerful position than the person or entity that is regulated. 
In considering the application of the pyramid model to the conflict 
diamonds legal system, it is perhaps most easily seen in terms of 
pyramids at two different levels: the national level and the international 
level. At the national level, the primary regulator is the national 
government and the regulated persons are artisanal and industrial 
rough diamond miners and traders. At the international level, the 
Kimberley Process is the initial regulator, with national governments 
being the regulated entities. Peer review represents a  regulatory 
ratchet available to the Kimberley Process, as does expulsion from 
the system for serious non-compliance. Further regulatory ratchets in 
relation to recalcitrant national governments may involve the UNSC 
and the ICC. 
Rather than relying on the earliest iteration of the regulatory 
pyramid model, this book draws on the latest imagining of the 
model, particularly as it relates to providing for multiple regulators, 
both sequentially and in parallel. The model anticipates ratchetting 
up through the regulatory pyramid, even, potentially, from 
national to international levels. As such, ratchetting up may pass 
the regulatory baton from national governments to international 
actors such as the KP,  the UNSC, and the ICC. The incorporation of 
the idea of regulators working in parallel is a more sophisticated 
version of the model, which provides a better explanation of the 
work of multiple regulators on a single regulated entity. The idea that 
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multiple regulators act together with respect to the Kimberley Process 
incorporates the tripartite nature of the process, which includes, 
even at the formal level, NGOs, industry, and national governments. 
Governments, NGOs and industry sectors operate as regulators from 
within and outside of the Kimberley Process. These three sectors are 
both regulators and the subjects of regulation. Thus, the subjects 
of such regulatory activities are industry bodies, other national 
governments, and civil society bodies. 
Descriptively speaking, it is possible to view the conflict diamonds 
prosecutions as an informal ratchet from the UNSC to tribunal 
jurisdiction. The two situations involving conflict diamonds 
prosecutions, Sierra Leone and DRC, have both been presaged by 
significant action by the UNSC. The UNSC had issued major reports 
about the role of conflict diamonds in the perpetration of human 
rights violations in Sierra Leone, and had placed economic sanctions 
on both Liberia and Sierra Leone. The UNSC was instrumental in the 
establishment of the Sierra Leone Special Court. The case records, 
particularly those of the Charles Taylor case, show that the UNSC 
expert committee reports about conflict diamonds were tendered as 
evidence, supported by the testimony of one of its experts, Mr Ian 
Smillie. In contemplating the establishment of the Sierra Leone Special 
Court, it would be difficult to imagine that its caseload would overlook 
the role that the conflict diamonds trade played in the conflict. 
Similarly, in relation to the DRC cases, the UNSC expert reports 
highlighted the connection between conflict diamonds and human 
rights violations in regions such as Ituri, and recommended follow-up 
action by the UNSC and the international community. It is likely that 
the UNSC expert reports formed the basis for public statements by 
the ICC prosecutor regarding the illegality of the conflict diamonds 
trade. Beyond this, the ICC initiated prosecutions for human rights 
violations in the area, highlighting the role played by conflict 
diamonds in exacerbating the situation. In an informal manner, there 
was a regulatory ratchet between the statements of the UNSC expert 
committee, its sanctions, and follow-up prosecutorial action by the 
ICC. Importantly, there is an institutional connection between the 
two, with the UNSC able to refer cases to the ICC even when such 
cases would not normally fall within its jurisdiction. Although the 
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institutional mechanism was not formally invoked, it makes sense that 
the ICC prosecutor would be carefully monitoring expert reports by 
the UNSC for possible independent action on its own motion. 
Descriptively, a focus on the role of national regulatory frameworks 
within the international system gives rise to the concept of a pyramid 
within a pyramid. From this point of view, national regulators have 
a range of interventions available to them in relation to their local 
diamond industry, with the apex of that pyramid arguably being 
domestic criminal prosecutions. The prime obligation of the Kimberley 
Process, by contrast, is to assist national governments in living up to 
their regulatory tasks. Returning to the national regulatory pyramid, 
national governments already have a range of regulatory interventions 
at their disposal. It is clear from analysis of legislation from African 
producer countries that a number of regulatory tools are already 
available, including licensing and zoning mechanisms to manage 
artisanal and large-scale rough diamond mining. They will need to 
be built upon, as is discussed below, to provide for a better overall 
approach to the issue of combating conflict diamonds. 
The Pyramid as a Normative Tool
One of the key challenges currently facing the Kimberley Process at 
the international level can be understood clearly in relation to the 
pyramid model. The challenge of serious non-compliance by Zimbabwe 
and Venezuela can be seen in terms of a normative application of the 
regulatory pyramid. The pyramid model requires a hierarchical range 
of sanctions, with a highly coercive option at its apex. Although the 
regulatory pyramid was not referred to in its remarks, the suggestions 
made by Partnership Africa Canada for reform of the Kimberley 
Process are conceptually very similar: 
In sum, the Kimberley Process needs a rigorous, clear and phased 
compliance enforcement strategy that starts with assistance and 
internal pressure, moves to public naming and shaming, and then 
moves to higher levels of sanctions, suspension and expulsion.7
7  Smillie, I, ‘Paddles for Kimberley: An Agenda for Reform’ (Report, Partnership Africa 
Canada, June 2010) 11.
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The Kimberley Process has already been successful at providing 
technical assistance and internal pressure, especially in the context 
of its peer-review system. However, it does not have a clear strategy 
for public naming and shaming, or suspension/expulsion from the 
Kimberley Process. One of the continued challenges in relation to 
enforcement via public naming and shaming is the fact that review 
visit reports are not made publicly available. The simple fact of making 
such reports publicly available would increase the ability of both the 
Kimberley Process and civil society organisations to bring the power 
of adverse publicity to bear on the national government in question. 
Finally, and most importantly, there needs to be an agreed process for 
the expulsion of countries in the event of serious non-compliance. 
As discussed previously, the parameters of what constitutes serious 
non-compliance need to be more clearly established, with a body 
exercising a degree of independence able to assess individual cases. 
While the decisions of this body, operating in conjunction with the 
Monitoring Committee, might be subject to confirmation by the 
plenary, as soon as a situation of serious non-compliance is recognised, 
steps must be immediately initiated leading to a review visit followed 
by the potential expulsion of that country from the Kimberley 
Process. In terms of confirmation of the process by the Kimberley 
Process Plenary, the voting method should provide for some type of 
majority vote, whether a 50 per cent majority or a two-thirds majority. 
This would liberate the Kimberley Process from the current deadlock 
arising from its consensus requirement (which has been interpreted 
as ‘unanimity’), and enable it to take appropriate action.
The pyramid model applied normatively suggests the possibility of 
further escalation to the UNSC in appropriate cases. There are two 
possible scenarios where this might be utilised. One is effectively an 
appeal from the Kimberley Process for a re-categorisation of a case 
as relating to serious non-compliance. This might be initiated by the 
Kimberley Process Chair or the Kimberley Process Plenary, following 
a  preliminary decision that a  case had been deemed not to have 
related  to serious non-compliance. The UNSC would then have an 
opportunity to reconsider the situation and, if it was of the view that 
the original decision was incorrect, it would be able to pass a resolution 
mandating a trading ban in diamonds with the particular country.
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A further scenario is a more traditional use of the pyramid, which 
would represent a ramping up of sanctions against a particular country 
that has been expelled from the Kimberley Process for non-compliance. 
If, in the view of the UNSC, expulsion from the Kimberley Process was 
not considered as having effectively countered the traffic in conflict 
diamonds emanating from the expelled country, it could impose, in 
addition, a trade ban in diamonds mandated under a Chapter VII 
resolution, or even more extensive economic sanctions (perhaps a ban 
on arms trading, for example) on that country. 
Applying the pyramid in a normative manner suggests that the 
conflict diamonds governance system would be improved if the 
regulatory ratchet between the Kimberley Process, the UNSC, and 
the international tribunals was strengthened. While the connection 
between the Kimberley Process and the UNSC has been discussed 
above, there are connections that can be made between the UNSC and 
the international courts, and even directly between Kimberley and the 
international courts. One way in which a greater connection could be 
made between all three levels, even down to the national government 
level, would be to formulate a specific crime of trafficking in conflict 
diamonds. The formulation of a formal conflict diamonds trading 
crime would serve to strengthen the respective regulatory ratchets 
in several ways. Primarily, it would bring clear subject matter clarity 
between each regulatory level, which would heighten awareness 
between regulators of the relationship and strengthen the awareness of 
potential perpetrators of the regulatory interest at higher levels of the 
system. For example, although the ICC and the Sierra Leone Special 
Court have had prosecutions involving conflict diamonds trading, 
the crimes connected to it have never been labelled specifically as 
conflict diamonds crimes. Charles Taylor, for example, was charged 
with rape, the use of child soldiers, and murder and crimes against 
humanity, with the conflict diamonds trade used as a way of sheeting 
home criminal liability for the commission of those crimes. While this 
type of prosecution arguably captures the full extent of his crimes, 
concurrent prosecution for a more simply defined charge of trafficking 
in conflict diamonds would arguably have created a stronger 
conceptual connection to the Kimberley Process and the UNSC. As is 
the case at present, concurrent prosecution would not result in more 
serious sentencing in the event of concurrent convictions, as long as 
the elements of the crime were captured in the alternative conviction. 
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A conflict diamonds crime before the ICC could be defined in a number 
of different ways. One definition could attempt to encapsulate the core 
elements of the definition, namely, trading in rough diamonds in the 
knowledge that the proceeds would be used to commit human rights 
violations. However, other definitions could reinforce its connection 
to other regulators further down the pyramid. In particular, there 
could be a concurrent definition of conflict diamonds trading as 
the contravention of UNSC resolutions imposing a ban on trading 
in diamonds originating from a particular country, along with 
appropriate mens rea. Such an approach would increase the leverage 
of the key international regulators. For example, Kimberley Process 
review visits would be able to gather evidence regarding potential 
conflict diamonds trading in addition to their general functions. 
The general authority of Kimberley Process review visits would 
be enhanced by the heightened prospect that an international case 
may be taken against persons, including government officials and 
rebel leaders, involved in conflict diamonds trafficking. A Kimberley 
Process review would be seen much more in terms of the phrase cited 
by Braithwaite: ‘speak softly, but carry a big stick’. 
Having an internationally defined conflict diamonds crime would 
also increase the power of the regulatory ratchet that lies between 
expulsion from the Kimberly Process and a rough diamond trading ban 
mandated by a UNSC resolution, as any breach of a UNSC diamonds 
trading ban would, by definition, constitute a crime. The  relevant 
persons within that country, whether governmental officials or rebel 
militia leaders, would be on notice that any contravention of that 
ban would carry a much greater risk of an international prosecution 
than simply trading despite expulsion from the Kimberley Process. 
The UNSC would not be required to take formal referral action to 
the ICC above and beyond imposing diamond trading sanctions on a 
particular country. The mere fact of its imposing a diamond trading 
sanction would alert the ICC that its jurisdiction would be activated in 
the event of a contravention. The ICC could then activate the ratchet 
by initiating prosecutions in the event of proven contraventions of the 
UNSC resolution. 
In relation to the level of regulation by national governments, the 
so-called national regulatory pyramid, it is arguable that there need to 
be further interventions available, both at the base and the apex of the 
pyramid. At the apex of the pyramid, it is suggested that a clear crime 
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of trafficking in conflict diamonds be enacted. This occurs where the 
offender knows that the diamonds are connected to the commission of 
human rights violations. An alternative, perhaps involving a financial 
rather than imprisonment penalty, is trading in diamonds without 
due authorisation. This contingency covers the situation where the 
alleged offender is merely negligent as to ascertain the nature of the 
diamonds, or even where conflict-free diamonds are traded but in the 
absence of attending to proper procedures and authorisations.
At the bottom end of the national pyramid are initiatives to assist the 
diamond industry, the artisanal diamond industry in particular, to be 
in a better position to be Kimberley compliant. Noting the networked 
nature of the pyramids being discussed, these initiatives might also 
connect with the international level. For example, the Kimberley 
Process established an Artisanal Mining Working Group, involving 
artisanal miners as representatives. Significant initiatives have already 
developed momentum, such as the Diamond Development Initiative 
International, seeking to enhance practices in the diamond industry 
that promote human rights and better income returns for artisanal 
miners. These initiatives, spearheaded at the international level by 
NGOs, need the significant commitment of national governments to 
be successful. It  is  perhaps ironic that the governmental actions of 
Angola, currently heading the artisanal committee at the Kimberley 
Process, have come under serious criticism on human rights grounds. 
In particular, the mass deportation of artisanal miners is of serious 
concern. An artisanal industry that allows for appropriate incomes, in 
reasonable working conditions, is less likely to go astray to assist rebel 
movements.
Insights from the Networked Pyramid of Rewards
As has already been discussed, one of the current challenges before the 
Kimberley Process is a sensible understanding of its existing mandate. 
It is unfortunate that elements within the KP continue to focus on 
a narrow reading, which, by focusing on the connection between the 
rough diamond trade and civil war, would seemingly exclude serious 
human rights violations from the definition of conflict diamonds. 
This misunderstanding led the Namibian Chair of the KP, Bernhardt 
Esau, to make the disturbing pronouncement that ‘the Kimberley 
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Process is not a human rights organisation’.8 By contrast with this 
approach, this book argues that the KP is quintessentially a human 
rights organisation, with the breaking of the link between diamonds 
and serious human rights violations at the very core of its mandate 
and the definition of conflict diamonds. In making this point, a further 
important distinction arises, well understood in the jurisprudence of 
international law, between serious violations of human rights that 
qualify as international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and genocide, and other human rights breaches that, 
although they may also be of a disturbing nature, do not qualify as 
international crimes. The group of crimes that qualify as international 
crimes are classified in international law as jus cogens, meaning that 
they are fundamental or peremptory norms of international law. 
This classification has a number of legal consequences. First of all, 
exceptions to following these rules that may apply to other rules 
are not allowed, such as because there is a state of emergency at the 
time: the norm is stated to be non-derogable. Another attendant 
consequence, in terms of crimes classified as jus cogens, is that the 
obligation to prosecute or extradite attaches. Above and beyond the 
standard obligation to implement the provisions of a convention, this 
is an emphatic and specific obligation to either take prosecutorial 
action through a domestic or international process, or extradite the 
person to a government or tribunal that will take prosecutorial action. 
An attendant legal concept, known as erga omnes, applies in relation 
to jus cogens and indicates that the international rule is applicable to 
humanity as a whole. This classification attaches to situations where 
one country sues another country in a civil international action 
before a body such as the International Court of Justice. Normally, 
when international legal action is initiated, procedural rules called 
rules of standing apply, stating that a case can only be brought by a 
party that has a legal interest in its outcome. In most cases, this means 
that the party bringing the action must have suffered in some direct 
way because of the behaviour of the other party. However, where an 
obligation is erga omnes, any country can take an international law 
suit, as it is considered that humanity as a whole has suffered a loss 
as a result of the conduct in question. 
8  Allen, M, ‘The “Blood Diamond” Resurfaces’, Wall Street Journal, (18 June 2010). 
Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704198004575311282588959188.
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It is more accurate to say that conflict diamonds are connected to 
international crimes than human rights violations for this reason, 
even  though the former is a subset, albeit a more serious subset, 
of the latter. It is submitted that the connection between international 
crimes and diamonds is already defined within the parameters of the 
current KP mandate. The majority of this book has been concerned 
with improving the effectiveness of the KP to achieve its core mandate, 
hence the focus on the regulatory pyramid, or pyramid of sanctions, 
to strengthen its ability to deal effectively with issues of serious 
non-compliance.
It should be noted, however, that the long-term effectiveness 
of  breaking the link between diamonds and international crimes is 
linked to the more general condition of the artisanal mining fields. 
Even in the absence of international crimes, reports on the condition 
of the informal sector in countries such as the DRC and Sierra Leone 
show it to be in a deplorable state. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
problems include the prevalence of child labour, unsafe and unhealthy 
working conditions, extremely low return for labour (less than US$1 
a day, according to one study), and lasting environmental damage to 
artisanal mining areas. For example, artisanal mining may require 
extensive periods of digging in mud or dirty water, or spending time 
in dangerously constructed ad hoc mine shafts. 
This book suggests that, in the interests of its own long-term success, 
the KP vote to extend its mandate to include a broader range of human 
rights issues and development goals for the artisanal mining sector. 
To achieve this, the KP might do well to explore the implications of the 
pyramid of rewards theoretical model. While the regulatory pyramid 
focuses on sanctions and disincentives, the pyramid of rewards 
focuses on rewards and incentives. A natural juxtaposition between 
these two models is to propose, in addition to conflict diamonds, a 
counterpart that could be termed the development diamond. While 
the basic concept of the development diamond has already been 
coined by some of the key NGO players within the Kimberley Process, 
the main field for work in the area has been removed from the KP 
itself. An interesting discussion of the politics behind this separation 
appears in the work by Franziska Bieri entitled From Blood Diamonds 
to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned up the Global Diamond 
Industry. Through her interviews with key players, Bieri shows that 
while De Beers was prepared to back the upstart NGO Development 
247
8 . APPLYING THe DUAL NeTwoRKeD PYRAMID MoDeL
Diamonds Initiative International, the remaining voices from industry, 
represented by the WDC, as well as national governments, were keen 
to exclude the KP mandate from moving in this direction. A revealing 
quote from a diamond industry representative put it in these terms: 
This is definitely where the NGOs and the industry are not on the 
same footing. Some people want to glide the Diamond Development 
Initiative, which is a fantastically positive initiative that has nothing 
to do with the Kimberley Process, they want to glide that into the 
Kimberley Process itself. I think that’s a wrong attitude … And in 
the  case of the Kimberley Process we are talking about stopping 
conflict diamonds from happening, and stopping conflicts in especially 
diamond producing countries in Africa. We are not talking about free 
trade, and fair trade. And when you talk about DDI you’re talking 
especially about the fair trade issue. And let’s not be forgetting one 
little tiny detail. We got away with the WTO waiver on the free trade 
issue, because in fact we are blocking free trade. I am not so sure that 
WTO would be willing to extend its waiver to cover also issues like 
fairer trade and DDI … But then of course what you are going to do 
is you are de facto overloading the scheme, with a fat chance that by 
doing that the scheme itself will not be very functional any more. 
And I don’t really fancy that.9
Here the WDC representative raised a number of concerns about 
putting the development diamonds initiative into the Kimberley 
Process. The first concern was in relation to the waiver granted by 
the World  Trade Organization (WTO) permitting trade in conflict 
diamonds to be restricted, further to exemption provisions under 
Articles XX and XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The GATT establishes a broad framework preventing national 
governments from imposing restrictions on international trade, 
although it allows for a number of broadly framed exemptions. Since 
2003, the WTO has issued a series of decisions granting countries 
permission to restrict trade in conflict diamonds. The decisions cite 
Articles XX and XXI of the GATT, which are broadly framed exemptions 
concerning measures pursuant to United Nations charter obligations, 
national security, the protection of human life or health, and public 
9  Interview with Mark Van Bockstael, 27 September 2005, in Bieri, F, From Blood Diamonds 
to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Cleaned Up the Diamond Industry (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2010) 162.
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morals.10 Considering that the United Nations charter, in articles 55 
and 62, refers to the protection of human rights, it is highly likely 
that the human rights concerns connected to development diamonds 
and conflict diamonds would be able to come within the auspices of 
a WTO waiver. Development diamonds issues, such as proper working 
conditions and freedom from child labour, are human rights concerns 
protected by international instruments such as ILO regulations 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As well as the more 
established concerns related to conflict diamonds, the human rights 
concerns underpinning development diamonds would also justify an 
exemption under the Articles XX and XXI of the GATT.
Perhaps the stronger argument raised by the WDC representative 
is that adding development diamonds into the Kimberley Process 
would overload the organisation and cause it to collapse. There is 
a logic to this argument, particularly given the challenges that the 
Kimberley Process has been through regarding Zimbabwe’s Marange 
diamonds. However, some time has passed since the Zimbabwe 
issue first emerged, and there may now be opportunities not simply 
to address this question and its related issues (such as the narrow 
definition of ‘conflict diamonds’), but a wider horizon of looking 
to formally incorporate the development diamonds concept into the 
KP organisation in order to give new impetus to the organisation. 
In a recent press release, the incoming KP Chair US Ambassador 
Milovanovic made a statement about dealing with shortcomings of the 
KP connected to the evolving nature of conflict diamonds, a reference 
to unresolved issues arising from the Marange diamonds dispute.11 
It would seem there is a willingness to begin to address this question, 
even if it is divorced from the actual case of the Marange diamonds. 
As was discussed previously, one of the challenging after effects of 
the Marange dispute was disaffection by NGOs, leading at least one 
high-profile NGO, Global Witness, to formally leave the KP. It may be 
that a different focus, on bringing development diamonds into the 
10  The WTO exemption for the Kimberley Process is discussed in Woody, K E, ‘Diamonds on 
the Soul of Her Shoes: The Kimberley Process and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions’ 
(2007) 22 Connecticut Journal of International Law 335, 349.
11  Kimberley Process, A Note from Ambassador Milovanovic (30 July 2013). Available at: 
www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/note-ambassador-milovanovic.
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fold, could reinvigorate NGO interest in the KP, and be a cause for 
reinvigoration of the organisation, helping it to tackle the more thorny 
issue of the definition of conflict diamonds. 
It might be noted that, even if development diamonds are not 
formally incorporated into the Kimberley Process organisation, there 
already exists a level of synergy between development diamonds 
initiatives and the KP. As envisaged in my dual networked pyramid 
model (DNPM), upward ratchets modelled on the pyramid of rewards 
concept might be developed more fully in the current global system. 
Even in the absence of formal incorporation into the KP, this might be 
achieved, with reference to my model, through graduated certification 
that diamonds have achieved particular human rights standards 
in the domain of development diamonds: free from the use of child 
labour, in compliance with reasonable working conditions, etc. Such 
formal certification might be standardised and harmonised, perhaps 
using particular international benchmarks (such as the International 
Standards Organisation system). As envisaged in the DNPM, a positive 
upward ratchet can be created when there is a systematic process of 
certification from one level of development diamonds compliance to 
the next. If the process were centralised in the KP it would be stronger 
and more powerful, as the DNPM seeks to enhance the upward 
ratchet of the pyramid of rewards with a rising minimum standard. 
For example, at some point in the future, the KP could declare that it 
is not permissible to trade in diamonds that were known to have been 
mined or polished using child labour. Such a trade ban would require 
the intervention of the Kimberley Process (or an organisation with 
similar powers) rather than relying solely on aspirational voluntary 
standard certification. 
Measures put into place in Canada reflect aspirational standards 
in relation to conflict-free diamonds and development diamonds. 
In publishing a press release on these measures, the Kimberley Process 
acted to fame Canada for implementing measures that are above 
compliance with minimum KP standards. This is an example of the 
pyramid of rewards in effect, as it creates upward momentum for other 
countries to follow suit. Through calling attention to the achievement 
by Canada, the KP increased the prestige of Canada, which creates 
a level of peer pressure for others to follow. The particular measures 
put into place by Canada introduced a unique standard of excellence 
in developing a particular system of tracking individual diamonds to 
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particular diamond mines. The centrepiece of this tracking system is 
a unique inscription on each diamond that is invisible to the naked 
eye but identifies the mine of origin of the diamond. Canada has 
also introduced development diamond initiatives that guarantee 
locals in the area of the mine benefit and the mine conforms to high 
environmental standards.12
Role of WTO in the Conflict Diamonds 
Governance System
As long ago as 2006, a government representative from Australia was 
speaking about Kimberley Process winding up due to the completion 
of its mandate. These words, it would seem, were a little premature, 
given the emergence of new sources of conflict diamonds from Côte 
d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Angola at around this time, as well as the 
ongoing problems in the DRC. What it speaks to, it would seem, is a 
lack of political will on the part of governments to ensure an ongoing 
role for the KP. Even if conflict diamonds were no longer entering the 
global system, there ought to be a process for preventing this occurring, 
should the nexus between international crimes and the rough diamond 
trade recur: a preventative role is important. The potential uptake by 
the KP of a broader human rights agenda is a reinforcement of this 
preventative role, through addressing the root causes of the emergence 
of conflict diamonds. Put simply, if more artisanal miners are able to 
make a reasonable living, in good conditions, without sending their 
children to work, then they are less likely to sell the product of their 
labour to benefit international war criminals.
One of the ironies relating to the pyramid of rewards concept is 
the unfortunate fact that incentives-based approaches have been 
misused by the international community to exacerbate conflict in 
central Africa. In particular, the Ugandan and Rwandan governments 
received inappropriate recognition following their alleged plunder of 
the natural resources of the Congo, including Congolese diamonds. 
It was reported that the International Monetary Fund and the World 
12  Kimberley Process, Diamond Store Guarantees Ethical, Conflict-free Canadian Diamonds 
(Press Release, undated). Available at: www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/
Diamond%20Store%20guarantees%20ethical,%20conflict-free%20diamonds.pdf. 
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Bank actually praised the Rwandan and Ugandan governments for 
their unexpected increase in GDP that was, according to UNSC reports, 
based on plunder of the DRC’s natural resources.13
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has returned to consider the original research questions: 
1. To what extent has the conflict diamonds governance system 
achieved its objectives? 
2. To what extent does the networked pyramid model provide 
descriptive and normative insights into the functioning of the 
conflict diamonds governance system? 
In responding to the first question, the first sub-question was 
whether  the KP had achieved its objectives. Noting the distinctive 
collaboration between governments, civil society, and industry that 
constitutes the Kimberley Process, it has managed in the first instance 
to socialise the large-scale industry players into being KP supporters. 
Beyond this, the quantity of conflict diamonds in the international 
system is at low levels, compared with the extremes of the diamond 
wars of the 1990s. It is, however, in the area of managing serious non-
compliance that the KP now faces its most trying test. Although it 
was precocious in dealing with the threat posed by diamonds being 
funnelled through the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville back in 2004, 
subsequent challenges of equal or greater severity from Venezuela, 
Zimbabwe, and Angola have been mishandled. In particular, the way 
in which the KP has turned a blind eye to gross human rights abuses 
in the Zimbabwe and Angolan artisanal fields shows that it is failing 
in its core mandate, and raises the risk of the complete collapse of the 
current arrangements. 
The second sub-question considers the extent to which the UNSC and 
the international tribunal system have contributed to the effectiveness 
of the conflict diamonds governance system. The UNSC has played a 
decisive role on the issue of conflict diamonds and was in large part the 
13  Montague, D and F Berrigan, ‘The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 
Dollars and Sense Magazine (July/August 2001). Available at: www.thirdworldtraveler.com/
Africa/Business_War_Congo.html.
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midwife of the Kimberley Process, calling for its implementation in its 
resolutions. The UNSC has also embodied important monitoring and 
enforcement roles through its expert committees to various affected 
diamond-producing countries, and the imposition of diamond trading 
and other related embargoes. Finally, the emerging jurisprudence 
on conflict diamonds from the Sierra Leone Special Court and the 
permanent International Criminal Court has provided support to the 
work of the UNSC, the KP, and national governments. By prosecuting 
key leaders in the AFRC, RUF, Civilian Defence Forces and Taylor cases, 
the Sierra Leone Special Court has sent a clear message that behaviours 
such as using child soldiers, and terrorising, murdering, and raping 
civilians in the pursuit of diamond profits are intrinsically criminal 
and unacceptable to the international community. This message is not 
lost on the participants in the Kimberley Process, who are galvanised 
by the prospect of breaking the link between diamond profits and 
international crime through the chain of custody system. 
The second research question considers the conflict diamonds 
governance system in the light of the DNPM. The  analysis is 
facilitated  by breaking the model into its three components, so as 
to  consider insights based on the network model, the regulatory 
pyramid model, and, finally, the pyramid of rewards model. The essence 
of the networks model is its reliance on the techniques of dialogue 
and socialisation to achieve its purposes. The Kimberley Process can 
be considered as a command centre, or node, where networks from 
civil society, national government, and the diamond industry engage 
in dialogue and socialisation. Its successful features largely reflect the 
benefits described in this model, particularly as seen in the strong 
engagement and commitment of diamond industry major players to 
the KP. Its use of peer review is another horizontal technique that 
has been used to promote best practice in different countries involved 
with the KP. It is with reference to the regulatory pyramid, rather than 
networks theory, that the KP’s shortcomings are highlighted. 
The regulatory pyramid provides for a range of more coercive 
interventions where particular regulated parties actively oppose the 
purpose of the regulatory regime. In terms of the functioning of the KP, 
expulsion from membership represents a more coercive escalation for 
situations where a government member is in serious non compliance 
with KP standards. It is argued that the KP should have taken this step 
253
8 . APPLYING THe DUAL NeTwoRKeD PYRAMID MoDeL
in relation to Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Angola, all of which have 
actively resisted the core purposes of the KP. This action is important 
to protect the credibility of the KP, as the failure to remove diamonds 
originating from these countries from general circulation shows that 
the conflict-free label provided by KP certification cannot be entirely 
trusted. The development of a new international crime for trading in 
conflict diamonds would further reinforce the pyramid structure of the 
conflict diamonds governance system, particularly as the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court would automatically be triggered 
following a breach of UNSC diamond trading sanctions. The enactment 
of this crime would further strengthen the negotiating hand of the 
KP, as the consequences for serial conflict diamonds offenders would 
loom larger.
The pyramid of rewards offers a further window of opportunity for 
the development of the conflict diamonds governance system. Beyond 
dealing with the current midlife crisis it finds itself in, the KP and 
its collaborators have an opportunity to broaden their horizons in 
the direction of an incentive-based system focused on the concept 
of development diamonds. Building on the important work of the 
Diamond Development Initiative International, the KP has a great 
opportunity to engage with the human rights issues associated with 
alluvial diamond mining in a proactive, incentive-based manner, 
beyond its existing sphere of activity. The book proposes that 
a system of voluntary certification, aimed at connecting to a fair trade 
niche market in developed countries, accompany the existing system 
of KP minimum standards. The voluntary certification is made with 
reference to a number of proposed aspirational standards, which move 
beyond the core domain of the existing KP mandate to encompass other 
issues confronting the artisanal industry: child labour, workplace 
health and safety standards, appropriate remuneration for work, 
and  environmental standards. When both systems are established, 
the intention is that a standards-raising regulatory ratchet be created, 
with today’s aspirational standard becoming tomorrow’s mandatory 
standard, without which export is denied. An application of the 
pyramid of rewards to the conflict diamonds governance system might 
well reinforce the new aspirational standards with a system of naming 
and faming to parallel the naming and shaming in the regulatory 
pyramid. That is, countries, corporations and NGOs making particular 
progress towards aspirational standards might be singled out for 
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particular encouragement. Beyond this, a system of grants might 
well be established so as to fund new initiatives towards meeting 
aspirational standards. The apex of the pyramid of rewards — a Nobel 
Peace Prize nomination — would serve as a fitting counterpart to the 
apex of the regulatory pyramid — international criminal prosecution.
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Did You Hear Something?: 
Concluding Remarks
High on the Jungfrau overlooking the town, it had snowed during the 
night, and for a few moments the clouds broke to reveal the mountain, 
looming over the town in its brilliant cloak of new white snow. 
Unresolved issues notwithstanding, it seemed like a metaphor for the 
event: a brief opening and a small step towards solving a problem that 
a group of NGOs had been battling for more than four years.
Ian Smillie, on the establishment of the KP in Interlaken, 20021
Chapter Overview
This chapter summarises the main findings of the book in response 
to the original two research questions, and sets out recommendations 
for improving the conflict diamonds governance system based 
on these  findings, directed towards national governments, non-
govermental organisations (NGOs), the diamond industry, the 
Kimberley Process (KP), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The chapter then suggests 
areas for further research before giving concluding remarks.
1  Smillie, I, Blood on the Stone: Greed, Corruption and War in the Global Diamond Trade 
(Anthem Press, 2010) 191. 
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Findings
In the first chapter of this book I posited two research questions: 
1. Has the conflict diamonds governance system achieved 
its objectives? 
2. Does the networked pyramid regulatory model provide descriptive 
and normative insights into that system? 
Chapter 2 of the book outlined the conflict diamonds problem, showing 
the connection between the rough diamond trade, conflict, and serious 
human rights violations in five African producer nations. Chapter 3 
introduced the Kimberley Process as the centrepiece of the conflict 
diamonds governance system, with its import/export certification 
process established and monitored by industry, government, and 
civil society representatives. Chapter 4 discussed the operation of the 
Kimberley Process at the national level. Internationally, the UNSC 
and the criminal tribunals, the conflict diamonds governance system 
institutions discussed in Chapter 5, have also played key roles through 
imposing economic sanctions and carrying out international criminal 
prosecutions. Chapter 6 reviewed the key models and theories from 
the field of regulation that would be later be deployed in the form of 
the dual networked pyramid regulatory model. The salient features of 
the dual networked pyramid regulatory model were set out in Chapter 
7, with networks theory explained by processes of persuasion and 
socialisation, while pyramid elements established a coherent rationale 
for deploying more coercive interventions in appropriate cases. 
Chapter 8 involved responding to the two original research questions 
by applying the dual networked pyramid model in descriptive and 
normative terms to the conflict diamonds governance system.
In response to the question of whether the conflict diamonds 
governance system has achieved its objectives, I have argued that, 
with the reduction of conflict diamonds traffic to less than 1 per cent 
of the world’s diamond trade, there has been a marked improvement 
since the pre-Kimberley era. It is also arguable that the success of 
peace initiatives in Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire 
have been in part attributable to the conflict diamonds governance 
system. Despite ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Central African Republic, the  Kimberley Process has 
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arguably contributed to the emergence of peace and stability in these 
countries through its handling of blood diamond issues. However, 
it would appear that it has fallen short of the mark in its response 
to the emergence of conflict diamonds in Zimbabwe. The seeming 
inability of the system to grapple with persistent non-compliance by 
Venezuela has posed a further challenge.
Analysis of the reasons for the conflict diamonds governance system’s 
level of success to date must start with its proven ability to bring 
together the vast majority of the rough diamond industry, national 
governments, and concerned NGOs to combat the issue. In an industry 
that was once considered opaque, the publication of global diamond 
statistics is a huge breakthrough in transparency. Other monitoring, 
through annual reports and peer reviews, has a proven ability to 
highlight relevant issues of non-compliance. The Kimberley Process 
has even had some level of success with situations of serious non-
compliance. On the lower end of the scale, efficacy of the peer-review 
system to promote normative compliance was demonstrated in the case 
of Brazil. Once its problems had been highlighted by an NGO report, 
and confirmed by a Kimberley review visit, Brazil acted conscientiously 
in taking legal action against illicit trafficking. Another example of 
success was the initiative taken by the Kimberley Chair, occupied at 
that time by the Canadian Government, in expelling the Republic of 
Congo from membership when it became clear that that country was 
a conduit for smuggled DRC diamonds. The international spotlight in 
2017 will be on Australia, as it takes its turn in the difficult position 
of Chair of the Kimberley Process.
The conflict diamonds governance system has not been an unqualified 
success. It faces three major problems: the continued role of conflict 
diamonds in ongoing conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and 
Zimbabwe; the serious non-compliance and active resistance of two of 
its members, Zimbabwe and Venezuela; and the threat that, ironically, 
the Kimberley Process may become a victim of its own success, with 
some governments calling for it to be dissolved. Of these threats, 
the inability of the Kimberley Process to deal with the active resistance 
of its own membership is the most serious. This threat represents not 
uncertainty in the potential result of Kimberley Process action, but 
actual failure to take action. While the continued flow of Venezuela’s 
diamonds represents an open breach by which conflict diamonds 
might contaminate the Kimberley chain of custody, the Zimbabwean 
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case is worse in that it enables the continued flow of conflict diamonds 
into the Kimberley system. The Zimbabwe case reflects a number 
of systemic challenges within the KP itself. Most significant is the 
inability of the KP to take a purposive approach to understanding the 
definition of conflict diamonds so that it might confront human rights 
abuses committed by governments and the perpetuation of conflict 
through fuelling the financial coffers of militia groups. Alternatively, 
or in parallel, the KP might have sought an amendment of its 
definition to cover these circumstances. A related issue concerns the 
definition of consensus under which the organisation operated. With 
consensus understood as unanimity, the ability of the organisation to 
move forward decisively has been hampered. No doubt the lack of 
a permanent secretariat and budget constraints have also hindered 
decisive intervention in the face of non-compliance.
It appears a little ironic that the Kimberley Process was able to deal 
with serious non-compliance by the Republic of Congo early in its 
mandate, with the chair expelling it from membership following 
a rapidly deployed review visit, but similar action has not been 
forthcoming in the cases of Zimbabwe and Venezuela. Certainly, this 
type of discrepancy leaves the Kimberley Process open to the criticism, 
as suggested by Global Witness in its research interview response, that 
the effectiveness of the response is largely dictated by which person 
is the occupant of the Kimberley Process rotating chair. Perhaps the 
same argument, put differently, is that there is no clear procedure for 
dealing with situations of serious non-compliance, including which 
body (whether the chair or the plenary) is empowered to act. If it 
is the plenary which is so empowered, there is a further problem in 
relation to the choosing of consensus as the mode of decision making. 
Consensus by the plenary voting membership in a decision to expel 
a national government from the Kimberley Process for serious non-
compliance is well-nigh impossible to achieve. If expulsion is to be 
a regulatory ratchet available to the Kimberley Process, then a majority 
vote by the plenary is the only viable option. 
The Kimberley Process has proven itself able to evolve since the 
decision to finalise its founding agreement in 2002. Two important 
examples of this are the peer-review mechanism and the Artisanal 
Diamond Working Group. When the Kimberley Process Agreement 
was finalised, there was no monitoring mechanism included in its 
provisions. Led by NGOs, the Kimberley Process agreed within 
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its own plenary membership to the creation of the Working Group on 
Monitoring, the Participation Committee, and the central mechanism 
of peer review, which has been central to the amount of success that 
the Kimberley Process has enjoyed to date. Another example, also 
on the initiative of NGOs, was the Artisanal Mining Working Group. 
Aware of the centrality of artisanal diamond mining to the problem 
of conflict diamonds, the plenary was able to approve the creation 
of a  committee mandated to assist with the working conditions of 
artisanal miners globally. It is this ability to evolve that is now being 
challenged in relation to its ability to deal with issues of serious non-
compliance. Also needing to be addressed is formalisation within 
the Kimberley Process Agreement, backed up by UNSC resolution, 
that the definition of conflict diamonds includes diamonds that are 
connected to human rights violations even in situations where there 
is no ongoing conflict.
Armed with a clear picture of the success and failure of the conflict 
diamonds governance system, it is possible to consider insights gained 
by analysing it in the light of the networked pyramid regulatory model. 
The coming together of NGOs, industry, and governments to create 
the Kimberley Process is almost by definition a network approach. 
It has almost exclusively relied upon methods of persuasion and 
socialisation, rather than coercion and punitive action. The discussion 
that occurs in the Kimberley Process Plenary, the information shared 
by industry about technical issues, or NGOs about compliance issues, 
and the informal naming and shaming as a result of peer-review visits 
all represent the standard tool-kit of networked governance. Such 
approaches confirm what has already been suggested in the literature, 
that networked governance can achieve a great deal. However, the 
Kimberley Process has a contribution to make towards networks theory 
beyond this statement. One of the features of the Kimberley Process 
that is not accounted for in networks theory is that fact that, as  a 
network, it embodies a separation of interests. This constitutionalist 
model operates to create checks and balances in the regulatory 
operation of the Kimberley Process. As such, it  represents a very 
different type of network to the networked regulation of the intellectual 
property regime. While the initial driver for the intellectual property 
regime was the profit motive of corporations, supported by the US 
national government, the Kimberley Process set itself up, at least in 
the short term, as a break on free-for-all profit maximisation by the 
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international diamond industry. The role of NGOs and enlightened 
national governments has been to help socialise big business into 
choosing long-term, enlightened self-interest over short-term profit 
maximisation. It has been remarkably successful in this effort, with 
the diamond industry major players coming on board. This task has 
naturally been a lot more difficult than promoting immediate self-
interest. The separation of interests model establishes a more robust 
organisational model whereby such a socialisation process can occur. 
It now faces significant challenges in confronting the immediate 
self-interest of a number of key national government participants. 
The networks theory concept of a node is a valuable tool in recognising 
the potential of the Kimberley Process to ratchet up interventions 
by engaging with higher level regulators, such as the UNSC and the 
international criminal tribunals. The further insights into enhancing 
the conflict diamonds governance system, however, relate more to 
the domain of pyramid than networks theory. Part of the success 
of the Kimberley Process has to be credited to the ongoing efforts 
of the UNSC and the international tribunals. However, there are a 
number of ways in which the regulatory ratchet from expulsion to 
UN sanctions to international prosecutions can be strengthened. Chief 
amongst these is the creation of an international crime of trafficking 
in conflict diamonds, which is defined in the ICC statute in terms 
of a contravention of UNSC diamond-trading sanctions. With the 
benefit of such an amendment, the threat of escalation to the UNSC 
and then the ICC becomes more meaningful, thereby enhancing the 
ability of the Kimberley Process to carry a big stick at the same time 
as it speaks softly. The enactment of a crime of trafficking in conflict 
diamonds at the domestic level would be a logical progression of this 
connection. It would create a fitting apex to the regulatory pyramid 
at the domestic level: the pyramid within the pyramid. The base of 
the national pyramid also needs attention, as  national government 
backing to initiatives such as the Diamond Development Initiative 
International would assist working conditions for artisanal diamond 
miners, thereby reducing the incentive to sell to illegal operatives 
engaged in human rights abuses.
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Further Research
Further research projects might relate to the theoretical and empirical 
investigations of this book. On the theoretical side, the dual 
networked pyramid model might usefully be applied to other complex 
international systems, such as the intellectual property system, so as to 
determine its strengths and weaknesses in other contexts. In relation 
to the conflict diamonds governance system, further studies might 
investigate the extent to which the KP is responsive to undertaking 
a wider mandate based around the concept of development diamonds.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has summarised the findings of the book in response to 
the two research questions. The first question sought to assess how 
effective the conflict diamonds governance system has been in meeting 
its goals. In response, the book argues that it has achieved a measure 
of success, notably reducing the quantity of conflict diamonds in the 
international system from estimates as high as 15 per cent in the 1990s 
to less than 1 per cent in recent years,2 and establishing an innovative 
tripartite partnership that has socialised the major diamond industry 
players into becoming active proponents of the Kimberley Process. 
The system as a whole is able to draw on a range of enforcement 
mechanisms, from horizontal peer review and informal naming and 
shaming, to expulsion for serious non-compliance, and, through its 
networked relationship with the UNSC and international tribunals, 
UNSC diamond embargoes and international criminal prosecutions. 
Despite the measure of success it has achieved, the Kimberley Process 
and its collaborators have fallen into a state of deepening crisis, 
beginning with its inability to manage serious non-compliance by 
Venezuela in 2006. Even worse, the KP did not act decisively following 
the commission of international human rights crimes by Zimbabwe and 
Angola in artisanal diamond fields in those countries. This inability 
to  quarantine conflict diamonds from Zimbabwe and Angola from 
the KP regime continues to undermine the legitimacy of the conflict 
diamonds system and may lead to complete system failure.
2  For discussion about estimates of the quantity of the conflict diamonds trade, see Chapter 2.
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The second question asks whether the dual networked pyramid model 
offers a description of how conflict diamonds governance currently 
operates or if it may be deployed normatively so as to suggest ways in 
which the system might be improved. The networked pyramid model 
is a hybrid, combining insights from networks theory, the regulatory 
pyramid model, and the pyramid of rewards. Networks theory 
suggests that regulation occurs through the combined operation of 
different individuals and organisations, which are considered roughly 
on equal terms. Its main regulatory techniques are dialogue and 
persuasion, and informal naming and shaming, which together create 
a process of socialisation towards compliance with a particular set 
of standards. Networks theory is an intuitive fit for the Kimberley 
Process, which combines networks of national governments, NGOs 
and diamond industry corporations. Acting as a command centre 
or node for these networks, the Kimberley Process is able to collect 
information and deploy a range of regulatory interventions, including 
peer-review reporting, which largely resembles the informal naming 
and shaming of networks theory. Indeed, one of the most dramatic 
examples of socialisation in the KP is the manner in which major 
diamond corporation, and alleged conflict diamonds trader, De Beers, 
became a stalwart proponent of the new system.
It is, however, the regulatory pyramid model that is best able to 
give  insight into the deployment of more coercive interventions, 
where these are appropriate. The conflict diamonds governance 
system intuitively fits this model, with regulation at the national level 
regulated by the informal naming and shaming through the KP peer-
review process. The system appears to be floundering, however, in 
being capable of ratchetting up from here to expulsion from the KP 
in the event of serious non-compliance. To achieve this, the KP needs 
to clearly define what constitutes serious non-compliance, clarify that 
the definition of conflict diamonds includes diamonds connected to 
grave human rights abuses, abandon the consensus approach to these 
issues when considered by the plenary, and empower the rotating 
Kimberley Process Chair to take expeditious expulsion decisions 
where time is of the essence.
Further improvements to current KP governance involve strengthening 
links to regulators at higher levels of the regulatory pyramid, namely 
the UNSC and the ICC. The UNSC has at its disposal a more powerful 
diamond embargo than the KP, which is binding under international 
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law. It would serve to strengthen the effectiveness of the system if 
the UNSC saw itself as a type of appeals body in relation to the KP. 
That way, a serious non-compliance issue might be forwarded to it 
for consideration, or it might consider the issue on its own motion, 
and impose a diamond embargo in situations where the KP has failed 
to act  for political or other reasons. Such action would strengthen 
the hand of  the KP, making it clear to member states in serious 
non-compliance that the UNSC will take action if the KP doesn’t. 
Contemplation of conflict diamonds governance in terms of the 
regulatory pyramid gives further insights into how the ratchetting-up 
pathway might be strengthened. Legislating for a specific crime of 
trading in conflict diamonds under the statute of the ICC would be 
a  strengthening measure, particularly if the new crime was defined 
in terms of breaching UNSC diamond-trading embargoes. If such 
a crime were created, then the UNSC diamond-trading embargo would 
be strengthened as an intervention, because sanctions busting would 
carry with it the possibility of international criminal prosecution. 
All of these developments at the UNSC and international tribunal levels 
would strengthen the hand of the KP in carrying out its activities. 
This is because responsiveness to  the KP speaking softly would be 
increased so as to avoid the possibility of the big stick.
The KP is in a state of crisis and needs to consider seriously the 
measures suggested above so as to protect the integrity of its activities 
from the taint of conflict diamonds originating from Zimbabwe and 
Angola. Without diminishing the importance of this primary activity, 
an organisation is sometimes bolstered by envisioning a future for 
itself above and beyond the crisis in which it finds itself. If the KP is to 
move beyond simply fixing its current problems, and look at a longer-
term preventative mandate, it would do well to reflect on insights 
available from the pyramid of rewards. This model is the carrot to the 
regulatory pyramid’s stick. It promotes the concept of development 
diamonds voluntarily certified against aspirational standards as 
a counterpoint to diamonds that must be certified as conflict-free prior 
to export. If artisanal diamonds are, for example, mined without the 
use of child labour, they would qualify for the development diamonds 
label, which would enable them to access greater profits through being 
sold as a  fair trade commodity. Should the KP become the central 
administrator of this system, it could generate a standards-raising 
regulatory ratchet, whereby today’s aspirational standard becomes 
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tomorrow’s mandatory standard, without which rough diamond 
export would be prohibited. Beyond the certification of development 
diamonds, a system of escalating rewards might include the practice of 
naming and faming NGOs, industry groups, and national governments 
who have made the greatest progress towards aspirational standards. 
A notch up, grants might be made available for projects supporting 
the achievement of aspirational standards. At the apex of the pyramid, 
if it had been merited, might be nomination for a Nobel Peace Prize. 
This chapter has also included a number of recommendations 
to national governments, the Kimberley Process, the UNSC, and 
international criminal tribunals for action to strengthen the conflict 
diamonds governance system. Finally, the chapter has suggested 
new areas for further research, in relation to both theoretical areas of 
interest and the conflict diamonds governance system.
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RECOGNISING that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter 
of serious international concern, which can be directly linked to the 
fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of rebel movements aimed at 
undermining or overthrowing legitimate governments, and the illicit 
traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms and 
light weapons;
FURTHER RECOGNISING the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled 
by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security 
of people in affected countries and the systematic and gross human 
rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts;
NOTING the negative impact of such conflicts on regional stability 
and the obligations placed upon states by the United Nations Charter 
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security;
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BEARING IN MIND that urgent international action is imperative to 
prevent the problem of conflict diamonds from negatively affecting 
the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a critical contribution 
to the economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and 
importing states, especially developing states;
RECALLING all of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
including the relevant provisions of Resolutions 1173 (1998), 1295 
(2000), 1306 (2000), and 1343 (2001), and determined to contribute to 
and support the implementation of the measures provided for in these 
resolutions;
HIGHLIGHTING the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
55/56 (2000) on the role of the trade in conflict diamonds in fuelling 
armed conflict, which called on the international community to give 
urgent and careful consideration to devising effective and pragmatic 
measures to address this problem;
FURTHER HIGHLIGHTING the recommendation in United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 55/56 that the international community 
develop detailed proposals for a simple and workable international 
certification scheme for rough diamonds based primarily on national 
certification schemes and on internationally agreed minimum 
standards;
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process, which was established to 
find a solution to the international problem of conflict diamonds, was 
inclusive of concerned stake holders, namely producing, exporting 
and importing states, the diamond industry and civil society;
CONVINCED that the opportunity for conflict diamonds to play a role 
in fuelling armed conflict can be seriously reduced by introducing 
a certification scheme for rough diamonds designed to exclude conflict 
diamonds from the legitimate trade;
RECALLING that the Kimberley Process considered that an 
international certification scheme for rough diamonds, based on 
national laws and practices and meeting internationally agreed 
minimum standards, will be the most effective system by which the 
problem of conflict diamonds could be addressed;
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ACKNOWLEDGING the important initiatives already taken to 
address this problem, in particular by the governments of Angola, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and Sierra Leone and by 
other key producing, exporting and importing countries, as well as by 
the diamond industry, in particular by the World Diamond Council, 
and by civil society;
WELCOMING voluntary self-regulation initiatives announced by the 
diamond industry and recognising that a system of such voluntary 
self-regulation contributes to ensuring an effective internal control 
system of rough diamonds based upon the international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds;
RECOGNISING that an international certification scheme for rough 
diamonds will only be credible if all Participants have established 
internal systems of control designed to eliminate the presence of 
conflict diamonds in the chain of producing, exporting and importing 
rough diamonds within their own territories, while taking into account 
that differences in production methods and trading practices as well 
as differences in institutional controls thereof may require different 
approaches to meet minimum standards;
FURTHER RECOGNISING that the international certification scheme 
for rough diamonds must be consistent with international law 
governing international trade;
ACKNOWLEDGING that state sovereignty should be fully respected 
and the principles of equality, mutual benefits and consensus should 
be adhered to;
RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:
SECTION I
Definitions
For the purposes of the international certification scheme for rough 
diamonds (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Certification Scheme’) 
the following definitions apply:
THe LIoN THAT DIDN'T RoAR
268
CONFLICT DIAMONDS means rough diamonds used by rebel 
movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining 
legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or 
in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, 
and as understood and recognised in United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which 
may be adopted in future;
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN means the country where a shipment of rough 
diamonds has been mined or extracted;
COUNTRY OF PROVENANCE means the last Participant from where 
a shipment of rough diamonds was exported, as recorded on import 
documentation;
DIAMOND means a natural mineral consisting essentially of pure 
crystallised carbon in the isometric system, with a hardness on the 
Mohs (scratch) scale of 10, a specific gravity of approximately 3.52 and 
a refractive index of 2.42;
EXPORT means the physical leaving/taking out of any part of the 
geographical territory of a Participant;
EXPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) 
designated by a Participant from whose territory a shipment of 
rough diamonds is leaving, and which are authorised to validate the 
Kimberley Process Certificate;
FREE TRADE ZONE means a part of the territory of a Participant where 
any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties 
and taxes are concerned, as being outside the customs territory;
IMPORT means the physical entering/bringing into any part of the 
geographical territory of a Participant;
IMPORTING AUTHORITY means the authority(ies) or body(ies) 
designated by a Participant into whose territory a shipment of rough 
diamonds is imported to conduct all import formalities and particularly 
the verification of accompanying Kimberley Process Certificates;
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KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE means a forgery resistant 
document with a particular format which identifies a shipment of 
rough diamonds as being in compliance with the requirements of the 
Certification Scheme;
OBSERVER means a representative of civil society, the diamond 
industry, international organisations and non-participating 
governments invited to take part in Plenary meetings; (Further 
consultations to be undertaken by the Chair.)
PARCEL means one or more diamonds that are packed together and 
that are not individualised;
PARCEL OF MIXED ORIGIN means a parcel that contains rough 
diamonds from two or more countries of origin, mixed together;
PARTICIPANT means a state or a regional economic integration 
organisation for which the Certification Scheme is effective; (Further 
consultations to be undertaken by the Chair.)
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ORGANISATION means 
an organisation comprised of sovereign states that have transferred 
competence to that organisation in respect of matters governed by the 
Certification Scheme;
ROUGH DIAMONDS means diamonds that are unworked or simply 
sawn, cleaved or bruted and fall under the Relevant Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System 7102.10, 7102.21 and 
7102.31;
SHIPMENT means one or more parcels that are physically imported 
or exported;
TRANSIT means the physical passage across the territory of 
a  Participant or a non-Participant, with or without transhipment, 
warehousing or change in mode of transport, when such passage 
is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating 
beyond the frontier of the Participant or non-Participant across whose 
territory a shipment passes;
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SECTION II
The Kimberley Process Certificate
Each Participant should ensure that:
a. a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the 
Certificate) accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds on 
export;
b. its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards 
of the Kimberley Process as set out in Section IV;
c. Certificates meet the minimum requirements set out in Annex 
I. As long as these requirements are met, Participants may at 
their discretion establish additional characteristics for their own 
Certificates, for example their form, additional data or security 
elements;
d. it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the features 
of its Certificate as specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation.
SECTION III
Undertakings in respect of the international trade 
in rough diamonds
Each Participant should:
a. with regard to shipments of rough diamonds exported to 
a Participant, require that each such shipment is accompanied by 
a duly validated Certificate;
b. with regard to shipments of rough diamonds imported from 
a Participant:
• require a duly validated Certificate;
• ensure that confirmation of receipt is sent expeditiously to 
the relevant Exporting Authority. The confirmation should 
as a minimum refer to the Certificate number, the number of 
parcels, the carat weight and the details of the importer and 
exporter;
• require that the original of the Certificate be readily accessible 
for a period of no less than three years;
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c. ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or 
exported to a non-Participant;
d. recognise that Participants through whose territory shipments 
transit are not required to meet the requirement of paragraphs 
(a) and (b) above, and of Section II (a) provided that the designated 
authorities of the Participant through whose territory a shipment 
passes, ensure that the shipment leaves its territory in an identical 





a. establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the 
presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds 
imported into and exported from its territory;
b. designate an Importing and an Exporting Authority(ies);
c. ensure that rough diamonds are imported and exported in tamper 
resistant containers;
d. as required, amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to 
implement and enforce the Certification Scheme and to maintain 
dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions;
e. collect and maintain relevant official production, import and export 
data, and collate and exchange such data in accordance with the 
provisions of Section V;
f. when establishing a system of internal controls, take into account, 
where appropriate, the further options and recommendations for 
internal controls as elaborated in Annex II.
Principles of Industry Self-Regulation
Participants understand that a voluntary system of industry self-
regulation, as referred to in the Preamble of this Document, will 
provide for a system of warranties underpinned through verification 
by independent auditors of individual companies and supported by 
internal penalties set by industry, which will help to facilitate the full 
traceability of rough diamond transactions by government authorities.





a. provide to each other through the Chair information identifying 
their designated authorities or bodies responsible for implementing 
the provisions of this Certification Scheme. Each Participant should 
provide to other Participants through the Chair information, 
preferably in electronic format, on its relevant laws, regulations, 
rules, procedures and practices, and update that information as 
required. This should include a synopsis in English of the essential 
content of this information;
b. compile and make available to all other Participants through the 
Chair statistical data in line with the principles set out in Annex III;
c. exchange on a regular basis experiences and other relevant 
information, including on self-assessment, in order to arrive at the 
best practice in given circumstances;
d. consider favourably requests from other Participants for assistance 
to improve the functioning of the Certification Scheme within their 
territories;
e. inform another Participant through the Chair if it considers that 
the laws, regulations, rules, procedures or practices of that other 
Participant do not ensure the absence of conflict diamonds in the 
exports of that other Participant;
f. cooperate with other Participants to attempt to resolve problems 
which may arise from unintentional circumstances and which 
could lead to non-fulfilment of the minimum requirements for 
the issuance or acceptance of the Certificates, and inform all 
other Participants of the essence of the problems encountered and 
of solutions found;
g. encourage, through their relevant authorities, closer co-operation 







1. Participants and Observers are to meet in Plenary annually, and 
on other occasions as Participants may deem necessary, in order 
to discuss the effectiveness of the Certification Scheme.
2. Participants should adopt Rules of Procedure for such meetings 
at the first Plenary meeting.
3. Meetings are to be held in the country where the Chair is located, 
unless a Participant or an international organisation offers to host 
a meeting and this offer has been accepted. The host country should 
facilitate entry formalities for those attending such meetings.
4. At the end of each Plenary meeting, a Chair would be elected to 
preside over all Plenary meetings, ad hoc working groups and other 
subsidiary bodies, which might be formed until the conclusion 
of the next annual Plenary meeting.
5. Participants are to reach decisions by consensus. In the event 
that consensus proves to be impossible, the Chair is to conduct 
consultations.
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT
6. For the effective administration of the Certification Scheme, 
administrative support will be necessary. The modalities and 
functions of that support should be discussed at the first Plenary 
meeting, following endorsement by the UN General Assembly.
7. Administrative support could include the following functions:
a. to serve as a channel of communication, information sharing 
and consultation between the Participants with regard to 
matters provided for in this Document;
b. to maintain and make available for the use of all Participants 
a collection of those laws, regulations, rules, procedures, 
practices and statistics notified pursuant to Section V;
c. to prepare documents and provide administrative support for 
Plenary and working group meetings;
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d. to undertake such additional responsibilities as the Plenary 
meetings, or any working group delegated by Plenary meetings, 
may instruct.
PARTICIPATION
8. Participation in the Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-
discriminatory basis to all Applicants willing and able to fulfill the 
requirements of that Scheme.
9. Any applicant wishing to participate in the Certification Scheme 
should signify its interest by notifying the Chair through diplomatic 
channels. This notification should include the information set forth 
in paragraph (a) of Section V and be circulated to all Participants 
within one month.
10. Participants intend to invite representatives of civil society, 
the diamond industry, non-participating governments and 
international organizations to participate in Plenary meetings 
as Observers.
PARTICIPANT MEASURES
11. Participants are to prepare, and make available to other Participants, 
in advance of annual Plenary meetings of the Kimberley Process, 
information as stipulated in paragraph (a) of Section V outlining 
how the requirements of the Certification Scheme are being 
implemented within their respective jurisdictions.
12. The agenda of annual Plenary meetings is to include an item where 
information as stipulated in paragraph (a) of Section V is reviewed 
and Participants can provide further details of their respective 
systems at the request of the Plenary.
13. Where further clarification is needed, Participants at Plenary 
meetings, upon recommendation by the Chair, can identify and 
decide on additional verification measures to be undertaken. Such 
measures are to be implemented in accordance with applicable 
national and international law. These could include, but need not 
be limited to measures such as;
a. requesting additional information and clarification from 
Participants;
b. review missions by other Participants or their representatives 
where there are credible indications of significant non-
compliance with the Certification Scheme.
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14. Review missions are to be conducted in an analytical, expert and 
impartial manner with the consent of the Participant concerned. 
The size, composition, terms of reference and time-frame of these 
missions should be based on the circumstances and be established 
by the Chair with the consent of the Participant concerned and in 
consultation with all Participants.
15. A report on the results of compliance verification measures is 
to be forwarded to the Chair and to the Participant concerned 
within three weeks of completion of the mission. Any comments 
from that Participant as well as the report, are to be posted on the 
restricted access section of an official Certification Scheme website 
no later than three weeks after the submission of the report to the 
Participant concerned. Participants and Observers should make 
every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issue 
and the discussions relating to any compliance matter.
COMPLIANCE AND DISPUTE PREVENTION
16. In the event that an issue regarding compliance by a Participant or 
any other issue regarding the implementation of the Certification 
Scheme arises, any concerned Participant may so inform the Chair, 
who is to inform all Participants without delay about the said 
concern and enter into dialogue on how to address it. Participants 
and Observers should make every effort to observe strict 
confidentiality regarding the issue and the discussions relating 
to any compliance matter.
MODIFICATIONS
17. This document may be modified by consensus of the Participants.
18. Modifications may be proposed by any Participant. Such proposals 
should be sent in writing to the Chair, at least ninety days before 
the next Plenary meeting, unless otherwise agreed.
19. The Chair is to circulate any proposed modification expeditiously 
to all Participants and Observers and place it on the agenda of the 
next annual Plenary meeting.
REVIEW MECHANISM
20. Participants intend that the Certification Scheme should be subject 
to periodic review, to allow Participants to conduct a thorough 
analysis of all elements contained in the scheme. The review should 
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also include consideration of the continuing requirement for such 
a scheme, in view of the perception of the Participants, and of 
international organisations, in particular the United Nations, of the 
continued threat posed at that time by conflict diamonds. The first 
such review should take place no later than three years after the 
effective starting date of the Certification Scheme. The  review 
meeting should normally coincide with the annual Plenary 
meeting, unless otherwise agreed.
THE START OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHEME
21. The Certification Scheme should be established at the Ministerial 
Meeting on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough 
Diamonds in Interlaken on 5 November 2002.
ANNEX I
Certificates
A. Minimum requirements for Certificates
A Certificate is to meet the following minimum requirements:
• Each Certificate should bear the title ‘Kimberley Process Certificate’ 
and the following statement: ‘The rough diamonds in this 
shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds’
• Country of origin for shipment of parcels of unmixed (i.e. from the 
same) origin
• Certificates may be issued in any language, provided that an 
English translation is incorporated
• Unique numbering with the Alpha 2 country code, according 
to ISO 3166-1
• Tamper and forgery resistant
• Date of issuance
• Date of expiry
• Issuing authority




• Value in US$
• Number of parcels in shipment
• Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System
• Validation of Certificate by the Exporting Authority
B. Optional Certificate Elements
A Certificate may include the following optional features:
• Characteristics of a Certificate (for example as to form, additional 
data or security elements)
• Quality characteristics of the rough diamonds in the shipment
A recommended import confirmation part should have the following 
elements:
• Country of destination
• Identification of importer
• Carat/weight and value in US$
• Relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System
• Date of receipt by Importing Authority
• Authentication by Importing Authority
C. Optional Procedures
Rough diamonds may be shipped in transparent security bags.
The unique Certificate number may be replicated on the container.
ANNEX II
Recommendations as provided for in Section IV, 
paragraph (f)
General Recommendations
1. Participants may appoint an official coordinator(s) to deal with the 
implementation of the Certification Scheme.
2. Participants may consider the utility of complementing and/or 
enhancing the collection and publication of the statistics identified 
in Annex III based on the contents of Kimberley Process Certificates.
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3. Participants are encouraged to maintain the information and data 
required by Section V on a computerised database.
4. Participants are encouraged to transmit and receive electronic 
messages in order to support the Certification Scheme.
5. Participants that produce diamonds and that have rebel groups 
suspected of mining diamonds within their territories are 
encouraged to identify the areas of rebel diamond mining 
activity and provide this information to all other Participants. 
This information should be updated on a regular basis.
6. Participants are encouraged to make known the names of individuals 
or companies convicted of activities relevant to the purposes of the 
Certification Scheme to all other Participants through the Chair.
7. Participants are encouraged to ensure that all cash purchases 
of rough diamonds are routed through official banking channels, 
supported by verifiable documentation.
8. Participants that produce diamonds should analyse their diamond 
production under the following headings:
• Characteristics of diamonds produced
• Actual production
Recommendations for Control over Diamond Mines
9. Participants are encouraged to ensure that all diamond mines 
are licensed and to allow only those mines so licensed to mine 
diamonds.
10. Participants are encouraged to ensure that prospecting and mining 
companies maintain effective security standards to ensure that 
conflict diamonds do not contaminate legitimate production.
Recommendations for Participants with Small-scale 
Diamond Mining
11. All artisanal and informal diamond miners should be licensed and 
only those persons so licensed should be allowed to mine diamonds.
12. Licensing records should contain the following minimum 
information: name, address, nationality and/or residence status 
and the area of authorised diamond mining activity.
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Recommendations for Rough Diamond Buyers, Sellers 
and Exporters
13. All diamond buyers, sellers, exporters, agents and courier 
companies involved in carrying rough diamonds should be 
registered and licensed by each Participant’s relevant authorities.
14. Licensing records should contain the following minimum 
information: name, address and nationality and/or residence status.
15. All rough diamond buyers, sellers and exporters should be required 
by law to keep for a period of five years daily buying, selling or 
exporting records listing the names of buying or selling clients, 
their license number and the amount and value of diamonds sold, 
exported or purchased.
16. The information in paragraph 14 above should be entered into 
a computerised database, to facilitate the presentation of detailed 
information relating to the activities of individual rough diamond 
buyers and sellers.
Recommendations for Export Processes
17. An exporter should submit a rough diamond shipment to the 
relevant Exporting Authority.
18. The Exporting Authority is encouraged, prior to validating 
a Certificate, to require an exporter to provide a declaration that 
the rough diamonds being exported are not conflict diamonds.
19. Rough diamonds should be sealed in a tamper proof container 
together with the Certificate or a duly authenticated copy. 
The  Exporting Authority should then transmit a detailed 
e-mail message to the relevant Importing Authority containing 
information on the carat weight, value, country of origin or 
provenance, importer and the serial number of the Certificate.
20. The Exporting Authority should record all details of rough 
diamond shipments on a computerised database.
Recommendations for Import Processes
21. The Importing Authority should receive an e-mail message either 
before or upon arrival of a rough diamond shipment. The message 
should contain details such as the carat weight, value, country 
of origin or provenance, exporter and the serial number of the 
Certificate.
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22. The Importing Authority should inspect the shipment of rough 
diamonds to verify that the seals and the container have not been 
tampered with and that the export was performed in accordance 
with the Certification Scheme.
23. The Importing Authority should open and inspect the contents 
of the shipment to verify the details declared on the Certificate.
24. Where applicable and when requested, the Importing Authority 
should send the return slip or import confirmation coupon to the 
relevant Exporting Authority.
25. The Importing Authority should record all details of rough 
diamond shipments on a computerised database.
Recommendations on Shipments to and from Free Trade Zones
26. Shipments of rough diamonds to and from free trade zones should 
be processed by the designated authorities.
Annex III
Statistics
Recognising that reliable and comparable data on the production and 
the international trade in rough diamonds are an essential tool for the 
effective implementation of the Certification Scheme, and particularly 
for identifying any irregularities or anomalies which could indicate 
that conflict diamonds are entering the legitimate trade, Participants 
strongly support the following principles, taking into account the 
need to protect commercially sensitive information:
a. to keep and publish within two months of the reference period and 
in a standardised format, quarterly aggregate statistics on rough 
diamond exports and imports, as well as the numbers of certificates 
validated for export, and of imported shipments accompanied by 
Certificates;
b. to keep and publish statistics on exports and imports, by origin 
and provenance wherever possible; by carat weight and value; 
and under the relevant Harmonised Commodity Description and 
Coding System (HS) classifications 7102.10; 7102.21; 7102.31;
281
APPeNDIx
c. to keep and publish on a semi-annual basis and within two months 
of the reference period statistics on rough diamond production by 
carat weight and by value. In the event that a Participant is unable 
to publish these statistics it should notify the Chair immediately;
d. to collect and publish these statistics by relying in the first instance 
on existing national processes and methodologies;
e. to make these statistics available to an intergovernmental body or 
to another appropriate mechanism identified by the Participants 
for (1) compilation and publication on a quarterly basis in respect 
of exports and imports, and (2) on a semiannual basis in respect of 
production. These statistics are to be made available for analysis 
by interested parties and by the Participants, individually or 
collectively, according to such terms of reference as may be 
established by the Participants;
f. to consider statistical information pertaining to the international 
trade in and production of rough diamonds at annual Plenary 
meetings, with a view to addressing related issues, and 
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